


Sergei Kremlev the Great Beria.



Kremlin S. Veliky Beria

M.: Yauza-Press, 2011. - 864 p.- (Series: Geniuses of Power)

annotation

Without this cult book, the publication of the personal diaries of L.P. Beria, which became the main historical sensation, it would be incomplete! This is the best monument to the only worthy heir of Stalin, who could fulfill the will of the Leader: to snatch power from the hands of officials to return it to the people! This biography pays tribute for the first time tribute to the greatest statesman of the Stalin era, who was not only the genius of the secret services, but also the genius of power.

In his youth, Beria dreamed of building new cities, but in the end he became the second after Stalin the builder of the superpower. Having taken the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in the midst of The Great Terror, he put an end to Yezhov's lawlessness and restored the rule of law. He warned the Leader about the imminence of war, prepared the defense of Moscow, defended the Caucasus and throughout the Great Patriotic War he was responsible for military production, and after the Victory he became founder of the nuclear and rocket industries. No wonder even many enemies recognized him "The best manager of the 20th century."

Refuting Khrushchev's slander, this book serves the cause of complete historical and moral rehabilitation of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, who was not an "executioner" and "ghoul", as the enemies of the people lie, but the savior of the USSR and the last hope Superpowers for a great future!

Sergei Kremlev the Great Beria.

*The reappraisal of the past is not necessary for conscience alone.
The reappraisal of history is the only possibility of the path.*
Petr Chaadaev

I don't believe in the collective mind of ignorant individuals.
Thomas Carlyle

From the publisher

The author proposes to regard this book as a conceptual basis for the actions of those of their fellow citizens, who have the right of legislative initiative, to organize campaigns for the full legal and historical rehabilitation of a prominent son Russia Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, as well as for the worthy perpetuation of his memory in on a nationwide scale.

FROM THE AUTHOR

Dear reader! In the last decade, the name of Beria in terms of the frequency of his mention among others historical figures of the Soviet era is, perhaps, in third place after Lenin and Stalin.

Is it by chance? I think no. Moreover, among the writings about Beria there are also serious works, such as, for example, "Unknown Beria" by the untimely deceased Alexei Toptygin, and lampoons such as the "Red Sunset" of the former partocrat Valery Boldin. Became widely known "The Murder of Stalin and Beria" by Yuri Mukhin and "The Last Knight of Stalin" by Elena Prudnikova. A lot of pages are devoted to Lavrenty Pavlovich in places controversial, but bright book by Alexander Bushkov "Stalin: the ice throne".

However, the topic is far from exhausted. And so I - after some hesitation - decided to make his own book about Beria. It all started, however, with a proposal to write a journal article about his contribution to the solution of the Soviet uranium problem. Long guessing that the name Lavrenty Pavlovich was slandered in many respects, I set to work with pleasure and soon was surprised by the appearance of Beria, which loomed upon careful study objective documents of the Atomic Project of the USSR. Chairman of the Special Committee under the Council Ministers of the USSR looked not only an outstanding organizer of the new industry, but also ...

Yes, he also looked like a man of high moral standard, normal and even sincere, sensitive person!

Moreover, I dealt with reliable declassified documents published in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 17, 1995 No. 160 "On the preparation and publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of a nuclear weapons in the USSR. Eight solid volumes of this collection weigh more than ten kilograms! And from these documents a man, not a monster, looked through!

I had to get into materials on Beria and his era (and, alas, in lampoons about him and about her) more deeply. I became more and more interested in the topic and, in the end, setting aside other plans, set to work, the results of which I now present to the court respected reader.

Concluding this short introduction, the author considers it his pleasant duty to thank many of my colleagues for their assistance and fruitful discussions, including: V. Akulov, V. M. Botev, L. A. Kochankov, P. P. Maksimenko, A. A. Mukashev, A. P. Osipsova, N. A. Soroka, and separately - V. M. Voronov, with the same kindness who helped the author to find some materials and constantly discussing with the author his future book.

The author is sincerely grateful to A. I. Kolpakidi for providing a number of valuable materials, and for useful discussions of various aspects of the problem in the course of work.

Chapter

1 REASONS ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF THE BOOK, ABOUT THE SOURCES AND SOME WHAT ELSE...

IT WOULD seem that the subject of the book is clearly indicated on the cover - this is the fate of Lawrence Pavlovich Beria. However, in reality, everything is not so clear. Therefore, when starting work, I thought a lot about how to understand his life in such a way as to give it as much as possible. *reconstruction*, not version. Now in the course of a series of books with an intriguing title "Declassified Lives". Lavrenty Beria was not a secret agent - from a young age he became a personality, as they say, public. And yet, if you turn it on biography in some series, then the name "Secret Lives" would be very suitable for her.

There are many reasons for this. One of them is that for almost half a century they either didn't say anything about Beria, or they lied so that it was impossible to form any more or less correct idea about him. Perhaps, only one more figure of world history was sought to be expelled from the memory of society. just as insistent. This is Herostratus, in 356 BC, on the night of Alexander's birth. Macedonian, who burned down the Temple of Artemis

at Ephesus. Beria did not destroy, but created, but he was also persistently expelled from the official stories. And even if they created glory for him, it was exclusively for Herostratus. However, time really sooner or later puts everything in its place, even if someone for a while cut out of history in the truest sense of the word - with a razor blade, as was cut out of Her name is Beria.

Yes, in 1953, subscribers of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia received by mail a package, inside of which there was a quarter of a sheet, where in a typographical way the following was reported:

"SUBSCRIBER OF THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA

The State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" recommends removing pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 from the 5th volume of the TSB, as well as a portrait pasted between pages 22 and 23, in return for which you will be sent pages with new text. Use scissors or a razor blade to cut off the indicated pages, leaving margins near the spine to which new pages should be glued.

State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet encyclopedia".

It is believed that the longest surname in Soviet history is "Joining knimshepilov".

This once famous party and statesman, editor-in-chief Pravda, a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who settled the Suez crisis of 1956, opposed Khrushchev at that meeting Presidium of the Central Committee in June 1957, when the majority of the Presidium (and above all, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov) were ready to remove Khrushchev from leadership. Soon the majority of this majority, and with it "Shepilov, who joined them," lost all posts after the plenum of the Central Committee quickly arranged

by Khrushchev. Shepilov lived a long life and died in 1995, ninety years old. For a book about I will later refer to him and his memoirs, and then the author's attitude towards him outlined more clearly. Now I mentioned this owner - as the wits of that era - "the longest surname in the USSR" only to refute the wits and to declare that a "surname" with 22 letters is not a record! For in the "surname" "Pasted between 22 and 23 pages" there are 29 letters, and, it turns out, the absolute record holder as anonymity, and along the length of the involuntary "pseudonym" became

Beria. Accordingly, after 1953, we would have searched in vain for his last name in any Soviet reference book. Even the most detailed and detailed academic publications do not the name of a person was mentioned, to whom four (!) pages were devoted in the 5th volume of the TSB and whose portrait occupied there in full another page. Beria was completely thrown out of national history. And from

the history of the world?

In the fourth volume of the Oxford Illustrated Encyclopedia, published on Russian language by the Ves Mir publishing house in 2000, scanty information about this person, who did not exist for decades for the USSR, is available, and this encyclopedia assigns the Soviet politician Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria a truly monstrous role in carrying out large-scale "purges" of the Stalin era.

In fairness, I note that the Russian "Oxford" sparingly admits that during War Beria was engaged in the development of the defense industry. And then, by translating chronology (Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested not in July, but on June 26, 1953), "Oxford" reports that after the death of Stalin, Beria lost to the coalition of Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev, was arrested, convicted and shot.

So, for world history, the key words in Beria's part are: "monster", "purges", "camps", "liquidation", "conspiracy", "execution", "death"...

And through the teeth -

"development". Homegrown "analysts" and "researchers" of the "democratic" type follow roughly the same pattern. They say, instilling fear, the "Chief of the NKVD" by the method of terror was able to de to ensure the work of various industries, well managed nuclear works, but - "all the same, a bastard," as one still "democratized" acquaintance told me. And tell him that in reality everything was different. No, he "knows" everything!

In order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous! With this recipe widely used by Goebbels, but already in the First World War, the propaganda of the Anglo-Saxons falsely accused Germany of producing fats extracted from corpses innocently murdered French babies.

And WHAT did the "monster" Beria do?

Here is a quote, which I will quote without the slightest cut:

"... the essay, already written, lay on my desk. I put the last point and thought and once again experienced all the horrors associated with the name of a person,

who will surely be cursed for generations. And if I wrote at four first essays with pain in the heart and compassion for the innocently shot marshals, then the fifth, which will be discussed, deserved not only to be shot, but, if it were possible, he would also have to be hanged, put on electric chair, cut off his head with a guillotine (actually a literary the norm is "on the guillotine". - S.K.) - and all this would not be enough for him crimes."

The four "innocents" are: 1) the self-confident, with the manners of Bonaparte, the "genius" of the Trotskyist persuasion Tukhachevsky; 2) a marshal with a very confusing fate Yegorov; 3) the incompetent "marshal" Kulik and 4) the degraded, self-lost Blucher.

The fifth marshal is Beria. And his hater is the writer Vladimir Karpov, in his time left the camp for the front and there became a regimental scout, Hero Soviet Union. You

read this and think - where does the "engineer of human souls" get such a bestial bloodlust? Yes, and not animal - the beast is not bloodthirsty, he just wants to eat.

So why such pathological hatred? From an old grudge? But very much vindictively ... No, it is unlikely that everything is explained by resentment. There is something different here ... Perhaps - the instinctive rejection of a person who is bright, outstanding and - unlike detractors - does not selfish, who lived - unlike detractors - not for personal gain, but for high ideals? But there are enough bright, non-standard personalities in Soviet history besides Beria.

So why is it stupidly viciously about Beria? Charming Constance Bonacieux from The Three Musketeers stated: "Whoever says 'Richelieu' says 'Satan'." Today "intellectuals", "intellectuals", liberals and "democrats" of a wide spectrum say the same about Beria. And this is a very infrequent case of absolute, total demonization of a historical personality not on the pages of an adventurous historical novel, but in real history.

It is not easy to say a kind word about Beria - no matter how it is backed up by facts. Further we will see that even one who brings deeply positive for Lavrenty Pavlovich's information from the practice of personal communication with him, shyly stipulates: they say, Beria, of course, is a "monster" and "creator of the Gulag", but, they say, he personally behaved with *me* humanly, he didn't wash it into camp dust and didn't even swear. So what can to be in doubt - "executioner"!

However, was it a boy? You mean a demon?

Russian history is rich in slandered for one reason or another outstanding government figures, starting with Ivan the Terrible ... It has become a negative household name the name of, say, Arakcheev ... Although objective documents prove the opposite, starting, for example, with the fact that the reformer of Russian artillery of the era of the Patriotic War of 1812 had nothing to do with the excesses of the "military settlements" with which his name is firmly bind.

And in our time, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria has become such a gloomy "sign" figure. "Internal Chronicler" of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikolai Zenkovich thumped in one of his books directly that, they say, the question is not whether Stalin was killed, but how it was done. The recognition is valuable, but about the same can be said, referring to Beria. The question is not whether he was vilely slandered, but why he was slandered so vilely and totally.

This question comes to the mind of anyone who begins to investigate the problem. unbiased.

They asked Yuri Mukhin. They asked Elena Prudnikova. I asked them too. And

my answer is close to the answers of other objective researchers of the Beria phenomenon: he was first slandered, and then generally cut out of the history of the country because he was not the criminal, but his detractors and destroyers.

The state potential of Beria compared to all these Khrushchevs and Malenkov was so great that the ends of the crime had to be hidden in the mud. That's where they hid them. And now it is difficult

to figure out where is sinful and where is righteous. And there is little primary information about Beria in scientific circulation, which is understandable: try to get before them, hidden in deadfly closed archives! And is there any in these, seventy or more years old prescription, archives all the facts? And how many "facts" in quotes are there in these archives?

Khrushchev already began to destroy the archives, under Gorbachev this line was successful continued, "enriched" by the practice of making strategic fakes.

And even under

Yeltsin ... For Putin's "Rossiyaniya" the process of destruction and falsification of historical archival documents is not typical, but only because Putin's predecessors in A lot of work has already been done in this direction. Lies about the Great October revolution, about the "white and fluffy" White Guards, about Lenin and Stalin, about the Great The Patriotic War and the "seventy-year-old" "soviet" slavery has already been compacted to the limit. The spring of falsification of the history of the Fatherland is compressed so that its "coils" are almost closed. AND gradually the reverse process begins.

HOWEVER, not every positive testimony about Beria can be trusted, especially if it comes, for example, from the son of Beria - Sergo, who wrote a sensational book "My father is Lavrenty Beria." This book contains a lot of frank fiction. Let's say Sergo clearly was not on the test of our atomic first-born RDS-1 in 1949. Very much inaccurate it is in many details. Fantastic are his statements that the guest of his father's mansion and Sergo's interlocutor was Robert Oppenheimer at the end of 1939. And absolutely not in any the gate does not climb Sergo's story about the meeting of his father in his presence with the commander of the German a submarine that arrived at the Soviet naval base a week before the start of the war, so that the boat commander could notify Beria of the order to sink Soviet ships in a week.

But when Sergo writes that his father was modest in everyday life, one can believe in this, as well as in the fact that his father loved outdoor activities (looking at amateur photos of Beria on rest, it is easy to verify this).

Sergo Lavrentievich's reports that his father did not prevented the desire of the young son to drive a car, but only after the son himself (albeit with the help of experienced mechanics) will assemble a "fordik" for riding out of junk.

And, as I understand it, Beria Sr. really brought stacks of foreign magazines to his son for translation, accustoming Sergo, under the guise of helping his father, to work and to master languages.

It seems to be trifles ... But these are indicative trifles, talking about the essence and character a lot of personalities.

And even - a lot. And you

can also believe the same Sergo that trade unionists Beria openly called idlers, because at the level of the highest trade union leaders (Beria had the matter, of course, is with them) because it most often happened. And Beria, being a man of action, complained no more of talkers and loafers than Stalin.

It is quite possible to believe those historians and memoirists who *are not* loyal to Beria, but from the materials of which conclusions objectively follow, for Lavrenty Pavlovich positive (as, for example, in the case of the memoirs of Kisunko, a missile defense system designer). Already this information can be considered reliable! It was very

easy to stray into such an approach: "Molotov himself recalled ...", or: "In memoirs of the "legendary" Sudoplatov ... ", etc. But how often does such information objectively costs a little. Somewhere memory fails, somewhere, alas, conscience ... Not excluded and later additions. And how often, I repeat once again, we are dealing with direct, Goebbels-type lies!

Granddaughter of an outstanding Russian neuropathologist, psychiatrist and psychologist, morphologist and physiologist of the nervous system Vladimir Mikhailovich Bekhterev, academician of Bekhterev, in late 80s, she stated that her grandfather, after a medical examination of Stalin, called him paranoid, for which he was de poisoned.

Oh, how many "democratic" denunciations were around this statement. But here in In 1995, in No. 32 of the Arguments and Facts weekly, the granddaughter-academician admits: "This there was a tendency to declare Stalin crazy, including using supposedly my grandfather's statements, but there was no statement ... They began to put pressure on me, and I had to confirm that it was so ... "

Consider, dear reader, this confession! And after all, even after him, Natalya Bekhtereva walked on the ground with unshakable legs, instead of publicly, under the eyes of television cameras, crawling on her knees behind the Mausoleum Lenin and on his knees to publicly repent in front of Stalin's grave.

Alas, even the most repentant villain will not be able to do this before the grave Lavrenty Beria. She just doesn't exist.

But there are documents - although many of them must be approached critically. Eat memoirs, historical works, and so on ... Do not use the same, say, books Felix Chuev about his conversations with Molotov and Kaganovich is impossible - this is a source, so say normative. However, there are enough inconsistencies and "blunders" there, starting with a purely actual and ending with logical ones.

And I tried to either cross-check everything, or proceed from the principle: that a person talks about his direct, personal contacts with Beria, to believe, rather everything is possible - after an analysis of both the factual and the psychological side of the matter. And if someone retells something (as, for example, NKVD General Sudoplatov - stories secretaries of Beria, which he heard from them already in prison during a joint "time in prison"), then it's probably not worth believing. This is a very slippery thing for a historical researcher - "spoiled phones" memoirs. So it is better not to rely on many "evidence". And it's not about the temptation to discard

information that is inconvenient for you, but about huge the scale of the Khrushchev-Gorbachevsky Yeltsin denigration of the Stalin era, and its leading positive figures, including Beria.

But there are still reliable documents about Beria, first of all, the totality of them that is contained in the declassified "atomic" archives mentioned above. These indisputable documents are a good guiding thread for an objective researcher.

Moreover, their reliability is guaranteed not only by the high status of the publication, but also professional and personal qualities of the two leading figures of this work, which was carried out in the main nuclear weapons center of Russia in Arzamas-16 - RFNC VNIIEF. I mean the oldest weapons physicist German

Arsenyevich Goncharov, Hero Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, and Colonel Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko, a former long-term head of the representative office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in VNIIEF.

Once, in a conversation, I informed Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko that, having started mastering the material, was dumbfounded by how abruptly and positively began to change for me figure of Beria.

And he heard in response: - When I started working with archival documents a few years ago, I was in relation to Beria, of course, he is prejudiced. But as I work, my impression of him changed to the exact opposite. - How about a person? I clarified. - Yes, including as a person ...

There is another thread - the simple logic of our modern life. Public the atmosphere today is unrighteous and deceitful. So if its creators are talking about something or someone bad, then in reality everything is, most likely, on the contrary. If they say about

Beria that he was an intriguer, then it is logical to assume that in fact he was very noble. If they say

that he was a careerist, then it is logical to assume that in reality, he was not looking for high posts, but they themselves found him, these posts worthy. If it is

said that he was voluptuary, it will not be very wrong to think that he was rather an ascetic and, in any case, quite reserved in personal human needs. But it is, dear

reader, so, in general, it was. And I will try to prove it! While working on the book, I had to clear a lot of dirt that had already accumulated on yellowed newspaper and magazine pages of the "perestroika" period, on the pages monographs and memoirs. However, in the course of work, I was also expected by pleasant surprises, when I found information that was quite positive for Beria, even where, it would seem, I could not find it in any way.

And as the book was being written, I began to understand better why they made Beria "monster". I hope that as you read the book, this understanding will come to the reader. In the meantime, I invite him to travel back with the author more than half a century ago, to Moscow in March, saying goodbye to Stalin.

Chapter

2 MOVEMENTS ON THE STAND OF THE MAUSOLEUM

MARCH 10, 1953, they stood on the podium of the Mausoleum ...

Lavrenty Beria, Nikolai Bulganin, Klimenty Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Georgy Malenkov, Anastas Mikoyan, Vyacheslav Molotov, Vyacheslav Malyshev, Mikhail Pervukhin, Maxim Saburov, Nikita Khrushchev...

The country buried Stalin. People were crying, trains were stopping along the way, factory horns, farewell artillery salutes thundered. And now the state they personified, now standing on the podium of the Lenin Mausoleum, from now on becoming Mausoleum of Lenin-Stalin.

And now they are the leaders of the state. Collectively. But even among equals, someone becomes the first.

Khrushchev was the chairman of the commission for organizing the funeral.

Members - member of the Presidium of the Central Committee L. M. Kaganovich, Chairman of the Supreme Council USSR N. M. Shvernik, Minister of War Marshal AM Vasilevsky, Secretary of the Central Committee N. M. Pegov, Commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General P. A. Artemiev, Chairman of the City Executive Committee M. A. Yasnov.

None of the members of the commission claimed leadership, and close, even though formally the first person of the state was Shvernik. But even under Stalin he was formally the first.

Another thing is Georgy Malenkov. He was not a member of the commission, but, nevertheless, not only claimed the first role, but also found it in many ways, becoming instead of Stalin Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

However, the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU were led by Khrushchev. And that also meant something. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria, until the death of Stalin who also headed the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on Atomic and Missile Affairs, after Stalin's death became the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs - with the reunification of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs.

But his range of duties and interests was not limited to this. He was active comprehensively. And this, I must say, was not new to him - he worked as a "multi-station operator" all

own life.

And everywhere - effectively!

Yes, the most comprehensively competent, energetic and suitable for the role not only the formal, but also the informal leader of the country was he - Lavrenty Beria.

While not bothering myself with lengthy proofs of what has been said, I will give the data from page 407 of the collection of documents of the International Foundation for Democracy (the Foundation is now late Alexander N. Yakovlev) "Lavrenty Beria. 1953".

Neither in this foundation, nor in the Hoover Institution, which acted as co-editors of the collection war, revolution and peace and Stanford University communist Beria on the shield nobody was not going to lift. But the reference data given about Beria in the above-mentioned collection and related to his activities in the period only from 1941 to 1945, when Lavrenty Pavlovich was a member of the State Defense Committee, impressive.

GKO - the highest emergency body that led the country during the war, was formed on June 30, 1941, consisting of: I. V. Stalin (chairman), V. M. Molotov (Deputy Chairman), L. P. Beria, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov.

Since February 1942, L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan, and later N. A. Voznesensky also joined the State Defense Committee.

And here is what the collection of A. N. Yakovlev says:

"Decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of responsibilities between its members, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, the formation of the Air Force, in addition, in further, Beria was entrusted with control over the implementation of decisions on production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three people's commissariats: oil, coal industries and ways messages."

In addition, according to the decision of the State Defense Committee of March 13, 1942, "in view of the difficult situation on railways and the need to get out of this situation "was created an operational group under the leadership of Kaganovich, Beria and Malenkov, "which was entrusted with the entire responsibility for all transportation by rail."

And Beria in July 1941 and later put a lot of effort into the creation of the Reserve front, "which included a significant number of military formations of the NKVD
THE

USSR". In 1942, Stalin sent Beria as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the North Caucasus.

And from August 21, 1943, he was a member of the supreme leadership group of the Committee under Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from German occupation.

And none of these duties was formal, parade. Stalin in the USSR sinecures were not handed

out. In 1944, Stalin appointed Beria as Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee instead of Molotov. and chairman of the Operational Bureau of the GKO, "considering all current issues."

Plus, all this time, Beria was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. During Tehran 1943, Crimean (Yalta) and Potsdam 1945 conferences "on he was entrusted with ensuring the protection of the Soviet delegation, and at the Crimean Conference - and other delegations.

Knowing all this, it is safe to say that during the war more than Beria in the country only one person was loaded and overloaded with the highest responsibility - Stalin himself.

And after the war, too! After all, Beria was entrusted with the most complex and new tasks - the uranium problem, control over the development of air defense systems (with counting on the future already anti-missile defense). And besides this,

from the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR, a member

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not relieve Beria of the responsibility for supervising a number of peaceful branches of the economy.

Such a "cart" could only be pulled by a highly professional versatile manager with great experience and good general and special erudition and instant business reaction.

And, of course, someone who knows how to pick up shots and skillfully use them later. Beria possessed all these qualities and objectively was head and shoulders above all the rest, who stood on the podium of the Mausoleum on a March day. And, of course, he understood this. His neighbors in the podium also understood this. But were they ready to accept the leadership of Beria? They stood under the March sky and they didn't know how everything would turn out there now ... Or did they know? Perhaps someone knew. And that "someone" was certainly Khrushchev.

A YEAR ago, Stalin stood in the center of the podium. He waved affably to the little girl, who was waving to him from below, from the shoulders of her father, who was passing by. past the Mausoleum in the May Day column.

Now Stalin was gone. And therefore, on the podium of the Mausoleum, one or another movement. Yes, they have already happened. But still the future of those standing on the podium in March 1953 was still vague. And they couldn't help but think - what will it be like?

Today we know the answer to this question. As early as May 1, 1953, the composition of the higher leadership, who occupied the festive platform, did not differ from the March one. But already on

November 7 of the same year, Beria was not on the podium. On June 26 he was arrested. At the

July (July 2-7, 1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he was expelled from the party "for treacherous actions aimed at undermining the Soviet state" and decided put on trial "as an enemy of the party and the Soviet people." On

August 8, 1953, the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on "depriving L.P. Beria of the powers of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet USSR, his removal from the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR with the deprivation of all titles and awards assigned to him and on the transfer of the case on the criminal actions of L.P. Beria to the Supreme Court THE

USSR". Four years passed, the year 1957 came, and the leaders left the rostrum "anti-party group" Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, left and supported them Pervukhin and Saburov.

Having disowned the incorrigible "Stalinists", they could not resist, however, on podium Bulganin and Voroshilov. And seven years later, Nikita himself ingloriously left her.

Khrushchev. Mikoyan stayed on it the longest - until March 1966. Some left the podium of the Mausoleum, others came to it. changed

nomenklatura conjuncture, the political sympathies of those who occupied the center of stands. Worker Lugansk, named Voroshilovgrad in 1935, in 1958

returned the old name in order to rename it again in 1970 to Voroshilovgrad, with over the years, which again became Lugansk. Something similar happened to ancient Rybinsk, which was renamed four times: Rybinsk - to Shcherbakov, Shcherbakov - to Rybinsk, Rybinsk - to Andropov, and, finally, again to Rybinsk. But the name of Lavrenty Beria, who left the

podium in March 1953, no one has ever did not return the life of the

country. Only with the beginning of "perestroika" did it gain loud fame, but only for in order to become in the eyes of the "progressive" and "politically advanced" sections of society

"a disgusting personification of bloody tyranny and total totalitarianism."

And WHAT if Lavrenty Beria not only did not leave the main rostrum of the state, but also firmly occupied its center? And it would keep her busy for years to come. He was pretty good amateur athlete, did not smoke, was not fond of alcohol, nor, contrary to gossip, women ... So he could live a long time. Say, until the age of seventy-seven.

That is, he could have died in that very year 1976, when the future four times Hero of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of his seventieth birthday was presented with a second Hero star complete with the star of the Marshal of the Soviet Union. But Beria was arrested, isolated and shot. Regarding how and when happened, there are several versions, but I will not dwell on them now, but I will acquaint the reader with one of those letters that Beria wrote after his arrest.

In fact, he wrote three letters to his former comrades in leadership. AND their authorship is disputed, for example, by Yu. Mukhin, E. Prudnikova, and also indirectly Sergo Beria, who claimed that his father was shot during his arrest in the mansion where he lived with family and Sergo. But I have no doubt that the "letters from the bunker" are genuine! Why am I in I'm sure of this, I'll tell you in due time, but now I'll just pick up the Yakovlev-Hoover Stanford collection of documents of 1953 on Beria and open it to page 74, where begins the second letter of Lavrenty Pavlovich to the Central Committee of the CPSU Malenkov.

Chapter

3 A LETTER FROM THE CELL

DATED July 1, 1953, this letter takes up five and a half sheets of printing format 70 × 100 1/16. Therefore, I will not give it in full, but it deserves our serious attention. On the one hand, the letter became kind of summing up the results of all the political and state work of Beria, and on the other hand, it turned out to be something like his political testament.

There are enough errors in the text, sometimes the style is "lame", but only publishers it is known where the errors belong to Beria, and where those who translated the manuscript into typographical text. The same letter can be read in different ways. In addition, the author of the letter was undoubtedly worried that the style of writing could not but be affected - Beria was still not a writer. I will

immediately comment on certain parts of the letter, and in such a way that these comments gradually acquaint the reader with some of the circumstances of that an era that is not very well known to us to this day.

The letter begins like this:

"To Comrade MALENKOV

Dear George!

During these four difficult days for me, I thought thoroughly everything that took place on my part in the last months after the plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, to [a]k at work, and in relation to you personally and - some comrades Presidium of the Central Committee and subjected his actions to the most severe criticism, strongly condemning myself. Especially hard and unforgivable is my behavior towards you, where I 100% guilty. Among other comrades, I am also firmly and energetically set to work with the sole thought of doing everything that was possible and not to fail for all of us without Comrade Stalin and to support the new leadership of Ts.K. and the government..."

There is no desire to pity and justify. Terms of writing letters for its author were not only uncomfortable, but simply wild. However it is imperceptible that he was psychologically crushed. But peace is far from here,

and Beria analyzes - what did he do wrong before his comrades so that his suddenly arrested. But

then something interesting follows: "In

accordance with the available instructions of the Central Committee. and Governments, strengthening the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local bodies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted to the Central Committee and the Government on your advice and on some issues on the advice of Comrade Khrushchev N. S. a number of deserving political proposals, to [a] to that: ... "

Well, well, what is this *deserving* advice to the new Minister of the Interior

the new presiding minister Malenkov and the secretary of the Central Committee Khrushchev?

And here's what:

"... something like: for the rehabilitation of doctors, the rehabilitation of those arrested at the so-called Mingrelian [th] national center in Georgia and the return wrongly exiled from Georgia, On the amnesty, on the liquidation of the passport regime, to correct the distortion of the party line allowed in the national politics and punitive measures in the Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine and western Belarus, but your criticism is completely fair, criticism of t-shcha Khrushchev N. S. and criticism of other comrades at the Presidium of the Central Committee; with my last participation..."

From these lines it follows that the initiative, for example, "rehabilitation" in the "doctors' case", came, contrary to popular belief, not from Beria, but from Khrushchev and Malenkov. After all, not would Beria invent non-existent initiatives of colleagues in a letter to these themselves colleagues!

True, some of the initiatives actually belonged directly to the new Minister of the Interior, but these were precisely the initiatives that, after the execution The Berias were completely or partially folded as "erroneous". And let's say oh national policy in the vision of Beria himself, we will still have a reason to talk.

But I will dwell on the "doctors' case" right away, recalling that it began in 1952 with Lidia Fedoseevna Timashuk's letter to the Central Committee, written and handed over to the MGB back in 1948.

In 1952, Lydia Timashuk was fifty-four years old, and since 1926, after graduating from a medical institute, worked in the Medical and Sanitary Department of the Kremlin, and from In 1948, she headed the electrocardiography room of the Kremlin Hospital. Leaving on Retired in 1964 as head of the department, Timashuk died in 1983, at the age of eighty-five. "Democrats" contemptuously write about her often as a "Nurse Timashuk", but this, as we see, is a lie.

By 1948, while taking a cardiogram for Andrey Andreevich Zhdanov, she, an experienced practical doctor, diagnosed "myocardial infarction in the region of the left ventricle and interventricular septum." But the Kremlin professors V. N. Vinogradov, V. Kh. Vasilenko and P. I. Egorov, the attending physician G. I. Mayorov and the diagnostician S. E. Karpay They said nothing serious happened.

Zhdanov, however, had been "treated" before that in such a way that the "treatment" itself was crime. If not state, then medical - for sure! Yes, Mayor entrusted the care of the sick to a nurse, and he himself fished for hours - it happened on Valdai, in the sanatorium "Long Fords".

The chief therapist of the Kremlevka, Professor Vinogradov, also looked no more attractive. The word "therapy" actually comes from the Greek "therapeia" - "care, care." But this renegade of the hippocratic oath instead of organizing daily health care the country's leadership focused on something else. He "simultaneously headed the department in the 1st Moscow Medical Institute, was the editor-in-chief of the journal "Therapeutic archive", head of the electrographic department of the Institute of Therapy of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and

held a number of other positions. I use here information from the book of G. Kostyrchenko "Stalin's secret policy. Power and Anti-Semitism", published in 2001 with funds from Jewish Congress. Such

are the lovers of earning income wherever possible and determined the appearance of Medical Sanitary Department of the Kremlin! Kostyrchenko himself writes:

"In the famous Kremlevka, as elsewhere (yes. - **S.K.**), there was the atmosphere created by the "authorities" of general surveillance and denunciation, vital dead spirit of bureaucratic hierarchy, corporatism, mutual responsibility.

"The atmosphere of universal surveillance and denunciation created by the 'authorities'" is on conscience (if he has one) Kostyrchenko ... At such, say, a super-mode "object" as the atomic KB-11 in Sarov, there was nothing like that - there was a businesslike atmosphere concentration, slovenliness, of course, was not encouraged.

But about the "mutual responsibility" - this is already interesting! In Moritz Ilyich's dictionary Michelson Russian Thought and Speech. Yours and someone else's. Experience of Russian phraseology. Collection figurative words and allegories "in article 702" Mutual responsibility "is relevant here quote from Saltykov-Shchedrin's Diary of a Provincial in Petersburg:

"How did this mutual guarantee of indulgence come about - I do not presume to explain, but that this guarantee was once very strong - this every provincial will confirm.

G. Kostyrchenko is not a provincial, but here he also confirms that the bail professorial rogues in the "Kremlevka" was strong, and as a result, Timashuk was forced rewrite the conclusion in accordance with the professor's diagnosis: "functional disorder on the basis of sclerosis and hypertension.

On August 28, 1948, the head of the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, Professor Yegorov, wrote in medical history:

"It is recommended ... to increase traffic, from September 1 to allow trips to car, on September 9 to resolve the issue of a trip to Moscow.

But Zhdanov was taken to Moscow earlier, because on August 31 he died.

A medical error is a terrible thing, but possible for any doctor ... However, in this case, everything was quite transparent - the cardiogram showed a heart attack confident! And how could one lordly neglect the conclusion of an experienced professional Timashuk, who did not occupy, like Vinogradov and others like him, a string of profitable posts, but all her life she was engaged in her direct business - she treated people ?!

Timashuk sent a letter to the head of the Main Security Directorate of the MGB Vlasik. And on September 6, 1948, Professor Egorov called a meeting in his office, where branded Lydia Fedoseevna as an ignorant doctor and an "alien, dangerous" person.

For all this "warm" company, Timashuk was really dangerous, as dangerous for scoundrels any honest person. And Yegorov was supported by Vinogradov, Mayorov, the pathologist of the Kremlin hospital Fedorov, Professor Vasilenko. Vinogradov then still

enjoyed the full confidence of Stalin (he "treated" both him and other members of the Politburo, accompanied Stalin in 1943 to Tehran), and a letter from Timashuk then managed to hush it up. Vinogradov told the Minister of Health of the USSR E.I. Smirnov: "Either I will work in the Kremlin hospital, or she." Unfortunately, they

left the professor, and Timashuk was transferred to one of the branches "Kremlin". But

in the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, such "arts" were created and "medical mistakes" acquired (taking into account the supposedly high qualification of top personnel) such a strange

massive character that in 1952 Timashuk's letter was extracted from the archive, published in press, and she herself was awarded the Order of Lenin on January 21, 1953.

By that time, professors Vinogradov, Egorov, Vasilenko, Vovsi, Kogan, Grinshtein, Feldman, Temkin...

When on November 4, 1952, the operatives came for Vinogradov, *"they were struck by the rich decoration of his apartment, which could be confused with a mediocre museum. The professor came from a provincial family (and, that's where the skill of mutual responsibility comes from! - S.K.) a small ... employee, but even before the revolution ... managed to become quite wealthy man, kept his own prize horses at the hippodrome, collected painting, antiques. The walls of the life doctor's dwelling were decorated with paintings by I. E. Repin, I. I. Shishkin, K. P. Bryullov and other first-class Russian masters. During the search were found, in addition, gold coins, diamonds, other valuables, even a substantial amount in American currency.*

That's all, dear reader, I quoted Kostyrchenko's book (p. 645), so accurate information, paid for by the Jewish Congress, and there is no smell of anti-Semitism here Maybe. But on my own note: it's a pity that this professorial bourgeois (according to Kostyrchenko - "intellectual of the old school") was undercut in the 17th ...

You look, and Zhdanov would be alive! And he's

not alone! Kostyrchenko, by the way, claims that the "doctors' case" began earlier than the time when Timashuk's letter was launched. But this is just an attempt to change the reasons and consequences. The real cause of the "doctors' case" was their criminal at least negligence.

Or maybe more than negligence! The devil only knows, these Kremlin "esculapius"... Looking ahead, let me remind you that they were all "rehabilitated" later, quietly forgetting that already Vinogradov was guilty of a number of quite vulgar criminal acts, secretly keeping gold, jewelry, and currency.

Yes, and it would not hurt to think - why does Professor Vinogradov need all these "pebbles" and dollars? Did he hide them until better times, hoping for such changes in the USSR that became possible only after 1991? And did he really try to bring change closer? But

were there such "trifles" then in the Kremlin - after the triumph of the winners "monster" Beria, sitting in the underground bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow military district!

BACK, however, to this bunker and, as researchers, we will read through the back Lavrenty Pavlovich in continuation of his letter to the Central Committee ...

"... absolutely fair... criticism... at the Presidium of the Central Committee; with the latest my participation in response to my wrong desire, together with the decisions of the Central Committee, to send out and memorandums of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of course, thereby to a certain extent belittled [meaning] the very decisions of the Central Committee.... I want to say directly that on my part insisting on sending memos was stupidity and political thoughtlessness, the more you advised me not to do this. My behavior at a meeting of the Presidium [a] of the Central Committee, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, it was very often wrong and unacceptable, which introduced nervousness and excessive harshness, I would said, k[a]k is now well thought out and understood, sometimes it came to unacceptable rudeness and impudence on my part in relation to comrades Khrushchev [a] N.S. and Bulganina N.A. when discussing the German question, of course, I am unconditionally guilty here and deserve all condemnation ... "

Here, perhaps, something needs to be clarified ... Today it is extremely difficult for us to imagine what it is - a purge of the party. Something punitive arises in the imagination, but when when we say that we need to take the suit to the dry cleaners, we don't mean anything bad, but

we are simply reporting that we would like to have a clean, or rather, cleaned suit.

So, the party purges had as their goal not some kind of beating and humiliation of members party, and, on the one hand, the cleansing of the party from the "adhering", and on the other, the cleansing and self-purification of quite reliable members of the party.

When a Christian goes to confession, he goes not only for the remission of sins. He goes also in order to purify himself, confessing to someone outside himself - to the priest, in those or other sins. The believer confesses them secretly - and that becomes purer. A the Bolsheviks during the purges engaged in self-criticism in public, in front of their comrades party, and it was - one must be clearly aware of this - a really powerful means of self-education and self-improvement. After all, even

Chekhov recommended squeezing a slave out of himself every day - drop by drop. And in strong party collective during the purges, people are not just drop by drop rubbish from themselves squeezed out, but in whole streams!

Over time, this mode of behavior became automatic for the old party members if they fell into a situation of sharp criticism from the outside. They didn't take offense like this it is customary now, at those who criticize, they did not get angry, but began to think - in what way did I give miss? Unless, of course, they were Bolsheviks, party members, and not "members of the party."

But Beria was a party member! That is, a man who lives entrusted to him business, and does not figure out how to squeeze more personal benefit out of this business. And him the letter had to some extent the meaning of personal cleaning - fortunately the situation contributed. He continues in the letter from time to time not to self-flagellate and does not humiliated before the leadership of the Central Committee, and sincerely, as it was then said, admits mistakes.

Sincerely ... Although to a modern person this may seem cowardice and ostentatious remorse. But

it was not cowardice! As for the

"German" question, as well as the "Korean", "Turkish", "Iranian" questions mentioned below, "answers to Eisenhower and Churchill", "act at the reception Hungarian comrades", then we will talk about some of these "questions" significantly later, but now I will only note that Beria's foreign policy concepts were interesting and realistic. Let's

continue reading...

"Suggestions about Nagy Imre should not have been made by me or someone else, but by you I had to do, and then I jumped out idiotically, in addition, along with the correct remarks, I took liberties and swagger, for which, of course, I should warm up hard."

It is said energetically, and behind these words the character is quite felt - not always restrained, but very sincere.

Sincere, dear reader! And the following lines seem to me just as sincere ...

"... But I must say with all honesty I myself carefully prepared and forced his assistants to prepare for the meetings of the Central Committee. and governments to to the best of his ability and ability to help in the correct solution of the issues under discussion questions. If I introduced initiative questions, then several times reviewed together with comrades working with me, so as not to be mistaken and do not let Ts.K. and the Government. I stayed in the Council of Ministers, I did not have time submit to you a memorandum and a draft decision on streamlining award cases, I spent about two months on this (talking about the idea establishment of new orders of the USSR. - S.K.) ... In relations with comrades with whom [and] I work, I always tried to be principled, party, demanding, so that the work entrusted to him was carried out, as it is required in interests of our Party and our Government. No other relationship with

I never had those comrades. Take at least the leadership workers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. T-schey Kruglov, Kobulov, Serov, Maslennikov, Fedotov, Stakhanov, Pitovranov, Korotkov, Sazykin, Gorlinsky, Goglidze, Ryasny, Sudoplatov, Savchenko, Raikhman, Obruchnikov, Meshik, Zyryanov and many others requirements other than helping them in their work, in order to better organize the struggle with the enemies of the Soviet State, both inside the country and outside it, I did not have. Yes, and these comrades worked as it should be for real party members. T-shcha Serov with a brigade to assist the Moscow and Leningrad police just drove to do everything possible to restore order in the work of the police these cities and draw the necessary conclusions and proposals for other Republics..."

I repeat: sometimes the authorship of this letter is disputed - they say, Beria could not to write, he had already been killed by that time, and therefore the letter was a falsification.

I'm sure otherwise! A careful analysis of the content and style of writing convinces that it, like other "letters from the bunker", was written by Lavrenty Pavlovich. Very this letter is already densely "stuffed" with such details and facts that no one, even a nomenklatura, "clerk" could know. Yes, and the level of thinking and feeling, characteristic of letters, "clerk" is not able to have. But even without a deep analysis, one positive mention of

the names of Serov and Stakhanov shows that the letter was written by Beria.

Nikolai Pavlovich Stakhanov, Chekist General, then headed the Main Directorate police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then he was the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from 1955 to 1961 - the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR. Why would it be - in the event of a falsification of the letter -

"attach" it to Beria? Well, Army General (since 1955) Ivan Serov, who in 1953 was not even fifty, was generally a solid "Khrushchevite". And no "clerk"-forger became would include him and Stakhanov among those whom he "should have" spoken of approvingly Beria.

And the fact that Kruglov mentioned in the "clip" immediately after the arrest of Beria was appointed Minister of the Interior, also indirectly testifies to the authenticity of the letter.

No, at the beginning of July 1953, Lavrenty Pavlovich was alive. And it's him, not a fake The "clerk", recalling his entire past life and struggle, wrote to Malenkov:

"...Everything of value in my life is connected [with] working together with you. WITH the very first days in 1938 to restore order in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, your participation in the acceptance and handing over cases (when Beria was appointed in 1938 to the NKVD of the USSR. - S. K.), strengthening personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with your help - a lot of hard work during the war in the State Defense Committee, when by the will of the party we were instructed you arrange in the required quantities in the relevant enterprises ministries - the production of aircraft and engines, and for me - weapons and ammunition or questions of formation for the front. Collaboration in the Operations Bureau Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the organization of the national economy during the war, when it was necessary to strongly support the work of transport, both of us were sent with you with tt. Kaganovich A.M. and Mikoyan A.I. to establish railway transport, which [th] played an exceptional role. First weeks of the war, when there was nothing to cover the Western [front] front - which the German strongly pressed by our joint work to create under the leadership State [State] Committee Headquarters and personally Comrade Stalin Reserve front to protect the approaches to Moscow, only for the reserve front was 15 full-blooded KGB military divisions were organized. Simultaneously sending you to the Stalingrad [th] front, me to the Caucasian. It must be said frankly that we were most conscientious about the successful implementation of orders of the Party, the Government and Comrade Stalin, never spared their efforts and energy and did not know fear ... "

No, a "clerk" won't write like that!

LOOKING LIKE, having begun to remember the past, Beria even forgot where and why he was all writes! And immediately after the above text, he touches with enthusiasm and detail on atomic problems and air defense systems "Berkut" and "Comet", and then, remembering that he was not writing a report note, returns to the topic, reminds Malenkov of the years of joint work:

"I am not talking about all sorts of assignments," he writes, "which were given to us by the Central Committee, the government and personally Comrade Stalin we had to work very often and painstakingly, we always tried to be fundamentally objective, we had no other interests, it so happened that we met almost every day in the course of ten years and we had a conversation was always only about business, about people, how it is better to organize this or that work and to [a]k it is better to carry out the available assignments. I have always had a need to consult with you and it always turned out better for business ... Therefore, my the tragedy is that, as I said above, for over ten years there have been real Bolshevik friends, worked with soul on a variety of difficult working conditions were in difficult bindings and no one upset our friendship, so valuable and necessary for me and now exclusively for my fault, lost everything that connected us ... "

And then Lavrenty Pavlovich writes: *"I want to say a few words regarding comrades..."* and addresses the other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. To Molotov:

"... Vyacheslav Mikhailovich! I've always had a great even attitude working for you in the Transcaucasus, we all highly valued you, considered you a faithful student Lenin and a loyal ally of Stalin, the second person after Comrade Stalin ... You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after our conversation with Comrade Stalin at his nearby dacha. You posed the question with an edge in your office in the Council of Ministers that it is necessary to save the situation, you must immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, then I will completely supported and suggested that you immediately call Comrade Malenkov to a meeting ... After ... we all went to Comrade Stalin and convinced him [about] immediate organizations of the Committee of Defense of the Country ...

I would cite other facts, but I will say one thing that I have said more than once, the one who quarrels Molotov with Stalin, then commits a monstrous crime against our A country ... I think that this can be confirmed by G. M. Malenkov and Mikoyan A. I. and others. Very often, earlier, and more recently, Comrade Stalin called pimps G. M. Malenkov and me, meaning you and Mikoyan.

Stalin had reason to be disappointed in some old comrades-in-arms ... However, not this is the essence of what is important now, but how Beria dismissed the accusations of some kind of intrigue! It was possible to refer in a letter to Malenkov to Malenkov's testimony only when you speak the truth.

And it turned out that the truth, and not slander, was the same as Beria wrote about. She was like this:

"Clement Efremovich! I'll start the same with Transcaucasia, we loved you dearly, I on behalf of the leading bodies of Georgia, went specially to Moscow to the Central Committee, etc. Stalin insisted on sending you in connection with the fifteenth anniversary of Soviet Georgia.

At the beginning of the war, Comrade Stalin severely scolded me and called me a political a coward when I proposed. Designate the hard times going through our The homeland of the well-known to all [th] country t-sche you and Budyonny commanders Scold

scolded, and, a little later, comrade Stalin carried out the appointment ... "

I draw the reader's attention to the formula "*on behalf of the governing bodies Georgia*"... Not "*I went*", but "*I am on behalf of the governing bodies of Georgia*"...

If Beria had a low nature, he most likely would not have failed to stick out in front of Voroshilov, a *personal* role in the invitation ... But Beria has always been a "team man." AND once again confirmed this in his letter.

He addressed Khrushchev and Bulganin shortly and "unsubscribed", dryly attesting both "excellent Bolsheviks and comrades."

Bulganin was a very gray figure, but as for Khrushchev, Lavrenty Pavlovich, it seems, already understood who he was ... Five lines addressed to Nikita are only interesting a message that Khrushchev at the Presidium of the Central Committee "strongly and angrily" scolded Beria.

On the other hand, although also briefly, but expressively and sincerely, the author of the letter addressed Kaganovich and Mikoyan:

"... Lazar Moiseevich and Anastas Ivanovich. Both of you have known me for a long time. Anastas sent me back in 1920 from Baku for illegal work in Georgia, then still Menshevik on behalf of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP and the Revolutionary Military Council, the XI Army, Lazar knows 1927 and I will never forget the help [help] provided to me by the party work in Transcaucasia when you were secretary of the Central Committee. While working in Moscow could have said a lot. But I will say one thing I always saw, from your side principled relationships, help in work and friendship, I, for my part, did all I could..."

How many insinuations can be read about Beria's service in Musavat intelligence. And I I'll tell you about this in detail ... But aren't these lines, just read by the reader, enough to put an end to all slander? Would Beria remind you of 1920 at *such* an hour if he were unclean? Hardly. The last appeal was "personal" in half. Lavrenty

Pavlovich
wrote about

Pervukhin and Saburov, but - without addressing them ... However, he wrote something so my opinion, it is interesting for understanding the personality of Beria that this part of the letter I have so far I will not inform the reader, returning to it in its own time and place. And this surprisingly capacious and multifaceted letter ended like this:

"... All this may be, I should not have written in my position, but I ask you to forgive me. Dear George, I ask you to understand me that you know me better than others. I only lived, how best to do, of course within of their capabilities, together with you, a country more powerful and glorious, to think otherwise about me is simply unacceptable to my head Of course, after all that happened, I must be strongly called to order, indicate my place and firmly pull up to be remembered for the rest of your life, but understand dear comrades, I am a faithful son of our Motherland, a faithful son of the party of Lenin and Stalin and your faithful friend and comrade. Wherever you want, for any job, the most send a little one, take a closer look, I can still work faithfully for ten years and I will work with all your heart and with all your energy. I speak from the bottom of my heart, it's not true that since I held a big post, I won't be fit for any small job, that's very easy to check in any region and region, state farm, collective farm, construction site and I beg Do not deprive me of being an active builder, [on] any small section of our glorious Motherland, and you will see that in 2-3 years I will firmly I'll fix it and be of service to you. I am devoted to our last breath beloved party and our Soviet Government. **Lavrenty Beria.**

The signature was followed by an inscription:

"T-shchi I apologize that I am writing not quite coherently and badly because of my condition, as well as due to the weakness of the light and the lack of pince-nez (glasses).

I don't know about anyone, but when I read this letter for the first time, for some reason it hit me to the heart is the last explanation in brackets - "(points)". Some kind of naive defenselessness, some kind of naive innocence ... However, maybe it just seems to me, I don't know.

THIS is the letter from the bunker. According to the account - the second, but the first - short, from June 28, I will give later. And what can be said about this?

Confession? To some extent, yes. But rather not a confession (this was unusual for Beria's nature), but a report on work done. Or rather, a report about the life lived, about what it was filled with.

Yes, here, in this letter, in fact - the whole life. And it seems to be stormy, and in general - monotonous. No Canary and Bahamas for you ... And no Nice - unless that you'll get out to Lake Ritsa ... No Versace suits and five-star hotels... No saunas in presidential suites... And no memories like: "Ah Do you remember how we cut ourselves hard in Courchevel and sang a dozen girls at once ...

But did he need them - all these Courchevel, Versace, apartments and so on ?! At him instead of them was - Business! Sovereign!

What else does a man need to calmly look into the eyes of the Age and History?

The tone of the letter was quite decent. There were no "vain appeals about help," who see "liberal intellectuals" in Beria's appeal to the Central Committee. They do not quote the letter in detail, but snatch a couple of phrases from it in order to either fooling, or "democracy" fellow citizens, and then juicily slander the author letters.

But the only word that betrayed Beria's extreme inner tension escaped from him at the very end - "I beg" ... But in the context it is not pathetic and tearful looks. No,

it doesn't look!

Finishing his second letter, Beria did not exclude, judging by the tone and content letters that his biography is personal and political, have not already been made before runs out. He hoped to be given the opportunity to work further - where he would say

Central Committee
However, we know what went wrong. In that or another month of 1953, but the life of the hero of this book ended in the same year when he was arrested. How did this path begin?

CHAPTER 4 THE BEGINNING OF A BIOGRAPHY

I DO NOT STRIVE to write only a biography of Beria - even a political one. Rather, the theme of the book can be defined as an era through the fate of Beria and the essence of this fate as a guide to understand the past of the state and ... And - its future, glorious or inglorious disastrous.

But, speaking of a man, one cannot but say nothing about the time of his formation, about his childhood and youth. After all, we all come from childhood. Looking

at photographs of the young and young Lavrenty, taken at the age of sixteen, in seventeen, at thirty-one, at thirty-three, and even later, with surprise

you discover that in them nature is visible in something indestructibly simple-hearted and naive ... Nature with a touch of spiritualized idealism and sincere faith in people.

By the way, it is unlikely that the beautiful Nino Gegechkori - herself by no means a cold "vamp" - would have married a prudent self-lover. Another thing comes to mind when

looking at these photos. If in 1930 Beria removed without pince-nez, then already in 1934 he wears it. It turns out that I read a lot by thirty-five for years, this guy is not Khrushchev for you with his famous resolution "Aznakomitsa" ...

However, the craving for knowledge and education is confirmed, of course, not pince-nez on nose of Beria, but the facts of his biography.

He was born on March 17 (29), 1899 in the mountain village of Merkheuli, Sukhumi district in Georgia. Born, according to some sources, in a poor, according to others - in a prosperous, peasant family.

Both are possible ... On the one hand, from very poor families, and even Caucasian, rarely received an education, and at the age of eight Lavrenty entered the Sukhumi higher primary school, also called real.

On the other hand, in order to send their son to school, parents had to sell half the house. There *would* be no need for the prosperous to do so . And, most likely, the Beria family did not beg, but lived modestly. The gymnasium is an

educational institution for the "pure". And the real school was a standard opportunity for talented children of the poor to "go out into the world". Let us remember that in both Pavka Korchagin and the creator of his image, the son of a worker Nikolai, studied at a real school Ostrovsky.

Lavrenty's father, Pavle, moved to Abkhazia from Mingrelia, according to his grandson Sergo because of the persecution of the gendarmes for participating in peasant unrest. This is very Maybe. I must say that the memories of the son of Beria are the more reliable the farther they are from that 1953, which cut short the life of his father and distorted the fate of Sergo, and the closer they are to childhood of both Sergo himself and Lavrenty.

Merkheuli, although it was in Abkhazia, was a Mingrelian village, so the choice of his rebellious Mingrelian was quite understandable.

Lavrenty's mother, Marta Jakeli, according to the same Sergo, was in some kind of relationship with Prince Dadiani, the owner of Mingrelia, but very poor. She married Pavle second marriage, having a son and a daughter from the first marriage.

Sergo Beria writes that his grandfather conquered his grandmother with courage and beauty, and now this surely true. Grandchildren often look like grandfathers, and the fact that young Sergo was damn handsome, not only photos prove (they often lie). This confirms, for example, Korney Chukovsky. In his diary for 1953 there is an entry dated July 12 (when Father Sergo had already been arrested):

"I remember the son of Beria - handsome, like porcelain, well-groomed, silent, haughty, calm.

I will note in brackets that "sleek" and "arrogant" are on Chukovsky's conscience, because that Sergo's colleagues in the 3rd Main Directorate (development of air defense systems) note as times his modesty.

Apparently, the family was friendly and hardworking. Father is always at work, mother is great sewed and all her life (even when her son held a high position) worked as a tailor craft.

Parents really wanted to give their son an education. He appreciated it and tried to help the family how could. To help, without neglecting his studies, he could only earn money by tutoring, and in his autobiography, written by him on October 27, 1923, Beria reports that in Sukhum school prepared elementary school students. I notice that the weak in tutors do not go, and they are not hired. So doubt the success of the young mountaineer in mastering the sciences

we don't have to.

Sergo Beria wrote:

"Some of my father's teachers, and these were amazing people who taught by vocation, I met many years later in Georgia. A lot of them told me interesting things about my father's childhood, and he himself is always warmly spoke of them, knowing full well what he owed to his first teachers.

At the age of sixteen, Lavrenty, having graduated with honors from the Sukhumi School, leaves study in Baku. Why exactly there - after all, Tiflis was closer? It seems that none of the biographers asked this question, but it is interesting. I think two

factors played a role. Baku at that time was the largest industrial center in Transcaucasia, and the center of political life. In Baku it was easier to get a technical education, and earn extra money, and get involved in political life. There is reason to think that the first consideration prevailed - Lavrenty had an engineering streak and the makings of a scientist (later this will be noted by such a competent expert, like Academician Kapitsa).

Since 1915, Beria has been a student at the Baku Secondary School of Mechanical Engineering. And besides, he is a member of the student Marxist circle. In the same

year, a mother with a five-year-old granddaughter and a deaf-mute come to him - after past illness - sister. The time has come to pay the debts of the sacrifice of relatives, and Lavrenty pays: he has three women on his payroll. They lived, of course, very poorly, the mother at one time sewed clothes, but then the son began to earn extra money as a postman, and the situation improved a little with money. Mother even stopped sewing.

Father still lived in Merkheuli in a small house (so that Lavrenty could go in Baku, had to sell the remaining half of the house) and peasantry. Why did it happen, I'm not going to guess. And is it worth

it? In Beria's own words, his first acquaintance with Marxism took place in October 1915 - in an illegal Marxist circle organized by a group of students from the Baku Technical College and other educational institutions.

"The motives for creating the circle," recalled Beria in 1923, "were: the organization of students, mutual material support and self-education in Marxist spirit (reading abstracts), analysis of books received from workers organizations, and so on.

During the summer holidays of 1916, Lavrenty served in the main office of Nobel in Balakhany, "earning," as he himself admitted, "to feed himself and his family." However, summer is already next year he will spend far from the Caspian - in Odessa.

More on this, however, a little later. And now, finishing a short story about the time of the formation of Lavrenty Beria, we ask himself: how, most likely, his character could be formed in those living conditions, in which it was formed? It is not

difficult to give an answer to this question. Beria was born into a working-class family, where they could not and they wanted to spoil him, but where they wanted to see him as a developed person. A developed person is an educated person. And in relation to the son, the parents behaved wisely and selflessly, sacrificing worldly well-being for the sake of his education. And we were able to instill in him a feeling not of dependency, but of gratitude for the good. Thrift, frugality, peasant solidity and self-restraint.

The teachers gave him lessons in serving the public cause by the example of their own lives. and helped to understand what debt is.

The mountains also gave something to Beria. After all, he was in the full sense of the word a son of mountains. And the mountains

able to create a character proud, independent, broad and wise. The highlander knows that the world surrounded by mountains is not cramped - as it might seem at first glance. Make an effort, get up to the top, and breathtaking vistas will open up for you, you will see far and see a lot. But all this - only after considerable effort.

Forced early - from the age of eight - life outside the family brought up autonomy and a sense of responsibility. Yes, I learned to recognize people.

Tutoring gave me a certain pedagogical skill and the ability to approach people. And still in there is no doubt about one thing - that Beria was formed as an energetic, active person. All these qualities soon came in handy for him.

Chapter 5 REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

In MARCH 1917, Beria turned eighteen years old. Revolutions in Russia turned a month old. And in Baku, as in Petrograd, a dual power was first established: an Executive Committee was formed - an organ of oil owners and landlords, and Council of Workers' Deputies.

Beria counted his party experience from March 1917 - then he was with a group fellow students organized a cell of the RSDLP (b). But, say, Antonov-Ovseenko-son assures that Beria joined the party only in 1919 (in February). It can hardly be one opinion.

After all, it was a revolution! What precise account of membership could there be then! The man united a few more around him, and they said to themselves and to others: "We are Bolsheviks." They did not have membership cards, but the essential thing was that they acted like the Bolsheviks.

And formally membership could be issued later. Incidentally, in "Nominal commentary" to the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich, published in 2001 ROSSPEN publishing house and the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, it is clearly stated: "Beria L.P. (1899-1953), member of the party since 1917."

One way or another, in June 1917, Beria voluntarily enters as a trainee technician to the hydrotechnical organization of the army of the Romanian Front and leaves for Odessa, and then to Romania, where he begins to work in the forest detachment of the village of

Negulashty. In 1953, after his arrest, he would be charged with this - they say, he considered himself a Bolshevik with March 17th, and without the permission of the party organization, he left for who knows where. Considering when it was and who then was Lavrenty, the reproach looks silly. The

first summer of the revolution was passing, but the revolution itself was not going shaky or roll. Beria is only eighteen, he is not a party leader, not an experienced revolutionary. And although he wants build a new life, he wants to *build it!* He dreams of architecture, he's not bad draws, even paints with watercolors, oils. Looking ahead, I will say that he, as soon as the opportunity arose, he was eager to continue his studies in order to become an engineer, builder, architect. He did not aspire to purely political work - he was drawn into it by the era, the tough political situation.

And here is a young guy who needs to feed himself, and his mother and sister and niece, a tempting offer in all respects turns up: to see new edge, get technical practice and - what can I deny - financial affairs fix it, help the family... And the

party? And the revolution? So he doesn't shy away from them. What difference does it make where to work for a new life - whether on the Caspian Sea, on the Black?.. The main thing is to work!

And what kind of tough party discipline could be discussed among the young and politically green enthusiasts? After all, it was only the summer of 1917! Still not that civil war was not foreseen, but the proletarian revolution was also in question.

In short, Lavrenty went to the Black Sea and Romania and stayed there until January 1918. A then returned to Baku.

Psychologically and historically everything is explainable. In distant lands he's aloof already he did not stand in the revolutionary process gaining momentum, he was - as he himself wrote - "elected from the workers and soldiers ... a delegate from the detachment", often visited "at district congresses representatives of the districts" in Pashukani (Romania).

Autumn gave Russia October, the situation escalated, it became clear that in a good way the old life will not go away. And I wanted to fight for a new life in my native places. Yes and I wanted to continue my studies, of course. This is evident from Beria's own confession:

"After my arrival in Baku, I continue my studies at the school at an accelerated pace, quickly making up for lost time."

The political struggle in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia promised to be especially difficult. Since the end of the 19th century, local nationalists and separatists have formed here into separate political parties. But there were also parties that were common to the entire Russian Empire.

The Mensheviks of Georgia were especially strong. Here are some interesting numbers. Out of 8 deputies The workers' curia from Georgia in the first State Duma had 5 Mensheviks. In the second In the Duma, all the deputies from Georgia were Mensheviks. In the third - 3 deputies, of which 2 Menshevik.

In the fourth, last convocation, the tsarist Duma, Georgia was represented by 2 Mensheviks and one socialist-federalist. Noy

Zhordania was chairman of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers' Deputies in February 1917, and in 1918-1921 the Prime Minister of Georgia was a Menshevik. And Nikolai Chkheidze, deputy of the 3rd and 4th Dumas, and in 1917 Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, too. A Menshevik was both a member of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet and a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and later the Minister of and telegraphs, and then - the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Provisional Government, Heraclius Tsereteli.

That's how strong the Georgian Mensheviks were even on the scale of Russia! And this is not counting the "pure water" of the nationalists, who did not have deputies in the tsarist Duma, but enjoyed a certain influence among the Georgian masses.

The socialist revolution of November 7, 1917 in Petrograd did not lead to establishment of Soviet power in Tiflis. There, at the end of November, more and more the "blushing" Tiflis Soviet and the Menshevik government was formed. And it lasted until 1921. Such was the

post-October political "disposition" in Georgia. In Armenia, in 1890, the nationalist party "Dashnaktsutyun" (in Armenian - union) was formed. The Dashnaks had secret connections with the politicians of France, England, the USA and with Turks - in the hope of creating a "Great Armenia". There were, however, more modest plans: the autonomy of Western Armenia within Turkey (the "realism" of such plans showed the year 1915, when the Young Turks slaughtered more than a million Armenians in Turkish Armenia).

The Dashnaks widely used terror, not neglecting the methods of massacre (with covert approval of tsarist Petersburg, inclined to dominate the national outskirts, dividing). After the collapse of the Russian

Empire in Armenia, not the Bolsheviks came to power, but Dashnaks. They came, of course, with outside help. But already in March 1920 Mikoyan wrote to Kirov in Astrakhan: "In Armenia, work has improved, our forces are growing."

In April 1920, Soviet troops occupied Baku. And in August the Dashnak the Armenian government declared war on Kemalist Turkey, and soon Turkish troops already threatened Erivan. All memorandums of the Dashnaks to the League of Nations, the European and (how without it!) the American "democracies" had the expected result, that is, zero.

On November 9, 1920, Stalin arrived in Baku and set the direct task of liberating

Armenia. In an interview with Pravda at the end of November, he said:

"Dashnak Armenia fell, undoubtedly, a victim of the provocation of the Entente, which set it against Turkey and then shamefully left it to be torn to pieces. Turks. There can hardly be any doubt that Armenia has no possibilities of salvation, except for one: an alliance with Soviet Russia. This circumstance, no doubt, will serve as a lesson for all peoples, the bourgeois whose governments never cease to kowtow before the Entente.

On November 29, 1920, Soviet power was established in Armenia. But, as it turned out, not yet final. On December 2, 1920, the Dashnak government of bourgeois Armenia signed the Alexandropol "peace treaty", according to which Armenia was declared Turkish protectorate. The next, by the way, could be Georgia. Counting on the support of Turkey, the Dashnaks rebelled in February 1921 and captured Erivan with the surrounding areas. The situation in the Caucasus immediately complicated. And on March 16, 1921, the RSFSR had to conclude an agreement with Turkey, according to which the regions of Kars, Ardagan and Artvin went to the Turks. Outside the borders of Armenia there was also the sacred mountain of Armenians - Ararat. Situated at a distance of approximately sixty kilometers from Yerevan, it still rises above the Armenian capital, but already on Turkish territory. "Democrats" put this fact at the expense of Lenin, however Ararat lost by the Armenians is the price of the last adventure of the Dashnaks.

In July 1921, they were finished with: they were driven out of the last base - Zangezur, and peace finally came to Armenia. Although rest was still far away. Somewhat earlier, Menshevik Georgia ceased to exist. 25 February 1921 the Red Army entered Tiflis.

In Azerbaijan, the nationalist tone was set by the Musavat (Equality) party. It was formed in 1912 and had a program of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. After February Revolution Musavatists united with the Federalist Party Azerbaijani beks. On

November 17, the Baku Council of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors was formed. deputies, and it was headed by Stepan Shaumyan. The returned Beria begins in January 1918 to work in his secretariat.

In the 1991 Politizdat collection "Beria: the end of a career" (analyzing this "documentary" libel, one could write a book of its own) on page 335 it states "significantly":

"From mouth to mouth, where secretly, and where they clearly transmitted, for example, the story that Beria in 1918 was the commander of a security platoon of the Baku commune, and everyone wondered how he managed to escape, and even more so to avoid arrest, while while those whom he protected under Soviet power were both arrested and shot."

Everything is incomprehensible here (or, on the contrary, everything is very clear) ... Firstly, why "from mouth to mouth" and

"secretly"? Beria had not such great power in the early 20s (and was not very eager for it, which is a weighty documentary, not denied by anyone, evidence in his autobiography 1923, which I will talk about later) in order to "wash into camp dust" those who this "story", then there is gossip, "passed on", instead of putting the question in party order (which was common practice in such cases).

Secondly, why would Beria, who had no military experience, be appointed commander guard platoon of the Baku commune? He was, according to the concepts of that time, already educated person, and it was advisable to use it, taking into account "literacy". What, in fact, was done - Lavrenty worked in the secretariat of the Council.

Thirdly, Beria, what, was he the twenty-seventh Baku commissar? Even if he guarded them, it was fundamentally easier for him to hide than for those he was under the Soviet "guarded" the authorities. Moreover, he did not protect them, because ...

For, fourthly, it would be pointless for Beria to hide from the party the fact of being in such a prominent (in the sense of public) position. But they could show off. However, in a detailed autobiography of 1923 (this is, in fact, the most valuable for analysis document!) he does not mention it. And he does not mention, of course, because no He was never the head of the security platoon!

On the contrary, he himself clearly stated in 1923 that he remained an employee of the Baku Council until September 1918, and the events of October of this year caught him "in liquidation commission of councilors, "and not in a security platoon.

Similar "revelations" of Beria in the "accusatory" literature about him are available in abundance. And almost all of them are refuted even without the involvement of documents - a simple logical analysis.

Let us return, however, to Baku in 1918.

At the end of March, the Musavatists raised an anti-Soviet revolt in Baku. Its fast suppressed, and on April 25 the Baku Council of People's Commissars was created, which included Shaumyan, Azizbekov, Japaridze, Fioletov... However, in June 18, the Musavatists formed their government with the center in Elizavetpol (later - Kirovabad) and began to flirt with both the Turks and Germans, and with the British (after all, the First World war).

The period of interventions began, and on July 31, 1918, Soviet power in Baku fell, and on August 1, the "Centro-Caspian dictatorship" was formed, which included Musavatists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Dashnaks...

On August 4, Baku was occupied by the British under the pretext of military assistance against the Turks. That is, the "nationalist" "Musavat" brought the Turks, the British to the Caucasus and cooperated and with those, and with those. As, however, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

It must be said that the political situation in Baku resembled a kaleidoscope. On September 11, due to the advance of the Turks, the British troops left the city, and on September 15, Baku occupied by the Germans and Turks. A reign of terror was established. On the night of September 20, 1918 between At the stations of Akhcha-Kuyma and Pereval, the Socialist-Revolutionaries (with the complicity of the British) shot 26 Baku commissars, headed by Shaumyan.

During the first period of the Turkish occupation, Beria worked as a clerk in the White City on plant "Caspian partnership". But, as he himself wrote in his 1923 autobiography, "in due to the beginning of intensive studies at a technical school and the need to pass some transitional exams" he "was forced to leave the service." His party work, of course, could no longer be stopped. At the end of October 1918, Türkiye withdrew from the war, and soon Baku was already occupied.

Turks. And on November 17, the city was again occupied by the British. The fighting of the First World War The Middle East and Mesopotamia were ending, and the Britons had the opportunity switch to the Caucasus. The liberated troops (mostly Sikhs) were brought in from Iran and Iraq. And the "sign" sign of the situation was the creation of interventionist structures for oil industry management. In December 1918,

the chairman of one of the Baku oil companies, Herbert Ellen candidly stated:

"British armed forces appeared in the Caucasus ... Their arrival welcomed almost all the peoples who were waiting for protection - some from the Turkish yoke, others from the Bolsheviks ... Never before has the history of the British Isles given us such an auspicious occasion for the peaceful expansion of British influence and British trade, to create a second India or a second Egypt... Russian the oil industry ... would in itself constitute a valuable addition to

empires..."

Is it worth it, dear reader, to comment on this speech? The British are recognized democrats, and therefore life in Baku under them was established in kind of like living in an apartment building. The British played the role of owner "Houses". Socialist-Revolutionaries and Musavatists - the role of the manager. Some "apartments" were occupied by this "official" authorities and parties, but there was also a place for semi-legal the existence of the Bolsheviks - they were seriously afraid to touch them, because they were such a people that could have snapped.

In 1919, Beria graduated from college, becoming a certified technician. By topics at times it was no small education, and Lavrenty would like to continue it. Political work for him is still the necessity of the moment, but he wanted to be architect. Alas, I had to do something else.

"From February 1919 to April 1920," he wrote in his autobiography, "as chairman of the committee. cells of technicians, led by senior comrades, carried out individual party assignments of the district committee, himself dealing with other cells as an instructor..."

And here we come to that moment in Beria's life, which, according to, for example, Nikolai Zenkovich, "the internal chronicler of the Central Committee of the CPSU", is in the biography of Lavrenty Pavlovich "dark page". This, of course, is service in the Musavatist counterintelligence...

However, I personally do not see anything particularly dark here and suggest to the reader work through this story together.

The mode of life in Baku in 1919-1920 was largely determined by the presence, as I spoke, English interventionists (officially - "allies"). Kolchak's adventure for the summer 1919 failed, and Denikin also showed a clear failure. So it's open commit atrocities and "tighten the screws" on the Socialist-Revolutionary-Musavatist "authorities" and the British in in the conditions of ever-increasing overhanging of the Caspian Sea, the 11th Red Army was out of hand. Tem moreover, the political life of Baku (and indeed in Transcaucasia) was full of then, like a skirt gypsies, and sometimes it was simply impossible to figure out who was who. A little later I will on this account, an interesting assessment of Ivan Isakov, the future Soviet admiral.

In such an environment, the notorious "dark page" began in the biography of the young technique. He himself wrote about it in 1923 as follows:

"In the autumn of the same 1919, from the Gummet party, I enter the service in counterintelligence, where I work together with Comrade Mussevi. Around March 1920, after the assassination of comrade. Mussevi, I'm leaving my job in counterintelligence and I have been working in the Baku customs for a short time."

In the not-so-mentioned Anti-Beria collection of Politizdat of 1991 regarding the Gummet party, a sparing and indistinct reference is given: "the social democratic an organization that operated from the end of 1904 to February 1920, created to political work among working Muslims. I think that this tongue

twister is not accidental. For a detailed information about the social democratic group "Gummet" ("Energy"), I refer the reader to a completely accessible source - the 13th volume of the second edition of the TSB (p. 202), and here I will report that it was created on the initiative of Stalin in 1904 for political work among the working people all of Azerbaijan, and not just Muslims (along with Azizbekov, it was headed by Alyosha Japaridze, was among the leaders Nariman Narimanov). During the Baku period of activity Stalin in 1907-1910, he worked closely with Gummet, but in terms of its composition, the group was not homogeneous - nationalist elements were active in it.

And just in the summer of 1919, "Gummet" split, and part of it, "rolled down, - like

writes the TSB, "to positions hostile to the proletariat," joined the Mensheviks, and the Bolshevik part of "Hummet" subsequently joined the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

And NOW you can reconstruct the events! In the summer of 1919 it was already easy to foresee such a turn of affairs when the 11th Army marches on Baku. To prepare this you need there was information about the actions of the enemy, and they decide to send Beria to the Musavatists. Quicker First of all, Anastas Mikoyan also participated in the decision-making (although, as we will see later, he "forgot" this). It is very

likely that he was related to the direction of Lawrence and mentioned by him M. Mussevi - in 1919, deputy head of the Organization for Combating counter-revolution (that is, counterintelligence) under the State Defense Committee Azerbaijan Republic.

Let the reader not be confused by the super-r-revolutionary name of the organization, one Moussevi, who died in March 1920, was one of the leaders. This organization and was ... the very Musavatist counterintelligence, which Beria came to. After all, in The government of the puppet Azerbaijan Republic was full of revolutionaries - Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks. And they "also fought against the counter-revolution." On your

lad - language.

Such "seventeen moments of spring" then flew over Baku. The time and channel for the introduction of Beria into counterintelligence were chosen (by him or by "senior comrades") very competently. If someone pays attention to the recent "redness" of a new employee, then it is easy to explain - yes, I'm from Gummet! Was, they say, nonsense youth, but she came out, and they say, my paths with the Bolsheviks parted. For that (and Is it just for that?) there was nothing particularly surprising in such a metamorphosis!

Let's ask ourselves a question: "If Beria was a secret agent of counterintelligence, working in party, would he openly join counterintelligence?" I don't think so.

Or rather, no! It

was easy to

dissuade him - he was not sent to an open front, but to secret. Here a refusal can be easily framed, - they say, under the bullets, comrades, even now, but not accustomed to pretend, will expose at the moment!

But maybe Beria was already recruited during his service in counterintelligence? Also not it turns out! Firstly, when it was already possible and necessary to say everything - after the arrest in 1953, even after the end of the "investigation", Beria's official accusations of such and was not presented. Although Bakradze, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia, named Lavrenty Pavlovich on the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "a spy of international imperialism", but this it was said so, for a dirty word. Most

importantly, if Beria had been recruited, then the whole "pattern" of his nature would have changed! What pressure and rigidity are there in hot times! Caution, restraint, unhurried lift up, but it would be better without it at all. The higher you climb, the more on you watching ...

Note political libelist Antonov-Ovseenko-son wrote a lot and vilely about Stalin. He "noted" in the "Beria" topic, writing a "work" called "The Way up", placed in the collection "Beria: the end of a career". Analyze psychopathic Ovseenko's nonsense is not easy - you yourself can go crazy, dealing with the "Inconsistencies" of facts and logic, sometimes within the same page. At the same time, Ovseyenko states: "My work is based on facts."

On his "facts" I will still have reason to dwell more than once, but now I will cite one "fact" concerning the work of Beria with the Musavatists. Ovseenko writes: "Produced by Beria Bagirov sent the data to Tsaritsyn, to the headquarters of the 10th Army.

About this "fact", dear reader, with reference to Ovseenko, I first read in N. Zenkovich ("Marshals and General Secretaries", "Rusich", Smolensk, 1997, p. 207) and then I thought,

that there is a typing error here, it is necessary - to the "headquarters of the 11th army", because Zenkovich lowered "in Tsaritsyn.

"Internal chronicler of the Central Committee of the CPSU" Zenkovich cites this "fact" even as an excuse Beria, - they say, he transmitted information, even, they say, Ovseenko does not deny. That is, he brought Beria Motherland some benefit. Although, they say, "the page is dark." But the

thing is that there is no information from Beria in any headquarters of the 10th Army could not do - they were needed there, like a cart's fifth wheel.

It's simply incomprehensible to the mind - if Ovseenko and Zenkovich do not know history Civil war, then you really need to know geography! Where is Baku, and where is Tsaritsyn? And why did

Bagirov or anyone else need to slurp a thousand and a half miles of jelly until Tsaritsyn, when the headquarters of the 11th Army was much closer along the way (in the Red Army, in fact, Roman numerals in unit numbers were not accepted) - in Astrakhan! As early as March 14, 1919 (to be completely, in a military way - at 14 hours 46 minutes) Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis signed in Serpukhov directive No. 1185 / op on the reorganization of troops in connection with the liquidation front, where paragraphs 2 and 3 read:

"2. From other troops of the former Kaskavfront (Caspian-Caucasian front. - **S.K.**) to form the 11th army, bringing them into two rifle and one cavalry division ... 3.

Headquarters of the 11th Army, Astrakhan.

And in this headquarters, operational information from Baku was extremely necessary. There her Beria and passed on.

And the information was obviously valuable if, as Beria wrote in 1923, he later was sent *"from the registrar (intelligence department. - S.K.) of the Kavfront at the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th (Beria writes the number correctly. - S.K.) of the army to Georgia for underground work abroad.*

These are the "facts".

Such, to match them, "arguments". And so

- finally ... In 2003, the Olma-press publishing house published translated (from Italian) two-volume "History of espionage" by a certain E. Boyadzhi. Written it is biting, the history of world intelligence is presented in it with the expectation of a sensation. However, in the article "Beria is the great architect of the secret police" about the alleged provocateurship of Beria is not not a word was said. It can be seen that even Boyadzhi did not dare to undermine his reputation for cheap gossip.

They don't mention Beria's alleged "provocateurism" and are actually eager for fiction Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, authors of the massive Encyclopedia of Espionage. They after all - not Antonov-Ovseenko or Nikita Khrushchev.

1920 BEGINS. The

Transcaucasian political farce (alas, not without considerable blood of the peoples!) is still continued, but was nearing its end. The

main hostilities of the Civil War in Great Russia were ending and Ukraine, and there was an opportunity to deal with Caucasian affairs. In February 1920 Baku illegally hosted the 1st Congress of the CP(b) of Azerbaijan. Kirov arrived in Astrakhan.

On March 17, Lenin sent a telegram in cipher to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front Smilga and Ordzhonikidze, where he wrote:

"It is extremely, extremely necessary for us to take Baku. Direct all efforts to this, and in statements be purely diplomatic and make sure as much as possible in the preparation of a firm local Soviet power. The same applies to Georgia, although I advise you to treat her even more carefully ... "

And the 11th Army, led by Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and Mikoyan.

On April 27, 1920, an uprising began in Baku, on the same day a Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee. And on the morning of April 28, swiftly, at full speed, flying armored trains of the 11th army with landing troops entered Baku. Ships came from the sea Volga-Caspian flotilla with a landing detachment of sailors under the command of Ivan Kozhanov.

The Azerbaijan SSR was formed. The remnants of the White Guards and the British went to the Iranian port of Enzeli (now Pehlavan). They took there all the ships and auxiliary vessels of their Caspian flotilla and considerable number of merchant ships.

Our command decided to return them by force.

The destroyers "Karl Liebknecht", "Active", "Quick", gunboats "Kars" and "Ardagan", auxiliary cruisers "Roza Luxemburg", "Soviet Azerbaijan", "Australia", two minesweepers. May 17 they and transports with a landing force of two thousand sailors left Baku and on May 18 approached Anzali. At the same time, a cavalry division approached from Astara.

The Persians were told that we were not at war with them, they came to Anzali "for the Russian property."

The fighting ended on the same day and consisted mainly of negotiations with English General Champain, who tried to delay the unpleasant moment of the inevitable surrender before dark, and periodically reminding him to hurry up with cruiser gunfire.

10 cruisers, air transport, 4 British torpedo boats, quite a few medium and small schooners and scows were returned to Baku. And this is not counting trophy cargo on ships and property abandoned by the British (also looted to a large extent), as well as 50 guns of English coastal batteries.

One of the leaders of the operation, Ivan Isakov, then the commander of the destroyer "Active", wrote in his diary:

"When the destroyers slowly passed along the fairway into the bay, a huge crowd of Enzelians, standing in a solid wall along the pier and mooring walls, waving affably small red flags (hurriedly concocted from matter and paper) and warmly applauded the aliens ...

It was a kind of gratitude for what we banished

English..."

There is no information about this or that participation of young Beria in the development and operation in Anzali. But he could not be ignorant of her, and he must have learned her lessons, moreover, there was something for the future Chekist to learn

here. The Anzelian operation is little known, but in vain. She should be mentioned in the history course elementary school as an example of how a real Russian power, restoring Russian interests.

Politically, the Enzelian operation had a brilliant result: May 20 the Iranian government proposed to the Soviet government "to settle good neighborly relations..."

September 30, 1920 between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the RSFSR was signed union treaty, which stated that the governments of both republics were the shortest possible time to unite the military organization and the military command, the agencies in charge of the national economy and foreign trade, the supply agencies, railway and water transport, the post and telegraph department and finance. In fact, the new Azerbaijan returned to the new Russia. But before that happened, it took several years of struggle.

For the young Bolshevik Beria, this struggle was at times illegal. And any secret work provides rich opportunities for slandering those who carry it out. To understand what I mean, I invite the reader to think about how ordinary residents of Rivne would have met Soviet intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov, if he had survived and arrived after the war would have been in Rivne without preliminary public explanations why it took place for a couple of years back along these same streets in the uniform of a Wehrmacht

officer? This is the same with the accusations against Beria as a "double", allegedly who worked for the Musavatists. There is enough false "information" on this score, and therefore this moment in the life of Beria must return again. Sergo

Beria writes:

"The fact that my father, on the instructions of the Bolshevik Party, worked in counterintelligence in Baku has never been hidden. It was there that he began his career in intelligence. Better others knew about this Anastas Mikoyan, who worked there on the same assignment.

But is it necessary to believe the son of Beria? After all, his book "My Father Lavrenty Beria" is often an unreliable source, which is once again confirmed by his ridiculous statement about working for the Musavatists and Mikoyan (Anastas Mikoyan was known in Baku as flaky, because he was already one of the party leaders of Transcaucasia then).

But, say, the magazine "Youth" in No. 9 for 1989 publishes a letter from a certain F. Ya. Berezina, whose father Ya. D. Berezin, secretary of the Moscow Cheka in victim of father Sergo Beria.

According to his father, the author of the letter claims that in December 1921, Yakov Berezin called Dzerzhinsky came to him and handed over a warrant for the arrest of Beria. *"At the same time,"* writes Berezin Jr., *"Felix Edmundovich said that Kedrov (at that time a prominent Chekist. - S.K.) wrote a memorandum in which there are facts about the provocative activities of Beria, a responsible worker of the Azerbaijan Cheka" ...*

Stop!

Berezin is just the secretary of the IBSC. This means: take away, bring, serve, etc., etc. To give him a warrant for arrest is understandable.

But why would the Chairman of the Cheka suddenly inform an ordinary worker, even if central office such operational data that this employee for the task is not supposed to know? This is the alphabet for everyone who deals with secrets - anyone is supposed to know only what he is supposed to know! From the message of this rules, the first briefing of those who are admitted to secret information begins.

OK! Suppose the "iron Felix" turned out, according to Berezin, either to his father, or son, talker. But then the Berezinsky narrative becomes completely implausible! To detain Beria, who arrives by night train from Baku, allegedly a detachment of four Chekists was appointed, but even the senior did not know who they should to arrest.

How is that? How are they going to arrest the unknown? And why not along with was to tell the name to anyone in Moscow then not known to Beria? Berezin himself-father is the name first heard in Dzerzhinsky's office.

Here the fantasy of either the father or the son clearly failed. And such incidents are explained shift in perception. They lie after a long time and at the same time forget that in 1953 the name of Beria thundered, and in 1921 the outfit would only shrug its shoulders - Beria, they say, so Beria ... We took not such Berievs! And then the

events - according to Berezin the son - unfolded like this. A few hours before the arrival of the night train from Baku, Dzerzhinsky again called Berezin, said that Beria's arrest was cancelled, asked to surrender the warrant and abruptly tore it.

"What's happened?" Berezin asked. "Stalin called and, referring to the guarantee of Mikoyan, asked not to accept strict measures against Beria," Dzerzhinsky answered ...

Beria did not arrive in Moscow that night; he did not receive reproaches for not appearing at the Cheka. It turns out that was the sanction of Dzerzhinsky or Stalin.

"Father told me," continued Berezin, "that ... Beria ... felt with his skin the danger of arrest hanging over him after the check carried out by Kedrov in Baku.

No, dear reader! It's good, after all, that the "victims of the regime" are so prone to "memoirs"! Admiral Canaris told Major Steinglitz that the signs of a donkey are not definitely ears. So it is with narrators like the Berezins. They themselves do not understand that write.

Let us ask ourselves the question: "How did Stalin, to the operational activities of the Cheka then who had no relationship, and even more so Mikoyan, learned about just the upcoming (not committed) arrest, albeit a responsible, but peripheral employee of the Cheka?

Maybe someone talked? But who? And to whom? However, Berezin-papa himself stated that Beria could not receive information about the impending arrest from the workers of the IBChK. Yes, as if did he get it from them, if even those who were supposed to arrest him allegedly did not know his name?

So, the version that Beria got in touch with Mikoyan, and himself, away from sin, to Moscow until you go, does not pass. And about the "skin felt" - also unconvincing. Beria What, was he a novice in Chekist affairs? If he assumed the arrest and knew for himself real sins against the party, he understood: they didn't take it in Moscow - they will take it in Baku.

And then he would have simply, taking his legs in his hands, would have rushed to run to "his own" - beyond the cordon. Then it was easy to do!

Further ... Berezin-son writes that his father in 1932 "in a narrow circle of Chekists spoke about Dzerzhinsky's past intentions to arrest Beria and about the role of Stalin and Mikoyan in this case".

How should *this* post be judged? What can be said about a person who on the basis of mere unproven suspicions (or, more simply, rumors) in the circle of colleagues blackens another colleague? It is clear that this is at least a slanderer and an envious person. But 1932

was a difficult time. Beria is already the party leader of the Transcaucasus, who replaced the "leaders" who failed. He completely devoted both to the cause of Stalin (that is, to the cause of building socialism in Russia), and Stalin personally.

Political struggle between the Bolshevik core of the CPSU(b) and "deviations" in 1932 starts to gain momentum. And at this moment the Chekist "in a narrow circle of Chekists" is trying to undermine the reputation as the leader of the communists of Transcaucasia, and at the same time the reputation party leader. How should this be understood?

Can this be regarded otherwise than as proof of Trotskyist sympathies? "twice honorary Chekist"?

I don't believe in the story with the warrant issued by Dzerzhinsky (I don't know how much I convinced the reader of the validity of his distrust as well). But the fact that Berezin-dad launched provocative rumors in 1932, I believe. This is well within the objective picture of that era.

Berezin tried, among other things, to denigrate Beria in the year of the 15th anniversary of the organs of the Cheka-OGPU. And a year before that - March 30

In 1931, the Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky issued order No. 154/93 ... However, I'm getting ahead of myself too much. Let's go back to the twenties, about which at the beginning In the thirties, Beria wrote from Tbilisi to Moscow to Ordzhonikidze this:

"Levon Gogoberidze is resting in Sukhum. According to the stories of Comrade Lakoba and a number other comrades, Comrade Gogoberidze spreads about me and in general about new Transcaucasian leadership (Beria since 1932 was the first secretary Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b), which united the party organizations of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. - S.K.) the most vile things. Particularly about my past work in the Musavatist counterintelligence, claims that the party allegedly did not knew and did not know. Meanwhile, you are well aware that Musavat intelligence

I was sent by the party and that this question was examined by the Central Committee of the AKP(b) in 1920, in presence of you, comrade Stasova, Kaminsky, Mirza Daud Huseynov, Narimanov, Sarkis, Ruhulla, Akhundov, Buniat-zade and others (in 1925 I gave you official extract about the decision of the Central Committee of the AKP(b) on this issue, which I completely rehabilitated).

This letter was published in No. 2 of 1995 for the theoretical and political the journal Svobodnaya Mysl, published by such a stronghold of democracy as the Gorbachev Fund. They hardly admire the communist Beria, so believe in the authenticity of the letter possible, especially since the original is stored in RTSKHIDNI - the Russian Center for Storage and studying documents of recent history.

As you can see, the son of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria can be trusted in this case. And here the son of Yakov Davidovich Berezin is unlikely.

Like Yakov Davidovich himself. And what is characteristic - these alleged revelations of Berezin the son were also included in 1991 political publishing collection "Beria: the end of a career." Tight, out, at "accusers" of Lavrenty Pavlovich with documentary evidence, if I have to use this kind of gossip over and over again...

Let's get back to the analysis. In Baku, Beria worked in the Musavat counterintelligence. If his party comrades had any doubts about his reliability, would he, after the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, be sent back to illegal work already in Georgia? And they sent him there! So what

is the reason for the gossip around the Baku period of Beria's work? I think not last of all, they are explained by the insinuations of Kedrov mentioned by Berezin.

Mikhail Kedrov left a complex memory in history. The old Bolshevik, known to Lenin, after October he carried out various assignments in the North of Russia, from January 1 to August 18, 1919 he led the Special Department of the Cheka, but by the end of the year he appointed chairman of the All-Russian Commission for the Improvement of the Sanitary Condition republics.

Such an appointment for an experienced worker in a hot time is not very explicable, if not to assume that he simply did not fit Dzerzhinsky for some serious reason. What could these reasons be?

There was fame about Kedrov as a person not just tough but brutal. However, in harsh times, rigidity is not the biggest vice. A such an excessive suspicion and a tendency to slander and arbitrariness in such a place as The special department of the Cheka is a direct threat to the

strength of the army! Perhaps that is why Dzerzhinsky got rid of Kedrov. Maintain cleanliness latrines when there is typhoid and cholera around - the task is also important, but here especially the tribunal don't threaten.

Later, Kedrov also served as chairman of commissions for the verification of various institutions. Here, captiousness and suspicion were also not good, but specific measures to punishment was determined by others.

Temporarily Kedrov returned to the KGB work in 1921-1924, combining duties of the authorized Council of Labor and Defense for the fishing industry of the southern Caspian with the duties of the Commissioner of the Cheka for the Caspian. It was then, in Baku, corrosive and suspicious, he "unearthed" "compromising evidence" on Beria.

Intelligence, and even more so illegal intelligence, undercover intelligence, is a delicate thing, in years The civil war is most often not documented. Kedrov was, I think, in kind limited, like any suspicious person who is ready to believe rumors. And right unable to assess the situation.

Only Azerbaijan was within its sphere of competence. From Baku, from Kedrov, and went with 21st year, a rumor about a "Musavatist agent" Beria. And some people liked this rumor very much. After all, Beria is not in a strange place

I worked in an institution, but in the Cheka. And the principled and intelligent employees of this department there was never a shortage of ill-wishers...

BUT YET, Kedrov is checking the toilets, and Beria... And Beria is again sent to illegal work. And let him tell about it himself:

"From the very first days after the April coup in Azerbaijan, the regional committee of the Communist Party (b-kov) from the register (registration, intelligence department. - **S.K.**) Cavalry Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army I am sent to Georgia for clandestine overseas work as a commissioner. in Tiflis I contact the regional committee in the person of comrade. Hmayak Nazaretian, spreading the net residents in Georgia and Armenia, establish contact with the headquarters of the Georgian army and guards, I regularly send couriers to the registry office in Baku. In Tiflis I arrested together with the Central Committee of Georgia, but, according to the negotiations G. Sturua with Noah Zhordania, release everyone with an offer within 3 days leave Georgia..."

And here I will interrupt Lavrenty Pavlovich to explain something. Georgy Fedorovich Sturua - then he was 36 years old - is one of the leaders Communist Party of Georgia, Bolshevik since 1901, professional revolutionary. In 1903-1914, he worked in illegal Bolshevik printing houses in Baku and Moscow, was repeatedly arrested, was exiled to the Naryn Territory, from where he fled. June 8, 1926 Stalin, answering the greetings of the workers of the main railway workshops in Tiflis, wrote:

"I remember the year 1898, when I first received a circle of workers railway workshops. That was twenty-eight years ago. I remember how I was in Comrade Sturua's apartment ... I received my first lessons practical work..."

So *this* Sturua is Ivan, this is the elder brother of Georgy Sturua, a member of the Central Committee of the CP (b) Georgia, a member of the RSDLP since 1896.

Ivan was born in 1870 and died in 1931. And George, being 14 years younger than Ivan, died in 1956 in Tbilisi, seventy-two years old. Someone who, but the Sturua brothers knew there is a lot about both Stalin and Beria... But here, no one has ever repressed them. And for What?

They were Bolsheviks without "deviations", they lived honestly. Because, probably, by the way, and not got into that volume of the second edition of the TSB, which was signed for publication on April 21, 1956 - already after Nikita Khrushchev's speech at the XX Congress on the "cult of personality", already after the crackdown on March 2, 1956 in Tbilisi, a demonstration of youth protesting against defamation of Stalin.

Together with the younger Sturua and other prominent Georgian Bolsheviks, Beria and arrested - right in the building of the Central Committee. After all, the situation then in Tiflis was with Beria not like in Berlin near Stirlitz - the communists in Georgia acted quite openly in 1920 and vigorously. The future, and already close, was behind them. The

Mensheviks of Georgia, then still formally in power, had a position It was, as they say, worse than a general's. It seems to be power, but with these damn no drastic measures are possible for the Bolsheviks. The only thing that is allowed is to cordon off the building of their Central Committee by a guard detachment,

arrest and deport. They were expelled, and the same Sturua soon worked in Baku as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan. But Beria was sent to Georgia to organize illegal work! And he organized her. And the agent network has already been created, and even among the Georgian gendarmes ("Guards") already had connections. And Beria remained, which in itself proves his lofty

sense of responsibility and duty.

He himself about this without the slightest panache, admiration and self-promotion, but in a purely informational style later wrote:

“However, I manage to stay, enrolling under the pseudonym Lakerbaya on service in the representative office of the RSFSR to comrade Kirov, who by that time had arrived in Tiflis (Sergei Mironovich Kirov at that time was the plenipotentiary representative Soviet Russia in Georgia. - **S.K.**). In May 1920 I leave for Baku to register for receiving directives in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Georgia...”

Yes, it was, of course, easier for Beria in Tiflis than for Stirlitz in Berlin - the Standartenführer could not go to Moscow for consultations. But intelligence at different times has a very different operational design.

So, Beria received new instructions in Baku, but on the way back, as he writes, he was “arrested by telegram from Noah Ramishvili” and taken to Tiflis, and from there “despite to the troubles of Comrade Kirov "are sent to the Kutaisi prison ...

Noah Ramishvili was Minister of the Interior in the Menshevik government Georgia (we will hear about him later).

In the meantime, I will say that there is no evil without good. The owner of one of the safe houses Beria was the Bolshevik Alexander Gegechkori, who had a charming 15-year-old niece of Nino. Nino's second uncle - Yevgeny Gegechkori - was the Minister of Foreign affairs of the Menshevik government. Similar incidents were, however, for Transcaucasia characteristic.

When Beria went to prison, Gegechkori was already there, of course, Gegechkori was a Bolshevik. Lavrenty and Alexander were in the same cell, and Alexander's wife Mary came to her husband on a date and took Nino with her. So Lavrenty first saw already his future wife. The plot is quite for a movie, but Beria's life was already more interesting than any

movie. And yes, it was an interesting time for him.

IF Beria was already arrested at the border, it means that Tbilisi already knew who in fact, this employee of Kirov is. After all, that side also had its agents on our side. Therefore, it is quite understandable why Kirov's efforts were not successful, although the request *such* an envoy in the summer of 1920 meant hardly less in Tiflis than the request of Ambassador Smith in the same Tiflis in the year

1918. So, despite Kirov's demanding requests, Lavrenty is not released. He writes:

“June and July, 1920, I am imprisoned, only after four and a half days of hunger strike declared by political prisoners, I are deported to Azerbaijan in a staged order.”

On that, Beria's underground ordeals ended once and for all. But full of dirty fictions and rumors of "antiberiad" was yet to come. For

example, in the “anti-Beria” collection of 1991, a tasty story is given ... Say, either in 1928, or in 1929, the Menshevik ex-Ministry of Internal Affairs Ramishvili and his ex-subordinate, the former head of the “special detachment” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Meki Kedia, recalled that Beria-de, after his arrest, “wept and blabbed everything about his assignments and connections, after which he was released.” Moreover, he allegedly “split” without any violence against him. Could something

like this really happen? Of course not! The whole story

of Ramishvili and Kedia is an undoubted fiction. If

"Dissolving snot" Beria was released, then, firstly, the whole prison would know about it. He After all, he was not a petty criminal!

Secondly, if he was taken like this and released as a reward for betrayal, then would he go to Baku? And most

importantly, if Lavrenty "blabbed everything about his connections and assignments," then, taking into account what Beria knew a lot, there are no guardsmen in the Georgian guard at Meka Kedia would be enough to ensure the arrest of Beria's agent network! However, nothing like Noah Ramishvili could not boast. It would

seem that it is impossible to lie and slander like that, all right, impudently, otherwise it's stupid! But I am not a collection of anecdotes quoted above, but an almost scientific work published in Moscow in 1991 Publishing house of political literature under the general editorship of Doctor of Historical Sciences V. F. Nekrasov.

Felix Chuev wrote down the following words of Lazar Kaganovich:

"Somewhere they found some kind of witness who spent 30 years in prison, and they Shatunovskaya (I will remember this madam much later. - **S.K.**) they are chatting ... Nonsense! The most nonsense! Dreyfusiada! Designed from start to finish. And this Antonov Ovseenko is the same..."

Lazar Moiseevich was indignant at the fabrications about the 17th Party Congress. But his words are completely least can be attributed to the evil inventions about Beria.

Let us return, however, to our hero, who was exiled in stages to the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan. As already mentioned, his underground ordeals ended once and for all. But the exciting work of the state, full of intense work, was still ahead.

Chapter 6 THE KEKIST DECADE

ON RETURN to Baku in August 1920, Beria was appointed manager affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan. In this position, one would have a good reputation oneself in a unique way - thoroughness, accuracy and diligence. And yet - honesty and incorruptibility.

The young, punctual manager of affairs showed, presumably, precisely these qualities, because already in October he was appointed executive secretary of the Extraordinary Commission to expropriate the bourgeoisie and improve the living conditions of

the workers. The choice of Beria for this position was clearly successful - even after decades, having risen to the heights of state power, being the Chairman of the Special Committee in 40 years, he could dismiss the director of a "nuclear" enterprise for - do not be surprised, dear reader - neglect of the social sphere. The origins of this approach go back during the youth of Lavrenty, when Beria learned to be attentive to needs working people.

"This work," he wrote in Autobiography, "I and Comrade Sarkis (chairman Commission) (Sarkis - S. Ter-Kasparyan (Kasyan). - **S.K.**) was carried out in shock up to the liquidation of the Commission (February 1921)".

Moreover, the activities in the commission had to be combined with studies at the institute. In the autumn of 1920, the Baku Mechanical Construction School was transformed into Polytechnic Institute, and Beria immediately enters it. He most wants to be student to become a civil engineer, but rather an architect.

How many young people, but in his place, would have already considered fate for a beard seized, and that all sciences surpassed, and he thought like a romantic.

However, as a "practical" romantic who knows how to do everyday things without losing zest for life and the ability to dream vividly...

The expropriation of the bourgeoisie, if it is carried out resolutely and wisely, the action is not

endless. And, as Beria continues the story, with the end of his work on the commission, he *"it is possible to persuade (!! - S.K.) the Central Committee to give the opportunity to continue education at the institute. The*

Central Committee satisfies Beria's request and lets him go to study, even giving him a scholarship *"through Baku Council. It*

would seem that one can finally take up books and a slide rule ... However not even two weeks pass before Beria is requested through the Caucasian bureau to work in Tiflis. So,

there he is remembered only from the good side. But valuable shots are nowhere on the road lying around, and if Beria is already in Baku, and Tiflis demands him, then if Lavrenty from studies and pluck, is it worth giving it "to the side"? It will come in handy in Baku too! Judging by

what followed, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan reasoned precisely this way, because which ended up like this ... Beria was "removed" from his studies, but instead of sending him to Tiflis, the Central Committee of the AKP (b) by its decree appoints 22-year-old Lavrenty to Azerbaijan Cheka as deputy head of the secret operations department (SPO), and soon - head of the SPO and deputy chairman of the Azchek. This is

already serious and more than responsible. But this is just the beginning of a fast career growth. Yes, it was service, and not career, as they would say now. After all, in that Beria did not aspire to making a career, the reader could already be convinced at least from how persistently he strove to be not a boss, but a student! Nino arrives in

Baku, and soon she and Lavrenty become husband and wife (son Sergo was born already in Tbilisi, where Beria would be transferred in 1922).

How did he live then? Well, I will again give the floor to answer this question myself young Lawrence. He remembers his life better than anyone else ... Besides above and below, I quote quite a few binding memoirs, and that official document, which is still hidden in Beria's personal file, but still not destroyed archives and which he entitled "Autobiography".

"I will not dwell on the tense and nervous nature of the work in Azchek, - Beria declares decisively, but at least briefly at such a job You can't stop, and it won't stop. - As a result, this soon affected positive results. Stop here on the rout of the muslim organization "Ittihat", which numbered tens of thousands of members (Turkish The right-wing Ittihad non Taraki party, Unity and Progress, was founded in 1889 and existed until 1926. - **S.K.)**. Next - the defeat of Transcaucasia. rights organizations. Socialist-Revolutionaries, for which the GPU (VChK), by its order of February 6, 1923, No. 45, announces gratitude to me with the award of weapons. results of the same the work was noted by the Council of People's Commissars of the ASSR in its commendation sheet dated September 12 1922 and in the local press.

Working in Azcheka, at the same time I am the chairman of Azmezhkom (Azerbaijan interdepartmental commission) from VII - 1921 to XI - 1922

revolutionary tribunal. On the party line, I am attached from the BK AKP (Baku Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. - **S.K.)** to workers cells, and later, for convenience, to the cell of the Cheka, where I am a member of the bureau, I visited elected to almost all congresses and conferences of the AKP, was also a member
Buck of the Council ... "

Everything is right here. And this is confirmed by documents stored in a personal file. L.P. Beria and cited, oddly enough, in the "anti-Beria" collection of 1991.

There, in addition to such, say, characteristics as Kirov (Kirov was then in Baku secretary of the Central Committee): "... comrade. Beria is a good and energetic Chekist, proved himself at the Chekist work on the good side", there are three more documentary evidence of the work of Beria in AzChK.

So first:

"Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic
Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars
Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars in commemoration of the execution
head of the secret operational department of the Azerbaijan Emergency
commissions tov. Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich of his duty to the proletarian
revolution, expressed in the skillful leadership brilliantly executed in
on the state scale of the case for the liquidation of the Transcaucasian organization of the
PS-R., rewards him with a gold watch with a monogram.
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
G. Musabegov.

Second:

"Extract from the order of the GPU
dated 1923, No. 45 For
the energetic and skillful implementation of the liquidation of the Transcaucasian organization
ps-r. early s.o.h. Baku Provincial Department comrade. Beria and early secret department
comrade. Yossem are awarded weapons - revolvers of the Browning system with inscriptions
about what to include in their service records ...
Deputy Chairman of the GPU (Unshlikht).

And third:

"Certificate
This was given to the responsible party worker comrade. Beria L.P. is that
he [possesses] outstanding abilities displayed in various apparatuses
state
mechanism ... Working as the Manager of the Central Committee of Az. communist party, emergency
authorized registrar of the Caucasian Front at the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army and
executive secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie
and improving the life of workers, he, with his inherent energy, perseverance
fulfilled all the tasks assigned by the party, giving brilliant results in his
versatile work, which should be noted as the best, valuable, tireless
a worker so necessary today in Soviet construction ... **Secretary of the
Central Committee of the AKP Akhundov.**

These documents are given in the "anti-Berian" collection of 1991 with the following
"scientific" comment:

"All ... three documents have in common not only a pompous tone, perhaps
corresponding to ... Eastern phraseology (yeah, especially among the Polish nobleman
Unshlikht. - **S.K.**) ... but also the fate of those who put their signatures under them. Year
their deaths are the same - 1938, when the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Beria came ... "

So, dear reader, it is written. And it is even said further that at first Beria was
Deputy People's Commissar, and it was even specified that - from
August 1938 ... But Joseph Unshlikht was arrested on June 11, 1937, and shot on July 29,
1938. But Gazanfar Mahmud oglu Musabegov (Musabekov) was arrested in July 1937, and
shot February 9, 1938.

I did not find exact data on Ruhulla Ali oglu Akhundov, but there is no doubt that Beria had
nothing to do with his arrest and execution in 1938. Moreover, most likely, Akhundov was arrested
in June 1937.

Akhundov and Musabegov in the thirties, of course, often encountered Beria - they were prominent people in the Transcaucasus. But their social position by the second half of the 30s was lower than that of Beria. No sins they follow him in years. As you can see, there was no civil war. And they were arrested not because of the intrigues of Beria, but in due to another reason - the general aggravation of the intra-Party struggle.

Moreover, Beria had nothing to do with the sanction for their arrest, because with the adoption at the 8th Extraordinary Congress

Soviets of the USSR December 5, 1936 "Stalinist" Constitution of the USSR Transcaucasian The federation was divided into the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian SSR, and in April 1937 Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, whose first secretary by that time was Beria, abolished.

Akhundov and Musabegov worked in Azerbaijan, and from the spring of 1937, Beria, being the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia, was no longer a party leader for them. AND Bagirov gave the sanction for their arrest along the party line. As

for Unshlikht, Beria did not and could not have any influence.

Like this!

BUT YET, we still have the year 1922, and brilliant service and party attestations. The Berias prove one thing: to do so much and so much in such a short time keep up, diligence alone is not enough, and even diligence and abilities are also not enough. Here you need a gift from God, talent! So

after all, Beria was obviously talented! And because of what else, if not because of this, his so insistently wants to drag the Georgian leadership to him? Indeed, how is it!

Born in Georgia, parents - in Georgia, and he is there on The Caspian Sea works for the Baku "uncle". No, give it to us in our native lands!

And in November 1922, Beria, by order of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, was recalled from AzChK at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia. And in Tiflis, Lavrenty is appointed chief secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia. In his Tale

of Life, Konstantin Paustovsky admitted: "I already knew a lot places and cities of Russia. Some of these cities were immediately taken prisoner by their originality. But I have not yet seen such a confused, motley, light and magnificent city as Tiflis. This is said about Tiflis

about those years when there - already as in the capital of the Soviet Georgia - a young Chekist Beria arrived. But not so carefree was waiting for him here. the life that the young writer Paustovsky could afford. Let's say Paustovsky

described his meeting with bandits - deserters in the mountains Caucasus as an adventure, but Beria had to catch these bandits. Paustovsky recalled:

"The whole of Batumi was noisy in the wind from the flags. Almost half of the flags were Turkish. Residents of the city have not yet had time to make new, Soviet flags."

And Beria and his colleagues had to figure out who "hadn't had time yet" and who hadn't away so that the Turkish flags will continue to fly over Batumi.

Paustovsky, as a funny figure, wrote about the commandant of Batumi:

"A certain handsome and exaggeratedly gallant colonel, left to the city into a temporary inheritance from ... the Menshevik army.

And Beria had to be evaluated - the colonel remained in Soviet Georgia by chance or by someone's more specific and definite will? But even in Paustovsky we find lines about "alarmed by war and civil strife"

Caucasus, directly related to the tasks of Beria:

"At any turn of the mountain road, one could get a bullet in the back ... Calmness came to the Caucasus slowly, gradually, only with the advent of Soviet power".

And the "punishing sword" of Soviet power in the Caucasus was the GruzChK. And in Tiflis to the Chekist Beria had to work no less hard than in Baku. In addition, he is a member of the Bureau party cell and a member of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

"Considering the seriousness of the work and the large object," wrote Beria, - I give all my knowledge and time to such, as a result, in a relatively in a short time it is possible to achieve serious results that affect all branches of work: such is the liquidation of banditry, which grandiose proportions in Georgia, and the defeat of the Menshevik organization and in general anti-Soviet party, despite the extreme secrecy.

Beria's literary style is far from perfect, but he did not come to Tiflis for material for new books. And not without legitimate pride, he recalls that the first the results of his activities *"are noted by the Central Committee and the CEC of Georgia in the form awarding ... the Order of the Red Banner ... "*

A long Tbilisi period begins in the life and work of Beria, which will end in 1938 with his transfer to Moscow. However,

the life of Lavrenty Beria could have turned out differently if the Central Committee of Georgia had given the course of that statement in the form of an autobiography, which I have repeatedly quoted directly or used in your story.

After all, it was, dear reader, a statement with a certain request. And perhaps, right now, when we have come to 1923, it is appropriate to bring an end to "Autobiography" of Beria, where this statement is formulated.

Here is what Beria asked senior party comrades:

"During my party and Soviet work, especially in the organs of the Cheka, I lagged far behind both in the sense of general development, and still did not finish his special education. Having a vocation for this branch of knowledge, having spent a lot time and effort, I would ask the Central Committee to give me the opportunity to continue this education in order to complete it as soon as possible. Finished special education will provide an opportunity to give their experience and knowledge in this area Soviet construction, and the party - to use me as it finds it necessary.

1923 22/X (signature)".

Yuri Mukhin, Elena

Prudnikova, and even Nikolai Zenkovich in the book "Marshals and General Secretaries" of the 1997 edition asked: "Do you like this young man? Do you like his spiritual impulses, the desire to learn, acquire knowledge, build a new life? Zenkovich himself answered

his own question: "For me, for example, such qualities are very soul!"

However, the "Kremlin scholar" Zenkovich would not have been who he is if, immediately after that, did not ask another question: "Where, then, did the devil, the tyrant, the executioner, whose name like a curse?" The

exact answer is actually this: "Yes, from the pen of people like Nikolai Zenkovich."

But I'm not sure that the reader will already agree with me like this - after all, my book is still far from finished and the reader has yet to get acquainted with many facts and arguments to make a final verdict on both the author's assessments and the hero of his book.

THEREFORE, I will continue to accumulate arguments and say this ... This statement is dated October 22, 1923. And it was written in Tbilisi. And given to The Central Committee - four sheets of this amazing document are in Beria's personal file.

The establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus turned the situation in a completely different direction. And on March 12, 1922, at a plenipotentiary conference of representatives of the Central executive committees of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Transcaucasian

The federation is a federative union of three Soviet republics of Transcaucasia. The

idea of a federation was opposed not only by "notebook nationalists", but also by quite a few national Bolshevik leaders. Mdivani, Dumbadze, Kavtaradze, Okudzhava, Tsintsadze in Georgia, Akhundov, Huseynov, Khanbudagov in Azerbaijan believed that each the republic must keep its army, have its own currency, enjoy freedom

foreign trade and have party autonomy from the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee. Looking ahead, I will say that almost all of the above "Bolsheviks" were in 1938 were repressed, but the reason was not in Beria and Stalin, but in the political degradation of their opponents, which will be discussed later.

The federation option was reasonable, and on December 13 of the same 1922 at the 1st Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets in Baku, the federation was transformed into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

On December 30, the ZSFSR merged with the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR into a single union state - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In Transcaucasia, the restoration of the destroyed and the construction of a new one began. And this economic construction had to be protected from sabotage and sabotage from outside and inside countries. And the calmer it became in Transcaucasia, the more difficult was the work on providing this peace of mind.

The struggle did not stop, it just changed. And its usually hidden from an outsider's view, the character only complicated the situation.

Many of the leaders of the same Mensheviks emigrated across the cordon - Zhordania, Mgeladze, Tsereteli ... Many of their

supporters remained in Georgia, but did the assessment apply to all of them? "former supporters"?

Careerists began to "cling" to the party, and they went into it with subversive goals hidden enemies.

I will remind the reader that the writer Shirvan-Zade said about the Red Army: snatched a gun from the hands of the Caucasian peasants and put a sickle in them, tore proletariat dagger, putting a hammer into them. And the proletariat, the whole people gradually understood this and dropped the weapon.

But not everyone dropped their weapons. And even more so, not everyone disarmed ideologically and morally. AND the deputy chairman of the GruzChK, young Beria, completely goes into the work of

the Chekist. However, to say so is to say very little. After all, then it was difficult in one word or a few words to describe what it is: the work of the Cheka. The

civil war is over, and now the tasks of the Chekists have seriously changed. Bodies VChK-GPU-OGPU now had to deal with so many problems at once that it was possible to lose a

head ... No, the Chekists were not allowed to lose their heads under any load. Nevertheless, the head was one, but the deeds ... There

were a lot of deeds, and different deeds. Opposition to direct, organized, illegal counter-revolutionary activity goes without saying. But besides this, both economic and economic problems, and cultural, and even - sports ... And in the national

republics - also national problems. And specifically in Transcaucasia, all this was painted in especially specific political and social tones. In 1910, Stalin published two very informative and well-aimed "Letters from

Caucasus" - "Baku" and "Tiflis".

In a letter to Tiflis, he wrote:

"In terms of the development of industry, Tiflis represents a direct the opposite of Baku. If Baku is interesting as a center of oil industry, then Tiflis may be of interest only as an administrative, commercial and "cultural" center of the Caucasus. All industrial workers in Tiflis about 20 thousand, i.e., less than soldiers and policemen. The only major enterprise - railway workshops (about 3,500 workers). In the rest enterprises of 200, 100 and mostly 40-20 people. But Tiflis literally fill trading establishments and the associated "trade proletariat"... This... explains why Menshevism... has held out for so long in Tiflis. Whether it's in Baku, where the class position of the Bolsheviks is sharply a lively response among the workers!"

But Beria was now working not in Baku, but precisely in Tiflis, where the class support for The Soviet government and its special services were less massive. And in Tiflis it was especially developed Menshevik and bourgeois nationalism.

Russia, which was foolishly called the "prison of peoples", for centuries was more like a fortress, behind the walls of which many peoples were able to preserve, if not their national statehood, then national identity, which is perhaps more important. And the brightest examples here are Georgia and Armenia.

It is unlikely that they would exist today, in the 21st century, at least in some form, if it were not for The Russian state, if not for Russia, to which Georgians and Armenians have huddled for centuries. And what is today called Georgia was gathered around Tbilisi by the first decade of the 19th century efforts of Russian policy, contrary to the aspirations of Turkey and Iran, to rigidly enslave these earth.

Nevertheless, in 1832, a noble conspiracy was uncovered, which had the goal of rejecting Georgia from Russia ... Georgian Iosif Dzhugashvili, who became famous under the political pseudonym Stalin, wrote about this: "Georgian nobility ... considering" a simple allegiance" by belittling one's dignity, wished for the "liberation of Georgia"... This the movement ... did not acquire glory for itself by a single fact ...

"Still! After all, if the plot was successful, not only would they go under a sharp Turkish knife Kartli peasants, but also sovereign princes. But can any nationalists - in all the time - to see beyond your own arrogant nose?

They didn't see it! And the Georgian "democratic" "intelligentsia" had a strong desire to break away from Russia even in pre-revolutionary times. Leader of the future Mensheviks Noi Zhordania in 1893 at the first meeting of the Marxist group in Georgia proposed to establish not a social-democratic, but a national-democratic party. And not it was by chance that it was in Georgia that the Mensheviks were very strong. Menshevik the party had **tens of thousands** of members in

Georgia. The total number of Bolsheviks in Georgia did not exceed **two thousand** - up to establishment of Soviet power. But less than a year after its establishment, in 1922, there were already 18,821 people in the Communist Party of Georgia! Soon

there was a purge, and almost half of the composition was excluded as adhering and alien elements. There were 10,816 people left, but in 1927 the GKP(b) had already 32,712 members. But how many among these three tens of thousands of members were real Bolsheviks, it was impossible to say.

But the composition of the Transcaucasian political "okroshka" by hidden Georgian was not limited to the Mensheviks. Quite a real factor of destabilization, terror and sabotage were monarchists who went underground, separatists, Armenian Dashnaks, Azerbaijani Musavatists.

And besides this - for a complete "gentleman's set" - agents of England (as without

them in the then Caucasus and Transcaucasia!), Turkey and Persia (Iran). And the US Ambassador Smith, departing from Tiflis, left someone in Tiflis.

It was impossible to forget about the German agents - both intelligence and agents influence. After all, the Germans, especially in Transcaucasia, have been strongly present for a long time. Richard Sorge was not a native of Leipzig, but Baku! It was there in 1895 in the family of a German engineer oil firm of Adolf Sorge, who occupied a two-story house in Ajikent, nearby from Baku crafts, the fifth child was born. But not all Germans, natives Adzhikenta, growing up, became members of the Comintern, like Sorge. Someone went to the Reichswehr, to the political intelligence of Germany.

And in Transcaucasia - as elsewhere in the USSR then - there were enough Trotskyists. How did they differ from the Bolsheviks? First of all, by the fact that they saw a base in the USSR world revolution. Is it worth it, they say, to strengthen the USSR, they said, if without a "world fire" is he still doomed?

Stalin and his supporters saw in the USSR, first of all, a new Russia capable of future, when it becomes powerful, economically developed and invincible in militarily, to lead the peoples of the world to a reasonable and just life already on the whole planet.

Trotskyists were enemies of Russia everywhere, and in Transcaucasia, Trotskyists were also dangerous nationalism. Typical in this respect is the example of Budu Mdivani. And characteristic so much so that I will dwell on it in detail ...

POLIKARP Gurgenevich (Budu) Mdivani was born in 1877, and has been in the party since 1903. He carried out revolutionary work in Kutaisi, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku and other cities of Transcaucasia. Repeatedly subjected to repression under tsarism. In 1921 - Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee Georgia. In 1922 he was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. In 1924 - trading Representative of the USSR in France. From 1931 to 1936 - Chairman of the Supreme Council national economy of Georgia. It

would seem that everything is OK?

Unfortunately no! Of those like Mdivani, in the Khrushchev-Gorbachev era, "fighters of the ideological front of the Central Committee" made "a cohort of the Leninist guard", but for the first time the name Mdivani appears in Lenin's correspondence on September 26, 1922: "Tomorrow I will see Mdivani (Georgian communist suspected of "independence")". Then Lenin learned for the first time about the existence in nature of this supposedly his "guardsman".

Mdivani was a communist in form, but in essence he was an amazing mix of nationalist and a Trotskyist (only oil and vinegar do not mix, and in politics it is not uncommon, having gone to the left, they come to the right).

In the early 1920s, just when Beria was sent to Georgia, Mdivani and his supporters made up the majority in the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia. **Majority**, dear reader! In

fact, they hampered the economic and political unification of the Transcaucasian republics and sought to preserve the isolation of Georgia. At first, the Mdivani group was generally opposed to the formation of the USSR, and after the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in October 1922 decided to create the USSR, the Mdivani group began to seek direct entry of Georgia into a union state, and not through the Transcaucasian Federation.

In the comments, not just anywhere, but to the 54th volume of Lenin's Complete Collection writings" clearly states: "This

position of Mdivani and his supporters played into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists, the Georgian Mensheviks, and the communists of Georgia at their congresses, conferences and meetings of party activists rightly regarded it as a deviation towards nationalism "...

But how many of those communists were there then in Georgia? So Mdivani objectively became a very attractive figure for all anti-Soviet Georgian forces. Was he

good for the fanfaronist Trotsky, who even then could not stand the businesslike Stalin.

Many years after the events described, when other, very sad events of the late 80s were already taking place in the country, the writer Felix Chuev in his book "So Spoke Kaganovich" cited the following conversation with Stalin's former "iron commissar":

Kaganovich: And what is happening with Georgia is a nightmare!

Chuev: Georgians need trade directly with the West. Of course simple people will get nothing from it.

Kaganovich: What Mdivani demanded under Lenin. And they want to get away from us. **Chuev:** But the Abkhazians don't want to.

Kaganovich: Abkhazians are not Georgians.

With this dialogue in mind, let's go back to the year 1922. Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP(b), to which the national Central Committees were subordinate, then headed by Sergo Ordzhonikidze.

He was a firm supporter of the Union, but he was also an ardent man, and his conflict with Mdivani's group also acquired a "hot" character. Moreover, the party mass of Georgia was on Sergo's side. In

October 1922, the Mdivani group addressed Moscow by direct wire with complaint against Sergo and "in protest" resigned. The so-called Georgian question.

I wrote "with a complaint," but it didn't seem to be much of a complaint, because on October 21, Lenin sent a cipher to Tiflis, where it was said:

"Surprised by the obscene tone of the note on the direct wire signed Tsintsadze and others, handed over to me for some reason by Bukharin (yes! - **S.K.**), and not one of the secretaries of the Central Committee ... I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and I insist on conveying your conflict in a decent and loyal tone to

permission from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party..."

On November 25, the Politburo decided to send a commission to Georgia headed by Dzerzhinsky for the urgent development of measures "necessary to establish a lasting peace in Communist Party of

Georgia. The Dzerzhinsky commission worked in Tiflis for about two weeks (December 12, Felix Edmundovich reported to Lenin on the results of the trip), and her work proceeded stormily. Suffice it to say that Ordzhonikidze slapped one of Mdivani's supporters. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky took this calmly, while Lenin was very indignant. But he was indignant all the same in vain - this company deserved nothing else!

And just in November 1922, Beria arrives in Tiflis! Arrives in the midst of a fight (like we see, even in the literal sense of the word) between real Leninists and "Leninists" in quotation marks. And he immediately takes the side of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze ...

You can imagine, reader, how much Lavrenty Beria is on this one at once he earned himself not only enemies, but mortal enemies!

What is there! Mentioned in Lenin's cipher, Tsintsadze was also an old Bolshevik, since 1904, under the tsar he worked with Mdivani in Kutaisi, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku. And then

establishment of Soviet power in Georgia became ... a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, a member of the Central Executive Committee Georgia and ... the chairman of the Cheka of the Georgian SSR. That is, the Trotskyist Tsintsadze (in 1927 his expelled from the party) for some time was the direct boss of Beria! I do not envy

Beria - with his principles! The conflict was then outwardly settled, but in fact it was only driven inside. And in 1928 Mdivani was expelled from the party for his Trotsky-opposition activities. In 1931 he allegedly repented and was restored, but in 1937 he was arrested and sentenced to execution.

And quite to the point. After hearing the "execution" sentence, Buda said:

"It's not enough to shoot me, I need to be quartered! After all, it's me, I brought here eleventh army, I betrayed my people and helped Stalin and Beria, with this degenerates, enslave Georgia and bring Lenin's party to its knees.

Like this! No more, but no less.

ABOUT "Lenin's party" Mdivani blurted out like this - for effect. Here is his real one the political (and human) face in this last word was fully manifested distinctly. And it is unlikely that it will look for you, dear reader, more attractive when the time comes for a story about what the summer of 1937 was socialist Georgia and what it became in the next few years.

By the way, in 1922 Sergei Ivanovich Kavtaradze was a member of the Mdivani group. The son of a nobleman, he graduated from the law faculty of Petrograd University in 1915. Like Mdivani, he has been a Bolshevik since 1903, from the age of eighteen. He worked in Kutaisi, Batumi, Tiflis, Baku, St. Petersburg, was arrested. In 1919 he was sent to Georgia - like Beria - for underground work, was arrested twice for "anti-government" activities. Since May 1920, he worked for Kirov - like Beria - in the representative office RSFSR in Tiflis. In 1922-1923 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, in 1924-1928 - First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR. In 1927 he joined Trotskyist opposition and in December 1927 was expelled from the party by the XV Congress VKP(b).

He was restored to the party only in 1940! Moreover, this former active the Trotskyist safely, not hiding anywhere, survived the "great terror", was not arrested, was not repressed, and in 1941 he was appointed head of the Central Asian Department People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, then - Deputy People's Commissar. After the war, he was ambassador to Romania, retired in 1954 and died in 1971, eighty-six years old. Like this! It would seem that someone had to go "under the knife" of the "executioner of Beria", so this nobleman Kavtaradze. Both the Trotskyist and the underground work of the "coward and traitor" knew Beria. But Sergei Ivanovich simply stopped playing politics, and there was no need to touch him - no for what!

People like Mdivani, Orakhelashvili and others did not let up and quarreled, bred nepotism and mutual responsibility, "dripped" on the brains, itched ... And Beria was a solid Bolshevik-Stalinist. And already in the twenties did not suit many even in allegedly Bolshevik Caucasian camp.

In the "Letters from the Caucasus" mentioned above, Stalin noted the "special propensity" of the Tiflis Bolsheviks for discussions. He explained this by saying that in Tiflis they needed especially stubbornly wage an ideological struggle against the Mensheviks. However, it is often said that sow a habit, you reap a character, and sow a character, you reap a destiny...

The habit of verbal battles before the revolution led to the tendency of the Georgian party, state and economic leadership of the 20s to excessive chatter instead of concrete deeds. That is, just to what Beria could not and did not tolerate.

And besides these unfortunate "leaders" there were, as already mentioned, lurking Mensheviks. Stalin called them back in 1907 "our Caucasian clowns", which the same Noah Jordania ("comrade An"), of course, could not forgive him.

Jordania emigrated, but did not withdraw from politics. And to make the reader better imagined the orientation of Jordania, I will report that this "theorist" reasoned at the beginning XX century: "Who in Georgia is the bearer of progress? Armenians are representatives backward, reactionary, predatory (commercial) capitalism. Russians are officials and landowners, conservatives. Europeans - this is progress, this is who points out to the Georgians path to the future."

Jordania's Kvali (Furrow) organ published laudatory biographies of Napoleon, Gladstone, Bismarck... The Jordanian party especially loved the British Empire, and in 1919

Jordania boasted that he had been conducting propaganda for her for 25 years.

During the evacuation from Batumi to Turkey, the "nationalist" government of Jordania exported from Georgia, by the way, the entire supply of quinine, vital for malarial (then) Georgia. And now Zhordania abroad

wished only one thing for Soviet Georgia—death, as did his supporters in Georgia itself. Some were preparing conspiracies, others were just itching ... However, the first and second could not but fall into the field of view of Lavrenty Beria and his department. And for 1923, out of 31 gangs established by the Chekists on the territory of Georgia, 21 were destroyed, during the fighting 123 bandits were killed, 377 were captured alive.

A separate "item" of concern for Beria was the Dashnaks, who at one time moved from already Soviet Armenia into still Menshevik Georgia. At the beginning of 1923 the main backbone of the Dashnak activists in Georgia was arrested, including the entire composition of their Tiflis committee. 11 machine guns, 33 boxes of grenades, 70 rifles, 30 bags of artillery gunpowder, 70 dynamite plates, 500 pounds of cartridges were confiscated from a secret warehouse in Akhaltsikhe ... But the main pain, of course, was the Georgian counter-revolutionaries.

AMAZING all the same thing - the fate of man! How much they tried to cut, black out, etch out any positive word about the role Beria in the history of the USSR! And the truth about him - albeit without mentioning his name - was reported not by anyone, but by Politizdat, even in 1978, when the second edition was published in Moscow David's monographs

Lvovich Golinkov "The collapse of the anti-Soviet underground in the USSR".

Yes, if a person's affairs are big and he served the Motherland honestly, then it's impossible to be silent these things completely. So, one of the chapters of the monograph was called "The adventure of the Georgian "parity"" and was devoted to the work of the Georgian Cheka in 1922-1925. Between other things, even when throughout the Union the organs of the Cheka were replaced by organs of the GPU, in Georgia it was the *Extraordinary* Commission for Combating counter-revolution - that's how difficult the operational situation was there.

In the purely documentary book of Golinkov, the name of Lavrenty Beria is not even mentioned. But about the work of the GruzChK, in which the head of the secret political department and deputy chairman played a leading role, told vividly.

This is the story I use! From August 25 to

August 30, 1923, a congress of Georgian

Mensheviks, whose delegates represented 11,235 party members. Congress announced liquidation of the party, but even before that, about 17 thousand workers and peasants left it. On about 2 thousand people remained on the side of the former Central Committee of the Mensheviks, mainly people from noble and bourgeois circles.

A "Georgian government in exile" was formed abroad, headed by Noah Zhordania, Noah Ramishvili and Irakli Tsereteli. In Georgia, representatives of the five parties that went underground - the Social Democrats (Mensheviks), National Democrats, Socialist Federalists, Independent Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries - concluded an agreement on the establishment of the "Committee of Independence". It was also called the "Parity Committee", because the five parties agreed: after overthrow of Soviet power, a parity commission will be formed, and not a single party will be able to occupy more than a third of the seats in the coalition government.

With arithmetic, the "parity" was, as we see, bad, because the word "parity" comes from the Latin paritas, which means "equality", and five-thirds into one whole is not are placed.

The "parity" was led by a member of the Central Committee of the party who arrived for this from behind the cordon Georgian Mensheviks, former Minister of Agriculture Noy Khomeriki (judging by the number Noah in their leadership, the Georgian Mensheviks traced their origin directly forefather of post-Flood mankind).

The GruzChK had a serious adversary in the face of the "Committee of Independence", but also the committee members in the person of the GruzChK were also far from being rotten in front of them. In 1924 Chekists of Beria arrested Khomeriki, members of the Menshevik Central Committee Chkhikishvili, Nodia and others.

Chkhikishvili was found to have a letter from Noah Zhordania, who instructed the "fighters" as follows:

"Russian tsars fought Dagestan alone for more than 30 years. And how many years will be needed by the Bolsheviks in order to fight not only Dagestan, but the whole Transcaucasia, it is easy to imagine. Transfer of a military base to the Caucasus Range and strengthening there with all our armed forces is the guarantee of our victory. Only in this case will Europe pay serious attention to us and help".

That's it, reader! These good-looking scoundrels, who honored Stalin as a barbarian, were ready to turn Transcaucasia into a place of constant military operations, ruining land and bring suffering to the people. Yes, they soon tried to do it - in Georgia an uprising was being prepared.

But the Menshevik adventure was already close to collapse. August 6, 1924 GruzChK arrested the emissary of Jordania - Valiko Dzhugeli. Moreover, Beria behaved with Dzhugeli in such a way that he was convinced that even without his confessions, the Georgian security officers have detailed information about activities of the Independence Committee.

Further, the deputy chairman of the GruzChK, Beria, acted nobly and at the same time prudently. And he proved at the same time that he understands: human blood is not water.

It would seem that if most of the threads of the conspiracy are in your hands, then the best way to curry favor for a careerist - immediately proceed to arrests, regardless of the scale of losses, and others, and their own. On the contrary, the larger they are, the more weight can be given to victory.

And Beria accepts Dzhugeli's proposal (it is possible, however, that he himself Dzhugeli suggested) to turn from the conclusion to the leaders of the impending speech with a recommendation to abandon - as he was convinced - an adventure. Dzhugeli did not want in vain blood. But Beria did not want her either!

Dzhugeli's letter was published in Soviet Georgian newspapers, and this is what he wrote, among other things:

"I experienced the terrible influence of the Cheka air, and I realized that all the power of this air lies in the fact that it is here that you get to know the reverse side of our work, with all its shadow sides.

Dzhugeli stated that it was not cowardice and cowardice that led him to give up the fight, but hopelessness of the planned enterprise. But after all, it was necessary to be able to prove this to Dzhugeli, to convince him. And to convince, it was necessary to have convincing evidence. And the secret political department of the GruzChK had them. However, the

conspirators did not heed the call of Dzhugeli, and on August 28, an armed group Prince George Tsereteli captured Chiatura and formed the Provisional Government of Georgia. There were minor performances in Senak, Seberinsky, Zugdidi, Dusheti districts, in Guria ... But by August 31, 1924, everything was completed with the support of most places of the population itself. In Adjara, to strengthen the protection of the border with Turkey fifteen hundred peasants came.

On September 4, 1924, employees of the GruzChK tracked down and arrested the main "Parity Committee" headed by Prince Kote Andronikashvili. But, as most often sometimes, the liquidation of the "head" of the conspiracy did not liquidate all its participants.

And it soon came to light in a very visible way.

IN AUTUMN 1925, Beria with a group of Chekists in two cars was returning along Georgian military road to Tiflis. An ambush awaited them at the mountain pass. Beria was driving the first car - this was how it was in the Cheka from the first days: the one who senior in rank. One Chekist

was killed, two were wounded. But Beria - this is not my assessment - "did not lose presence of mind" and, shooting back, covered the rest. Well,

what here, it would seem, to complain about? The hero did not abandon his wounded comrades, he covered them with fire. But the slanderer will always find where to bite ... And Antonov-Ovseenko for this about "thinking":

"How did Beria survive if he was driving the first car, and even shot back?"

This "still shot back" is just great! According to Ovseenko, it turns out that if Beria did not shoot back, then he would have had more chances to survive!

Absurd?

Alas, not quite ... This is the very monstrous lie when they lie so totally that lies are hard to believe. Unless, of course, you act in accordance with the recommendation Marx: "Question everything." Do not "doubt

everything" - it is useless! But question everything in order to after a balanced analysis, either accept something as fact, or discard it as fiction.

And as soon as we act "according to Marx", all "suspicions" about the staging this ambush by Beria collapses immediately. In life there are no dramatizations where three people in transient situations receive real bullets and where the customer himself is staging in conditions of the mountains, you can easily get a fourth - just crazy. No, at that (and only at that?) time, real and cruel enemies fired at Beria. AND

these enemies, as Soviet power strengthened, only changed the forms of struggle, but from the struggle as such was not refused. Therefore, Beria had to remain a Chekist, never retrained as an architect.

BOURGEOIS public figure and moderate Kolchakist I. I. Serebrennikov in exile he wrote memoirs, where there are frank confessions ...

"The nationalization of industrial and commercial enterprises that had begun," he recalled, "the confiscation of valuables in banks and, most importantly, the trampling of all freedoms and private property rights deepened the sea of bitterness against invaders in all circles of society, except for those who had nothing to lose (and such in tsarist Russia was somewhere around 70 percent or so. - **S.K.**)...

Bolshevik "action" gave rise to its opposition. Resistance to the Bolsheviks it was expressed in different forms; main *forms* of expression were passive methods of struggle, boycott and sabotage...

In Irkutsk, as in many major Russian urban centers, many employees of government agencies began to leave their places ... The rest ... began to work under duress ... without showing any zeal and sometimes even deliberately undermining the success of this enterprise ...

In Irkutsk, almost in February 1918, the organization of officers in a secret anti-Bolshevik detachment.

This is how it all began... And not only, of course, in Siberia, but also in the Transcaucasus. rout in the Civil War, opponents of the nationalization of industrial and commercial enterprises, confiscation of valuables in banks and "trampling" of private property rights temporarily reduced the visible opposition of the old, greedy, and the new - humane ... But immediately after Stalin's party took a course towards industrialization and

collectivization, a new civil war began in the country of an embittered and very the educated minority versus the majority. It was conducted by

different methods and was conducted everywhere - starting from those places from where to the country the sun comes from Primorye. And what about the turbulent 20s! Looking ahead, let's take a year 1933 ... At the most powerful in Primorye, the Putyatinsky cannery, the daily production dropped from 1,000 cases of canned food a day to 150–200. Part of export canned food was delivered daily to landfills ...

In Vladivostok, a new bakery was "commissioned" without a fermentation chamber and other necessary equipment...

At the Far Eastern Industrial Academy, Academicians Mirokhin and Ushakov openly talked about the restoration of capitalism, and when they were expelled from the academy, their supporters gave them a magnificent send-off, in which communist students participated ...

In the collective farms of the Ussuriysk region, rumors were spreading that Komsomol members would be alive in dig the earth. The fists declared: "We'll see who wins" ... The Separate Red Banner Far

Eastern Army was also restless ... A typical example from the report of the Chairman of the OGPU G. G. Yagoda to Stalin dated May 4, 1933:

"Assistant]. for Political Affairs of the Chief of Communications of the Heavy Division 1 S. D. Divanov, Member VKP(b), during political studies under the Red Army, the book "Questions Leninism" called a prayer book, the law of God, painted Jesus on it Christ and before the start of classes he said "Hallelujah, hallelujah" ...

Let's take places closer to Moscow - Central Kazakhstan, the shores of the bay Bertys... Balkhashstroy, Balkhash copper smelter. The investment program for the 1st quarter of 1934 was thwarted, out of 20 million rubles, 316,500 rubles were disbursed for half a quarter. Chief Engineer Arkhireev was not at the construction site for two months. Chief Assistant engineer Kraines, former owner of a copper smelter, laid out engineering and technical workers ... Arriving equipment is not taken into account ... Works are carried out without projects and estimates ... "

And this is not an invention of the OGPU, dear reader, although the data is taken from a special message Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G. E. Prokofiev to Stalin dated March 20, 1934. And here is Moscow itself, August 1931. Kaganovich complains to Stalin:

"With the order for oil tankers, an ugly picture emerged deliberate delay and red tape on the part of the NKTorg, and meanwhile the directive of the PB was quite clear - to purchase ships for 250 tons no older than the 25th year, spending up to 25 million. rubles, and now you have to spend the currency on chartering".

You read about such savagery and you don't believe that out of all these "drag and toss" the country was able to get out in a matter of years! The first stage of the same Balkhash plant was commissioned in 1938. In 1950, in those places where nothing had grown before, a botanical garden bloomed, on irrigated lands ripened delicious watermelons and tomatoes ... And Vladivostok by

the end of the thirties had a different look. And the general mood of the active part people by 1938, and even more so by 1941, had changed beyond recognition. The revolution took place, I repeat, in a matter of years! But one of the

reasons for this is the tough repressive policy of the Bolsheviks, in the same a few years who managed to rigidly separate the "tares" from the "grains" in the masses of the people in the interests of the masses of the people! And it's time to understand it! Yes,

perhaps in the name of the smart and abundant life of the people, the assistant for the political department of the chief of communications tyazhartdiva 1 S. D. Divanov, having made his way into the CPSU (b), led an anti-communist propaganda?

Did the chief engineer of Balkhashstroy Arkhireev, destroying the construction, do it during the name of a mighty and independent

Russia? And Chekist Beria served such a Russia, which, under the leadership of Stalin's party, transformed itself into a first-class world power in the eyes of the world.

BERIA worked hard and well. Back in 1924, the then 1st Secretary The Transcaucasian Regional Committee Alexander Myasnikov (Myasnikyan) gave him a very flattering characteristic and noted that "Beria is an intellectual ... declared himself in Baku as a capable Chekist ...".

Myasnikov, a Bolshevik since 1906, was thirteen years older than Beria, in 1911 graduated from the law faculty of Moscow University and, after serving a year in the army volunteer, until 1914 he was an assistant to a barrister in Moscow (since 1914 at the front, ensign). All this to the fact that Myasnikov himself was quite intelligent, developed person. And the fact that he appreciated not only the KGB qualities Beria, but also his intelligence speaks for itself. Moreover, it is

necessary to emphasize one more point, which is somehow forgotten. Both in AzChK and in the GruzChK, and then in the GPU of Georgia, Beria was not just a deputy chairman, but also head of the SPO - secret political department. In other words, he was in charge of intelligence. A intelligence, as you know, is a delicate matter, and poorly educated ignoramuses try not to let in. Beria

himself, however, constantly felt the lack of a real education, and in May 1930 he wrote to Ordzhonikidze:

"Dear Sergo, more than once I have raised the question of my studies before you. Time passes, around people grow, develop, and those who were yesterday far from me, gone ahead today. I know that I am way behind. After all, at our Chekist work we often do not have time to even read a newspaper, let alone engage in self-education ..."

Perhaps when he wrote these lines, Beria was thinking about a blonde with blue through the eyes - to Nino's wife, who graduated from the Faculty of Economics of the University, cooked dissertation. All this was far from him in 1930, just as in 1922, in 1923 ... And he bitterly remarked:

"Dear Sergo! I know you will say that now is not the time to raise the issue. about studying. But what to do ... I feel that I can no longer ..."

Beria at that time was only thirty-second year old, and he was the Chairman of the GPU Georgia and Deputy Chairman of the GPU of the Transcaucasian SFSR.

And, even occupying such positions, he wanted to learn. Although it is possible that now he, if would have had the opportunity to choose the profile of education, would have chosen not architectural faculty, but, say, the Industrial Academy, which trains personnel for economic leaders.

After all, Beria always had the makings of a brilliant leader and a major organizer. AND before his arrival in Georgia, and after his departure to Moscow, he is in all the posts he holds showed obvious competence and even supercompetence. Supercompetence is a diverse concept. Confirmation of supercompetence athlete - a world record. Composer - "Moonlight Sonata" ... Writer - "War and world"...

And what does it mean to be a super-competent leader? work fourteen hours a day? I do not argue, this is also. Be able to give specific instructions or advice, be able to to make the right and quick decision, and not to carry out "general intervention in the affairs subordinates"? And this is also ... Like the ability to see problems in general, the ability to see

perspective.

But a super-competent leader is, first of all, a skillful selection of personnel and the ability to neutralize the threat of their degradation. It is said that the environment "plays" the king. Right! But in order to be strong, the king must be competent in business.

selection of such an environment, which in itself is strong and outstanding. As deputy chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia, Beria did not have absolute opportunities formation of an ideal "team", but he - there can be no doubt - belonged to this responsibly and interestedly. That is competent.

And he obviously didn't show off when he wrote to Ordzhonikidze in Moscow:

"My departure at work will not be reflected. The office of the Georgian State Pedagogical University both in the center and in the field is well-organized and works so clearly that any comrade who leads it after me, handle the situation.

The AzGPU apparatus in the center is also adjusted. The apparatus is now being strengthened ArmGPU by transferring new workers there."

And this strong apparatus "in the center and in the localities", established by Beria, could carry out Chekist work calmly, systematically and also competently. In Transcaucasia under Beria there were assaults and "shock campaigns". In sports terms, consistently high the results were ensured by persistent and daily "training". By the way, about sports. For a Chekist, good

physical shape is one of the mandatory qualities. competent professional. And Beria, as I said, could already in the Transcaucasian period activities to claim supercompetence - not in sports, of course. And if so, then Chekist bodies of Transcaucasia to the physical development of employees had to be treated with due care.

And so it was, because the deputy chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU himself set a personal example here. Let's say he played football in such a way that in the early 20s he played for Dynamo Tbilisi, and when the Moscow team arrived in Tiflis, he played as a left midfielder against Nikolai Starostin (this Spartacist will be remembered later). Actually, the high level

of Georgian football already in the thirties is not the last thing I owe to Beria ... And certainly the city of Tbilisi owed him a wonderful republican stadium, not accidentally named the same as the KGB sports society, - Dynamo, and it was not by chance that they bore the name of Beria until the summer of 1953.

SO, in the early 30s, in purely KGB work in the Transcaucasus, Beria was competent and independent. However, the general leadership of the life of Transcaucasia in Beria's prerogatives were not included then. This was done by "senior comrades", most often not having, to put it mildly, high business, and by that time, political competence. They brewed political "porridge", and the Chekists often had to disentangle them. This happened, for example, with collectivization in Transcaucasia. Around the events of the "Great Break" in the life of

the peasantry and in its mass consciousness a number of vile myths have been created today, and this is also one of the signs of an unprecedented hitherto muddy time in Rus'. Exposing such myths is beyond the scope of my book, but something here need to say.

Repeatedly and unreasonably ridiculed by "democrats" "History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A Short Course, published by Gospolitizdat in 1945, reported:

"The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class was enshrined in historical resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 5, 1930 "On the pace collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective-farm construction "" ...

Various rates of collectivization were established. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks divided the regions USSR in terms of the pace of collectivization into three groups.

The first group included the most important grain regions, the most prepared for collectivization, having more tractors, more state farms, more experience in the fight against the kulaks in past grain procurement campaigns, - Severny Caucasus (Kuban, Don, Terek), Middle Volga, Lower Volga. For this group of cereals districts of the Central Committee proposed to complete the collectivization in the spring of 1931.

The second group of grain regions, which included Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, Siberia, Ural, Kazakhstan and other grain regions, could finish basically collectivization in the spring of 1932.

The rest of the regions, territories and republics (Moscow region, Transcaucasia, Central Asian republics, etc.) could stretch the terms of collectivization until the end of the five-year plan, that is, until 1933). As

you can see, Moscow and Stalin were quite realistic and, on the whole, true and the groups identified and set deadlines. But two factors worked: the desire of "places" to report as soon as possible, and to an even greater extent - hidden Trotskyist provocations. Yes, Moscow the region began to focus on the completion of collectivization in the spring of 1930 (instead of the deadline - the end of 1933). And one of the reasons was that the secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU (b) was Karl Bauman, in April 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. In

the same year, Bauman was simply replaced by Lazar Kaganovich, making him the 1st secretary Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee (this is how strong the hidden oppositionists). And by the end of 1931 in the Moscow region, the level of collectivization reached the level of only 37.5% of peasant farms. In

Transcaucasia, even more gross "excesses" were allowed. Although there behind this the standard formula much more often than in other areas were not only "percent mania" and opposition from the opposition, but also a disguised internal counter-revolution and subversion from outside. Here

is part of the note of the chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU, S. F. Redens, and the chief secret operations department of L.P. Beria, sent on March 11, 1930 to the first Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G. G. Yagoda by direct wire:

"Owls. secret

Moscow, OGPU - comrade. BERRY

As a result of insufficient coverage of the huge number of newly created collective farms, admitted excesses, intra-kolkhoz shortcomings and general activation of anti-Soviet and kulak forces, mass anti-collective farm speeches that take on political overtones, a number of districts ... There is a rapid disintegration of collective farms, accompanied by a number of cases of defeating the village councils, beating and expulsion of party members and coactive. The uprisings that have taken place have so far been liquidated by peaceful means and persuasion, and only in rare cases by demonstration and insignificant military force, initiators and direct participants in the rout and violence, with a few exceptions, was not arrested ... all this was interpreted population as a sign of weakness in power and contributed to even greater insolence of those who spoke under the influence of anti-Soviet forces ... A

particularly tense situation was created in the Turkic regions. IN

In the Vedibasar district of the Erivan district, up to 250 people went to the mountains together with their families, of which up to 150 were armed. The departed led a wide campaign in the surrounding villages and recruiting supporters. To eliminate the speech, which took on a broad character, it was necessary to send a military group up to 30 bayonets. Subsequent negotiations did not yield results, so operational operations will begin on March 11. In the rest of the Turkic regions of Armenia, as well

as in certain

in the border Turkic villages of Georgia, there is a strong migration movement - flight to Turkey. For Georgia and Armenia, and in particular for Azerbaijan, went underground and are hiding with weapons groups of kulaks, at their expense, the existing gangs were significantly replenished ... "

And it was the very "old Bolsheviks", those "victims of Stalin and Beria", about which the current liberals and "democrats" shed tears. Created and due to leftist delusions - Sergey Kavtaradze, for example, was a sincere supporter tough policy.

They were also created maliciously - to discredit the "Stalin regime". After all, if you believe not to anyone, but to Antonov-Ovseenko (and here you can trust him!), in the environment of the then Georgian leadership "remembered the opinion of the old guard of the Social Democrats: Noah Zhordania called Stalin nothing more than a barbarian. And

the "recognized Bolsheviks" Mikha Tskhakaya, Philip Makharadze, Shalva Eliava, Mamiya Orakhelashvili - according to Ovseenko - were perplexed: "What kind of leader is this?"

Well, 65-year-old (in 1930) long-liver Tskhakaya (he died in 1950), chairman of the Central Executive Committee ZSFSR, was already a predominantly representative figure - like Kalinin in Moscow.

The 63-year-old (in 1931) Filipp Makharadze, who replaced Tskhakaya as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the TSFSR in 1931 (died in December 1941 in Tbilisi), was a fighter from the same venerable grey-haired cohort of permanently grumbling patriarchs.

But the 47-year-old (in 1930) chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, Shalva Eliava, the former People's Commissar of the Military Sea of Georgia, together with the 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, 49-year-old Mamiya Orakhelashvili was not so much grumbled as acted. After all, for them almost their the same age as Stalin, who in 1930 was only 51 years old, was not very much a leader. IN difference, it should be noted, from the "old revolutionary" Trotsky.

These, accustomed to the Caucasian kunachestvo and cabal, "genatsvale" already then interfered with the normal socialist construction in Georgia, and their conflict with the course Stalin's "barbarian" was inevitable. Therefore, their conflict with Beria was inevitable.

In the 19th century, the French historian Jules Michelet said: "Sensitive people, weeping over the horrors of the revolution, shed a few tears over the horrors of its gave birth."

And at the beginning of the 21st century, may I be allowed to say to myself: "Shameless falsifiers, weeping crocodile tears over the horrors (I'm not being ironic!)

gave birth."

After all, they were, my dear reader, both provocations and ambitions ...

Beria in March 1930 turned thirty-one years old. Not yet the age of Christ, however...

Bursting with conceit and ambitions, Mdivani, Orakhelashvili, Eliava and his brothers Okudzhavs brewed conflicts, and Beria had to take "operational" actions to eliminate them. And this is not an evening gathering. These

are the bayonets of military groups, arrests initiators of speeches and instigators, arrests and ordinary peasants, liquidation gangs, machine guns, rifles, cartridges and grenades... This is

blood. Both one's own and someone else's, which, although someone else's, is also blood. And this, of course, tired.

Indeed, on the Chekist front, a real Chekist received not only well-deserved bullets enemy, but also undeserved spitting, even if ignorant and deceived, even if they do not know how look into the future, but their own fellow citizens. Yes, and not only ignorant ones ... And perhaps not so much ignorant as quite educated, for the most vicious and the ignorance of highly educated ignoramuses is indestructible.

The note by Redens and Beria to Moscow about the situation with the collective farms is dated March 1930.

And in May, Beria writes to Ordzhonikidze the letter that I have already partially quoted. And in it there are lines indicative of the then psychological state of Lavrenty. Justifying before Ordzhonikidze the possibility of his direction to study, Beria wrote:

"I think that my departure from the Transcaucasus will even serve the best. After all, for ten years of work in the organs of the GPU in the conditions of the Transcaucasus eyes not only to all anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary elements, but also some of our comrades. How many people will actually greet my departure, so I became boring to them with my constant awakening and opening existing shortcomings. They wanted everything to be covered, but here, if you please rejoice, there are shortcomings and blunders all around ...

With me begin to connect all the stories that have ever been in Georgia and in the Transcaucasus in general ... In the minds of many comrades, I am the root cause of all the troubles that befell the comrades in the last time, and appear almost as an informer.

Well, a comprehensive assessment of the situation and leadership on the ground was part of the direct official duties of the plenipotentiary of the OGPU of Transcaucasia. And Lavrenty Beria with his never neglected his duties. And he didn't let

others do it either. They are not liked in many "smoking rooms", and even more so in most chief offices. Indeed, for the opposite, it is required that the owner of the cabinet himself be active leader, whose main "hobby" is his business, which occupies twenty-four hours a day, and not the prescribed "attendance" hours. Lenin

was such a leader. Stalin - too ... Lenin, according to the Menshevik Dana, I always thought about one thing, about the socialist revolution. Stalin also thought about one is about building a power for the working people.

But were the "old party intellectuals" capable of this? Especially in Tiflis - with its atmosphere of "princely" nobility among those in power, which has not weathered over the years of Soviet power! Don't think. And the mood of

Beria, which broke through in a letter to Ordzhonikidze, could be understood ... Yes, anywhere - if only away from these party "princes"! Moreover, throughout country begins the first five-year plan, begins a grandiose socialist construction.

Construction! For Beria, this word has always been attractive, after all, he education was a builder! And I wanted to build ... And for this I wanted to get already fundamental, higher education.

Ordzhonikidze was at that time a candidate member of the Politburo (he would soon become full member), Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Council of Labor and Defense. On November 10, 1930, he headed the Supreme Council of the People's economy (VSNKh).

And all these circumstances allow us to assume that Beria hoped, having learned a little, to ask Sergo for housekeeping work (Lavrenty did not know then that this work during the war years, he will have more strings). But

the era of Beria was needed not yet in the national economy, but in the Chekist department. AND here I will give extracts from the order dated March 30, 1931 of the Chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky No. 154/93, which I just mentioned earlier:

"March 30, 1931.

Secret

Gor. Moscow

March 21 marked the 10th anniversary of the existence and heroic struggle of the

The GPU of

Georgia... The work of the GPU of Georgia was difficult, many glorious fighters were put out of action, but the achievements are enormous: the Menshevik Party of Georgia, one of the most powerful and organized anti-Soviet parties in the USSR, seized dozens of compositions of its Central Committee, hundreds of local committees, thousands of active members; lines of communication were destroyed and, as a result, the 80,000-strong Menshevik Party, which had the support of the interventionists and the entire 2nd International, was reduced to plight of a miserable group of counter-revolutionaries exposed before the working masses.

Also, major anti-Soviet bourgeois parties of national democrats and socialist-federalists. Banditry has been crushed... The

OGPU Collegium notes with particular satisfaction that all this huge hard work was done mainly by our own national cadres, brought up, educated and tempered in the fire of combat work, under the permanent leadership of Comrade. Beria, who managed with exceptional flair to always clearly navigate and in the most difficult situation politically correctly solving the assigned tasks ... at the same time by personal example infect employees and, by transferring to them your organizational and operational skills, educate them in unconditional devotion to the Communist Party and its Central Committee ...

Chairman of the OGPU V. Menzhinsky.

What can be said here?

Beria's detractors sometimes hint that, they say, the deputy actually prepared the order Menzhinsky Yagoda, because, they say, the Chairman of the OGPU himself was already "seriously ill" at that time. But at that time Menzhinsky (he died in 1934) intellectually was still quite "in form."

So, Dzerzhinsky's ally Menzhinsky, an experienced party member and Chekist, could not to discern in real time the careerist, Bonapartist, "dirty" sides of Beria's nature, if they were present at the chairman of the GPU of Georgia?

What, Menzhinsky and the top leadership of the OGPU were blind and did not want to convert attention to those "mountains of compromising evidence" that were available, according to the aforementioned "Anti-Beria" collection of 1991, anywhere, even in the Rostov department of the GPU?

No, answer "democratic" "historians" and "publicists". And they claim that the leadership of the OGPU of the times of Menzhinsky-Yagoda, and then the NKVD of the times of Yezhov, so was afraid of the "executioner" Beria, who enjoyed the patronage of another "bloody executioner" - Stalin, which could not have been thought about the expulsion of the "rogue" and "provocateur" from Chekist environment and about his worthy punishment. And, being afraid, he praised Beria and praised him.

So, our story includes the theme "Stalin and Beria". Well, let's see how when these two "executioners" first came together...

Chapter

7 CORRESPONDENCE STALIN AND KAGANOVICH

ON AUGUST 5, 1931, the last subparagraph (subparagraph "p") of paragraph 2 resolution of the Politburo "On the personnel and activities of the OGPU" plenipotentiary representative OGPU of Transcaucasia Comrade Beria was approved as a member of the

board of the OGPU. The decision of the Politburo is an act that could not pass by Stalin, and all the names, appearing in such documents, one way or another were in Stalin's circle of attention.

Beria also entered this circle, and, of course, not from August 5, 1931. But until the early 1930s years, contacts between Stalin and Beria could not be either frequent or confidential.

In the 1920s, Stalin rested (if one can call rest only a temporary falling out of a very damned whirlwind into a mode of relatively quiet work) in

area of Sochi. And this is the Krasnodar Territory, the North Caucasus, and make it Georgian the Chekists had nothing.

And only when Stalin began to prefer the Abkhaz Gagra, the plenipotentiary of the OGPU of Transcaucasia Beria simply had to visit the resting places of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

And I have been. But he came to Stalin's field of vision more and more often, not because he constantly flickered before Stalin's eyes. By the way, if he did this, then Stalin would reasonably I would ask: "What are you doing here, Comrade Beria? I have a rest, I deserve it, and you? The Soviet leader was sharp both in sight and in word, we have a lot of evidence for this.

No, Stalin in Beria was attracted precisely by his managerial competence, especially noticeable against the background of all these Mamiya, Mikha and Shalv ... And on August

17, 1931 ... No, first I will explain how I know what I did (and specifically - what and to whom I wrote) in this day Stalin. In

2001, the Russian Political Encyclopedia publishing house and the Federal The Russian Archival Service published a circulation of 2,000 copies of the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich for 1931-1936. This correspondence is captivating in itself - I read it as Dumas novel! But it also came in handy for me practically - there often (although not so much often) Beria is mentioned. And

what's interesting! In 1995, a (much more modest) correspondence between Stalin and Molotov for 1925-1936. As you can see, the period of this second correspondence is five years longer than that of the first. Nevertheless, in the Molotov correspondence, the name of Beria is absent altogether.

Why? Is it because the correspondence between Stalin and Molotov is only 86 letters (for comparison: the correspondence with Kaganovich has a volume of 862 letters), which 79-year-old Molotov handed over in December 1969 to the Central Party Archive on his own initiative? AND if so, are we not dealing here with the censorship of Molotov himself? Personally,

I am convinced that the absence of the name of Beria in the letters handed over by Molotov cannot not look significant. I didn't want, it seems, to represent Vyacheslav Mikhailovich descendants of a very objective picture of the distant past.

But be that as it may, I had at my disposal an extensive correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich, and in it I found a lot of interesting information, starting right from the first pages.

On August 17, 1931, Stalin wrote from the south to Kaganovich in Moscow:

"... Now it is clear to me that Kartvelishvili (until 1929 - the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, in 1929-1931 - the 2nd secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine and Head of the Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Military District, and since 1931 - 1st Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee. - **S.K.**) and Gruzdek's secretariat reckless "grain procurement policy" brought a number of regions of Western Georgia to hunger. They do not understand that the Ukrainian methods of grain procurement, necessary and expedient in grain-producing areas, inexpedient and harmful in areas non-grain, who, moreover, do not have any industrial proletariat. Hundreds of people are being arrested, including party members who are clearly sympathetic dissatisfied and not sympathizing with the "politics" of the Georgian Central Committee. But on arrest you won't get far. It is necessary to intensify (speed up!) the delivery of grain now, without delay. Without it, we can get bread riots despite the fact that the grain problem has already been resolved in our country. Let immediately ... PB will oblige Mikoyan increase the supply of grain to Western Georgia ... Otherwise, for sure Let's create a political scandal."

And two days later, on August 19, Stalin ends the following letter as follows:

"...Fourth. I propose the whole business of building new grain warehouses for

tea growers, tobacco growers in western Georgia to put under the control of the RCT, to send people to the places, to involve in the work of the Zakchek, in particular, Beria, and to ensure that all new warehouses were built and put into operation no later than beginning of November.

Bread went to Western Georgia, warehouses were built quickly (since "connected" Beria). However, the general situation in Transcaucasia was far from favorable. And this was proved by Stalin's letter to Kaganovich dated August 26, 1931:

"Hello, comrade Kaganovich. I write about Transcaucasian affairs. Members of the Zakkraykom, secretaries of the Central Committee of Georgia, some workers of Azerbaijan (including Polonsky). Their squabble is incredible, and apparently it will not end soon... I reconciled them somehow, and the matter has been settled for the time being, but not for long. lie and almost everyone is cunning, starting with Kartvelishvili. Beria, Polonsky, Orakhelashvili do not lie. But on the other hand, Polonsky admits a number of tactlessness and mistakes. Most Mamulia (Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia) makes an unpleasant impression...

dunce... If

you do not intervene in the case, these people can foolishly ruin the case. They have already ruined business with the peasantry in Georgia, in Azerbaijan. without serious the interventions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Kartvelishvili and the Zakkraykom in general are powerless improve the case, assuming that they want to improve the case. How to be? It is necessary:

1)

Appoint ... at the end of September (for my arrival) a report to the Organizing Bureau ... about state of affairs;

2) Clean them thoroughly at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau and remove a number of people like Mamulia; 3)

Appoint the third secretary of the Zakkraykom (I suggest Meyerzon

[Head of the organizational and instructor department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks]. - S.K.)), giving an appropriate order for him... Without

such measures, the business in Transcaucasia will rot. *I.*

Stalin 26/ VIII-31".

As you can see, even in the summer of 1931, there was no special favor with Stalin in relation to there is no need to speak to Beria. However, Stalin already firmly keeps him in mind.

September passed, Stalin returned to Moscow. On October 19, a meeting was held Orgburo, and on October 31, the Politburo adopted a number of personnel decisions on the Transcaucasus. First Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Transcaucasia became Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee M. P. Orakhelashvili, the second - L. P. Beria, and the third - V. I. Polonsky, the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan. Beria concurrently was appointed first secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party (b) of Georgia. Orakhelashvili became the 1st secretary of the Zakkraykom for the second time - he had already been one in 1926-1929.

AS THEY SAY, "not even half a year has passed" ... Or rather, it has been less than eight months, and on June 20, 1932, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich, Postyshev and Ordzhonikidze: *"Well, dear friends, another squabble. I'm talking about Beria and Orakhelashvili..."* Yes, the first and

second secretaries had a serious conflict. And one of the reasons could be found, guided by the old advice: "Look for a woman." In this case it was in the wife of Mamia Orakhelashvili - 45-year-old beauty and shrew Mary Platonovna Orakhelashvili, an old (since 1903) Bolshevik.

In October 1931, in Moscow, many leading Caucasians were strongly warmed up for grouping in the selection of personnel. However, Mamia Orakhelashvili did not have time to become the first

a man in Transcaucasia for the second time, as Maria Orakhelashvili became a people's commissar education in Georgia. Here are those

on! Although, on the other hand, is it proper for the "first lady" of Transcaucasia, and even with rare beauty, but with a solid pre-revolutionary party experience, to be out of office? Spouses Orakhelashvili came, as they say, from intellectuals, and Mamiya even more - from the nobility. Beria, in the eyes of Maria Platonovna, was nothing more than an upstart, yes also an underachiever.

Well, could he be equal to her Mamiya, who graduated from the Military Medical School in 1908 academy? In addition, among other things, Mamiya was a member of the editorial board of Pravda. And this Beria ... In

short, on June 10, 1932, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia sorted out the issue of grouping of Maria Orakhelashvili and others who "by spreading false rumors, they tried to oppose the Central Committee of Georgia to the Zakkraykom and discredit certain leaders of the Central Committee and the Tiflis Committee (in particular, Comrade Beria).

Beauty Maria was reprimanded and was relieved of her post. But did not calm down, but went to Moscow, to the Central Control Commission to Yaroslavsky. And Mamiya wrote letters Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, which Stalin sent to Kaganovich. Beria did not write any letters to anyone.

STALIN, after reading Orakhelashvili's letters, informed Kaganovich:

"... My opinion: for all the angularity in the "actions" of Beria, I'm wrong in this in fact, Orakhelashvili. Orakhelashvili's request must be refused ... He should leave no need. I'm afraid that Orakhelashvili has self-esteem in the foreground (they pecked "his" people), and not the interests of the cause and positive work ... "

So far, Stalin is not inclined to replace Orakhelashvili, and the letter of June 20 ends immediately after the text quoted above:

"Everyone says that positive work is going well in Georgia, the mood peasants became good. And this is the main thing at work. **Hello. I. Stalin.**

I note that this statement by Stalin also characterizes Beria. Under the first secretary The Central Committee of Georgia Mamulia, the peasants were worried, and under Beria who replaced him, their mood "became good." That's

what competence means! Kaganovich,

having familiarized himself with the essence of the claims and complaints of the Orakhelashvili spouses, in his turn in an extensive, touching on many issues letter to Stalin on June 23

In the eleventh paragraph, he also expressed his opinion:

"... 11) A new squabble really ignites in Transcaucasia. You are definitely right that a healthy start, especially in business terms, is on the side of Beria, Orakhelashvili reflects the aching, non-business circles of the asset ... "

The BUSINESS "circles of the asset" were already entirely for Beria - normal people don't I want to quarrel and not be clever, not to tear my nose, not to beat the thumbs ... They want to be normal work!

Moreover, the "positive" work in Georgia did not go well for many years, and here an intelligent person stood at the head of the business, and it turned out that the affairs of the solar republics!

But an asset is an asset, and the old Bolsheviks are old Bolsheviks... The asset has energy, the patriarchs have merits. And Maria Platonovna Orakhelashvili also has a "rare beauty".

Speaking seriously, the ambitions and antipathies of Maria Orakhelashvili are something seriously meant only for Mamia Orakhelashvili. And for Beria in this conflict was important - as Stalin accurately grasped it - is the business side. And in the end it was conflict between the increasing competence of Beria and the decreasing competence Orakhelashvili.

And to be absolutely precise, between the young and old party members of Georgia. On July 13, Beria informed Kaganovich: *"I was twice with Comrade Koba and had the opportunity inform him in detail about our affairs.* And a month later, on August 12, Stalin wrote to the same Kaganovich as follows:

"...3. Beria makes a good impression. A good organizer, businesslike, capable worker. Looking closely at the Transcaucasian affairs, more and more I am convinced that in the matter of recruiting people, Sergo is an incorrigible bungler. Sergo defended the candidacy of Mamulia for the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, but now it is obvious (even to the blind) that Mamulia is not worth Beria's left foot."

That's even how! And the very logic of the situation makes Stalin come to the conclusion that release of Orakhelashvili from the Zakkraykom, which the first secretary.

Who will replace him? Stalin reflects and continues:

"Although Beria is not a member (and not even a candidate) of the Central Committee, he will still have to nominate Polonsky (his candidacy) is not suitable, since he does not speak any of the local languages "...

This was written on August 12, 1932, and in mid-August Beria arrived in Moscow. He put several questions before the Politburo, and they were to be discussed at the next meeting on 16 August.

The meeting took place, and on the same day Kaganovich notified Stalin:

"Beria was with me. Indeed, it produces very good the impression of a great worker. We discussed a number of his questions today at the PB. In particular, they removed another 300 tons from Georgia. bread and other questions. Buses we we will give at the expense of Moscow ... "

Yes, the "cold intriguer" Beria came to Moscow not to quarrel like Maria Orakhelashvili, but to intercede for the republic, to ask for a reduction in the grain procurement plan, for a seed loan, for the allocation of cars. Moreover, he substantiated all requests, otherwise they no one would be satisfied. He

even managed to "chop off" something from Moscow, as we see! Specifically: 10 buses, 10 Ford cars and 8 trucks. And here I must inform the

reader that concern for the matter in which he is currently the moment is busy - in general, a characteristic feature of Beria. Looking ahead very far, I will say that if, over time, Beria became the head of the country, then he would also take care of the whole country. After all, now *all of her* would be his business !

FORMALLY Orakhelashvili was still the first secretary, but in fact people went to Beria, and in addition to the problems of Georgia, the problems of the entire Transcaucasia were already falling on him. And he them decided. But many of these problems were all-Union. Especially - Baku

oil.

Almost immediately after returning from Moscow, Beria, without a doubt, inspired perspectives and support of the Politburo, takes the same Politburo into circulation and asks Moscow is already something more serious than a dozen Fords. And not for Georgia, but for oil workers of Azerbaijan. In his

letter to Kaganovich and Molotov, he asks to improve the technical supply oilfields, supply additional pipes and transport and improve the food situation of the workers.

Consideration of purely industrial and social spheres in a single complex is also was Beria's style. And he asks not only for pipes, but also: 764 tons of meat, 56 tons of animal oil, 167 tons of vegetable oil, 64 tons of herring, 328 tons of cereals, 198 tons of sugar, 2 tons of tea, 172 tons of rice, 596 tons of flour, 67 tons of cheese, 370 tons of confectionery, 65 tons of linen soap, 545 thousand meters of "cotton "and" various manufactured goods "by 2 million rubles.

All of this is per block. In addition, he proposes to equate oil workers in supply with Moscow and Leningrad. On

August 26, Kaganovich and Molotov sent a cipher to Stalin proposing these requests to satisfy, but ... But at the same time to give to Beria, the first secretary of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan Ruben, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of People's Commissars Bagirov and the manager of the trust "Azneft" Barinov a telegram with a counter request - not only fulfill the given "from above" oil production program of 500 thousand tons before closing navigation, but also overfulfill it.

The draft telegram ended like this: "Grozny will let you down this year, it is necessary with all press Azneft by force." Stalin in the upper left corner of the encryption imposed a resolution:

"Although you are overfeeding Azneft according to the 'requirements' of
of any kind, I think that the telegram can still be received.

I. St.

So, Stalin has already enrolled Beria in the number of "grabbers", but if Lavrenty Pavlovich If I had read this resolution, I would only have been delighted. After

all, Stalin grumbled for the sake of appearances - so that the service would not seem like honey. In fact, he already I saw - this "grabber" can be

given. Firstly, he tries not for himself, but for business and for people, not forgetting about one or the other.

And secondly, this "grabber" is not a talker. And if you give him what he needs, then as a result you will get what you want from him!

On October 9, 1932, the Politburo granted Orakhelashvili's request for his release from the duties of the first secretary of the Zakkraykom and outlined the first secretary to Beria, leaving him as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. And soon Beria became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He reached the age of Christ and managed for his thirty-three years, too, a lot. But even more he had to do - together with the country. Mamiya Orakhelashvili left for

Moscow to serve as deputy director at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. Soon Maria also drove off there - to the People's Commissariat of Education as head Higher School Administration.

And Stalin went on vacation at the appointed time, and the correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich continued. And it periodically discussed the affairs of Transcaucasia and periodically the name of Beria arose. But

now the word "squabbles" has disappeared from this correspondence.

But the words "ideas and suggestions" appeared there.

Chapter 8 PARTY LEADER OF TRANSCAUCASUS

PARTY bureaucrats-Khrushchevites, who renamed Beria into a directive a quarter of paper for subscribers of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia during "Pasted between 22 and 23 pages", would not be bureaucrats if they approached their duties differently than they fit. By sending subscribers a recommendation to work with a razor or scissors, they lost sight of the fact that such a figure as Lavrenty Pavlovich cannot be cut *out of history* so easily. And so, when I

picked up, for example, the volume of the second edition of the TSB No. 12, signed for printing May 28, 1952,

to look at the content of the article "State Defense Committee", it was I am almost sure that I will find the name of Beria there. I

found it there, but more on that in due time. And

now I will inform you that, encouraged by the first success, I delved into other volumes. (naturally, only those of them that were published before June 26, 1953) and I can report that, according to the TSB data that eluded the Khrushchevists, by 1953: And

rest them. L.P. Beria in Leninakan (volume 3);

b) in Georgia, the Abkhazian state farm "Akhali-Afoni", Sukhumi was named after Beria Pedagogical Institute, Tkvarcheli State District Power Plant (volume 1), machine-building plant in Batumi, a shoe factory in Tbilisi, a collective farm in the Sukhumi region, Georgian Agricultural Institute, Tbilisi Palace of Pioneers and Schoolchildren and Stadium "Dynamo" - also in Tbilisi (volume 13). In

Azerbaijan, too, presumably, they did not forget about Beria - for his oil industry, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee did a lot, but mentions I did not find this in the TSB. And then I was rescued, wow, Antonov-Ovseenko, from the book whom I learned that the name of Beria was given to a car repair plant in Baku and major oil industry.

He also reports that there were the Leninakan border detachment named after Beria and his own named after the theater in Poti, Khashursky electric locomotive depot, Agarinsky sugar factory. All in all Ovseenko's additions did not add much to the encyclopedic list.

I do not think that all these (and, presumably, others not established by me) assignments named after Beria, factories and collective farms were his initiative. In such acts there was a spirit era. And not so unhealthy - for that time - the spirit, I must say.

Most often, this was not manifested by subservience, but by respect for those whose name he accepted. on the team. What were the bearers of these names to do? Refuse? But that meant offend, right? Especially in the Caucasus!

One way or another, with the beginning of the thirties, Beria becomes the undisputed leader Transcaucasia. And the statement of volume 1 of the second edition of the TSB that *"the implementation Stalin's plan for the reconstruction of Azerbaijan. oil industry from the Bolshevik perseverance was carried out by students and associates ... Stalin - S. M. Kirov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, L. P. Beria "*, fully corresponded to the actual situation

affairs.

But Beria was actively engaged not only in oil. Suffice it to say that already in October In 1933, Beria personally gave Stalin two notes - one about oil, and the other about rare metals price Georgia

| Beria proposed to include in the 1934 plan: • the construction of crackers and plants for primary oil refining; • construction of a kerosene pipeline Makhachkala - Stalingrad;

- expansion of the Baku-Batum oil pipeline; •
- conducting exploration work on new areas in Azerbaijan; • construction of new vessels for the Caspian Shipping Company. Here everything was considered as it should be - in a complex. And this too

was Beria's style. In fact, he was at the head of the Transcaucasus for the first time, speaking more late, not a pure politician, but a technocrat.

But not just a technocrat, but a technocrat of a new, socialist type, a technocrat politician. That is, a statesman who is able to understand special problems and works to develop a meaningful and prosperous life for the masses. A figure who does not divide life into "production" and "social and cultural life", but sees their unity.

Beria's "rare earth" note was just as specific. It spoke about Chiatura manganese, about polymetallic molybdenum and lead-zinc deposits, on the production of aluminum oxide.

And it's clear, dear reader, that Beria was neither a geologist, nor an oilman, nor metallurgist ... He did not put forward the idea of new exploration ... He did not assess the need in a new oil pipeline or the prospects of polymetallic deposits.

But *if* earlier these ideas of various kinds of specialists were deadened by incompetence the same Mamiya Orakhelashvili, now they came to life with the competent support of Beria.

Manganese was mined at the Chiatura mines under the tsar... And under Orakhelashvili... But the scale, the volume of production, its methods - everything was now changing both quantitatively and qualitatively. Previously, with the same polymetals, things were stalled. And now moved from the dead points. Thanks, I emphasize again, Beria!

Stalin believed that "this matter should also be moved forward," but he was more worried about oil, and on October 21, 1933, he wrote to Kaganovich:

"The situation with Baku oil is bad. This year we are producing 15 mil. tons of oil. In the future, 21-22 mil. tons ... Despite this, the Oil Directorate is sleeping, and Sergo gets off with pious promises ... "

But now Stalin in the Transcaucasus finally has a reliable person who himself does not sympathetic, and will not give to others, who, behind the "trees" of oil rigs, knows how to see and the whole "forest" of problems. See both in perspective and in real time.

And - which is also very valuable - does not wait for guidance, but is proactive and independent. This "eternal" partocrat Suslov will creak later: "We were not instructed," and Beria was "himself with a mustache."

Against the background of his readiness to take responsibility for the decision, Stalin could not help but to annoy the lack of independence of others ... On September 5, 1933, Stalin in the south is put on table encryption:

"From Moscow 5/IX.33, 1 hour. 28 min. In. No. 18
Art. STALIN. The

Cominternists are asking to speed up the consideration of the answer of the Comintern English Independent Party.

If you have material, I ask you to urgently report your opinion ...

No. 18 KAGANOVICH.

Stalin, directly on the decoding form, not without irritation, answered as follows:

"Your HP is 18. I cannot and should not give an opinion on everything and everyone questions raised in the PB. The answer to the English independents you could yourself consider and develop. **Stalin.**"

BERIA, on the other hand, did not need guiding "crutches". And why were they to him when wherever you look, piles of unresolved problems have accumulated in Transcaucasia, which need to be solved it was just interesting! After all, it was

not without reason that the ancients placed paradise in these places, it was not without reason that they went for the Golden Fleece Greeks to the legendary Colchis. Potentially Transcaucasia was fertile, flourishing land of fabulous beauty and fabulous riches. But in order to have this fairy tale

Really, I had to work hard. By the way,

about Colchis ... In 1934, Konstantin Paustovsky wrote a story "Colchis", where among the main characters were engineers Kahiani and Gabunia - enthusiasts draining swamps in the basin of the Rioni River, flowing to the sea along the Colchis lowland.

"In Colchis, the climate of southern Japan and Sumatra," said one of characters, old Pakhomov, - an abundance of warmth, but meanwhile this is a malarial desert in the full sense of the word. Something like tropical penal servitude ... If not for swamps, then we would block Java and Ceylon with their splendor and riches ... "

I do not have the opportunity to quote the book of the young Paustovsky extensively, but I suggest that those who wish to reread it themselves - after all, even in the current Rossiyanie, not all mass libraries yet, and finding "Colchis" is unlikely to be difficult.

At the end of the book, Kahiani gives a speech. In response to his question - who was ill with malaria, only "a little boy with a red tie" did not raise his hand ... And Kahiani says: "

But not only the value of our work lies in the fact that we drain swamps and create a new land that we radically destroy the old swamp vegetation ... and we plant a new one. This is not the only point of our work, comrades. It is also in the fact that we are creating a young, healthy generation ... " Paustovsky Beria is

not mentioned in the book, however, the real prototypes of Kakhiani and Gabunias were people just from the "team" of Lavrenty Beria.

However, the drainage of the Rion swamps in the general Beria program of transformation Georgia still occupied a modest place.

In Abkhazia alone, it was necessary to speed up the construction of a mine in Tkvarcheli, the Sukhumi hydroelectric power station, the Black Sea railway, to develop the production of citrus fruits, tobacco, tea ... And on the other Black Sea edge of Georgia, in Adzharia, a lot of attention is needed it was to be given to Batumi - port, oil refining ... And again citrus fruits! Here is just one number. In 1932, 14 million citrus fruits were harvested in Adjara fruits, and in 1940 - 315 million.

And from the shores of the Black Sea, large and small covered with forests went deep into Georgia. mountain

ranges. And all this needed smart heads and skillful hands of creators. Mamia Orakhelashvili argued that a large-scale collective farm is impossible in Georgia. farming - on the slopes of the mountains it is inefficient ... He was for the preservation of corn crops and opposed the planting of citrus fruits - they say, the peasants need to eat.

That's right, but corn and wheat could be grown in the Kuban, bringing grain to Georgia. But tangerines and lemons ...

Beria thought, as mathematicians say, exactly the opposite. And explained this is not just his broad outlook, but also his fundamental orientation towards development Georgia as an integral part of a single complementary all-Union economy.

And this was not only about agriculture. March 2, 1932 Beria initiates a decision on the reorganization of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of Georgia with transfer of republican enterprises of heavy industry to the jurisdiction authorized by the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry of the USSR. It was brilliant and promising clean management decision. Now, on the one hand, Ordzhonikidze could more effectively organize the development of industry in Georgia, linking it with the all-Union, and on the other On the other hand, Beria could concentrate more on domestic affairs, not

escaping, of course, from problems and heavy industry. But it was also a wise political decision deepening the integration of the economy of Georgia with the all-Union. And this led to consolidation of Soviet society and in other areas. All sorts of

Mdivanis thought differently ... Beria spoke about this at a meeting of Tbilisi party activists on July 21-22, 1935 year, where he made a report "On the history of the Bolshevik organizations in the Transcaucasus." Here is part of the transcript of his speech:

"National deviationism was a rather versatile system nationalistic Menshevik views. It is known that Georgian deviators tried to pass a decree on the "unloading" of Tiflis, the implementation which would mean the expulsion of foreign elements, and first of all

Armenians. Also known is the fact of the "wild" - in the words of Comrade Stalin - the decree on the cordons with which Georgia was fenced off from the Soviet republics ... These are the documents: 1) March 31,

1922, signed by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Comrade. Makharadze and Deputy prev. Council of People's Commissars comrade. M. Okudzhava sent the following telegram:

"From this date, the borders of the Republic of Georgia are declared closed (*laughter in Hall*) and the further passage of refugees to the territory of the USSR of Georgia has been terminated ... 2) § 1. Persons receiving permission to enter Georgia their relatives, pay 50,000 rubles for the issued permits. (*laughter in the hall*)...

§ 5. Persons who arrived in Georgia after August 13, 1917 and wishing to obtain the right to permanent residence in Georgia, in case satisfaction of their requests are paid for the issued permits 1 million. rubles ...

4) ...Georgian citizenship loses: a Georgian citizen in the event that she will marry a foreigner (*laughter in the hall*)... "

You read this, compare it with today and involuntarily think: "Everything is sad this, gentlemen, comrades ... Yes, and vile!

WITH THIS famous report, which was soon published in the form of an equally famous pamphlet of the same name, one of the most high-profile purely political accusations is connected Beria allegedly in the falsification of history "to please Stalin." Beria did say that "the entire history of the Transcaucasian Bolshevik organizations, the entire revolutionary movement Transcaucasia and Georgia from the first days of its inception are inextricably linked with work and name comrade Stalin. And how many of the "old Bolsheviks" then, and types like Antonov-Ovseenko later. But this is true. And the point is

not even that already in 1905, Lenin highly appreciated Stalin's article, published in No. 11 of the illegal newspaper Proletariatis Brdzola (The Fight proletariat") and immediately translated into Russian. And not even that the newspaper itself, initially called "Brdzola", was founded back in 1901 (less than a year after "Iskra") with the participation of Koba, and in its very first issue he published a program article "From the Editor". Brilliant, by the way, an article of a purely Bolshevik direction - even before the very concept of "Bolshevik" arose. And it's not even the point

that already in 1903 Koba was sent to Siberia for the first time, in Irkutsk province, that all the years before the revolution and after the revolution, Stalin did not hesitate followed Lenin...

The point is *who* Stalin became in the new Russia. After all, if we compare it with the post-October political and organizational scale, his talent with the scale of all these Mdivani, then everything will immediately fall into place.

But after all, it doesn't happen that in youth - "while hearts are alive for honor" - a so-so man, neither a candle to God, nor a poker to hell, did not show any outstanding

leadership qualities, and then he took it and became the great leader of a great power.

Before Stalin and Churchill felt the desire to stand at attention. But before Mdivani - if you imagine such a meeting for a moment - it's unlikely ...

Or will someone deny this too?

Yes, and confirmation of the initially leading role of Stalin in the labor movement in Transcaucasia can be found, in addition to Beria's brochure, also in other sources. For example, on October 8, 1904, a new entry appeared in the card of the Tiflis security department: "Dzhugashvili fled from exile and is currently the leader of the party of Georgians, workers." It is unlikely that the Tiflis

gendarmes wrote this in order to reinforce the arguments Beria.

And one more thing ... How often they write that Beria wrote the pamphlet almost according to Stalin's order ... But this is what Stalin was indignant about in a letter to Kaganovich, Yezhov (then head of the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee - S.K.) and Molotov on August 17, 1935:

"I ask you to forbid Zakkraykom for the personal responsibility of Beria republishing without my sanction of my articles and pamphlets of the period 1905-1910. Motives: they are published sloppily, quotes from Ilyich are completely distorted, correct there is no one but me (just think, but what are the referents for? - S.K.), I each time rejected Beria's request for a reprint without my revision, but Despite this, the Transcaucasians unceremoniously ignore my protests. In view of what the categorical prohibition of the Central Committee on republishing without my sanction is the only way out."

I will not claim that always and everywhere in all the actions of the hero of this book is visible only impeccable chivalry. Although the nobility of thoughts and deeds, it's like the freshness of Bulgakov's sturgeon: either it exists or it doesn't. And if guided credible documents and objective recollections, nothing unworthy for Beria is not found.

By objective memories, I will note in parentheses, I also understand such memoirs, the authors of which, in *the emotional* assessment of Beria, did not go far from the same Antonov-Ovseenko, but at the same time they unwittingly cite *facts that* attest to Beria positively.

However, the persistence of Lavrenty Pavlovich in requests to Stalin for a reprint of his work is just a fact. And it is easy to assess it as a manifestation of the same toadying, in which Beria is passionately accused by his

detractors. But on reflection, one can understand that here we are dealing with the same competence - political, state, and human.

Well, actually! On the one hand, by the mid-1930s, a new generation had grown up in Georgia, completely formed by the Soviet government and not familiar with those works of Stalin, which made him the leader of the Bolsheviks of Transcaucasia and who proved his outstanding political and intellectual level.

On the other hand, it is in Georgia that a considerable number of "Old Bolsheviks" (and especially the former Mensheviks, etc.) rumors spread about the secondary role Stalin in the initial era of the revolutionary struggle. Yes,

there are rumors! Here is volume 19 of the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (in the editorial board then included Bukharin, Pyatakov and a number of other prominent oppositionists).

Editorial work on the volume in which the lengthy article was placed "Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSRG)", ended November 1, 1930. By that time, Stalin had already held the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee for eight years. VKP(b).

So, in the historical outline of the article "SSRG" in the subsection "Start of the working Movements and Social Democracy" the first name encountered was F. Makharadze. In subsection his quote is given, beginning like this: "Already at the end of 1894, the foundation was laid the first strictly Marxist group..." etc. And this could already be regarded as a hint reader: the first to say the Caucasian "meow" was by no means Comrade Stalin, so his role in development of the labor movement in the Caucasus is not so great.

So, the first name is Makharadze ... But maybe Stalin is mentioned at least later? Yes no, his number is not even number two...

For the second name mentioned in the subsection is Noah Zhordania ... He, however, is certified as the leader of the "right-wing opportunist" trend as opposed to the "orthodox Marxist" one, headed by "M. Tskhakaya, F. Makharadze, Soso Dzhugashvili (Stalin), Al. Tsulukidze and others.

So, Coco Dzhugashvili's number was only the fourth ... And further again, Jordania's activities are described at length. And only then the author of the article in TSB, announcing that at the beginning of 1903 "the Union Committee was elected, which included the majority turned out to be on the side of the future Bolsheviks (Tskhakaya, Makharadze, Knunyants, Zurabov, Tsulukidze, Bochoroshvili, Stalin, etc.)" "graciously", through gritted teeth, states: "Comrade Stalin begins to play a leading role in the revolutionary wing of the Transcaucasian organization." But then on sheets

582–598 (two sheets per page), in the subsections "Between two revolutions", "Organization of power during the February Revolution", in the following section "The October Revolution and the Struggle for Soviet Georgia" (with subsections "Separation of Transcaucasia from Russia", "Menshevik dictatorship in Georgia", "Bolshevik organization in 1918–1920", "Peasant uprisings 1918–1921", "The end of the Menshevik authorities", "The First Steps of Soviet Power" and "Anti-Soviet Activities of the Mensheviks"), Stalin's name is missing altogether! At all! There is

even a

"renegade Dzhugeli" (is it because his name is consonant with "Dzhugashvili"?), And Stalin is not. It

was so unexpected for me that I could not believe my own eyes and went through the text again ... No, that's right - Stalin is not mentioned in any way.

By the way, neither Ordzhonikidze nor Kirov are mentioned there ... But it is mentioned more than once Zhordania, and - of course: F. Makharadze, Am. Nazaretyan, S. Kavtaradze, Mravyan, Tskhakaya, Shaumyan and Dzharparidze (the last two were shot among the 26 Baku commissars, so what's there - you can be mentioned and "be generous"), Okudzhava, Orakhelashvili

"and

etc.". Stalin, it turns out, fell into the

"other". That's it, dear reader! And

the "democrats" tell us that the activities of the anti-party centers the opposition is an invention of the NKVD.

In the bibliography to the encyclopedic article mentioned above, there are no works by Stalin either, by the way. But there are works by F. Makharadze, E. Drabkina and some G. Natadze and S. Kakabadze.

And this is in the TSB, published in Moscow! You can imagine how things were before Beria - under the "Marxist patriarchs" such as Mdivani, Eliava and Orakhelashvili - in Georgia itself!

So what were the young communists, Komsomol members of Georgia and just young Georgians supposed to think about the role of Comrade Stalin? But the pioneers were already growing up! Yes what pioneers! Those who were born in 1921, by 1935 had already reached Komsomol age.

Young people do not really believe allegations. And here - there are no works by Stalin, but the "recognized Bolsheviks" Mikha Tskhakaya, Philip Makharadze, Shalva Eliava, Mamiya Orakhelashvili is perplexed about him: "What kind of leader is this?"

And the former Mensheviks whisper that such a smart girl as Noah Zhordania, called Stalin nothing more than a barbarian.

And the young could not help but have an unspoken question: "So was Comrade Stalin Bolshevik of Transcaucasia No. 1, was he a "Caucasian Lenin" - as Zarya writes now East"? All

this was explained, of course, not by an accidental oversight - in the country then there was a struggle between the Trotskyists and the Bolshevik core of the party, headed by Stalin. AND The "objectivity" of the article in the TSB was one of the confirmations that in this struggle Trotskyists and oppositionists (and in the then TSB they occupied, I repeat, solid positions) do not neglect any methods. Not without reason, after all, the authors of the "Georgian" article in The TSB not only "forgot" about Stalin every now and then, but also about Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Sergey Kirov, and in fact about Anastas Mikoyan...

In fact, the opposition not only distorted the role of Stalin in the development of the worker movements in Transcaucasia, but an attempt was made to disavow both him and his concept of the country's development - with an emphasis on economic independence!

And the youth was deprived of the opportunity to see an objective historical picture. To some extent, the information gap was filled by the report and pamphlet of Beria, however The best answer to all questions would be the reprinting of these old articles by Stalin. This and political education of young communists would be promoted, and gossip would refute.

After all, Stalin really deserved to be called the "Caucasian Lenin! Deserved both as a practitioner of the Bolshevik movement and as its ideologist.

So here, too, Beria turned out to be not a toady, but a mature politician, wisely concerned with the political education of the masses.

Is not it?

Stalin insisted that Beria, by decision of the Central Committee, be forbidden to print early works without his sanctions. But it was precisely Beria's efforts in this direction that initiated another, objectively very relevant, decision of the Central Committee - "to recognize the need for a complete publication Comrade's essays Stalin and instruct the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute ... to develop publication plan.

Mamia Orakhelashvili was then the Deputy Director of IMEL. But he and others "ran away" to comply with the decision of the Central Committee that the first volume of the Collected Works of Stalin was signed for publication only after the war (the author's preface to the first volume is dated January 1946). Such

is the indicative detail of the "developed cult of personality" ... However,

Mamia Orakhelashvili was up to the scribbles of some Koba! He is in the summer In 1935, he spent days and nights with Abel Yenukidze, who had just been expelled from the party, relieved of his duties as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Transcaucasia and staying in Kislovodsk as now authorized by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for the Mineral group. In September, Stalin wrote from Sochi to Moscow:

"Yenukidze is not aware of his fall, and he does not suffer from modesty ... plays into politics, gathers dissatisfied people around him and deftly pretends to be a victim inflamed passions in the party ... "

This is how the situation in the party and in the country developed! On the one hand, Stalin and Beria, pulling the cart of daily state work. On the other hand, the victim Stalin" - the decomposed Yenukidze, and the "victim of Beria" - the babbled Orakhelashvili. And this confrontation between the sovereign cause and irresponsible malice in the next few years in Transcaucasia and especially in Georgia only worsened.

YES, ACTUALLY, it never weakened there. After all, Georgia in the political relation was the most difficult of all the national republics.

The East is a delicate matter, we know that. But by the beginning of the 20th century, in Georgia alone, out of all other eastern regions of Russia, what I would call political intelligence.

Central Asia remained politically virgin in the European sense. Azerbaijan experienced a strong cosmopolitan influence, since oil is also in Africa oil. True, in Armenia, home-grown nationalist politicians who have chance and in the all-Russian arena, it was not so little. But Georgia eclipsed everyone!

Zhordania, Gegechkori, Tsereteli - these were the All-Russian "stars" of the first quantities. How many "politicians" in Georgia tried to shine at least reflected their light, however, there were also those inclined to their own game - more nationalistic.

Alas, many leading Georgian Bolsheviks also had "star" ambitions. And How Menshevism was popular among Georgians before the revolution, so now it was popular there Trotskyism. Not in its political sense - the Georgian Bolsheviks were not very delusional world revolution, but psychologically, so to speak. Korney

Chukovsky has a wonderful collective psychological portrait Trotskyists, and this one is purely for himself, in the diary of 1933, where on January 28 he wrote:

"Trotskyists have always been hated for me not as politicians, but first of all as characters. I hate their phrasing, their posturing, their gestures, their pathos. Their very leader has always been aesthetically pleasing to me. unbearable: hair, narrow beard, provincial demonism. Mixture Mephistopheles and Assistant Attorney at Law..."

And this portrait was reminiscent of many Transcaucasian opponents of Beria.

In addition, there were enough opponents not only in Transcaucasia, which can be seen at least from Stalin's letter, which left Sochi for Moscow on November 2, 1933:

"Kaganovich. Molotov

The behavior of Pravda in relation to the Transcaucasian party organizations is becoming strange. For oil, cotton, for Abkhazian tobacco Zakkraykom and local Party organizations have made significant progress. There are corresponding reports in Pravda. And "Pravda" hushed up the facts and did not publish reports. Reports of Chuvashia, Udmurtia are published. And the report of the Zakkraykom is rotting in Pravda. Praises Pravda Barinov, although Barinov is a brake, and not the engine of oil production, the merits of the foreign Communist Party organization are hushed up. And this rotten incongruity is admitted by the organ of the Pravda party. I think it's my fault Kahiani, who stood and stands against the current leadership in Transcaucasia. It's time put an end to this mess! It is time to ensure that Pravda does not Friends of the left-bourgeois radicals, Kostanyan, Aominadze and others, had leading posts.
Stalin."

Barinov is a 45-year-old manager of the Azneft trust, an old Bolshevik (many of them by this time had already begun to discover, to put it mildly, incomplete service compliance). Kostanyan

- People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Armenia.

Kahiani is a member of the bureau of the editorial board of Pravda, but I will speak about him and Lominadze separately, but now I will only note: the scale of Kahiani's personality is already visible from the way he clamped information from his native Transcaucasia, just to petty annoy Beria.

But the insult was inflicted on three republics at once - which is clearly Beria's attention Stalin and drew. The

essence of the conflict is seen transparently - Beria himself was always accurate, punctual, smart in thoughts and deeds, and demanded this from others. And arrogant, more more willing to talk than to do, the young Transcaucasian "leaders" (Kakhiani and Lominadze, a number of

worked in the Transcaucasus for years) clearly could not stand this Chekist in pince-nez - full of them antipode.

And personal antagonism was so strong that it did not disappear even after the "leaders" left for other places of work.

BERIA himself was a professional - an intelligence professional, a professional management, and therefore knew how to appreciate professionals. And this is what happened in Georgia when he was the first secretary there Transcaucasian Regional Committee. He worked in the republic for a long time and gained fame as qualified engineer-designer of hydraulic structures Nikolai Kozmich Zworykin, brother of the famous electronic engineer, inventor of television Vladimir Zworykin. The

brothers had a bad social background: their father is a Murom merchant first guild, steamer and bread merchant. It turned out that Vladimir (later will be called a gift to the Americas) ended up in the USA, doing well. However, in visited the USSR more than once in the thirties, was inclined to accept the invitation of the government and stay. And only the confluence of a number of circumstances and the unkind advice of Zworykin's brother-in-law, the future academician-geologist Dmitry Nalivkin, deprived Russia of one of its outstanding sons.

Nikolai remained ... And so, during the construction of the hydroelectric complex, a failure occurred, and as a result Zworykin and his subordinates were convicted, nevertheless continuing to work. And How only the object was successfully put into operation, the criminal record was removed from the entire brigade.

It was Beria's style - not to avoid harshness, but not to allow cruelty, and more injustice. That is why those who became his trusted collaborators already would not want to deal with anyone else. We have a vivid example of this in the face of Vsevolod Merkulov-Merkulov was four years older than Beria. The son of an officer, he studied at the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of St. Petersburg University. In 1916 he was called to army, and after graduating from the Orenburg school of ensigns in 1917, he managed to fight.

Since March 1918, the ex-ensign Merkulov has been unemployed in Tiflis, and in August he starts working as a teacher in a school for the blind. In Menshevik Georgia to force him they could not serve in the army - this was not Russia, where both the "reds" and the "whites" were mobilized. He himself, it seems, did not really decide then who he should be.

But in September 1921, after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, Merkulov recruited into the Georgian Cheka. And soon Beria appears in Tiflis, and Merkulov enters its orbit already in the Chekist period of Beria's activity in Tiflis.

In October 1931, Beria was transferred from Chekist to party work, and he took Merkulov (a member of the CPSU (b) since 1925) from the GPU of Georgia to his place in the Zakkraykom. But before that, how we already know Beria's position was problematic. And this is what Merkulov wrote to him in 1930, at a difficult time, when Beria's relations with the then party leadership of Transcaucasia.

"Here we have rumors about your alleged imminent departure from Tiflis ... In connection with them, I have a deep request to you: do not forget me. IN if you really decide to leave the Transcaucasus, I beg you take me with you to where you will work. City and position do not me interested in: I agree to work anywhere ... "

This request deserves our attention for three reasons... First, it characterizes Beria as a person and leader. Secondly, it characterizes Merkulov like a person. And, thirdly, it to some extent characterizes the then party members. Transcaucasian leaders and the general atmosphere in the "tops" of Transcaucasia. Having said that, I will now explain in more detail...

Merkulov himself was a rather outstanding personality, had a good pen, wrote under the pseudonym "Vsevolod Rokk" ... Yes, he rose together with Beria: assistant to the first secretary of the regional committee, head of the Soviet trade department of the regional committee, head of the industrial and transport department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia and deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from September 1, 1938 - 1st deputy Beria, head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, and from December 15 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar Beria and head of the GUGB.

However, it is impossible to compare Merkulov with a "sticky" fish. Beria just appreciated him before others, and this once again proves the personnel insight of Lavrenty Pavlovich. But not only Beria considered Merkulov, he appreciated the potential of his "protégé" and Stalin himself. After all, it was he who later appointed Merkulov Minister of State Security, Minister of State Control of the USSR ...

And if such a person was ready to follow Beria anywhere, then this can be regarded unequivocally: Merkulov was interested in working with the leader, with whom it was interesting. And this is a plus for both the boss and the subordinate. Moreover, the letter was written in 1930, when Beria was only the chairman of the GPU of the Georgian SSR, and in the event of a transfer could hardly count on a post higher than the head of some regional management. And not necessarily in a very big city. And then, after all, there are not enough products where it was good, even in Ukraine. And the salary of the Chekists was not great ...

Mamia Orakhelashvili and other "leaders" such a request of Merkulov indirectly certifies not in the best way. After all, from the mood of Merkulov it follows that he, a person, is clearly sensible, the party leadership of Transcaucasia did not appreciate just because Merkulov was Beria's man. The second option: Merkulov was bullied precisely because of his high business qualities. But only incompetent leaders can do this, what are these Mamiya and were, however.

And since at the head of the country then there was a leader who was quite competent, then leave Mami had to. Beria was rightfully raised in Transcaucasia to commanding heights.

In 1935, Stalin put forward the slogan "Cadres decide everything!". And one of the brightest personal confirmation of the correctness of Stalin's statement was Lavrenty Beria.

TO be more objectively convinced of this, let us return to the first period of a full-fledged Beria's leadership in Transcaucasia. I already wrote that he quickly reoriented agricultural production in Georgia for the cultivation of crops that could give the country only the mountainous and subtropical zone of Georgia: citrus fruits, grapes, tea, tobacco. Already in 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR noted in their resolution that Georgia's achievements marked the beginning of the independence of the Soviet Union in the production tea.

However, Beria did not start with tea, but with the fact that in December 1931 he liquidated Georgian Collective Farm Center, replacing it with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. And unlike, for example, Kosior and Khataevich in Ukraine, he did not reduce, but even somewhat expanded subsidiary plots of collective farmers to avoid the threat of starvation. And in parallel the first the secretary of the Zakkraykom did a lot of organizational work both in the office and when traveling in the villages. Plenums of the Georgian Central Committee were devoted to individual cultures, congresses were held collective farmers, exhibitions were organized, portraits of leading workers adorned the front pages of newspapers and magazine covers. As

a result, in January 1934, at the IX Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, he had every right to say like this:

"It has become a reality that the situation in the countryside of Georgia is quite stable, the strengthening of collective farms, the growth of collectivization, the successful introduction of special and industrial crops ... and conscientious fulfillment by collective farmers and individual workers of their obligations to the state".

Here is the digital "background" of the above: in 1931, 36% of peasant farms were united in collective farms, by 1939 - 86%. At the same time, in 1936 the income of collective farms amounted to 234992 thousand rubles, and in 1939 they exceeded half a billion.

Alexei Toptygin, in his book about Beria, states that *"as an organizer agricultural production, Beria was at a height that was available*

very, very few . "

I will refine this assessment by adding only one conjunction to it: *"And how organizer of agricultural production ... "* Let's say the same

A. Toptygin rightly states that under Beria, Georgia became leader in the creation of the Soviet food industry in terms of canning fruits and vegetables, industrial winemaking, tea processing ... Here he worked hard and Beria's closest associate in the ZakChK, Vladimir Dekanozov, who became People's Commissar food industry in Georgia. But Beria

was no less competent in organizing the cultural revolution in Transcaucasia. In this case, I will refer to the data of A. Toptygin:

"In 1928/29, several resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were adopted on building a high school. In Georgia (where then she labored in the field of higher enlightenment Madame Orakhelashvili. - **S.K.**) reacted to it - it was several institutions were created, eking out, to put it mildly, a miserable existence ... L. Beria treated these issues as a serious combat mission. Totally agree the end of 1931 and 1932, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia adopted six resolutions on different areas of public education (for the previous five years to this the problem was addressed twice ... discussing the decisions of the plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks). The resolutions adopted during Beria's secretariat fit on 1–1.5 pages, but were literally packed full of numbers, amounts, names responsible for the execution ... Since 1932, Georgia has been moving to a universal primary education of children and adolescents ... According to the Komsomol recruitment, thousands Georgians are sent to study in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Saratov ... By 1938, Georgia was one of the first places in terms of the level of education of the population in Soviet Union".

Beria headed the Transcaucasus on the eve of the second five-year plan. And it was mutual good luck for both Beria and Transcaucasia. Beria got the opportunity of an ever-increasing activities. Transcaucasia received an active leader capable of deciding the upcoming big tasks.

All-Union directives for the new five-year plan (1932–1937) were approved by the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which ended on February 4, 1932. And in March, the joint plenum Zakkraykom considered the main directions of the five-year plan for the development of the Transcaucasian Federation. The volume of industrial production in Georgia was to increase by more than five times, ferroalloy production - seven and a half times, coal mining - twelve once...

IT WAS 1936. At the end of this year, at the Extraordinary VIII Congress of Soviets, the new Constitution of the USSR - Stalin's. But not only the legal base of the Soviet power - the structure of the union state had to change as well. Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic on the basis of the new Constitution was abolished. The Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian SSRs were directly part of composition of the USSR as union republics.

The structure of economic management was also changing - in the Union republics people's commissariats of light, food, timber industry, grain and livestock farms were formed. And on October 17, Kaganovich and Molotov sent Stalin in Sochi, a draft of the corresponding resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. ZSFSR in this project, for obvious reasons, was not.

On the same day, Stalin answered by telephone:

"Your project ... raises objections from Transcaucasians, for example, from Beria. Formally, the TSFSR should also be mentioned in the list of union republics, but in 2 months the TSFSR will no longer exist, but to create people's commissariats in the TSFSR in order to of course, it is not worth eliminating them after two months. On the other hand, the absence of the TSFSR in the list of union republics may cause bewilderment ... "

Stalin proposed to wait with the publication of the resolution until the adoption of a new Constitution, but for now, to engage in the formation of republican people's commissariats in fact ... And in added at the end:

"As for the project itself, it is, in my opinion, formulated somewhat clumsily. It is inconvenient to order the union republics from above to form such drugs. I imagined things in such a way that the union republics, each separately, they will turn to the CEC with the wishes to create such and such people's commissariats, but the CEC does not will object. But you did the opposite."

It may seem to the reader that this is a trifle and that Beria raised a storm in a glass water ... And, perhaps, someone will say: "Just think - they didn't remember" his "Federation, and Beria immediately with objections! And that it was Stalin who began to build a democrat out of himself - they say, it's impossible point to the union republics. He pointed them out! Moscow First Secretaries of the Central Committee these same republics sometimes changed like gloves "... But it was

not a trifle! And if you think about it, from this "trifle" came in 1953 and the strange death of Stalin, and the unexpected arrest of Beria. And

here's the thing. Replacing

first secretary of the Central Committee Ruben from Moscow with Bagirov in Azerbaijan is permissible and acceptable, because from Moscow to the very outskirts, all communists must

strictly obey the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

This is a party, the political vanguard of society, an alliance of voluntarily united ideological allies.

And the union republics are Soviet power, they are the whole of society. And decide for society has the right only society!

And the fact that Stalin (and Beria too!) saw this subtle difference showed that Stalin considers the supremacy of the party in society not as something immutable and eternal, but as a measure necessary until the Soviet power is consolidated and developed.

And such an approach could hardly please the already emerging - so far only in rudimentary forms - partocracy. Moreover, such a trifling, it would seem, "difference" in the approaches of Stalin and the party-state "top" of the USSR to

The prospects for the development of the social system were already affected in the near future - in 1937, the year of the beginning of serious repressions. But

more will be said about this. The

reorganizations of 1936 in Transcaucasia had many aspects, starting with the change purely administrative division and subordination and ending ... However, from the political aspect should be started.

The Transcaucasian Federation had both a common Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR, and separate republican Councils of People's Commissars. The same was true for the party leadership. the most: there was the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) and three subordinate Central Committee of Communist Parties of Azerbaijan, Armenia and

Georgia. Now the Zakkraykom was abolished, and Beria remained only the first secretary of the Central Committee. CP(b) of Georgia. On the one hand, it was like a downgrade. On the other hand, he is now could focus on the problems of Georgia. However, before that, still the first secretary The Zakkraykom faced a lot of trouble. After all, the preparation of any reorganization is a matter

difficult, if it is carried out in a businesslike way, and not businesslike.

Beria knew how to work and did not know how to imitate violent activity. So 1936 brought him many new tasks in addition to the already familiar ones - he had to prepare "separation" of the Transcaucasian republics. But here's what I want to note ... Let's read it again into Stalin's letter and try to understand - why did Beria protest? 2 months later The ZSFSR will no longer be, and then what does he care about possible insults that are already almost "strangers" to him Azerbaijan and Armenia! But

Beria never worked "from now to now." He was the complete antipode of personalities. Suslov type (if in the latter case one can speak of personality), with his sacramental "we were not instructed." Beria subtly understood that, despite the almost liquidation Transcaucasian Federation, resentment may arise. And that's not good for business. And if so, then, Comrade Stalin, we should take this into account.

Comrade Stalin and took into account. After all, he also knew how to understand everything subtly and knew the power of "little things". The year 1936 flew by in troubles ... The Transcaucasian Federation is a thing of the past, and the coming 1937 was already the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution. He is was the year of the centenary of the death of Pushkin, and the whole country was preparing for this date. The date was although with a mournful meaning, they were preparing to celebrate it with an emphasis not on the fact that Pushkin died, but that Pushkin is immortal. And this seemingly literary anniversary had serious political significance. Not only Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, but also Joseph Dzhughashvili understood the importance of the cultural front, especially when the country wins one victory after another. Some

people celebrated this date, however, in their own way. On the cover of one of the anniversary student notebooks depicted a knight at a crossroads. The contours of the interceptions of the scabbard of the sword were made up of letters, and the letters were on the badges of the horse's harness. On the whole, everything evolved - upon careful study - into the slogan: "Down with the CPSU (b)".

Tbilisi was actively preparing for the Pushkin anniversary, but they were also preparing to celebrate 750th anniversary of Rustaveli's poem "The Knight in the Panther's Skin". After all, the Georgians had someone and what in be proud of literature! Treasurer of Queen Tamara, sovereign feudal lord, Rustaveli in the 12th century sang honor, justice, goodness, denied evil as a natural principle ...

The anniversary of Rustaveli became the same all-Union holiday as the anniversary of Pushkin, and although the scale of Rustaveli was undoubtedly great, in that the anniversary of the creation of the Georgian the whole country loudly noted, there was a merit not only of Stalin, but also of Beria.

Alas, 1937 was marked not only by glorious anniversaries ... He entered the newest history of the country also as a year of serious dramatic events. "Democrats" are called this period of the "great terror", and repressions from the summer of 1937 to the spring of 1938 were indeed more significant in scope and depth than in any other period.

BUT HERE were they really massive and, even more so, unfounded - this is a big question. And on it, as well as on other events of 1937, we, dear Reader, you will have to stop for a long time ...

Chapter

9 "ORGANS", PLENUMS, CONSPIRACIES, REPRESSIONS AND ELECTIONS

"IN AUGUST 1938, Beria arrived in Moscow and on August 22 was appointed 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov. And soon the NKVD began the era is already Beria ... "- this was the beginning of the first version of the 9th chapter, which originally was called "NKVD model 1939-1941".

But as I worked on it, I realized that at first it was necessary to at least briefly say about predecessors of the NKVD, about the activities of the NKVD in 1937-1938 and even earlier, and even then move on to later times.

Then it turned out that the topic "NKVD sample 1937-1938." adjoining topic Constitution of 1936 and the first elections to the first Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And chapter 9 began to be called "NKVD, the Constitution of the 1936 model and elections" ...

But even later it became clear that it was necessary to somehow dwell on the topic of a military conspiracy, at the plenums of the Central Committee in 1937, as well as on some social trends, quite to 1937 formed.

The chapter grew, "budded" from itself the 10th chapter, finally took on the form, with which the reader will now meet, and has acquired the final name. The one that the reader has just read. So we move on...

LAVRENTY Beria became a Chekist in 1921, during the era of the Cheka Dzerzhinsky. And on August 5, 1931, the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the ZSFSR, L.P. Beria, was introduced into collegium of the OGPU.

The Cheka is the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and sabotage, organized at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on December 7 (20), 1917. On

January 23, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to abolish the Cheka and creating on its basis

State Political Directorate (GPU) as part of the People's Commissariat internal affairs of the RSFSR.

On February 9, 1922, Order No. 64 of the Cheka was issued announcing the abolition of the Cheka. However, the same Dzerzhinsky remained the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (he had been him since March 25 1919 to July 7, 1923).

On December 30, 1922, the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR adopted the Union Treaty between RSFSR (which then included the Asian national republics), the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the Transcaucasian Federation. Clause 12 of the agreement stated:

"In order to establish revolutionary legality on the territory of the USSR and uniting the efforts of the union republics in the fight against counter-revolution established ... under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union ... a joint body of state political management..."

On November 2, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted resolution on the organization of the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which was announced by order OGPU No. 486 of November 21, 1923. Paragraph 9 of this order stated that the OGPU of the USSR supervises the work of local bodies of the OGPU "through its representatives under the Soviets People's Commissars of the Union Republics.

Around that time, the generalized concept of "organs" arose ... Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky remained the Chairman of the OGPU, and after his death from a heart attack provoked by emotional speech in a joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on July 20, 1926, Vyacheslav Rudolfovich became chairman Menzhinsky.

The total staff of the central and Moscow city apparatus of the OGPU was 2,409 people as of December 1, 1929, but since the 1930s, the functions of the OGPU have been expanding (in its composition there were police agencies, economic departments for industries and etc.).

On May 10, 1934, Menzhinsky died, and on July 10, 1934, by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR On the basis of the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR was created, headed by Genrikh Yagoda, chairman of the former OGPU. Among other departments and departments (there were eleven at the beginning, including GUPO - Main Directorate of Fire Protection, and OAGS - Department of Civil Acts

state) as part of the NKVD of the USSR, the Main Directorate of State security with a staff of 1410 people. The work of the GUGB was led by the people's commissar himself, and formally there was no post of head of the GUGB.

By a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of October 7, 1935, for employees of the GUGB, special ranks: commissioner of state security of the 1st rank, commissioner of the State Security of the 2nd rank, commissioner of the 3rd rank GB, senior major of the GB, major of the GB, captain of the GB, senior lieutenant GB, lieutenant of GB, junior lieutenant of GB and sergeant of GB. Special

ranks were two steps higher than the army ones: the commissioner of the State Security Service of the 1st rank was equal to the commander of the 1st rank of the Red Army, and since May 1940 - to the general of the army; captain GB was equal to an army colonel, and the sergeant of the State Security Service wore two head over heels in his buttonholes - like Lieutenant of the Red Army.

On November 26, 1935, the title of "General Commissar of the State security", assigned to Yagoda (and later to Yezhov and subsequently to Beria).

Ten months later, Yagoda was relieved of his post as People's Commissar, and on September 26, 1936, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Party Control Commission. Yagoda April 3

1937 was arrested and March 15, 1938 - after the process of Bukharin - Rykov, where he passed as one of the accused, was shot.

Yezhov was relieved of his post by the NKVD on November 25, 1938, April 10, 1939 arrested and on February 4, 1940 shot.

The fate of these two people's commissars is explained by the insidious plans of Stalin in his struggle for sole power in the party, but this is not so. Although I do not deny that some plan Stalin *in the course of the development of the situation*

and arose. But I will tell about this when we come to August 1937 ...

The repressions of the beginning and end of the 1930s have not yet been given a comprehensive objective grade. Changing the state of affairs in this matter is beyond the scope of the book, but since when "democrats" say "Beria", they mean "repressions" (even if we are talking about repressions of the period when Beria was in the Transcaucasus), about this side something needs to be said...

One of the main symbols of the Stalin era, the "democrats" consider not the "Worker and Collective Farmer" by Vera Mukhina, created for the Soviet pavilion at the World Exhibition 1937 in Paris, and the law, as they say, "on five spikelets", or the law from the "seventh to the eighth", that is, from August 7, 1932.

So, in the preface to the well-known reader "Correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich" it is stated that "in conditions of famine, these measures were directed against the starving peasants who, saving their lives, cut spikelets of bread in the collective farm fields.

In fact, spikelets are not grain, but wheat, rye, etc., but "democrats", after all, buns grow on trees, so let it be so ... Let's not take into account the fact that it was Christ who could feed a horde with five loaves people, and you won't be fed up with "five spikelets" of "bread", so they cut off - if they already cut off - not five of these notorious spikelets, but, presumably, more.

I am not being ironic here - I almost died of hunger in Ukraine in the Dnipropetrovsk region my grandmother with her three daughters, so I know there was a famine. And there were, alas, starving peasants. However, according to the

"democratic" authors of the same preface, for six months the law of 08/07/32, on the basis of it, by January 15, 1933, 103 thousand people were convicted. "Of these (according to the developed data on 79 thousand convicts), according to the same authors, 4880 people were sentenced to death, and more than 26 thousand people to 10 years in prison" ... Strange! .. Many millions were starving, and a hundred

thousand were condemned. Strange and something else ... January 15 in Russia - it's winter. August 7 in it is already the end

summer, and the 1932 harvest seemed to be over by the time the law was promulgated. TO In addition, the instruction "on the application of the Decree of the CEC and SNK of the USSR dated 7 / VIII-32 about protection of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and strengthening of public (socialist) property" was approved only on September 16, 1932.

What are these "spikelets" and where at the end of 1932 a hundred thousand convicted under the "law of five spikelets"?

The answer, dear reader, is found in the very name of the CEC resolution and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (the law "from the seventh to the eighth")! For there it was not about five spikelets, of course, but about the protection of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and strengthening public (socialist) property.

Stalin, who initiated this decision, wrote on July 20, 1932 to Kaganovich and Molotov:

"Recently, firstly, theft of goods on railway transport (plundered for tens of millions of rubles), and secondly, the theft of cooperative and collective farm property ... According to the law, these gentlemen (plunderers. - **S.K.**) are treated as ordinary thieves, receive two or three years in prison (formally!), but in reality they are amnestied after 6-8 months. Such a mode... only encourages them ... To endure this situation further unthinkable. I propose to issue a law ... which would:

a) equate in its importance railway cargo, collective farm property and cooperative property - to state property;

b) punished for embezzlement ... at least ten years in prison, but how rule - the death penalty ...

Without these (and similar) draconian socialist measures, it is impossible establish a new social discipline, and without such discipline it is impossible to defend and strengthen our new system ... "

So not for five spikelets were shot by January 15, 1933, almost five thousand people, and for millions (in total, of course) theft, including - at enterprises and railways. And

everyone tells us about the "five spikelets".

PREVIOUSLY, I gave other examples, from which it should be clear - with the beginning the first five-year plan, all the internal enemies of the new Russia revived and became more active. After all The five-year plan was given to the country at a difficult price. May 4, 1935 in a speech at the Kremlin Palace on reception in honor of graduates of the academies of the Red Army (on May 6 it was published by Pravda) Stalin recalled:

"We have inherited from the old times a technically backward and half-impooverished, devastated country ... Devastated for four years imperialist war, re-ravaged by three years of civil wars, a country with a semi-literate population, with low technology, with separate oases of industry, sinking among the sea of the smallest peasant farms - this is the kind of country we inherited from the past ... "

His audience knew how right the General Secretary of the Central Committee ... They knew that he was right and when he continued like this:

"The task was to transfer this country from the rails ... of darkness to the rails of modern industry and mechanized agriculture ... The question was: either we will solve this problem in the shortest possible time ... or ... our the country ... will lose its independence and become an object of the game imperialist powers...

The "academicians" of the Red Army listened to what the whole country would read in a day:

"It was necessary to create a first-class industry ... And for this it was necessary make sacrifices and introduce the strictest economy in everything, it was necessary to save on food, and on schools, and on manufactory, in order to accumulate the necessary funds to create an industry ... It is clear that in such a big and difficult matter ... success can be identified only after a few years. Therefore it was necessary arm yourself with strong nerves, Bolshevik restraint and stubborn patience to overcome the first setbacks and steadily move forward ... "

Stalin was right a hundred times, but what was before his rightness to a fist deprived of good? Deprived of a normal piece of bread to the townsfolk? Not far away - even if not his own fault - a peasant in the village? Arrogant in its intellectual arrogance of the old a specialist internally hostile to the new Russia? And the new Soviet bureaucrat?

All of them were dissatisfied with the deteriorating quality of life. And this dissatisfaction tried to use (and strengthen it) various political forces - from the Trotskyists, who fought "against Stalin", to the anti-Soviet, who fought both against Stalin and against Soviet power in general. So

objective circumstances made certain repressive measures in "reconstruction period" inevitable. But this is the first half of the 1930s. How was it in the second half?

BEFORE me lies a book bound in black with crimson letters: "The Book of Memory of the Victims of Political Repressions in the Kalinin Region. Martyrology. 1937–1938".

This is a sad document. But this is unlike the libelous collections of the document (although and not without a touch of distortion in the introductory articles and in the comments). And work with the document simpler ... You can extract facts from it.

And they are worth bringing here. So, in the introductory article by G. P. Tsvetkov it is clear and it is clearly reported that shortly after the murder of S. M. Kirov:

"The Judicial Collegium of the OGPU was replaced by a Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, endowed with the right of expulsion and exile, **imprisonment in forced labor camps for up to 5 years** " (hereinafter it is highlighted me. - **S.K.**).

I will interrupt the quotation to clarify - in fact, even in the OGPU, except for the Special meeting since 1933, there was an institution of "troikas" who had the right to apply the highest measure of punishment. But it was every time really special cases. About providing such rights each time a separate Politburo Resolution was adopted (for example, on judicial "troika" of the OGPU embassy in Belarus; on the "troika" in the Leningrad region "as part of vols. Kirov, Medved and Kodatsky" and for a number of "troikas" of the OGPU in some regions and republics).

And now I will continue quoting the article by G.P. Tsvetkov.

"By order of the NKVD of the USSR of May 27, 1935, **NKVD-UNKVD troikas were formed in the NKVD of the republics, administrations of territories and regions**, on which were subject to **the rights of the Special Conference**. The troika included: the head of the UNKVD, the head of the police department and the regional prosecutor. by order The NKVD of the USSR of July 30 ... were created regional, republican and regional troika, whose members approved the secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b), head Directorate of the NKVD and the prosecutor of the region. Also formed in 1937 commission consisting of the people's commissar of internal affairs and the prosecutor of the USSR (deuce).

Threes and twos (G.P. Tsvetkov for some reason uses the plural number, speaking of "twos", although he himself said that the "two" was one in the USSR and It included two senior officials of the state. - **S.K.) were endowed the right to apply capital punishment.** Accordingly threes and twos could act (again, "twos" - a two-man, or something, was this G.P. Tsvetkov? - **S.K.) edges and regions. These extrajudicial bodies were abolished in November 1938.** From that time until September 1953 in the bodies state security, the only non-judicial body operated - the Special Conference (endowed, I remind you, only with the right of expulsion and exile, and as well as imprisonment in forced labor camps, and **"increased" their rights "before VMN" only with the outbreak of war in 1941. - S.K.)**".

Here's how simple and clear everything is: since November 1938, there were no "triples" in the USSR, that is, there were no extrajudicial bodies with the right to apply capital punishment.

And most of the "execution" tales of "democratic" "historians", and more - "publicists", claiming that "the executioner Beria was replaced by the executioner Yezhov" (it was in in this order, I was not mistaken!), are not worth a damn. Let's

return to the "Martyrology of the Kalinin Region" ... In the second introductory article, the dean Faculty of History, Tver State University, Professor Smirnov writes:

Survivors of the Political Terror of 1937-1938. repeatedly asked themselves and us the question: why, in the name of what goals innocently millions of Soviet citizens suffered? No one can give a complete answer now, but, of course, with the help of repression, Stalin strengthened his political positions as the sole dictator, and also decided all those political, economic and social problems that are like mountains accumulated in the state" ...

For the historian, this passage is actually disgraceful, since it shows how his incompetence, and, alas, bad faith... A scientist must not

only collect facts, but also comprehend them. And even deprived a sense of historicity, the historian cannot but know that Stalin was not a dictator ... What By the end of the 1930s, many of the problems that had accumulated in Russia over the previous three hundred years, such as once they started to find their solution.

However, Professor Smirnov is not Antonov-Ovseenko. He is still a scientist, and therefore then he reports the facts, and reports them in such a way and in such a sequence that, according to in fact, he himself gives an answer to the question, to which, in his opinion, "cannot give an answer nobody".

And what does he say? And here's what:

"In 1936, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, instead of being released from his job position, and then the executed G. G. Yagoda was appointed N. I. Yezhov ... The final sanction for mass arrests (this, alas, is a lie, and a lie for the historian impermissible. - **S.K.) gave the February-March plenum of 1937, at which I. V. Stalin called for smashing and uprooting mercilessly "the enemies of the workers class" and "traitors to our Motherland". Soon followed the order of the people Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. I. Yezhov "On the operation of repression former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements", approved**

Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 31, 1937.

Here we must immediately make a clarification ... The decision to conduct such an "operation" is not was directly related to the main agenda of the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, not even the June plenum of the Central Committee in the same year.

And I will elaborate on this later. Perhaps the attentive reader himself has already noticed some oddities in information of Professor Smirnov. The plenum ended at the beginning of March and, it seems, has already "gave sanction for arrests," and Yezhov issues an order only at the end of July (obviously, he means operational order of the People's Commissar No. 00447 dated July 30, 1937, and possibly his own Operational Order No. 00486 of August 15, 1937). Why such a delay?

Yes, because there was no "delay". And you have to lie to hide from us very dynamic and to this day not well covered events of that time.

After all, one more absurdity in the statements of Professor Smirnov must immediately indicate - between the order of Yezhov and the February-March plenum there was also a June plenum. So isn't it more correct to link Yezhov's order with the decisions of this plenum? (Running go ahead, I'll say that to a certain extent it was so!) And I want

to warn the reader that "democratic" historians are either thoughtlessness, or consciously, they combine into one TWO quite different processes - mass repressions of 1937-1938 and repressions in the Soviet military and party state leadership in the same 1937-1938. **I will repeat and highlight boldly: two quite different**

process: the elimination of a possible "fifth column" in the lower classes of society and the elimination specific anti-state (formally - anti-Stalinist) conspiracy "upper".

These two categories of repression coincided in time and were, of course, mutually connected, if only by their common orientation against anti-socialist elements. But, nevertheless, in order to understand them, they must be clearly distinguished!

And in each of these processes one can single out, by the way, at least two ... Let's say the conspiracy of the "top" was in some of its manifestations rather "deaf" than organizationally structured. But he was. It simply could not be - we will see it.

The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria, was - unlike many his colleagues and comrades in the party - certainly competent. He and under the new electoral system would not have been rejected *by the masses* and would have been elected anyway. AND therefore, he did not simply respond to the draft constitution, but did so clearly and deployed. His article "The New Constitution and the Transcaucasian Federation" appeared in "Pravda" is already June

12. It was sustained quite in the spirit of Stalin's ideas, but the old Chekist would not have been himself, if at the same time he did not warn: "There is

no doubt that attempts to use the new constitution in their counter-revolutionary purposes will be done by all the inveterate enemies of the Soviet government, in the first place queue from among the defeated groups of Trotskyist-Zinovievites.

BERIA was, of course, right in his fears! On the eve of the June plenum of 1937, which will be discussed below, a telegram arrived from Mexico to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Trotsky.

"Stalin's policy leads to the final, both internal and external defeat. The only salvation is a turn towards Soviet democracy, starting with the opening of the latest trials. Along the way, I offer a complete support." And

he knew, after all, when to write - the entire party leadership gathered in Moscow! And knew it's not from the newspapers. He had a strong connection with Moscow, he was! Trotsky was still a strong factor - not in itself, but precisely as an inspirer of his like-minded people. It was precisely like-minded people, and not the masses, that the masses followed Stalin.

Feuchtwanger, who brilliantly comprehended the processes of 1937, wrote brilliantly about Stalin with Trotsky. I will quote just one of his thoughts:

Trotsky is a dazzling individual. Stalin - risen to genius is the type of Russian peasant and worker, for whom victory is guaranteed, since in him the strength of both classes is combined. Trotsky is a rapidly fading rocket, Stalin is a fire that burns and warms for a long time.

I note that Beria, after all, was the son of a peasant who rose to an outstanding knowledge worker. Although not raised, of course, to genius.

And here are Trotsky's recommendations to the Spanish Trotskyists in the Bulletin of the Opposition for 1937:

"Ten thousand, with firm and shrewd guidance, may find road to the masses, wrest them from the influence of the Stalinists and the Social Democrats ... and ensure not only ... an unstable victory of the Republican troops over fascist, but also the complete victory of the working people over the exploiters."

Trotsky recommended the same line of conduct to his supporters in the USSR. In fact, this was not a strategy for victory - Stalin, back in 1934, said HG Wells that any political vanguard is powerless without at least a silent mass support. But "ten thousand" "Trotsky's falcons" could harm the country huge because the atmosphere was tense. Let me remind you: •

On March

31, 1937, Yagoda was arrested - then already People's Commissar for Communications. However, arrests in the central and peripheral apparatuses of the NKVD continued;

- in May, the main arrests took place among the highest command staff of the Red Army, arrested Marshal Tukhachevsky, army commanders Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, commanders Primakov, Putna;
- in the summer of 1937, a military conspiracy trial took place, and on June 11, in this case, the verdict was pronounced...

A third trial was being prepared in March 1938 in the case of the "right-wing Trotskyist bloc" Bukharin-Rykov, at which Yagoda was also tried. At the same time, preparations were underway for first elections to the Supreme Council.

This is how the main political affairs in the country stood by the end of June 1937, when The next plenum of the Central Committee, originally scheduled for June 20, opened in Moscow.

REALLY, it lasted from June 23 to June 29, considered the draft "Regulations on elections in Supreme Soviet of the USSR" and approved it. An information report about the plenum, published in Pravda on June 30, said: "Further, the plenum considered the following questions: a) about improvement of seeds of grain crops, b) the introduction of correct crop rotations and c) measures to improvement of cereal seeds"...

The "seed" question was indeed considered at the plenum, and it was a corresponding detailed, quite business-like resolution was adopted, published in print.

However, the main issue was, of course, the "election" issue, but there was no detailed discussion on it. there was no public information. Little is known about this plenum, even transcripts are missing. Even the order in which the question was dealt with was hidden, because The "seed" question was considered not "further...", but first. And

there were reasons for that. An analysis of some of them involving many little-known data about those days carried out in the book of Yuri Zhukov "Another Stalin", which would be more accurately called "The real Stalin", if we mean not so much the assessments of its author as the facts, he cited. The

annotation on the fourth side of the book says that Yuri Zhukov proves incredible things, namely:

“Stalin wanted to start the democratization of the country and hold free elections on an alternative basis, ensuring the advancement of new forces that have shown themselves in socialist construction; ... sought to remove from power the partocracy, which continued to live in the illusions of a world revolution, and partly in a bourgeois reborn; tried to remove amateurs from managing the economy, replacing them with new professionals brought up by the socialist system; ... to conduct foreign and domestic policy, in accordance only with national interests of the peoples of Russia and the peoples who have united with the Russian into a single Union State.

I confess to the reader, at the same time offering my apologies to Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov that all the words in italics in this quote belong to me, not to him. AND With these adjustments, I share this view of Stalin.

I hope that I have already said enough so that with such an assessment of Stalin's period 1936–1937, the reader also agreed. But now I will add something...

The party and Soviet bureaucrats have indeed become more and more insolent. For example, practice co-optation (introduction to an elected body without elections), despite the resolution February-March plenum of the Central Committee, did not stop. Let's say Chelyabinsk the regional executive committee resolved more than two-thirds of the issues by “poll”, and not by sessions, Sverdlovsk - 70%, Azov-Chernomorsk Regional Executive Committee - more than 80%.

Of the 20,000 resolutions of the regional executive committee of the Western Region adopted since the beginning of 1936, only 500 were considered at meetings of the presidium, and the rest were adopted either by “poll” or simply after the signature of the chairman and secretary. The latter

fact revealed three unfortunate moments at once: • the passion of regional “leaders” not for business, but for paperwork (about 40 “papers” of regional significance per day!); • the disinclination of the same “leaders” to advice, not only with the people, but even with their own electoral environment; • the reluctance of the leading regional circles to change the situation.

And STALIN used the same method (there is always a double-edged sword!). Already in the second half of May, by “poll” were withdrawn from the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) the first secretary Sverdlovsk Regional Committee Kabakov, Rudzutak, Eliava, Orakhelashvili (he), Ukhonov (besides them, also Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Eideman, Gamarnik) ...

And already during the plenum, they were quietly removed from the Central Committee - with expulsion from the party - and others ... Including: secretary of the Union Committee of the Central Executive Committee USSR Unshlikht, Chairman of the Commission of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Antipov, former people's commissar of state farms Kalmanovich, first secretaries of Kursk and Odessa regional committees Sheboldaev and Veger, the first secretary of the Crimean regional committee Lavrentiev.

Former Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia and Secretary of the Zakkraykom Kartvelishvili left Transcaucasia in 1933. He was the secretary of the West Siberian regional committee, the Far Eastern regional committee, and from December 28, 1936 he became the secretary of the Crimean regional committee party Lavrentiev (so Kartvelishvili began to call himself for some time).

The “democrats” attribute the repression and Lavrenty Kartvelishvili to Lavrenty Beria. But let one of them explain how the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Beria could dispose of the fate of the first secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the CPSU (b) Lavrentiev. It Of course, the Crimea is a sunny land, but it still was not part of sunny Georgia.

However, these were only “flowers” ... He presented the sour “berry” to many participants plenum member of the Politburo Commission formed on May 26, 1937 for the preparation of a new electoral law Yakov Yakovlev (Epshtein). Reminding that the elections will be universal, equal, direct and secret, he stressed that the elections are in full in accordance with the already existing Constitution should also be alternative!

Alternative!

After all, dear reader, it became the norm in Khrushchev-Brezhnev times the presence on the ballot of only one candidate, although the Constitution allowed there are several of them. And then, after all, it all began - the first elections were just ahead.

And according to the Constitution (I quote, by the way, the textbook "The Constitution of the USSR" for the 7th grade of the secondary school edition of 1953) the right to nominate candidates for deputies The council was used by "all public organizations and societies of working people: communist party organizations, trade unions of workers and employees (and there were more than a dozen of them, if we count the branch trade unions! - S.K.), cooperative organizations, youth organizations, cultural societies"... And this is not counting general meetings at enterprises, collective farms, state farms and military parts!

Yakovlev said:

"The Constitution of the USSR provides every public organization and society the right to nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This article is of great importance, it was introduced at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin. Her goal develop and expand democracy. This article provides genuine democracy at the elections".

What was said from the rostrum of the plenum was not just a sound, because further Yakovlev elaborated the general thesis:

"The district election commissions are responsible for register and put on the ballot according to the relevant district of all candidates for the Supreme Soviet, without exception, who are nominated public organizations and societies of workers ... "

Further, Yakovlev explained that the refusal to register could be appealed to the Central Election Commission that there are no special requirements for candidates, that for election to deputies requires an absolute majority of votes, etc.

But that's not all!

Speaking about the work of those called upon to control the executive committees of the deputy sections of local Soviets (that is, commissions of the Soviets), Yakovlev said:

"In those numerous cases when the sections take the initiative, reveal shortcomings, demand correction, criticize the heads (departments executive committees. - **S.K.**), managers often begin to upset them, stop go to sections ... All our workers must understand that there are no people who could claim lack of control in work, that accountability any worker follows from the foundations of Soviet power, that only with the help of control from below, complementary to control and leadership from above, can be improved the work of the Soviets ... "

Perhaps some of the readers may find these words too general and similar to the non-committal party chatter that we heard from Brezhnev-Gorbachev tribunes. But this is a closed (until 2005) transcript of the plenum Central Committee. This is not propaganda, not agitation. This is a practical, so to speak, "analysis flights"... And at the same time - briefing and directive.

Therefore, in order to understand the emerging situation, it is important for us to know what Yakovlev said So:

"It goes without saying that the practice of substituting laws at the discretion of that or some other group of bureaucrats is an anti-Soviet affair..."

So:

"Party groups in the Soviets, and especially in the executive committees of the Soviets, often turned into bodies that substitute for the work of the Soviets, into bodies that decide everything, and The only thing left for the Soviets is to stamp a pre-prepared decision ... Conclusion hence: it will be necessary to enter the next party congress with a proposal for cancellation of the paragraph of the Charter of the CPSU (b) on the organization of party groups in the Soviets ... "

The style of Yakovlev's report suggests dual authorship - both Yakovlev, and Stalin. Who was

he - Yakovlev Yakov Arkadevich, or rather - Yakov Arkadevich Epshtein? He was clearly a talented man, but ambiguous and with a fate that was not very clear to me. Born in 1896, the son of a teacher in Grodno. Studied at the Petersburg Polytechnic institute, but did not graduate - obviously due to going into politics, since 1913 a Bolshevik. Member of the October Revolution in Petrograd. Then - standard for professional revolutionary whirlwind of positions and localities. Was the editor newspapers "Poor" and "Peasant newspaper", that is, he had both literary skills and style. And plus to that - and a head. He had

nothing to do with Trotsky, on the contrary, Trotsky periodically "pecked" him. After all, Trotsky was "leftist", while Yakovlev deviated "to the right." And at one time evaded seriously - up to organizational actions. In December 1929, on the eve of the start collectivization - he headed the newly created Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and he is credited with all the "horrors of collectivization", which, of course, is not true.

From April 1934, Yakovlev became head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee, and from October 1936, he actually acted as chairman of the Commission of the Party control under the Central Committee (formal chairman Yezhov even officially nine-tenths of his gave time to the NKVD).

Yakovlev was one of the co-authors of Stalin and Bukharin on the draft Constitution. Above report at the June plenum, Yakovlev, as I understand it, also worked a lot, however its general plan was, of course, Stalinist. And according to him, the Soviet government had to become the Power. The

Kronstadt rebellion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1921 was held under the demagogic slogan "Soviets without communists". And now Stalin's party, realizing the danger of establishing a the country of power of the party of partocrats, put forward, in fact, the slogan: "Soviets without partocrats, but under the ideological leadership of the communists!"

Here are those, grandmother, and St. George's Day! They came, they say, "masters of life" to the plenum! Such a turn of affairs did not please the "victorious" partocrats. But also disinterested the old fighters were also not happy with Yakovlev-Stalin's report. And then Molotov added:

"We must understand, comrades, that our old criteria of the old party members are now insufficient in many respects. Comrade Stalin lately several times he told us all that our old estimates of people are now completely inadequate. He has a pre-revolutionary party experience ... participated in the October Revolution, had merits in the Civil War, then ... fought well against the Trotskyists and against the right ... But this is not enough ... In given time from us ... it is required that ... leaders ... be able to obsolete rubbish, a bureaucratic or bureaucratic group of workers promote new people.

All quotations from the speeches at the June plenum given above are not taken from anyone's memories. This is data from the archive, and specifically from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) See how

it says, fund 17th, inventory 2nd, file 616th, sheets 5-224th ...

I, of course, did not read this case myself - I was not admitted. But it is unlikely that the presenter who read it Researcher at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. N. Zhukov messed up something in the citation.

Although there is a lot of confusion around the June plenum. And quite consciously.

After all, if you widely publicize the fact that Stalin intended already in 1937 democratize the country, then this ... **This**

will put an end to any - Khrushchev, Soviet, "democratic" - the concept of Stalin as a "tyrant", "satrap", "dictator"!

And remembering the main theme of the book, I will emphasize: on similar concepts of Beria - too! After all, if a pack of partocrats and partocratic historians is so impudent, vile and totally slandered Stalin for decades, it is logical to assume that his colleague She slandered Beria in the same way!

By the way, at the plenum, the People's Commissar of Health of the USSR was removed from the Central Committee Kaminsky - Bolshevik since 1913, in 1920-1921 Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Baku Council. A certain

hack from history Fyodor Volkov in his capital-libelous work 1992 "The Rise and Fall of Stalin" (among the reviewers were academician AM Samsonov and the writer Ovidy Gorchakov, who is much more inventive, whom we will encounter later) reported that Kaminsky de *"died after speaking on the advice of Stalin at the plenum of the Central Committee*

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with the exposure of Beria as an agent of the Okhrana (already the Okhrana! - S.K.)".

It's funny that a few pages later, Volkov claims that these are Georgian the Bolsheviks, they say, "told Stalin about his (Beria. - S.K.) dark past, that he was an" agent of international imperialism "for a long time." That is, according to Volkov, it goes like

this: the old Bolsheviks told Stalin, he said Kaminsky, and Kaminsky told everyone what he got burned on - Beria shot him right there. Not being, however, still the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and being not in Moscow, but in Tbilisi.

If you believe K. Zalessky, the author of the biographical guide "Empire Stalin," Kaminsky allegedly turned to Stalin at the June plenum with the words: "The NKVD continues to arrest honest people," to which Stalin de replied: "They are enemies people, and you are a bird of the same flight.

Perhaps such a pick-pocketing took place - in any case, it is adequate reflects the essence of the situation. However, on June 27, Molotov, in his report at the plenum, caused dismissal of Kaminsky and a number of other people's commissars called the inability of too many professional revolutionaries to cope with their direct official responsibilities.

Specifically, Kaminsky did not cope with the construction of maternity hospitals, nurseries and providing them with equipment. Molotov defined his attitude to the matter as "completely bureaucratic." June 25,

1937 - during the plenum - Kaminsky was arrested and March 8, 1938 sentenced to death. The

reader may remark: "Even if he failed as the People's Commissariat of Health, not shoot for it!" But Kaminsky was not just a people's commissar, but also an "old fighter" with experience in underground and propaganda work. And he was not so many years old - only forty-two ... Remaining at large and gathering together, such fighters could, after all, arrange a fight and again. with Stalin. And the country did not need their struggle, but new maternity. Then Kaminsky's speeches will come up at the Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953 - in Khrushchev's speech. But before this plenum, dear reader, we still need to get.

AND UNTIL that the June 1937 plenum of the year is ending with us, and

last debate. Object to Yakovlev (that is, Stalin) or Molotov (that is, the same Stalin) no one can essentially do it - you can't argue against the truth!

It is also impossible to "reset" Stalin using the plenum. Stalin is firmly behind not only the bulk of the party, but also the overwhelming majority of the active part of the country. I emphasize - active! But it is she who determines the situation! No, the partocrats cannot dump Stalin.

And everyone understands this - both they and himself Stalin. And the dispute is not around the essence - the question of alternativeness, but about the most impartial form of counting votes - who will control it? Stalin casually threw a phrase about the fact that in the West, they say, in the conditions of a multi-party There is no system for this problem, and he suddenly

added: "We don't have different parties." Fortunately or unfortunately, we have one party ... I don't know if these words were followed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is a silent stage like Gogol's. I don't think so whether ... Especially since Stalin immediately explained that, as a temporary measure, it is necessary to involve to control existing public organizations, but not party ones, they say, we already have a lot of power in the hands. But Stalin's remark was noticed and remembered by many.

Preparations for the elections after the plenum were still in line with alternatives. At the end of August, the draft sample of the ballot included the following text:

"Leave on the ballot the name of ONE candidate for whom you vote, delete the rest.

So why, instead of alternative or, as they said then, parallel elections the country received the "operation" of the

NKVD? Yu. Zhukov, who has already been mentioned more than once, believes, for example, that repressions provoked by the partocrats in order to prevent the implementation of the ideas of the "Stalin group". Like, Eikhe demanded the right to immediate execution by firing squad for his West Siberian region, and there, they say, off and on ...

But the Moscow historian Zhukov had the opportunity to observe only not that rotten, and initially rotten "elite" of the 70-90s. And so he thinks in categories "struggles for power", "sitting", etc. He measures Stalin by the standards of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov (Gorbachev is "past the money" here, because this one did not fight for power, he was brought to power so that *he* would subsequently *passed* - together with the country).

But Zhukov, of course, is mistaken! Comrade Stalin was not so simple and weak to succumb for a great life - in a matter of days after the end of the plenum - to the requirements or provocations of some kind of Eikhe and so - hastily - give sanction to mass repressions in order to avoid de undesirable election results for Stalin. In addition, the repressive "operation" after the elections did not end after all. I think it was both easier and more difficult. How could (and even how obliged was!) to reason in specific situation, Stalin?

Most likely, so ... Who should in practice organize the election campaign and in general, for the time being, to carry out - albeit poorly - the daily management of the country and economy? Yes, these same party and Soviet bureaucrats, and even the hidden "right" and "left"... You can't replace them all overnight - and the administration will collapse, and they will rebel. And instead powerfully gaining momentum in economic development, we get the devil knows what ...

Bureaucrats will not ensure the organization of genuine alternative elections and sabotage them silently. And if you "click" on them, they can pick up such *candidates* and to push through that from the newly elected Supreme Council the whole country will have a head pain.

Precisely - a headache, and not the overthrow of Soviet power, as it is, I will note in brackets, it happened with the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in 1991. elect the anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist Supreme Soviet among the anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinists did not it would have turned out - the public moods in general were not the same. But to drag into the first Supreme Soviet a certain number of political

"Buzzers" - it was real. And what would happen? The country needs more than just a parliament was, from the word "parole" ("to speak" or more sharply - "talk"), but a normal working body that solves the pressing *business* problems of a socialist society. In some sense - a depoliticized body. Depoliticized

in the sense that there is no *political* struggle within
There should not have been a Supreme Soviet of the USSR ... Disputes should have gone only about ways solution of problems of *economic and social* construction. It was possible

to argue, but about how best to build socialism, and not about whether it can be build in one country, or whether it should be built at all. And bureaucrats freely (trying to realize their political ambitions) or unwittingly (failing to effectively counteract the direct or hidden enemies of socialism) could impose on the country politicized Supreme Soviet. And here the

remaining Trotskyists, and the "rightists", and careerists, and hidden anti-Soviet. And to neutralize their partocracy - in the conditions imposed on it Stalin, - I would hardly want to. Yes, and I wouldn't have been

able to ... On the other hand, the upcoming elections inevitably activated the enemies of socialism at all levels (remember the statements of the Kalinin dispossessed?). Stalin was

not afraid of "losing power." He was not afraid, of course, and the threat of falling Soviet power in general, because there was no such internal threat - young Russia was for Soviet Russia. But Stalin feared even temporary instability, the threat which, *as it turned out*, alternative elections could create. On the other

hand, since things were brewed in this manner, it was possible use the situation to "clean up" the grassroots potential "fifth column". After all it is known that in order to detect the enemy's firepower, it is necessary to call him to activity. And such activity in anticipation of the election campaign has already been observed.

And it turned out that one way or another the necessary Chekist "operation" against the "fifth columns" it was advisable to start right now. And she had an explanation. convincing - they say, the neutralization of the unfinished hostile "element" capable of disrupt the

elections. This "operation" had to be carried out under the old partocracy, Soviet and economic bureaucracy. And only then (and even during the "operation" in the "lower classes") you can gradually clean up "to the nail" the failed and hostile "tops". Mathematicians know:

an integral that cannot be taken is taken by parts! So Stalin decided to take it like that! So that later - as Molotov said there? - "on places of obsolete rubbish, a bureaucratic or bureaucratic group to put forward new of

people". So far, the idea of alternative elections had to be abandoned, but the constitutional opportunity saved! And the idea could be postponed until the next election.

The first elections are on December 12, 1937. The terms of office of both chambers of the Supreme Council - 4 years. This means that the next elections are on December 12, 1941. Fine! Besides time and personnel can be changed... And the young growth of socialism will grow stronger.

And if Eikhe, Khrushchev and others themselves demand immediate repressive measures, so much the better.

This is how Stalin might have thought. And I did not think long: the plenum ended on June 29, and Order No. 00447 of the NKVD was approved by the Politburo on 31 July. But it was still necessary to give requests "on the ground" about how many people are supposed to be repressed there, to get answers and determine the final quotas for the regions - these same "limits". It was not a policy

of struggle for personal power, but a policy of struggle for the country. Yes here there was a calculation, but not selfish, but wise and necessarily tough. A request

was made to the republics and regions about the number of those whom, in the opinion of the "locals", it is necessary to repress in the course of a one-time "operation". The answers "places" were different (but almost all - up to units), and I will give only three:

To be shot To be deported Georgian SSR (Beria) 14191562 West Siberian Territory
(Eikhe) 10800—Moscow Region (Khrushchev) 850032805 So, what do we see here?

"Executioner" Beria issued quite reasonable and even moderate figures to the Central Committee: it is necessary to send few, but there are "execution" candidates ... And how could they not be in such a difficult republic like Georgia?! Let us recall the cannibalistic instructions of Noah Zhordania, bearing Transcaucasia blood, tears and smoke of military conflagrations ... Didn't they still remain in Georgia then? many of those who failed to comply with these instructions in 1924-1925, but who were not away to fulfill them yet at an opportunity? Sometimes they

falsely write that Beria destroyed everything in 1937-1938 leadership of Georgia as an act of some personal revenge. But in the Transcaucasian republics communist swagger, the growth of which already bothered Lenin and which made it so difficult Stalin's life had a particularly fertile base. After all, there weren't enough hands for everything, even Stalin in Moscow, as we see, he could not always cope with the partocracy and was forced to go along with it "cleansing". It

was not easier for Beria in Tbilisi, and I have little doubt that he, regardless of the possibility of repression (the sanction for which from Stalin and the Stalinist part Besides, he could not foresee the Politburo) was preparing reasonable personnel replacements "Old Bolsheviks" Repressions solved this issue harshly, but quite effectively.

If anything catches the eye, it is, on the contrary, the low "execution" proportion of Georgia when compiling "proscription" lists: approximately 1 person per 2,400 inhabitants. And here the obvious enemies of the Soviet power were included ... And "just" bandits - they were in mountainous Georgia was still enough.

No, those from the Georgian leadership, who later, during the years of general rehabilitation, were included in the "innocent victims of Beria's vindictiveness", if they were personal enemies the latter, only because they were already interfering with the cause of Soviet power as a power creativity of the masses.

By the way, Mikoyan and Malenkov in the fall of 1937 "cleaned up" the leadership neighboring Armenia is no less cool than Beria. And about what kind of "personal revenge" Mikoyan, and that more Malenkov, could we talk here?

Finally, if Georgia turned out to be drained of blood in terms of personnel, then where there would have been a powerful increase in the volume of gross production in the republic in the period from 1937 to 1940? And it has grown by half!

And this was the result of both the creation - under Beria - of the economic basis for growth, and the work of young cadres of the Beria call. But

Khrushchev, and Eikhe ...

Roy Medvedev, in his falsely "objective" biography of Khrushchev, hypocritically stated: "We did not have to meet evidence that Khrushchev took an active part in carrying out terror... Khrushchev was not the driving force behind the terror in Moscow..."

As you can see, it

was! And such retouching of Khrushchev's true nature is quite understandable. The time will come and young Khrushchev referents, friends of the Medvedev brothers, will push "dear Nikita Sergeevich" on the first steps towards the creeping restoration of capitalism, which then will support the "energetic" Leonid Brezhnev with his inaction and for which he will prepare the final personnel base of the "mysterious" Yuri Andropov.

There are no two kinds of partocracy, just like some very odorous substance. As for Eikhe, then, say, Yu. Zhukov considers him one of the main initiators mass repression. However, after the XX Congress, Eikhe was enrolled by Khrushchev in their "victims" ... However, after this sacramental congress in Russia, they became possible and more amazing things!

"OPERATION" in the "lower classes" began on August 5 in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar Internal Affairs No. 00447.

"Operation" in the "top" no one officially announced. But already in September 37th arrests began among various first secretaries and people's commissars. And the confessions began followed by new arrests and new confessions.

There were also innocently slandered here, but I think there were much fewer of them than in the "lower classes". And much less than the "official" figures of the Khrushchev era tell us.

This is how I imagine the political essence of the period from the summer of 1937 to the spring of 1938. During this period, the most extensive repressions in the country were indeed carried out. However, they were not the essence of the life of the country during this period.

In 1937, young Soviet guys rushed forward over Paris - Worker and Collective farmer Vera Mukhina.

In 1937, Shostakovich's 5th symphony was first performed and the station was opened. Mayakovskaya metro station, amazing in its innovative architecture. In 1938,

Kapitsa discovered the superfluidity of helium. In 1937, already after August 5, the Murmansk Fishery was put into operation. port, Smolensk flax mill, and in 1938 - the first stage of the Balkhash copper smelter.

In 1937, a Soviet turbine was assembled at the Leningrad Metal Plant with a capacity of 100 thousand horsepower at 3000 rpm.

In 1938, the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics of the Academy of Sciences was established. This is all offhand, too, my dear reader! Complete list only major achievements - economic, social, scientific, technical, cultural, military - of the country in these two years would make up a whole chapter.

LAVRENTY Beria was a highly talented person. But the genius of the social analysis - unlike Stalin - he was not the disappointment of a genius, presumably, not experienced. Yes, and these generations were different - the difference in age was twenty years, and in destinies - a whole era.

But psychologically, Beria was, of course, very close to Stalin - both were practical romantics, both idealists, loaded to the neck with real and laborious deeds of creating a new society. Stalin said:

"Cadres decide everything!" And in the party-state environment, raised to heights of power by the revolution and the Civil War, Beria was one of the most striking representatives of those who turned out to be indifferent to roast geese, but who, on the contrary, turned out to be greedy for work, who wanted to be among those cadres who decided "everything" ...

Decide and work! To work both because it is interesting, and because with my work to serve the grandiose cause of the development of a great country. For Beria, it was not beautiful phrase, but an everyday moral attitude.

That is why Stalin could not but include Beria in his inner circle already in soon. Soon he will be called to Moscow for a new, this time in Moscow, appointment to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. And

the arrival of Beria to the highest floor of state power was due objectively - the demands of the era and the interests of the state.

Chapter 10

BUSINESS IN THE COUNTRY, BUSINESS IN TBILISI...

RETURNING to Tbilisi from the plenum, Beria again plunged into those numerous economic problems, which became more and more as they were solved yesterday's problems.

In August 1937, the Chekist "operation" began, which, of course, affected Georgia. Since repressive actions against a wide range of hostile elements - anti-Soviet, "right", Trotskyists and others, gave more and more investigative

material and involved more and more names in the circle of investigation, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia had to deal, of course, with this side of the matter. Beria was a Chekist for a long time, and his investigative experience simply could not help but be used by him in these approximately six months, when a thorough "cleansing" of the failed part of the party state "generals" and "officers" was going on throughout the country. Having

previously said something about the scope of repressions in Georgia, I will now inform additionally, that on July 8, 1937, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Goglidze, reported Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Beria the following: from the general "limit" for repression by the first category (execution) of the "contingent of kulaks and criminals" in 1419 people per 338 people are the criminal element registered through the Office of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, and 1081 people through the State Security Administration, and 463 and 1099 people, respectively, for expulsion. I note that such specific figures indicate that the Georgian NKVD included

in the lists of repressed quite specific people with very specific sins. Moreover, extrajudicial execution of more than three hundred bandits immediately sharply improved the crime situation, as well as the expulsion of recidivist criminals from the republic. Repressions were also justified against counter-revolutionary forces, such as and a hard "cleansing" of dubious personnel. However, I do not intend to go into detail on this side of the matter, critically analyzing the "credibility" of "democratic" nonsense about how the "sadist" de Beria had just not eaten the prisoners under investigation alive. However, I hope the reader will be interested to know that if during the "purge" of the party, which began in May 1933 and became tougher after the assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934, there were 46% of the party members were excluded, then in Georgia with the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) G Beria - 31.8% (about 18 thousand people). Moreover, during the "purge" Beria spoke more than once in Georgian press with calls to treat those being checked carefully and respectfully.

2,394 people filed an appeal based on the results of checking party documents, out of whom 638 were reinstated, 424 were transferred from members to candidates and 315 more reinstated as candidates.

These figures and facts show well whether Lavrenty Pavlovich was a "sadist." IN addition to the above data, I later *in a separate chapter* in more detail I will analyze in this way the most, perhaps, serious accusation against Beria - in the murder personally named after the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, Khanjyan, right in his office cabinet when Beria was the first secretary of the Zakkraykom in 1936. Formally, the

incident with Khanjyan (suffering from severe tuberculosis and being unbalanced person, he committed suicide) occurred a year before the start a broad repressive action at the top. But according to the technology of its "illumination" in documents period of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the case of Khanjyan is very typical for understanding that falsified approach to the problem of repression, which was established in the USSR after this congress. That is why I will stop there. But in due time. Returning to the year 1937, I will say that no "cleansing" of personnel led to disorganization of the economy - rather, one can say the opposite, both in Georgia and generally in the USSR.

And I, at first glance, moving away from the topic of Beria, but in essence continuing it, something I will inform the reader about one of the addressees of the previously mentioned correspondence between the two leaders VKP(b) - about Lazar Kaganovich.

Konstantin Zalesky, in his biographical dictionary, claims that Kaganovich, they say, even before the start of the mass purges, organized a pogrom in the People's Commissariat of Railways, arresting 3,000 people of "leading personnel" in the NKPS and destroying "the entire top and middle echelons of executives.

It is difficult to understand what K. Zalesky means by "NKPS" - the entire network of iron roads of the Union or the central apparatus of the people's commissariat? For the entire network, the number of arrests is to those times when there were enough saboteurs alone, it was small. And if it means

the central apparatus of the NKPS, then in the mid-30s there were three thousand people in it only "*leading* personnel", it was not a working apparatus, but a bunch of idlers.

One way or another, but before Kaganovich there was no order on the railways. He became Commissar of Railways on February 28, 1935, and here is what he told Stalin from Irkutsk code January 26, 1936:

"I got acquainted with the work of the Krasnoyarsk hub and the locomotive repair plant. On the approaches to Chernorechenskaya, at the station itself and in Krasnoyarsk, dozens of trains delayed by moving east. Along with the ugly the work of the operators is caused by the collapse of the locomotive fleet of the depot Krasnoyarsk. Half of all commodity steam locomotives were put out of action due to malfunctions. The quality of repairs is ugly, often downright criminal. Depot and the plant is littered with sabotage elements ... They, with the connivance of grief The communists introduced such a repair system that led to ... damage to boilers, injectors and pumps. A group of Trotskyists engaged in wrecking in repairs, harassment of the Stakhanovites, the disintegration of the workers. Party organizers and the party organizations of the depot and the plant are working disgustingly, the party organizations are in the pen, the mood of the workers is unimportant. He took prompt measures ... transferred 15 steam locomotives from the NKPS reserve from Irkutsk ... "

etc.

Kaganovich on the spot found sensible replacements for the party organizers of the depot and the plant, the head Krasnoyarsk locomotive department was replaced by engineer Sokolov from the Office locomotive economy of the NKPS ... And similar measures on the railways of the Union quickly won a strong business reputation among the railroad workers.

And before him ... Let's say, Korney Chukovsky in 1933 checked in luggage in Batumi *for three half an hour*. It is a pity that Konstantin Zalessky was not in this queue, just as he was not and at that Armavir station in 1932, where the Chukovskys waited for several days for the arrival train, "excellently marked" in the timetable.

Zalessky argues that the vast majority of contemporaries respond about Kaganovich as an extremely rude and deeply ignorant person. But I'm reading it business letters, his memoirs (after all, they were not written by referents), over and over again he was amazed to how well this self-taught pure water mastered both the word and logic. AND understood the problems of those industries that he headed.

Without serious work on oneself and without talent, nothing would have come of it. What's up rudeness, then from my childhood I remember the story of an acquaintance of my father, an old railwayman, about how Kaganovich, having accepted the report of the head of the station by the name Gapon and, after a corresponding question, having learned that he was not a namesake, but a brother "That very" priest Gapon, immediately asked: "How, are you not pressed here?" AND added: "If anything, contact me directly" ...

So Lazar Kaganovich was not rude to everyone. Although special politeness "iron People's Commissar "and really never bred. What was not, was not. As for

the work of the railways, in 1932 the freight turnover on them amounted to 169.3 billion ton-kilometers, in 1937 - 354.8 billion, and in 1940 - 414 billion. For three "post-repressive" years, growth by 17%. Very decent, and hardly this growth would take place if Kaganovich really destroyed the entire higher and middle echelon of leading workers in transport. In 1938-1940,

4.6 thousand kilometers of new roads were built (in the second five-year plan - 3.4 thousand), fixed assets of railways grew by 74% in three years, the locomotive fleet became the youngest in the world in terms of the average age of locomotives. Share new freight locomotives of the FD series (Felix Dzerzhinsky), SO (Sergo Ordzhonikidze), E and passenger IS ("Joseph Stalin") and Su approached two-thirds, all electric locomotives were domestic production, the share of heavy-duty wagons

increased up to 30%.

This is all the same, after all, after Kaganovich "destroyed" in the NKPS "the entire higher and middle echelon of executives.

GRIBOYEDOVSKY Colonel Skalozub said about Moscow: "The fire suited her" ... Alas, the bitter irony of history affected the fact that the repressions rather improved the quality the work of the economy. And they raised it not by injecting an atmosphere of fear, but by strengthening responsibility, firstly, and by eliminating from the economy its conscious disorganizers and incompetent managers, secondly.

Yes, in all spheres of the country's life, the repressive "purges" also caught a number of honest Soviet people. Someone died like that - not due to the "bloodthirstiness of the shoulder cases of the masters NKVD", but due to the harsh realities of the class struggle, which was by no means invented in the Lubyanka. General Tsvetaev (then divisional commander), whom I mentioned, had already been released from under investigation, when reinstated in the ranks of the Red Army, he ended his autobiography as follows:

"... I consider the reason for my arrest the result of enemy work
counter-revolutionary element seeking to undermine the power of the Soviet
Union and the Red Army.

Having experienced severe injustice, Tsvetaev understood this in real terms. time, but for the military man who brought these lines in his book "From the Gulag to Battle" historian Cherushev, there are only "dungeons of the NKVD." As if Yezhov and his successor Beria only thought about how to "drink the blood of innocent victims" ...

Actually, the very title of Cherushev's book has a slanderous connotation, because it tells about those military leaders who were released - as a rule, already under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria - from under investigation, and not from the camps. So they went to 1939-1940 not into battle, but again into the ranks of the

Red Army. But the conspiracy of the military elite, conspiracies in the party and state leadership existed, and it was extremely difficult to unwind all their threads. I will say more about this when there will be a story about the initial period of Beria's activity as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

At the end of 1937, on December 12, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held. Was elected deputy and Lavrenty Beria. The

idea of the failed alternative elections did not become known to the general public. However, some of its echo sounded in Stalin's speech at the election meeting voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on December 11, 1937, on the next day published in Pravda.

I think modern, well-fed with pictures of "Russian" election campaigns it will be even more interesting for the reader to get acquainted with one fragment of this speech than listeners of Stalin. He then said this:

"I would like, comrades, to give you advice, the advice of a candidate for deputies to his voters ... If we take the capitalist countries, then there between the deputies and voters there are some peculiar, I would say quite strange relationship. While the elections are going on, the deputies flirt with the voters, fawn over them, swear allegiance, make a bunch of all sorts of promises. It turns out that the deputies' dependence on voters is complete. Once the elections have taken place and candidates have turned into deputies, relations are changing radically. Instead of Dependence on voters results in their complete independence. For four or five years, that is, until new elections, the deputy feels completely free, independent of the people, of their constituents. He can move from one camp to another, he can turn off the right road to wrong, he can get confused in some machinations not quite

necessary character, he can tumble as he likes - he is independent.

Ah, dear reader! Doesn't this remind you of something familiar to disgust? But that is not all! Stalin - and this part of his

speech could only be fully understood by the party "generals" who are aware of the "pre-election" struggle in the "top," said something else, and this was another of his direct advice to the people over the heads of the partocrats:

"Can such a relationship be considered normal? No way, comrades! This circumstance was taken into account by our Constitution, and it passed the law, by virtue of which voters have the right to early recall their deputies if they start to feint if they swerve off the road, if they forget about their dependence on the people, on the voters.

But this was said about the "party of partocrats", and not about the party of Stalin, active The "bayonet" in which was Lavrenty Beria.

1938 BEGAN. The "operation" of the NKVD was still going on, but this last his Tbilisi year, when he was still the party leader of Georgia, Beria simply did not it was possible to give Chekist investigations too much time.

Passed the anniversary of Rustaveli's poem, the anniversary of Pushkin, celebrated in Georgia too loud and nice. But these were still secondary concerns. In the first place were large industrial projects...

And the construction of a new Tbilisi! This one thing could swallow up all his time, moreover, the problems of construction and architecture were for Beria as a first love.

Volume 53 of the first edition of the TSB in 1946 reported:

"A new era in the history of T[bilisi] begins after the establishment of the Soviet authorities in Georgia (1921). T[bilisi] becomes the capital of the Georgian SSR and Transcaucasian Federation. The rapid development of the city ... takes on the character of a complete its reconstruction, carried out under the direction of L.P. Beria "...

So it was! In 1926, 294,044 inhabitants lived in Tiflis, and in 1939 Tbilisi - already 519175, almost twice as much! I repeat:

Beria knew the construction business professionally and was trained not only theoretically - his office dacha in Gagra was built according to his own project, which contained all drawings and calculations. And he gave nothing to the cause of the socialist reconstruction of Tbilisi. only the heart, but also the mind, knowledge.

The general plan for the development of the capital of Georgia was considered in June 1933 at joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Tiflis city committee, where the main report was made by the first Secretary of the Central Committee and

City Committee L.P. Beria. As always with him, and in terms of reconstruction, a comprehensive, systemic approach, when issues of architectural appearance are linked to problems of all kinds communications, rational placement of residential, administrative, public and industrial zones, reasonable redevelopment without losing the existing originality cities. Suffice it to say that all architectural sights have been preserved old Tiflis, including temples.

Over the two five-year plans, 219 million rubles were invested in public utilities (not Putin's, but Stalin's!). The main highways and squares of the city were subjected, as she wrote TSB, "radical, sometimes very difficult restructuring" ... The

new residential area of Vake ... Beria Square ... Kalyaev's rise, which connected with the center of the main working area ... Completely renovated station square ... The embankment named after Stalin, three kilometers long ... New bridges, including the bridge named after

Chelyuskintsev... The circus and the Dynamo stadium named after Beria... A wonderful park of culture and rest on Mount David, from where panoramas of Tbilisi and the Caucasus Range opened ... New parks on the former Madatovsky Island and on the Funicular Plateau ... The funicular, built in

1936-1938, was the pride of both Tbilisi and Beria ... But after all, one could be proud of the new powerful water pipeline with Natakhtari spring water, and new thermal power plant ... And an automatic telephone exchange ... And a large bath building at sulfur springs ... And the Botanical Garden ... And the buildings of the Tbilisi Institute railway transport engineers ... And the campus of the Institute of Bacteriology ...

And yet - the rebuilt tram lines, as well as the city's new for Tbilisi transport - bus and trolleybus.

In 1938, the construction of the ensemble of the Palace of the Government of Georgia was completed. project of Professor V. Kokorin. It was the largest building in Transcaucasia.

According to the project of academician A. Shchusev, with the participation of architect P. Sardaryan, in the same 1938, a monumental building of the Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute was built. This is what 1937 and

1938 were like for the capital of Georgia and for Lavrenty Beria... And in transforming before the eyes of Tbilisi, not only business energy, but also architectural talent was invested in its socialist general development plan, dear reader

Beria. This, too, must be remembered. And above all to the people of Tbilisi themselves.

He often came or came to the facilities under construction at night ... It was easier that way get an objective view of the real state of affairs, and ...

And, of course, to dream after the usual bustle of the day, in the silence of the night about unfulfilled ... About the title of architect that he never achieved. In 1934 the

Union of Architects of Georgia was established. This was the general trend in USSR - The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee on architecture was adopted in 1932. But what is in Georgia, as well as in Armenia, in Azerbaijan, this case was not delayed, it was also Beria's interest. His opinion as secretary of the Zakkraykom until the beginning of 1937 was, of course, significant, and the fact, for example, that a new one was adopted in 1938, is seriously revised master plan for the restructuring of Yerevan, proves Beria's attention is not only to Tbilisi.

Formally, he never built a single building in his life. However, he became the same architect, but not just one ensemble - even the most grandiose, but architect in the great restructuring of the whole society.

And he was sure that he would do a lot more in this matter ...

YES, PEOPLE of the case in 1937, oddly enough, felt freer and more

confident. Even such a hater of the new Russia as the émigré historian Georgy Fedotov, in his "snapshot of Russia - by January 1, 1936" admitted through gritted teeth:

“...Stalin opened wide the door to life for professional practitioners... Stalin's true support is the class that he himself called "noble" people ... Party card and past merits mean now A little; personal suitability ... - everything. This new ruling layer includes ... security officers, commanders of the Red Army, the best engineers, technicians, scientists and artists of the country...

The new Soviet patriotism is a fact that is pointless to deny. This is the only chance for the existence of Russia ... "

But it was written by the enemy! Open... Malicious... Hating. In the second half of 1937, he was appointed People's Commissar for Heavy Industry. Lazar Kaganovich. The new people's commissar had enough problems, and really "heavy" ones:

downtime, accidents, persistent sabotage.

And Lazar Moiseevich began - although September, terrible for the "democrats", began 1937 - not with repressions, but with what a truly business person begins with on a new place - with advice from people.

Kaganovich became People's Commissar on 22 August. And already on October 26, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry convened the All-Union activists of workers in the metallurgical industry, prepared in September.

The results were not long in coming. In 1938 construction began on the first blast furnace with an oxygen plant, which increased the productivity of the furnace by two times. In order to increase the productivity of rolling mills, ingot-free rolling ...

Professors Vologdin and Geveling developed a method for surface hardening of metal high frequency currents, and Kaganovich immediately became extremely interested in this. He, by his work in the People's Commissariat of Railways knew what it was - the wear of rails in operation, and the new method made it possible to drastically

reduce it. By the way, Professor Valentin Petrovich Vologdin (he was 56 years old in 1937) was one of the founders of the Nizhny Novgorod radio laboratory in 1918, in 1919 he created the world's first liquid cathode mercury rectifier, in 1927 proposed use titanium dioxide to create artificial dielectrics ... A scientist, an engineer, who was formed by the old regime, he has been all his life until old age served in Russia, in 1943 he received the Stalin Prize, was awarded the Order of Lenin. In 1948, the USSR Academy of Sciences awarded him the first gold medal named after A. S. Popova.

And no one has ever oppressed him, repressed him. His older brother is Sergey, a Russian metal scientist, professor of Donskoy. (Novocherkassk) Polytechnic Institute, also honestly and without problems worked for Russia until his death in 1926, at the age of fifty-two. Metal scientist Nikolai

Vladimirovich Geveling, later Major General aviation engineering service, holder of the Order of Lenin and four other orders, was born in 1897 and was sixteen years younger than Vologdin Jr. In 1924 he graduated MVTU, since 1933 - professor at the Air Force Academy named after N. E. Zhukovsky.

And also - no repressions, no arrests. Not for what it was! November

25, 1937 Kaganovich spends in Sverdlovsk an asset of workers already colored metallurgy producing copper, aluminum, lead, tin, gold, and rare metals. In 1938, a separate

In March meeting of workers was convened gold industry... A little later - the asset of the cement industry, twice - the assets of the builders. But other industries also received

new impulses - fuel, chemical, energy, construction and building materials...

Kaganovich perfectly understood the importance of extensive geological exploration and brought good business acquaintance with academician-geologist Ivan Mikhailovich Gubkin, conducted and All-Union Conference of Geologists.

And in 1938, the All-Union Conference of Oil Workers was to meet in Baku. The people's commissar saw him off, but before leaving *Moscow* he had a thorough conversation with Kaganovich Stalin, who knew well both the Transcaucasus and the problems of the oil and oil refining industry. Kaganovich

was in Baku for two weeks. Beria was also there ... He tightly "driven" into the oil problems, while still being the first secretary of the Zakkraykom, and his help was so great that Kaganovich noted it even decades later in his memoirs, published in 1996 (ninety-six). And such praise from such lips - taking into account everything that happened later is worth it.

Is not it?

THE FIRST half of 1938, Beria was busy, as always, with the affairs of the republic. Freed since the beginning of last year from the need to distribute their attention and time between the three regions, in 1937 he "rushed" especially powerfully, and the results were is evident everywhere - in industry, in construction and agriculture, in culture.

Georgia exceeded the second five-year plan in all respects. And by the number students per 1000 people, she bypassed England and Germany!

The volume of industrial production from 1929 to 1939 increased by more than five times, and compared with 1913 - more than fifteen times! electrified railways, new enterprises were built. Tea plantations in

1913 occupied less than a thousand hectares, and in 1938 - more than 47 thousand. Up to 400 million lemons and tangerines were harvested from citrus trees, and in Billions have already been seen in the future. More than two thousand people worked on the fields of the republic. tractors. The swamps of Colchis were drained.

Georgia has become an all-Union health resort: Gagra, Sukhumi, Gulripsh, Tskhaltubo, Borjomi, Batumi ... To create a network of resorts, Beria had a direct and complete understandable attitude, as in general to all major construction projects.

In 1938, the Georgian Institute of Physical Culture was founded, and this was also one of Beria's direct initiatives.

Beria worked enthusiastically in Tbilisi, but Stalin in Moscow already had his own types.

Chapter 11

WHY EZHOV WAS REPLACED...

STANDARD scheme of "democrats" when explaining the double replacement of people's commissars Internal Affairs for three years is... 1)

Yagoda created the "GULAG empire", carried out the "dirty work" of 1930– the first widespread repression.

2) Then he was removed to hide the first mass de crimes, and in his place Yezhov was placed, dooming him to a future slaughter in advance.

3) Yezhov organized and carried out a "great terror" among the masses and also carried out mass purges of people objectionable to de Stalin in the party and state leadership.

4) When this was done, the "executioner" Yezhov, hiding the "secret of crimes" Stalin, removed and replaced by the "executioner" Beria.

Regarding the last link in this scheme, I note that Stalin could hardly have imagined that in the future his compatriots would fall so low that they would allow the Gorbachevs, Yeltsins, Yakovlevs to power and to the mass media - the Volkogonovs and Radzinskys, and they will begin to vilely slander him. So "hide the ends of crimes in the blood" he does not there was no need. He did not hide anything, because there was nothing to hide - the repressions in the highest echelons of power immediately become known not only in the country, but throughout the world.

Regarding the third link, we already know enough to remember the role in "grassroots" repressions not of Yezhov, but of Eikhe, Khrushchev and the entire partyocratic rati, and also about the need for repression among this "rati" itself ... As for

the first two links ... Here, for example,

are the "secrets" of the notorious Gulag - the Main Directorate of Camps of the NKVD . IN His history has one surname - Yakov Davydovich Rapoport. Born in 1898 in Riga in family of an employee, studied at Dorpat University. In January 1917 he joined RSDLP (b), and this was the time when the Bolshevik Party was joined exclusively by ideological considerations. Since August 1918, he was an investigator, and then - head of the department and Deputy Chairman of the Voronezh Cheka. In 1922 he was secretary of the People's Commissar

Foreign Affairs Chicherin, served in the Economic Department of the OGPU, and from June 9, 1932 became deputy head of the Gulag and since then he has been engaged in one thing - he built: the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the Rybinsk and Uglich hydroelectric facilities ... During the war he commanded sapper army. With

the name of Major General of the Engineering Service Rapoport, we, albeit in passing, still we will meet at the time of solving the atomic problem in the USSR, because he worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the forties and early fifties. He was transferred to the reserve on June 6, 1953. Lived the same Rapoport until 1962 and was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

He knew about the "secrets", or rather, about the activities of the Gulag - from the very beginning of his organizations, everything. And no one "removed" him. Rapoport was a capable organizer, well oriented in technical matters. He did not get into "politics", although he valued himself highly. That is why he "survived" during all the purges of the NKVD, although the word "survived" is incorrect here, or rather, he remained in his place. Because he has always been there.

Also, without any problems under Yagoda, and under Yezhov, and under Beria - until 1947, he worked in various positions (head of work at the White Sea Canal, head of the BAMlag, which built the second tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway, deputy head of the Gulag) Naftaly Frenkel. In 1947, at the age of 64, he retired due to illness and calmly, receiving

general's pension, lived in Moscow. He died in 1960, two years before eighty. Both Frenkel and Rapoport worked. But many of their colleagues had, yes, and

political plans, which is why they were subsequently repressed. However, they are also unlikely were there any "secrets" associated with the repressions of the late twenties and early thirties years. Then the new system had so many real enemies inside and outside the country that The United Main Political Directorate of Menzhinsky - Yagoda was not no need to "invent" conspiracies, acts of sabotage and sabotage. God bless s real something to figure out! As

soon as socialist reconstruction began - from the end of the twenties, then immediately the counter-revolution was also activated, and nothing else could be. So make out Berries of some provocateur-falsifier can only malicious slanderers.

Here he plotted. And he admitted this in the last word at the trial, rejecting only accusations of espionage: "If I were a spy, then dozens of countries in the world could close their intelligence."

Moreover, Yagoda was first removed for purely business reasons, and he was suspected of conspiracy somewhat later. And the whole explanation can be found on two pages of "Correspondence between Stalin and Kaganovich"...

On September 25, 1936, Stalin and Zhdanov (the last one held the pen) sent a coded message to Molotov and Kaganovich from Sochi, where they wrote:

"First. We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent to appoint comrade Yezhov was promoted to the post of People's Commissar. Yagoda was clearly not up to par. its task in exposing the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc. OGPU was 4 years late in this matter (given that the sabotage of the "old specialists" after 1930 went to "no", but the peak of the disorganization of the economy, sabotage and wrecking by the forces of the opposition fell on 1932-1933, then Stalin defined the time frame precisely. - **S.K.**). Everyone is talking about it party workers and most of the regional representatives of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Deputy Yezhov in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs,

you can leave Agranov. Second. We consider it necessary and urgent to remove Rykov Narkomsvyazi and appoint Yagoda to the post of Narkomsvyaz. We think that this is not the case needs motivation, as it is already clear... Fourth. As for the

CPC (Party Control Commission under the Central Committee. - **S.K.**), then Yezhov can be left part-time chairman of the CPC so that he gives nine-tenths of his time to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and the first Yakovlev Yakov could be nominated as Yezhov's deputy for the CPC Arkadyevich.

Fifth. Yezhov agrees with our proposals. Stalin.
Zhdanov. No. 44
25/IX-36 Sixth. It
goes without saying that Yezhov remains secretary of the Central Committee.

On the evening of the same day, at half past ten, Stalin dictated to Moscow phone note for Yagoda:

"Tov. Yagoda. Drug dealing is important. This is the People's Commissariat for Defense. I don't I doubt that you will be able to put this People's Commissariat on its feet. I'm begging you agree to work Narkomsvyazi. Without a good Commissariat of Communication we feel yourself, as if without hands. Narkomsvyaz cannot be left in its current position. Her needs to be put on its feet. **I. Stalin.**

Both the encryption and the note are purely internal, operational documents, not for the public. There was no point in saying nothing, casting a shadow on a clear day ... And therefore, everything tales about the removal of Yagoda and the appointment of Yezhov as an act of preparation for the notorious supposedly "great terror" can be sent to a landfill. Yagoda was

then removed not with the aim of eliminating it altogether, but because he, as he believed Stalin *failed*. But since Yagoda could not help but fail, for his goal was conspiracy, then four months after the new appointment he was taken to the reserve, when suspicions arose. And on March 28, 1937, he was arrested. On April 27, Peterson was arrested and something began to clear up for Stalin and Yezhov, a thread was pulled ...

Yezhov, appointed by the NKVD on September 26, 1936, was seen as a good candidate. He after all, he really worked well in all the posts in which he found himself. And about the atmosphere in the NKVD immediately after Yezhov arrived there can be judged by what Kaganovich wrote about her Stalin October 12, 1936:

"...5) Yezhov is doing well. He grasped firmly and vigorously uprooting counter-revolutionary bandits, conducts interrogations remarkably and politically competently. But, apparently, part of the apparatus, despite the fact that it is now quiet, will be disloyal to him. Take, for example, such a question, which, it turns out, is of great importance to them, this title question. There are talks that the General Commissioner is still Yagoda, that de Yezhov will not be given this title (January 27, 1937, Yezhov received. - **S.K.**), etc. Strange, but this "problem" has in this device meaning. When the question of the people's commissar was being decided, this question was somehow not raised. Not Do you think, Comrade Stalin, it is necessary to raise this question?"

And then Kaganovich adds:

"As for the rest, we try to correct the shortcomings and mistakes that you point, and work on the full force of traction. We are very glad that you feel Fine. Warm regards and best wishes to you. **Yours A.**
Kaganovich ... "

After all, this was also not written for the public and not counting on future historians. This is current business correspondence, and it is clear from it that the driving force of those days was for Stalin and his faithful associates were not intrigues, but problems that had to be solved. And the fact that Yezhov he himself was subsequently repressed, was explained not by the principle: "The Moor has done his job, the Moor must go," but by his personal qualities. The famous

aircraft designer Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev recalled a conversation with Stalin when he said: "Yezhov is a scoundrel! Was a good guy, good

worker, but decomposed ... You call him at the people's commissariat - they say he left for the Central Committee. You call to Central Committee - they say: he left for work. You send to his house - it turns out that he is lying on the bed dead drunk. Killed many innocents. We shot him for it..."

By the way, at the time of his arrest, Yezhov was a widower - his wife committed suicide, and he loved his wife.

No, Yezhov was by no means a "fiend" and a gray apparatchik. I read with interest, for example, the transcript of his speech to those mobilized for work in the NKVD young Komsomol members and communists on March 11, 1937 ... This was not a performance on a piece of paper, but it was extensive, specific, businesslike and informative from the standpoint of precisely vocational guidance speech.

At the beginning of it (and the conversation was "at home", and with people who were to work not so much in the central office, but "mainly in large cities"), Nikolai Ivanovich said: "We and our apparatus with all the tentacles rely on most of our country. On our entire people ... "And later he repeated:"

Our intelligence is of the people, we rely on broad layers population..." At the end, they were told this:

"With the introduction of the Constitution (1936. - **S.K.**), many of our things that we are now doing in passing (transcript mark "laughter in the hall". - **S.K.**), they are not will go to waste. There is legality, so we need to know our laws, the investigator must know our laws thoroughly, then all relationship with prosecutors. Our main fight with the prosecutor's office so far goes simply along the line of ignorance of laws, ignorance of procedural norms ... "

I can't resist and will quote this, by the way, Yezhov's remark:

"Two friends, Party members or non-Party members, have gathered and begin to tell ... and the Chekists are tempted to tell a story ... like a hunter, all sorts of fairy tales. I know, for example, from different Chekists at least 15 options the capture of Savinkov ... "

You read this and think - how many such lovers of "hunting stories" have launched "misinformation" about Beria's service with the Musavatists? Probably more than fifteen! YES, NOW it was no longer 1928 in the yard, but 1938 The "operation" of the NKVD was ending, and here it became more and more clear that together with a rotten forest was cut down and part of a healthy one.

However, how and who cut it?

On January 19, 1938, an informational message was published in Pravda No. 19 about the Plenum of the Central Committee that ended "the other day" and the resolution of the plenum "On the Errors party organizations with the exclusion of communists from the party, about the formal bureaucratic regarding the appeals of those expelled from the CPSU(b) and on measures to eliminate these shortcomings."

"... The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) more than once demanded from party organizations and their leaders attentive, individual approach to party members in resolving issues of exclusion from the party or the restoration of those incorrectly expelled ... ", it was said in beginning of the ruling.

And then it was reminded of Stalin's calls for such an approach in February March 1937 plenum, about an even earlier letter from the Central Committee of June 24, 1936.

Then there were dense concrete examples in many regions of the Union, of which I will give two: in the Kuibyshev region of the RSFSR and the Kyiv region of the Ukrainian SSR:

"The Bolshe-Chernigov district committee of the CPSU (b) expelled from the party and announced enemies of the people 50 people out of a total of 210 communists, consisting in

district party organization, while for 43 of these excluded
The NKVD found no grounds for arrest...

Former secretary of the Kyiv regional committee of the CP (b) U, enemy of the people Kudryavtsev on party meetings, he invariably addressed the communists who spoke with provocative question: "Have you written a statement against anyone at least?" as a result of this provocation in Kyiv, political compromising statements on almost half of the members of the city party organizations, and most of the statements turned out to be clearly wrong or even provocative.

Like this! The question is, who unreasonably expanded the scale of repression - "executioner" Yezhov and his "henchmen" in the field or partocrats and hidden oppositionists?

Of course, in each case, the answers could be different - up to opposite. However, "information for thought" is available here.

But everything really was very ambiguous, dear reader. After it was convenient for the party functionary Khrushchev to blame everything on the NKVD, on Yezhov, on Beria ... But professionals from the NKVD were often forced to figure out what heaped up non-professionals from the "party" of self-seekers.

Although there was enough work for professionals. Here is another document - "Special report on counter-revolutionary manifestations on the part of persons expelled from VKP(b) when checking party documents in the Kursk region and in Georgia. And here it is in "Pravda" was not published - due to the presence of the heading "Top Secret" on it.

Head of the secret political department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, commissioner of the State Security Service of the 2nd rank On February 14, 1936, Molchanov reported to Stalin and Yezhov about the situation in Georgia:

"There is an increase in the counter-revolutionary activity of those expelled from parties ... and above all the Trotskyists ...

An analysis of the moods of those expelled from the party shows that some of them ... are starting to create counter-revolutionary groups, and most embittered express terrorist sentiments.

In connection with the verification of party documents on the party organization of the SSR of Georgia 460 people were arrested by the NKVD, including: 1. double-dealing Trotskyists - 136 2. members of anti-Soviet political parties - 157 3. crooks with party cards - 167.

This is just a clear danger! But the special report says another ninety identified Trotskyists, a total of 550 people. Simple logic suggests that not every enemy "talks". Moreover, the dog that does not bark is the most dangerous, it is just bites harder. And not everyone gets into the field of view of the "organs".

If we compare the "limit" requested by Beria in 1937 (1419 people to the VMN and 1562 for expulsion) and figures from Molchanov's message, then everything finally falls into place: Beria did not "butcher" in Georgia, the need for such *minimal* repressive figures was objective. And the data of the SPO of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR is confirm.

Below I give, practically without comment, a number of statements from the report on Georgia, obtained by agents ...

"We have to wait a few months. Then the war with Japan will begin, the people will go behind us and the power will pass to us. (*Trotskyist expelled from the party.*)

"Exit in the war. Then we, the old people, will be called, and the helm of leadership will pass to us." (*Trotskyist expelled from the party.*)

"We have a large organization at the military shipbuilding plant. Whole The Baltic Fleet is ours. We have a connection with Moscow, but we do not work the way we used to. Now Let's be more strict." (*Trotskyist Kalandadze, subject to arrest.*)

"I want to be in the party only in order not to lose authority among the people. victory for the Mensheviks. Communists in Georgia cannot win." (Dismissed *from the party Trotskyist Gogotishvili.*) What's

funny is that Gogotishvili, who did not believe in communists, was nevertheless in the party, to have authority among the people. *Recognition is involuntary, but valuable.*

"We won't be able to do anything in the city, we need to move work to the countryside ..." (Berdzenishvili, *arrested.*)

Yes, it was easier to "fake" a peasant... Then... "I am not interested in a membership card. Through the party card, I was aware of the secrets parties." (Trotskyist *Vashekidze, expelled from the party.*) "Of course,

I don't want the death of Russia. I am a supporter only of the fact that the young the generation of our party, which found itself at the head of the ... apparatus, was arrested and leadership was handed over to the old Bolsheviks." (Kalandadze, *passed the party check.*)

"I hid from the party that I was a Trotskyist. We must endure, be careful, vote for their suggestions. Clap your hands if you have to." (Seperteladze, *party verification passed.*)

And it wasn't just a "grumble" ... In stable, however, times, you can I had to wave my hand, they say, everything will be limited to figs in your pocket. What about unstable ones? Such because the "doves" could do a lot of bloody troubles. Here is an

example already in the Kursk region: the composition of one of the organized groups of former "Party members" in the Grayvoronsky district:

1. Tishchenko, a kulak, worked as an instructor in the district committee. 2. Novomlinsky, a former kulak, worked as a garage manager at MTS. 3. Zakharov, former kulak, former chairman of the City Council. 4. Soloshenko, a former kulak, previously worked as the head of the district land department Grayvoronsky RIC. 5.

Tverdokhle, former fist, owner of a brick factory, former chairman city council.

6. Ustinov, expelled for bribery, former district prosecutor... Good selection? And all of them, as one, were

ready, "without hesitation", "to join the gang, if it organized somewhere. This

group, fortunately, was neutralized in time. And such a group in the Kursk region was not the only one. There were similar groups in other areas. Moreover, the

introduction of enemies of Soviet power into the organs of Soviet power took place almost since the establishment of this power. So, in 1924, the future Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitry Medvedev (then he worked in the Odessa department of the GPU of Ukraine) with a group Chekists and employees of the criminal investigation department eliminated the Bim-Bom gang from the fists of Ukrainians and Jewish raiders (as we can see, the bandits did not suffer from ethnic strife at all times). The fist Filka Telegin, a professional robber, was at the head of the gang Abram Leher and ... the chairman of one of the village councils Grigory Roshkovsky.

The bandits deliberately dragged "their own" to responsible positions in the local Soviets. Someone was exposed in the 20s... Someone in the 30s... And someone

was never exposed. It was a potential

"fifth column" in the "bottom" ... But it was also in the "top". So, objectively, there was enough work for the NKVD without falsifying cases. But subjectively Yezhov as the worker, it seems, was no longer

pulling. He, by the way, could really be one of the unwitting victims of repression 1937-1938 in the sense that

that at that time it was not just a burden of huge administrative responsibility (for a strong manager this is not a reason to give up), but psychological responsibility.

He could not but understand that with the expansion of the scale of repression, and even in conditions when they were most often preventive in nature (that is, they were not repressed already accomplished, but potential criminals), the condemnation of some of the innocent is inevitable. Yes not just condemnation, but their death. And these, what can I say, terrible overlays were more likely at the bottom. That is, the account here was in the thousands, and even tens of thousands.

In the "tops", while investigating cases of conspiracies, sabotage and other things, innocently there could not have been any convicts either, because there was no direct *material* evidence on anyone, even those who are obviously guilty. Everything was based on confessions. So there were stipulations are

possible. Finally, Yezhov could not but understand that the simplified order of the investigation cannot but corrupt part of the apparatus. Let not "brutal torture", but some physical measures influence had to be used in conditions of political and historical time trouble - in war as in war. And at the same time, Yezhov, very

likely, saw another, psychologically scary, moment: he and his people unwittingly create innocent victims, but at the same time enemies not all are identified - for objective reasons. You really get drunk here - if there is at least some weakness.

One way or another, Stalin increasingly came to the conclusion: Yezhov must be replaced.

But by whom? Beria's candidacy arose naturally. He was well known Stalin, had a strong and unsullied Chekist past and perfectly recommended themselves in Transcaucasia

and Georgia. There are different versions about how the final decision was made: Stalin personally decided; someone specifically recommended Beria to him; someone prepared a list that included Beria, etc.

I will not retell any version here, leaving this task to the creators "historical thrillers", and I won't guess who the initial impulse came from in the case new appointment of Beria. But there is no doubt that it did not come from the Lavrenty Pavlovich.

Remaining on the basis of exact facts, one thing can be said: by August 1938, the choice Stalin was made. And

this choice was a good one.

IN AUGUST 1938, Beria was summoned to Moscow.

Leaving his native places, he could be satisfied. For the land in which he was born, he worked with success. And now he had to expand the field of his activity to the scale of the whole country and even the whole world - given that the NKVD included foreign intelligence.

Initially, on August 22, Beria was appointed Yezhov's 1st deputy, and on September 29, he was also appointed head of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD. THE USSR. He replaced both the 1st Deputy People's Commissar and the head of the GUGB, his almost the same age as Mikhail Petrovich Frinovsky.

Frinovsky, in fact, was simply the head of the Department of State security, because on March 28, 1938, the GUGB was slightly lowered in status. However Beria immediately insisted on the restoration of the State Security Department the former position of the Main Directorate.

He was, of course, right - it was not a matter of personal ambitions, but of the prestige of that unit, which was the core of the NKVD. And not even in prestige, but in opportunities, in rights ...

Frinovsky began to rise even under Yagoda, but under Yezhov not only retained his position, but also strengthened it by becoming the first deputy people's

commissar. At that time, every person "in plain sight" had a biography that was not quiet. However,

Frinovsky, it was especially stormy. A year older than Beria, originally from Penza Narovchata, the son of a teacher, he graduated from a religious school, in January 1916 he entered cavalry volunteers, already deserted in August, joined the anarchists, participated in a terrorist act against Major General Bem. From March 1917 he worked as an accountant, in

September he joined the Red Guard

Khamovniki district of Moscow, stormed the Kremlin in November, was seriously wounded. In March-July 1918 Frinovsky - assistant superintendent of the Khodynka hospital. However the reason for such a peaceful position was clearly recovery from the consequences of a wound, because in July he was already in the First Cavalry, rose to the rank of squadron commander there.

In 1919, Mikhail was transferred to the bodies of the Cheka, and soon he became an assistant chief active part of the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka. Then: operations to defeat the anarchists and rebel detachments in Ukraine, the Special Department of the Southern Front, again the First Cavalry, the operational detachment of the All-Ukrainian Cheka ...

Until September 1930 - commander and commissar of the special purpose division named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky, and then until 1933 - the chairman of the GPU of Azerbaijan, from where he left for promotion as head of the Main Directorate of the Border Guard of the OGPU of the USSR.

While working in Azerbaijan, Frinovsky simply could not help but encounter Plenipotentiary of the OGPU for the Transcaucasus, and later - the first secretary of the Zakkraykom, Beria. A Beria was not just an experienced, but, of course, an outstanding psychologist and, of course, understood Frinovsky, as they say, "to the bottom."

Frinovsky in literature is usually certified as a kind of almost beast, and also ignorant, but I am sure that this simply cannot be. Physically it he really was a hero, there was a scar on his face. Ignorant is he, the son of a teacher, not to be I could already because theological schools provided a good basic education. Besides In 1927, Mikhail also graduated from the Courses for the Highest Commanding Staff (KUVNAS) at the Frunze Academy, and they also taught well there. And the fact that he

began his Chekist work, being in the field of view of Dzerzhinsky, also means something. Dzerzhinsky did not favor the ignorant.

Psychologically, Frinovsky ... But psychologically, he was probably a person who combined prudence with "riskiness". Definitely a fighter. That is, as a friend was priceless, like an enemy - very dangerous, and what could always wake up in him adventurous streak made him even more dangerous. Again, there are frequent statements in the literature that Frinovsky quickly de "crushed" Yezhov, who was ignorant of Chekist affairs, and recklessly falsified de "fake" cases in the NKVD.

I think it is not. No, I do not want to say that in the OGPU and NKVD throughout for some period there were no creators of "fake" cases (about his statement I have not forgotten the opposite, but there are sad exceptions to any rule). However less objectively, they could succeed more on the periphery than in the central apparatus. There, as I said, there was enough "fair" loading. On the periphery, however, also ... To see this, let's go back to 1933.

Plenipotentiary of the OGPU in Belarus Leonid Zakovsky (actually - the Latvian Heinrich Stubis) in October 1933 telegraphed Yakov Agranov to Moscow:

"October 4, 1933 No. 50665
TOP SECRET I. In Mogilev, a
branch of the Polish Military

Organizations (POV). Consciousness of the members of the organization: a depot locksmith, expelled from the party in 1931, REUTA, sister of the famous c.-r. figure BELOGOLOVOY - SKOPOVSKAYA, more than 30 members of the organization, recruited priest YAROSHEVICH.

II. In Zhlobin, there is also a branch of the POV, created by a priest YAROSHEVICH. Arrested members of the organization BATURO and KUCHINSKAYA

confessed to handing over to YAROSHEVICH information about the Zhlobin knot and military parts.

III. In the Osipovich district, a branch of the POV, priest MUSTEYKIS, is opened, liquidated. Consciousness created by the arrested

ROZHNOVSKY and BARTASHKEVICH, the occurrence of organizations in 1924...

IV. Arrested in Gomel in the case of POV SESKEVICH Anton confirmed their involvement in the organization. He confessed that in 1929-1932. on assignment priest ANDREKUS visited Poland, in 1932, while in Bialystok, he graduated from the 3rd monthly reconnaissance and sabotage courses.

V. On October 1, 1933, a man who fled to Poland at the beginning of 1933 for early demobilization from the army by the decoration (separated commander, sergeant. - S.K.) of the 5th artillery regiment of the 2nd division SUCHKOV. SUCHKOV's consciousness his cooperation in the Auninets reconnaissance plyacuvka and the creation of in Minsk residency in the person of the decoration committee of the 2nd artillery regiment TROFIMOV Georgy, instructor of the military construction site Ivan KULINICH. Arrested TROFIMOV confessed to espionage..."

And so on, for a total of ten points.

This is not a "fake". This is the reality of the secret war against the USSR in those years.

Zakovsky, by the way, was himself arrested in 1938 on charges of having links with the Germans and by the Poles and shot. But the above document does not refute such an accusation. Firstly, it was not Zakovsky who opened the members of the POV, but all Belarusian Chekists. Secondly, the defeat of the POV was also beneficial to the Germans, reducing the influence of Poland on events in Russia. Samo As for the message of the Belarusian plenipotentiary of the OGPU, it hardly needs comments.

Moreover, the accusation of Zakovsky-Shtubis is also a "fake" one, most likely not belonged, despite Zakovsky's undoubtedly glorious revolutionary past. Between among other things, in 1987 it was recognized that there were no grounds for a review of his case (here, of course, simply the vindictiveness of the "democrats" could have affected, but still ...).

Alas, even the book is not rubber. And I cannot cite, as an illustrative example of the fact that the degeneration of a number of Bolsheviks took place, also an extensive letter from a certain G., forwarded by an unknown addressee to the Moscow City Committee personally to Khrushchev. This "well-wisher", having received G.'s letter, considered it reasonable to tear off on the first page addressing and send the rest to the MK with the request to "sort it out, leaving me aside, in peace."

From the MK the letter got to the NKVD, from where Deputy People's Commissar Agranov on September 5, 1935 sent it to Stalin. Those who wish can familiarize themselves with this curious document (p. 683, doc. No. 539) in A. Yakovlev's capital publication of the Democracy Foundation - "Lubyanka. Stalin and the Cheka - GPU - OGPU - NKVD. January 1922 - December 1936.

So, there is a lot of interesting things in this letter about, for example, Avel Yenukidze, who dreamed of "becoming a Russian Roosevelt", and about dissatisfied old Bolsheviks - "p ... nah", who "should be organized", and about the plan to "remove that odious figure, which is now even blocked the sun"... Is it

necessary to decipher whose "odious figure" Yenukidze had in mind? But who was specifically meant by "the old Bolsheviks -" p ... us """, the Chekists only was to be installed. And, facing the need to "unwind" the ball connections of one such letter, to blame ourselves on the hump also "linden"? What else is this from?

And such, no doubt, reliable and testifying to the severity of the moment there are more than a dozen documents in the collection mentioned above, I ask the reader to believe me on word.

But I have not yet finished with Mikhail Frinovsky, who supposedly beat Yezhov, who is "ignorant" in operational terms... I doubt it even here. Certainly in subtle, let's say, intelligence affairs, Nikolai Ivanovich could not immediately navigate. But in in general...

In general, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov's biography, after all, was also not so clean stationery!

Skilled worker-Putilovets, since 1915 - private of the 172nd Lida infantry regiment, fought, was wounded, demobilized in 1916, and at the end of the same year again drafted into the reserve regiment in New Peterhof. After the revolution - the commissioner of the station Vitebsk, and only later - a party worker. In Kazakhstan, he led the suppression of the Basmachi.

Work in the accounting and distribution department of the Central Committee and in the Party Control Commission also had a number of features that made her related to the Chekist. According to his former "patron" Moskvina, Yezhov had a poorly developed sense of proportion - he could not stop in time. Perhaps so, although such neat people as Yezhov, rather, suffer from the opposite - they do not know how to go far inland.

Transcripts of his speeches reveal, however, both intelligence and competence (to word, his speech at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 is very convincing supplements the documents of the type of the letter "G." mentioned by me

above). And yet, in solving the problem of a constructive transformation of the NKVD, Yezhov got confused, how confused he was in his own life.

THEREFORE, many things in the NKVD had to be changed by the beginning of 1939. As are many. Firstly, during the "operation" of 1937-1938, one way or another, unsuitable for work in the NKVD for many reasons. There were also dubious ones ... The

same Frinovsky was removed from the NKVD shortly after Beria arrived there, but arrested only on April 6, 1939 (and shot after a long investigation only on February 8 1940). And they arrested, apparently, just because of the fact that his former adventurous vein has not completely died out. But he was not an "old p ... n" ...

Or here is another deputy commissar from the time of Yagoda-Yezhov - Yakov Agranov. Historian Gennady Kostyrchenko, in his very informative book Stalin's Secret Politics, is strangely maliciously inaccurate in an obvious situation. He refers Agranov to de victims of the new People's Commissar Beria. But Agranov was arrested on July 20, 1937, convicted Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR to the VMN on August 1, 1938 and on the same day shot. And Beria appeared at the Lubyanka exactly three weeks later - on August 22.

I think that Kostyrchenko is inaccurate not by chance - and so, according to false "facts", and the image of the "bloodthirsty" Beria is molded. After all, Kostyrchenko's monograph claims to solidity - it was published by the Foreign Ministry publishing house "International Relations" under auspices of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In documentary references to Agranov, it is far from always reported that before to become a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1915; So

that both the Socialist-Revolutionary past and the branched connections among the "elite" could well to produce some political ambitions of Agranov. Yes, they produced it.

No, the "tops" of the NKVD were "thinned out" by People's Commissar Beria, most often not "Yezhov's", but still "Yagodinsky", and even of an even earlier origin - when the Trotskyists were not sitting in camps, and in high offices ...

But many of the "recruits" of the "Yezhov" draft already under Beria grew up in sensible workers. And the level of their education was quite "on the level". At one time we Let's get acquainted with Vitaly Pavlov, a participant in Operation Snow. So here he is, like thousands of his future colleagues, came to the NKVD under Yezhov after graduating from the Siberian road institute. And no one subsequently "removed" him. On the contrary, they promoted Elena

Prudnikova, the author of an interesting book about Beria, writes (about the times, however, the beginning 30s): "What is a typical Chekist of that time? .. In all positions, from bottom to the very top, it was full of illiterate and semi-literate nominees from the time of the revolution and the Civil War. So, the famous Zakovsky finished two classes, Agranov - four class ... They were uneducated, cruel, unprincipled adventurers ... "

Vitaly Pavlov and his comrades - as representatives of the Chekist "lower classes" - did not fit into this scheme. As for the "tops" ... I think Prudnikov

was let down by the desire to show Beria's "chivalry" "on contrast" with the "cruel" predecessors, and she uncritically reacted to the later negative characteristics of a number of prominent Chekists of the era of the Cheka-OGPU and the first NKVD. After all, these characteristics are most often maliciously distorted.

The same Agranov was well acquainted with Averbakh, Mandelstam, Pilnyak, Brik, Mayakovsky ... Now it is sometimes claimed that Agranov organized

"suicide" of the latter, which I personally do not exclude, just as I do not exclude that there were Averbakh and Osip Brik were also involved. But to talk about Yakov Agranov as a gray man do not have to. There was a "second bottom" in his nature, but he was, of course, an outstanding personality. For those who wish to further verify this, I can recommend a multi-page

"Review of the activities of counter-revolutionary organizations in the period 1918-1919", written by Agranov and placed in the Red Book of the Cheka. God bless any order such "ignorant" civil servants as the 26-year-old author of this review.

And let's not forget - Anton Makarenko, Dmitry Medvedev, Alexander Lukin, Georgy Bryantsev, the heroes of the writer Yuri German Ivan Lapshin and Altus are also Chekists twenties and thirties. So Beria and his "recruits" did not replace not mediocre.

Moreover! I'm not sure that from the very beginning Beria was called by Stalin before just for the quick replacement of Yezhov. For some reason, they do not pay attention to the fact that Beria was appointed not just the 1st Deputy People's Commissar, but also the head of the Chief Department of State Security, which was also in charge of foreign intelligence. And just at intelligence officers of the NKVD, shortly before Beria was called to Moscow for a new appointment, three major emergencies.

Initially, the captain of the GB, Ignatius Stanislavovich Reiss, changed. The same age as Beria, he born in Austria-Hungary, in Galicia, studied for a while at the Faculty of Law University of Vienna, in 1917 he joined the Bolsheviks. Was at illegal work in Poland, worked in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, and in 1931 he moved to intelligence OGPU - Foreign Department (INO). Based in Holland, he also operated in France. In July 1937, Reiss was recalled to Moscow, but he did not return, and on July 17 he published French newspapers an open letter denouncing Stalin and also openly joined Trotsky.

Reiss liquidated a special group of the NKVD near Lausanne already in September 1937. But Stalin's confidence in the Foreign Department of the NKVD was undermined.

And then came the second betrayal. In the autumn of 1937 he became a traitor and defector Captain GB, illegal resident in Holland Walter Germanovich Krivitsky - also the same age as Beria, by the way.

Krivitsky had a biography similar to Reiss: he was born in the Austro-Hungarian Podvolochisk, served in the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army, since 1931 - in the INO OGPU. Awarded with the Order Red Banner. Krivitsky

also went into all serious trouble, contacted Trotsky's son Lev Sedov, but the main thing is that more than a hundred of our intelligence officers and agents "surrendered" the Intelligence Service.

Even relatively objective authors often blame all the losses of our external intelligence in 1937-1938 on Yezhov's bloody repressions. But after all, a hundred of our "exposed" scouts are on the account not of Yezhov, but of Krivitsky. And this is a lot. INO NKVD - not field division, there "and one soldier in the field."

And in addition to Krivitsky in July 1938, Alexander Orlov changed (aka known in the NKVD and as Lev Nikolsky).

The senior major of the GB (almost a general!) Orlov knew a lot. He was a resident of the INO NKVD in France, Austria, Italy, an adviser in Spain (he fled from Spain to the USA).

Orlov-Feldbing was sent to Spain by his close friend Slutsky. In fact -

saving from scandal. In August 1936, a young woman shot herself in front of the Lubyanka building. NKVD officer Galina Voitova is Feldbing's mistress. She could not bear the fact that he left her, refusing to divorce his wife. Subsequently, Beria will be

credited with many stories with women, all of which will be false. But here you are, dear reader, a real unseemly story with one of those who were part of the KGB environment, "cleansed" by Yezhov. Moreover, Slutsky's protégé, breaking with the Motherland, took with him sixty thousand dollars earmarked for operational purposes. At the current exchange rate, this is somewhere more million.

So, on the one hand, Feldbing was, although talented, but an adventurer, oh which today it is difficult to say what he will do tomorrow. On the other hand, Slutsky was, I repeat, a close friend of Feldbing. And we are all surprised - how could we not appreciate such an undoubted clever as Slutsky and others like him, and also clever!

As for Feldbing-Orlov, in 1924 he was also subordinate to Beria - he worked as an employee of the Economic Directorate of the OGPU and head of the border guard Sukhumi garrison. It is

believed that Orlov saved his life by warning in his letter to Yezhov that he will not "hand over" agents - as long as he is alive. But in general, in intelligence, rely on honesty "Defector" can only naive people. So Orlov's betrayal can be explained that distrust of agents, which at first was already shown by People's Commissar

Beria. Not to mention the betrayal of

Krivitsky ... In short, it is possible that this triple betrayal also became one of the reasons for the call Beria in Moscow. After all, he was not only an experienced intelligence officer, but also more than experienced *counterintelligence officer*. And this, by the way, is very infrequently combined in one person.

PLEASE, one more consideration can be made ... If we compare the structure NKVD on January 1, 1938 (People's Commissar N. I. Yezhov) and on January 1, 1939 (People's Commissar L.P. Beria), we will see that since 1939 a new administration has appeared - the Main economic (GEM), and that on January 1, the position of his chief is vacant.

From September 4, 1939, it was occupied by the thirty-five-year-old Bogdan Kobulov, a longtime Beria's employee in Georgia and for a long time, like Beria, a professional Chekist. Kobulov

actually created the GEM. And already in 1940 it included departments: • industry, • defense industry, •

agriculture, • Goznak and

refineries, • aircraft

industry, • fuel industry. In addition,

by January 1, 1940, the following

were created in the structure of

the NKVD: • Inspectorate for Boiler Supervision; • consumer goods sector; • Main

transport department with

departments for railway

transport,

water transport, communications, highway construction, civil air fleet;

• Main Military Construction Department; • Main

Directorate of Military Supply; • Dalstroy.

Everything

was explainable: the economic tasks of the NKVD after the repressions of 1937-1938 objectively expanded. Having said this, I am by no means inclined to follow the standard "democratic cliché"—Stalin and the NKVD drove the people into the Gulag in order to build socialism with slave labor. However, the new tasks of the NKVD were indeed connected with a significant increase in the number of prisoners who had one or another national economic qualifications (if my assessments based on "Kalinin" data

are correct, the replenishment of the camps amounted to about half a million people).

No, it was not the NKVD that "driven" people into camps, but the harsh reality of confronting the new and old. However, it was impossible to simply feed this real labor force! Tem more force is often, I repeat, qualified. In short, the NKVD

dramatically expanded its economic activities. AND here, at the head of the NKVD, a man of broad abilities was needed. And Beria just proved to be a master of all trades. A master of intelligence and counterintelligence, he proved his competence as a political figure, and - which was also very important - he showed himself as a competent economic organizer.

However, dear reader, not all these considerations - for all their paramount significance - most likely influenced the choice of Stalin. I think it's crucial had other considerations, which will be discussed later.

Beria did not remain Ezhov's FIRST deputy for long. November 25, 1938 Yezhov was dismissed from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, while remaining People's Commissar of Water transport, which he became *part-time* from April 8, 1938. "Democrats" often lie about the fact that Yezhov-de was "transferred" to the NKVT only after being removed from the NKVD before the future de "slaughter", but, as we see, it was not so.

Only on April 10, 1939, Yezhov was arrested and after, again, quite a long investigation, he was shot four days before Frinovsky - February 4, 1940.

There are also many versions about the removal of Yezhov, as well as about the circumstances of Savinkov's arrest, over

which Yezhov himself taunted. The two most common options are as follows ... First: Stalin wanted to remove the "Moors" Yezhov and Yezhov himself, who knew too much, with the hands of Beria. Something similar was written by "general" Volkogonov (I must add his name, like the name of Edvard Radzinsky, I can not only pronounce, but even write without extreme disgust) ... The

second option: the eternal intriguer Beria carried out an intrigue against his boss, in as a result of which he was arrested on charges of intending to remove Stalin. It is this the second option was voiced in the memoirs of the outstanding figure of the NKVD - MGB General Pavel Sudoplatov. We will see him again...

So, Sudoplatov cited a story of the former secretaries of Beria Mamulov and Ludvigov, allegedly heard by him from them in the Vladimir prison in the fifties. Alas, Elena Prudnikova seized on this bike, either Sudoplatov, or - Mamulova - Ludwigov, or - in general, political correctors of Sudoplatov's memoirs.

This story is as follows: a fake, "opening the way for a campaign against Yezhov and people who worked with him, "launched de two heads of the NKVD departments from Yaroslavl and Kazakhstan, incited by de Beria. They wrote to Stalin, stating that "in conversations with them, Yezhov hinted at the upcoming arrests of members of the Soviet leadership in the eve of the October celebrations (that is, on the eve of November 7, 1938. - S.K.)".

But this is nothing more than a bike from any point of view. Here, let's say, the logical side ... Last year's disclosure of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy was still fresh in Stalin's memory before his speech. Arrests of the highest leaders after that were held many. And if Stalin really received such a "signal", then Yezhov, regardless of the reality of his guilt, would be, if not formally arrested, then actually isolated already in early November 1938. And, in any case, it would replaced by Beria as People's Commissar *immediately!* And this is no particular surprise to anyone, including Yezhov himself would not have caused - his replacement by Beria was largely a foregone conclusion by the very move events.

And Yezhov was replaced only on November

25th. Moreover, Beria also knew that his appointment as People's Commissar was, presumably, a matter of a few weeks. So why should he, who certainly knows about this, start a risky intrigue,

drawing into it people he did not know well (after all, at that time he still did not manage personnel and could not place his people in the peripheral system of the NKVD)? So is it worth referring to the prison "memoirs" of Sudoplatov and Mamulov with Ludwigov? The latter, by the way, was a relative of Mikoyan and could spit about Beria a lot of things - to quickly free yourself ...

And here we turn to the already chronological proof of the later origin of the "Sudoplatov" version. Yezhov was replaced on November 25, 1938, and head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia Stepan Mamulov (Mamulyan) was summoned Beria to Moscow only in December 1938 and became the first deputy chief Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR January 3, 1939. By that time, Yezhov was no longer in the NKVD over a month. And even if we admit (which I personally do not admit) that the above-mentioned the intrigue took place, then it was carried out without the participation and, of course, without informing Mamulova. The former assistant to Beria, still on the Zakkraykom, Ludwigov - to him in 1938 turned thirty-one years old - all the more he could not know anything, his number was even compared with Mamulov then was the "third".

That is, the final conclusion coincides with the initial one: either Mamulov with Ludwigov, or the political correctors of Sudoplatov's memoirs are lying. No, I believe more in the testimony of the aircraft designer Yakovlev, according to which Stalin Yezhov's removal was explained by the decomposition of the latter ... I think Stalin's words about Yezhov Yakovlev conveyed accurately, and Stalin was sincere in his confession. Beria didn't "sit out" Yezhov, it's just that Nikolai Ivanovich and Lavrenty Pavlovich were very *different in size* quantities.

AND IF I REMEMBERED Yakovlev, I will cite one more of his reminiscences, allowing, in my opinion, to better understand both Beria and the general atmosphere around him ... Yakovlev recalled:

"A. A. Zhdanov once told me a joke about his favorite pipe
Stalin:

"Stalin complains: the pipe is gone. They say to him: "Take another, because there are so many of you." "But that's my love, I would give a lot to find her."

Beria did his best: after three days, 10 thieves were found, and each of them "confessed" that it was he who stole the pipe.

A day later, Stalin found his pipe. It turns out she's just collapsed behind the sofa in his room.

Further, Yakovlev summarizes: "And Zhdanov laughed merrily at this terrible anecdote." Alas, Alexander Sergeevich did not understand the essence of the situation, but let's try to figure it out, dear reader, we ourselves, taking into account that Yakovlev wrote his memoirs already when Only the lazy refused to kick Beria, and that memoirists' assessments are often influenced generally accepted later estimates of the period they recall. And these *ratings* difference from *the facts cited by the memoirists*, who were *personally with them*, can be directly contrary to the essence of what was happening then in reality.

So, let's think ... What,

Zhdanov, laughing about "this terrible anecdote", was a kind of moral a freak, devoid of an elementary sense of proportion, compassion, etc.?

Of course not! He laughed because such a story was for him, a well-known with the state of affairs and knowing both Stalin and Beria well, was essentially absurd, without any real basis. That is, in the full sense of the word anecdotal, but ... But

- what can we deny - witty. Rethinking

Yakovlev's story (knowing it since my student days, I saw situation in its true light only in the course of working on this book), I remembered another

a similar situation. Lenin once told an anecdote he had heard from someone with a laugh. They ask: "What is the end of

Bolshevik revolution? Answer: "Read the words" hammer sickle "in reverse."

Having done this, the reader will read: "Throne."

Lenin, telling this, laughed. So was he a hidden monarchist? No - he was just a spiritually healthy person, able to laugh even at a cruel joke.
enemy - if it is successful.

Lenin, by the way, also took the book of the émigré satirist, "embittered, in his definition, almost to the point of insanity of the White Guard "Arkady Averchenko" Twelve knives in the back of the revolution" and on November 22, 1921 published an article in Pravda "Talented Book" So Lenin was a covert counter-revolutionary? And the joke about Stalin's pipe?

BUT DAMN with them, with jokes and anecdotes! Let's try to follow Stalin's logic. For example, A. Toptygin, who I mentioned more than once, believes that De Stalin, in choosing new cadres, acted logically.

"Let this person's logic be for us (it's 'for us' instead of 'for me' I have A. Toptygin understood poorly. - **S.K.**) and is unacceptable," the author writes. "Unknown Beria" - but the logic was. And Toptygin imagines the logic Stalin, alas, like this: "Select young people who are ready for him (?? - **S.K.**) and for the sake of saving one's own head for everything, smart and promiscuous (n-yes. - **S.K.**) in means."

Unfortunately, the logic here fails A. Toptygin himself. In his book he gives a lot of documentary evidence that Beria behaved in the positions are quite personally worthy, rising up not due to intrigues or toadying, but due to outstanding business potential. And suddenly...

No, Stalin was logical in his personnel policy, but his logic is not even close corresponded to the ideas of Alexei Toptygin about her.

The point - among other things - is that today there is no longer any doubt about the authenticity of some significant fact: *even before Beria was summoned, Stalin several times offered the post of the NKVD to Chkalov.*

Why? Why to him? Chkalov is a person, firstly, famous all over the world, and not only in the Soviet Union. Moreover, in his country he was sincerely loved by the people and ... And had an unblemished reputation as a knight.

So - this is **Chkalov** Stalin originally intended to entrust the role "destruction of those who knew Yezhov and his henchmen a lot"?

What nonsense! And taking into account the candidacy of Chkalov, we can say that Stalin in the post The NKVD needed a

person: a) honest and sincere; b) not having innocent blood on his hands, but resolute; c) hardworking; d) uncompromising; e) devoted to the people and personally to Stalin; e) able to understand economic problems. But if we take into account that Stalin saw Chkalov in such a post, it becomes clear

NKVD Stalin needed a person who could undoubtedly and above all become a "sign" figure! A figure capable of changing the image of the Chekist "office" after all the imaginary and real sins of Yagoda and Yezhov-Hero, beloved hero of the Soviet people, Hero of the Soviet Union in rank and in fact, his own person in the environment and technical, and of the creative intelligentsia, clearly chivalrous, Chkalov could become such a figure ... And

not only a parade figure... However, Chkalov refuses...

And Stalin chooses Beria. He did not have the loud fame of Chkalov, but how "workhorse" he was, of course, immeasurably stronger and more promising.

But if at first Stalin stubbornly "wooed" Chkalov to the NKVD, would he stop at as a result, on Beria, if the leader of the Caucasus had a reputation in the country and at the "top" as an executioner or schemer? Don't think.

Beria had a well-known Chekist past - although quite old (he departed from Chekist work even before the formation of the NKVD, during the time of the OGPU Menzhinsky). If there were intrigues in this past, they would, of course, burden the unofficial Beria's reputation. However, they did not exist, just as there were no "sadistic" methods of conducting investigations in Georgia, allegedly used or encouraged by Beria. And it was significant is that the NKVD knew about the clean hands of Beria.

So in the light of already one failed appointment as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Chkalov, the appointment of Beria, in my opinion, reveals a positive image Beria to a greater extent than many archival research. Already

in our time, a number of slanderous versions have arisen regarding the fact that Beria was involved in the death of Chkalov, but this is precisely slander, on the analysis of which I will not dwell will. And I will only remind the reader that Chkalov died on December 15, 1938, when, with any point of view, the question of his appointment to the NKVD was removed from consideration once and for all - with On November 25, Lavrenty Beria became head of the NKVD.

BERIA is credited with a dual role in repressive politics after he came to leadership of the NKVD. They say, on the one hand, when he began de softening. But, on the other On the other hand, illegal-de repressions continued under him. It's certainly another sneaky antiberian myth. Even

if we take the already mentioned and, in my opinion, dubious certificate and about. Head of the 1st Special Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Colonel Pavlov dated December 11, 1953, where it is reported that in 1937-1938 he was sentenced to capital punishment allegedly 681,692 people, then from the same certificate we learn that in 1939-1940 there were **only 4,201** people were sentenced .

There was no need for the Khrushchevites and the "democrats" to reduce the real "execution" figure related to the activities of Beria. Unless they could overestimate it, although in unlikely in this case. So,

if we consider that: • anti-

Soviet activity in these two years within the country has intensified in connection with a general aggravation of the world military-political situation;

• in these two years, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the three Baltic republics became part of the USSR - and everywhere, of course, there were irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power (only Bandera were worth something!); • in late

1939 - early 1940, the Soviet-Finnish war took place; • the activity of pro-

Western circles in the Caucasian and southern national republics (after all, the Anglo-French in the spring of 1940 had plans to bomb Baku and

Batumi); • political banditry, including Basmachism, was not completely eliminated (it was completely eliminated only in 1945), then the figure of four thousand executed for state crimes looks surprisingly moderate.

However, more than

that! About any unjustified repressions (except for the inevitable in such an area involuntary "overlays") in Beria's NKVD was out of the question for a very significant reason! I am surprised how those who claim the opposite "lose sight" of the fact that a week before the withdrawal Yezhov and the appointment of Beria, on November 17, 1938, it was accepted signed by Stalin and Molotov Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On Arrests, Prosecutorial Supervision and Investigation". The tone and essence of the decision were tough, the addressing was quite specific:

"To the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics, to the Chiefs UNKVD of territories and regions, heads of district, **city and district** (highlighted here and below by me. - **S.K.**) of the NKVD departments. Prosecutors of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Territories and Regions, District, **city and district** prosecutors.
Secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees, regional committees, district committees and **district committees** of the CPSU (b).

The resolution noted the great work of the NKVD in 1937-1938 clearing the USSR "of numerous espionage, terrorist, sabotage and wrecking cadres of Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, bourgeois nationalists, White Guards, fugitive kulaks and criminals", as well as "to defeat espionage

sabotage agents of foreign intelligence who made their way into the USSR in a large quantity because of the cordon under the guise of so-called political emigrants and defectors from Poles, Romanians, Finns, Germans, Latvians, Estonians, Harbins, etc."

Further, it was frankly admitted that:

"Mass operations to defeat and root out hostile elements carried out ... in 1937-1938 with a simplified investigation and the courts, could not but lead to a number of major shortcomings and distortions in the work of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office ...

The main shortcomings identified in recent work bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office are as follows: Firstly, the NKVD completely abandoned intelligence work, preferring to act in a more simplified way, through the practice of mass arrests, without caring about the completeness and high as an investigation.

NKVD workers are so unaccustomed to painstaking ... work and so they entered to the taste of a simplified procedure for the proceedings, which until very recently raise questions about granting them so-called "limits" for mass arrests...

Secondly, the biggest shortcoming of the work of the NKVD is deeply rooted simplistic order of investigation, in which, as a rule, the investigator is limited from the accused confessing his guilt and does not care at all about supporting this recognition with the necessary documentary data..."

Further, both the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office got it ... And the style clearly gave out a hand Stalin.

Dear reader! The very statement in an official document, which should have been guided by tens of thousands of functionaries, was from Stalin's side action unprecedented! However, it is quite logical: after all, the "operation" of 1937-1938 was unprecedented, and unprecedented were the perversions. This means that the measures to correct them should have been the same.

And they were. The operative part, inter alia, stated:

"1. Prohibit the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office from carrying out any mass arrests and evictions....

2. Eliminate judicial troikas created by special orders NKVD of the USSR, as well as troikas at regional, regional and republican departments of the Republic of Kazakhstan (workers and peasants. - **S.K.**) police ...

Henceforth, all cases in strict accordance with applicable laws on jurisdiction to submit to the courts or the Special Meeting of the NKVD THE

USSR. 3. When arresting the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, be guided by as follows: ...

b) when requesting from prosecutors a sanction for arrest, the NKVD bodies are required to submit a reasoned decision and all substantiating the need to arrest materials ... d) the

bodies of the Prosecutor's Office are obliged not to allow arrests without sufficient grounds. Establish

that for each wrong arrest along with the NKVD

The prosecutor who authorized the arrest shall also be held liable..."

etc.

The last sentence of the decision was:

"The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks warn all employees of the NKVD and

Prosecutor's Office, that for the slightest violation of Soviet laws and directives of the party and government, every employee of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, regardless of the person, will subject to harsh legal action."

I do not rule out that it is not so that the widely known resolution today can cause shock to some: "How, and this is Stalin ?! And this is 1938?!"

The objections of the "democrats" are well known: the tyrant Stalin acted as usual! At the beginning authorized mass terror, and when it was carried out, once again (as in collectivization) presented himself as a champion of justice. But let me bring an example from the history of any nation in any era when a tyrant would publicly admit mistakes authorities! And not just recognized in words, but initiated a broad process of liberation innocent victims, not being afraid, by the way, that these liberated ones, having taken a sip of dashing, will now become his enemies.

Stalin, after all, risked his authority - the officials knew that repression could not be sanctioned without the decision of Stalin, and now he is not only directly scolded them, but also indirectly admitted that he was wrong.

Could a tyrant do this? Finally, if the

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee were an act "to the public", then it would be possible to be limited to words in combination with the release of some of the convicts, but to keep the repressive mechanism itself. And he was abolished! Troikas eliminated at all levels! And the Special Meeting at the NKVD of the USSR is only in Moscow for especially important matters state importance. And - without the right to issue "execution" sentences.

So what kind of illegal and unjust repressions could we talk about after such rulings? What prosecutor would now succumb to the "pressure" of the NKVD *without risking* being convicted by the troika, but at the risk of being sued for failure to comply with a strict party government directive? No, a thoughtful

analysis does not leave a stone unturned from the attempts of the "democrats" to make from the Bolshevik Stalin to the Jesuit Loyola, and from the Bolshevik Beria to Malyuta Skuratov.

The decision was not published. However, already its broad addressing - up to "grassroots" apparatus - in advance programmed a wide familiarization of the public countries with the heart of the matter. That is, they would not have been able to shut up and "put on the brakes" this directive "on the ground". In addition, the document was strictly directive! And there were hardly many willing to risk and ignore such a directive.

Chapter 12 NKVD SAMPLE 1939-1941

HERE against what political and legal background Beria became full-fledged on November 25, 1938
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

So where did he start? And from the fact that the very next day he signed an order on measures
on the implementation of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of November 17. The new people's commissar demanded from
subordinated to him bodies of the NKVD of all levels of the immediate cessation of mass
operations. The practice of arrests on the basis of so-called "albums", "certificates" and
"memoranda". It was clarified that, in cases of state crimes,
draw up motivated resolutions, etc. *And on January 1,*
1939, Beria introduced into the new structure of the NKVD a previously unprecedented
element - Complaints Bureau. It will last for a year and
proves that such a bureau was created to deal with complaints concerning cases specifically of 1937–
1938.

However, for a long time we have not remembered Beria's antibiographer - Antonov-Ovseenko ...
What did he write about the actions of the new Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR?

And here's what:

"Beria by all means supported the illusion of climate warming. According to him
By order, prisoners were allowed to use board games in their cells and
books...

So what about the camps? At the end of 1938, those
prisoners whose term expired next spring. They were read to them
resolution of the OSO and announced new dates ... And in March they called again. It
turns out that those papers are the result of a mistake. Now the Yezhovschina is over, their
released into the wild in accordance with the law. **There**
were several such lucky people in each OLP
(separate camp point. - **S.K.**) ...

What has changed in the fate of sixteen million languishing in
countless prison camps? Like all other
political campaigns, this one soon withered away.
demagogic smoke ... "

Alas, in addition to the standard "democratic" lie ratio (10:1) in the amount
prisoners, we will not find anything here, and therefore I, perhaps, will not quote this "biographer" further,
although on some occasions I will return to him much later.

The reality was, of course, not idyllic, but completely different. Beria quickly
figured out (he figured everything out quickly) with the main blockages of the righteous and
unrighteous, which was done under Yezhov, and already in 1939 the NKVD left the camps
over two hundred thousand people.

And when Beria was at the head of the NKVD, there were never any mass repressions
was carried out. Although this does not mean that the repressive
activities of the NKVD. It just couldn't be, because in hard times
harsh measures against anti-state elements are characteristic of any

building. And the times were harsh, and this was due not to the cruelty of Stalin and
Beria, not by the desire for the sole power of Stalin, but by the objective conditions of the current
historical life of Russia and the world. So to be a kind of all-forgiving "Jesus" Beria
didn't want to and couldn't. Especially in the matter of investigating and suppressing conspiratorial
trends. Due to his high competence as a counterintelligence officer, he clearly gave himself
report that although the "personal", so to speak, base of anti-Soviet conspiracies was
seriously undermined by the purges of 1937-1938, but it was hardly completely destroyed. Beria had to
deal with this problem as seriously as before - Yezhov. Colonel-historian Suvenirov complains that
Tukhachevsky and his accomplices are already in the first

days, they say, after the arrest, dozens of people were "slandered". But one wonders why Tukhachevsky or Uborevich named major general such and such, not lieutenant general such and such? After all, from their marshal and army commander heights, it didn't matter who call? "Aha! Colonel Souvenirov will say. - That's what we're talking about! They called at random - who did they remember! There was no conspiracy."

No, that doesn't happen in real life. And Beria, even without psychological analysis, knew how it happens! And he understood that in the investigation of cases of conspiracies, material evidence, direct evidence, could not be found. There were no video recordings then, but to fix something on paper only idiots can. And the only thing the investigator has at his disposal is testimony and recognition of the defendants. Testimony only! And the evidence may be intentional contradictory, unintentionally contradictory, inaccurate, etc. It is very difficult here in figure something out.

Another thing is that you need to figure it out. Moreover, the information, according to the investigation, is extremely secret - leaks are unacceptable here. And the sphere is special, if we mean the military conspiracy. Indeed, during the war, only two or three unidentified traitors (at the level, say, of the high command of the border military districts) can cause a strategic collapse!

When investigating a general political conspiracy, security is also at stake the entire state. Beria understood this and therefore could be tough even when someone formally and found not guilty. Nevertheless, the process of returning to the Red Army cadres of many arrested commanders - this is one of the first merits of Beria to the country in the position drug commissar, as they said then. Of

course, merit! And here we need to clarify something.

USUALLY as examples of the "arbitrariness" of the NKVD of the 1939 model, that is, the NKVD already under Beria, the "democrats" cite all sorts of memories - they say, one general said, and another old Bolshevik confirmed, etc. However, it is not without reason that lawyers have expression: "Lies like an eyewitness" ... Even a hundred of the most "terrible" testimonies do not proves in the study of the phenomena of life of the whole society. Need summary statistical data.

And there are objective figures given, say, by the military historian N. Cherushev. In his book "From the Gulag to Battle," he writes that not one of the dismissed or commanders arrested and then released and reinstated in the ranks of the Red Army did not knew the true extent of repression in the Red Army.

Strange, of course ... If the repressions were as total as they claim "democrats", then their huge scale could hardly be a secret, especially in a military environment. And such a statement by a military historian raises doubts: "Were these repressions really great?"

Well, now we know them, including thanks to the same N. Cherushev! And he claims: "... these figures are impressive!"

And they can really impress, dear reader! They impressed me so much so that when I present them now, I myself do not believe that they are true. They are very "penny".

But N. Cherushev is a politically correct historian, he has a different term than "dungeons NKVD, does not know. And he will not underestimate the data, reporting them, especially with a link to the Russian State Military Archive (fund 37837, inventory 18, file 888).

So, with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD, the process of liberating the military intensified markedly not immediately, but only by the end of 1939, which, of course, indicates a careful study investigative cases. After all, before deciding whether to release a person or not, it was necessary to understand whether he is guilty or not?

And as of January 27, 1940, the number of restored in the Red Army command staff in ranks from division commander to junior lieutenant from among the released

amounted to 1579 people.

Is it a lot or a little? But

let the reader decide this himself after getting acquainted with N. Cherushev's data on the number dismissed command and command staff in 1937 and 1938. So, in two years, the

Red Army was dismissed (of which - arrested): **1937 1938 Total Komkorov**

35 (30) 17 (16) 52 (46) They corresponded to 25 (11) 1 (1) 26 (12) Komdivov 73 (54) 50 (42) 123 (96) Corresponding to them 84 (14) 22 (15) 106 (29) Commanders of Brigs 124 (65) 140 (100) 264 (165) Corresponding to them 194 (36) 85 (49) 279 (85) Colonels 362 (141) 535 (352) 897 (493) Them corresponding 513 (108) 461 (231) 974 (339) **Total 1410 (459) 1311 (806)**

2721 (1265) That is, at the level from commander to colonel in the Red Army, only something was arrested 1265 people!

And we are told about tens of thousands, almost hundreds of thousands!

Of these 1265 people, by January 27, 1940, 129 people were released, but with not all of those arrested were subsequently repressed. Moreover, as I said,

there were repressed lieutenants and captains in the Red Army less than the repressed colonels.

So where is the mass beating of military personnel here, if at the end of 1938 the full-time the number of command and command personnel of the Red Army was equal to 240 thousand people and by 1940 increased to 358 thousand people?

Now it is clear why, as N. Cherushev reports, not a single one of the dismissed or commanders arrested and then released and reinstated in the ranks of the Red Army did not know the true extent of the repression.

They did not really notice them - after all, there were almost no arrests, at the mass level. Arrests and executions were significant only in the highest echelon of the command staff, but there after all, a conspiracy was concentrated! In addition, many army commanders of different ranks then already turned into something similar to their "obsessed" civilian brother-partocrats.

The army masses were practically not touched by repressions, and that is why they the scale was never "realized" - in the troops, after all, there is always a great movement of the command staff ... sometimes they were fired for drinking, someone went to the reserve, someone - to another part, but you hear someone, they

arrested ... I will give a hypothetical (alas!) example from our life today ... Imagine imagine that in some middle-class city of Pereputkinsk, without much fuss, the "authorities" will arrest three-quarters of the city administration ... Even if it is headed by its head, the microoligarch Nedoputkin. And in addition - about fifty local businessmen, functionaries, etc. Yes, two or three hundred thousand inhabitants of the city will not even

notice this! What difference does it make to them Nedoputkin, Besputkin, Rasputkin? Things are still going wrong.

Of course, in 1937-1938, not only scoundrels with and without buttonholes were arrested, but and a number of worthy people. However, I am not talking about this now, but only about the analogy in the psychological side of things.

So, even Yezhov cannot be accused of organizing a pogrom in the Red Army. And Beria, I repeat, should be credited directly with the restoration of justice in relation to several thousand (including lieutenants, captains, majors) honest red commanders.

In the Great Patriotic War, they will be very useful to the country.

By JANUARY 1, 1939, the NKVD structure had not yet acquired that deployed rebuilt type, which the structure of the already purely Beria NKVD had by January 1 1940. However, contours were outlined - I spoke about this. And that was typical too. for Beria. He was always an excellent organizer - this is recognized today even by those who hurriedly adds at the same time: "but his hands are still up to the elbow in blood."

What does it mean to be a great organizer? It is, firstly, to know the entrusted you care or be able to figure it out and then develop an effective structure

its management, as well as the structure of its functional division. Secondly, one must be able to understand the existing personnel situation and select those personnel who will fill the "squares" of the scheme and will work under your leadership.

Thirdly, one must be able to demand, but also be able to help those who are in need in time. needs, and if necessary - in time to change the unfit or failed workers. In

addition, one must be able to and, as they say, inspire people. And not chatting with tribunes, but taking care of

them. Beria knew how ... And he once again confirmed this when he came to the NKVD. For any smart manager and leader, the personnel issue is always the main one. Personnel everything really decides, but only when it is competent personnel. He started here vigorously. And already on January 27, 1939, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar of the 2nd rank Shchadenko issued order No. 010 on early release and secondment to the disposal of The NKVD of the USSR a number of students of graduation and junior courses of the military academies of the Red Army.

Schemers and tyrants do not like to deal with either advanced people or the military. The former are too often independent, the latter too often honest. And the fact that Lawrence Beria called under his banner not only young engineers like Vitaly Pavlov, but also young "academic" commanders, also proves that he was not what he was made in in the eyes of society after 1953 partocratic - "democratic" "party".

He dealt with the personnel issue a lot in his first "commissariat of internal affairs" months. Under Yezhov, from October 1, 1936 to January 1, 1938, 5229 operational employees (but only 1220 of them, by the way, were arrested). In return, 5359 new employees were hired. And not all of them were fired already with the advent of Beria.

Nevertheless, in 1939, 7372 operational workers were fired from the NKVD system. (22.9% of their total composition), and 14,506 people were accepted for operational security work, of which 11,062 were on party and Komsomol vouchers. Dismissal,

even from the NKVD, is not necessarily an arrest. The famous Chekist Dmitry Medvedev, forty years old, was transferred to the reserve for health reasons, November 3, 1939 (three weeks before the appointment of Beria as People's Commissar), and returned to the footage with the start of the war, which was sanctioned, of course, by Beria.

Konstantin Zalessky in the reference book "Empire of Stalin" claims that Beria de "Almost half updated the NKVD apparatus, replacing Yezhov's associates personally responsible people."

Such a statement is quite typical for the slanderous Beriada. About Beria you can to say any, even obviously stupid and absurd, infamy, and you can be sure that they will believe her. Such an impenetrable black wall around the true fate of Beria built by common efforts several generations of falsifiers of this fate. That's here... Nearly a dozen and a half thousand people "personally obliged" to the people's commissar? Excuse me, Konstantin Alexandrovich, you can lie, but is it really worth lying so openly?

I will inform you, by the way, that the total staffing of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR as of January 1, 1940, it amounted to 32,642 people. These are the Chekists, and policemen, and firefighters, and others, including here 259 staff units of the song ensemble and dances (if I am not mistaken, the future dancer of all masters Igor Moiseev and future favorite of the "democrats" "Tagansky" director Lyubimov). But since

the time of Menzhinsky, the Chekist leadership included such, for example, Jews like the head of the Gulag Naftaliy Frenkel, Yakov Rapoport and others...

In the "personnel" period of 1939, Beria also established good business contacts with Georgy Malenkov, who was then in charge of the Department of Leading Party Personnel in the Central Committee. Malenkov himself was one of the candidates to fill the post of Yezhov, had experience "purges" - in 1937, together with Mikoyan, he replaced most of the party apparatus, by that time in this southern republic was greatly degraded.

Two years younger than Beria, Malenkov could be classified as a "technocrat" - he started

studied at the Moscow Higher Technical School, from there he went to the front in 1919, returning, he continued his studies. However, without completing it, at the beginning of 1925 he was appointed technical secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. Sometimes they write about some later "tandem" of "technocrats" Malenkov and Beria, and in their time it will become at first glance an obvious fact. But they were still different people. then it will show up very sharply. But then Malenkov and Beria worked quite amicably, including including and to restore order in the new "economy" of Beria.

Beriev's (although in part they can also be called "Malenkov's") "cleansing" of the apparatus The NKVD and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army have long been overgrown slander - as, in fact, everything related to Beria. But here are five fates (taken

almost at random alphabetically) ... **1. Georgy Ivanovich Kilachitsky**

(Lawyer, Georges, Volsky, Rashevsky), b. 1887, Warsaw. Russian. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1932, member of the Polish Socialist Party "Proletariat" (1904), in February 1908-1910 sentenced to 6 years hard labor, since 1913 zemstvo activist.

Worked in the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Far Eastern Republic (1920-1922), in administration

Executive Committee of the International Workers Aid Organization (IDWO). At the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters since April 1926. Illegal resident in France, left the country after discovering police surveillance. Regimental commissar (1936), head of department at the Central Training School commanders of the headquarters service of the Intelligence

Department of the Red Army. **2. Kolesnikov (Moskalenko) Ivan Antonovich**, b. 1897, Novosotensky volost (now Ostrogozhsky district of the Voronezh region). Ukrainian. Graduated from teacher's seminary in the city of Ostrogozhsk (1916), the Alekseevsky military school in Moscow (1916). Member of the First world war, lieutenant. In the Red Army since September 1918. Member of the RCP(b) since October 1919 of the year.

Assistant to the military commissar of the Novosotensky military registration and enlistment office, chief of staff of the brigade, assistant to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Volga Military District (1922-1927). He graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army (1922) and the Oriental Faculty of the Academy. Frunze (1927-1930). Employee

of the Intelligence Agency (1930-1937). Was abroad for seven years. Since 1937 in at the disposal of the Intelligence Agency for the 5th department.

3. Konstantinov Vladimir Mikhailovich, b. 1903, Irkutsk. Russian. Participant Civil War in the Far East. Member of the RCP(b) since 1921. Organization department instructor Irkutsk Provincial Committee (1922-1923). In the Red Army since 1921. Graduated from Japan diplomatic faculty of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (1927).

Secretary of the Military Attaché in Japan (1927-1933), completed a course at Waseda University. At the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters since August 1933, graduated Oriental Faculty of the Academy. Frunze (1938). After graduating from the academy - 1st embassy secretary in Japan.

4. Kravchenko Fedor Iosifovich (Klein, Tycoon, Pancho), b. 1912. Krasnodar edge. Russian. Member of the revolutionary movement in Uruguay, where he lived from 1913 to 1929 year.

In the Red Army since 1936, participant in the war in Spain, translator of the Chief Military adviser D. G. Pavlov (before the war - commander of the Western Special Military district, in the autumn of 1941 he was shot for the loss of command and control).

5. Kremer Semyon Davidovich (Alexander, Sergey), b. 1900, Gomel. Jew. From workers. In the Red Army since 1918. Member of the Civil War. Member of the RCP(b) since 1919. Graduated Communist University. Sverdlov (1922) and the main faculty of the Academy. Frunze (1934).

At the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters since August 1933. From January 1937 of the year - Secretary of the Military Attache at the USSR Embassy in England ...

Try to guess - what was the further fate of this "great five"? The correct answers are as follows... The first one, Kilachytsky, was repressed on June 14, 1937. The second - Kolesnikov, was repressed on March 14, 1938. The third, Konstantinov, was arrested in the fall of 1938 and in 1939 sentenced to execution. In 1940, for the translation of a Japanese strategically important document, the death penalty replaced by 20 years in prison. Transferred from Butyrskaya prison, first to Ufa, then to Khabarovsk. Worked with secret Japanese documents in cooperation with a hundred Japanists who arrived in Khabarovsk from all over the country. In 1954 he was released, in May 1956 rehabilitated. Conducted scientific activities, under the pseudonym M. Airsky, doctor Historical Sciences (1961). Died 09/08/1967.

The fourth - Kravchenko, from 1938 to October 1941 - an illegal intelligence officer in Mexico. Member of the Great Patriotic War, performed tasks as part of reconnaissance group "Leo", commander of the detachment. Ivan Bohun in partisan unit A. Fedorova (1942-1943). Major. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1943. Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). Illegal resident in France (Toulouse, 1945-1949). Reserved since 1951. passed away at Moscow on November 19, 1988 and was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery.

Fifth - Kremer, until August 1942, through Ursula Burton-Kuchinsky (Sonya), he maintained contact with the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs in London, then until July 1943 he was head of the western faculty of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages. WITH July 1943 - at the front, in 1944 the commander of the 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade, hard injured. Major General of Tank Troops, Hero of the Soviet Union (1944), commander of the 5th Guards Mechanized Division (1945-1956). Reserved since 1956. Died 1990 in Odessa.

That's it, dear reader! Outwardly - absolutely similar, to a certain extent moment, destiny. And so different. Here is another fate of the already "clean" personnel Chekist, the same age as Beria, Colonel Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov (Vaupshas). The son of a Lithuanian peasant, he lived, as they say, a bright and stormy life, in the 20s years partisan in Western Belarus, fought in Spain, was also an illegal immigrant.

During the Great Patriotic War, Major Gradov commanded the "Invincible" special detachment in Belarus, and in 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Vaupshasov becomes a Hero of the Soviet Union ... Vaupshasov was one of the last to leave Spain - in March 1939. By the way, no one tried to "recall" him from there in 1937 - like the same Orlov-Feldbing. AND not surprising! The official biography of Stanislav Vaupshas was impeccable - its purity was confirmed not by a questionnaire, but by the nature of a knight and a soldier of the people.

May 19, 1939 Vaupshasov through France arrived in Kronstadt on the same ship "Ulyanovsk", on which Dolores Ibarruri arrived in the USSR. At the end of 1939 he was in the Finnish war. And then - again a year and a half of illegal work in Europe, from where Stanislav returned in the autumn of 1941. After the fighting near Moscow as part of the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Special Purpose of the NKVD, Major Gradov in the spring of 1942, he went behind the front line with an operational special group - on skis, under Minsk.

Many years later, Vaupshasov wrote the book "At the Troubled Crossroads", and this is what he writes about the spring of 1939:

"Having returned from Spain, for some time I got used to a peaceful life, to noisy and prettier capital, to a quiet household. I spent my vacation near Leningrad with my wife... Upon my return to Moscow, I began working in one of the NKVD departments. He lived in a family, went to work along his native Moscow streets, admired metropolitan brilliance and business bustle of a huge city ... "

As you can see, no one pulled Vapshasov with checks. For him personally, this meant that they trust him. For us, dear reader, this can serve as proof that in The NKVD of the 1939 model did not suspect everyone who returned from business trips abroad. However this did not mean that Beria believed everyone without verification - we will see this later ...

ON THE GENUINE ROLE OF LAVRENTY PAVLOVICH WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET SPECIAL SERVICES in 1938-1939 and later, one can talk a lot about the malicious manipulation of this role - there are countless examples of lies. For example,

Viktor Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB in 1982-1988. He is one of those "cohort" of Lubyanka ranks, on which the blood of the Soviet Union, which betrayed the state to reprisals against Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and then the "democrats" with the "oligarchs".

On September 2, 1988, he, already in the position of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, gave an interview to Pravda (in which by that time there was not only news, but also the truth) and declared:

"As a result of false accusations, more than 20,000 Chekists became victims of repression. Highly professional workers devoted to the Communist Party."

But Igor Pykhalov in the book "Stalin's Time: Facts Against Myths" with reference to The Central Archive of the FSB cites information about the number of repressed employees of the OGPU - NKVD for 1933-1939. And we'll take care of it now!

It should be noted that giving *such* a summary certificate is already doing juggling. And why so, I will soon explain (perhaps the reader guessed what was the matter, already himself).

Reference

data are as follows: **YEAR**

ARRESTED

1933738193428601935624919361945193738371938562519391364TOTAL: **22618** Weird

we observe a jump in 1934: the number of those arrested increases immediately by almost four times!

Why?

Yagoda was and remained the head of the department, and he was inclined to cover up the sins of his employees - the farther, the more. At that time, no special conspiracies were revealed. There were also no instructions from above to intensify repressions. Where does such growth come from?

Everything is explained simply: By the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on July 10, 1934 on the United State Political Administration of the USSR was formed People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. And now in submission to Yagoda were not only the Chekists themselves and the worker-peasant police with a threat, but also additionally:

- Main Directorate of Fire Protection; • Department of acts of civil status; • Department of Forest Protection... And this is a

sharp expansion of the quantitative composition of peripheral structures with a decrease in their personnel quality (bribes are possible in the registry office, firefighters are not always on top readiness and sobriety, foresters can float the forest "to the left", etc.). The functions

of leadership of the paramilitary fire brigade were transferred, however, to the OGPU already in the autumn of 1932 (then a special department was created). But the scale itself firefighting activities greatly expanded precisely with the formation of the GUPO.

In addition, by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of October 27, 1934, all correctional labor institutions of the People's Commissariat of Justice (houses of detention, isolation wards, correctional labor colonies, forced labor bureaus) were transferred to the Gulag of the new NKVD of the USSR. After all, the "democrats" have it - like a prison, so immediately the Gulag, and in fact, until October 27, 1934, these were different things. Now in the Gulag the number the number of arrested employees was bound to increase - in prisons, criminals sometimes come across on both sides of the cell doors.

And, finally, with the formation of the NKVD, the states grew - both central and peripheral - directly to the KGB and police structures of the NKVD. So in full accordance with the laws of statistics, the number of those arrested and punished for various sins. All this, taken

together, gave such a leap by *the end of 1934*. In 1935, the first full year of the existence of the NKVD, the figure grew by compared with 1933 - the last year of the "pure" OGPU - already at eight and a half once! And here, too, everything is explained. Now the firefighters, foresters, prison guards and registrars of registry offices gave a full-fledged increase in statistics, and even clean new employees Yagoda had to, putting things in order in the same fire department.

1936 brought a quite expected "plateau" - stabilization was achieved. Employees of the peripheral structures of the new departments of the NKVD are forced to pull themselves up - discipline has improved.

The years 1937 and 1938 gave a new, albeit smaller, increase as part of the general increase in repression. By the way, the fact that even in these two years the level of 1935 was not reached is once again indirectly proves the not-so-massive nature of the supposedly "great terror" as in Chekist department, and in the country. But the

first full "Beria" year, 1939, gave a sharp decline in the number of arrests. Which is also understandable - Beria never liked extra blood and extra cars.

After all, Antonov-Ovseenko and General Volkogonov have him - a "monster", a "ghoul", "executioner", etc.

I think it is now clear that the total figure of 22,618 includes not only Chekists, but also policemen, firefighters, personnel of the border, internal and escort troops and personnel of the "civilian" structures of the NKVD.

Actually, Gennady Kostyrchenko reports that from October 1, 1936 to January 1 1938, 1220 Chekists were arrested. And this figure fits well into the general figures for the NKVD, and also correlates correctly with the increase in the number of arrests in the NKVD, which we observe in comparison with 1933.

The author of the FSB's summary report slyly "tweaked" the NKVD with its overgrown functions of only one year of the "pure" OGPU, and thus produced in the minds of those who will get acquainted with the help, a clever substitution.

Arrested employee of the OGPU - although it may be a stealing accountant from the Administrative and Economic Department - in the minds of the majority of Chekists. AND the combination in the certificate of the OGPU and the NKVD into something unified provides the majority with confidence in the fact that all those arrested, noted in the certificate, are Chekists.

I have to admit - well done! But a lie is a lie ... This is not true expose never and in no way - that's what it's true. And lies can be exposed, although not always make it easy. But we exposed it, dear reader, didn't we?

THIS is how much you can understand by analyzing just two columns of numbers! But all the viciousness of the slander against Beria can be illustrated by examples of direct falsifications, which were first noticed by the same Igor Pykhalov and which I'll bring it now. In

1995, the weekly News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (No. 15-16, p. 4) wrote about scout Fyodor Karpovich Parparov:

"On May 27, 1938, Parparov was arrested at the direction of Beria and was under investigation until June 1939. Released due to lack of composition crimes (espionage).

In the same 1995, the Foreign Intelligence Service publishes a short biographical reference book "Veterans of Russia's foreign intelligence" (even the name of the USSR in Yeltsin's SVR

the sample was then afraid. - S.K.), and it states:

"At the direction of Beria, by the middle of 1938, almost all residents of the foreign intelligence agencies were recalled to Moscow, many of them were expressed distrust, and back they did not return" (p. 161).

And in the biography of intelligence officer Grigory Sergeevich Syroezhkin it is said that in 1938 he *"in a private conversation expressed an opinion about the innocence of Tukhachevsky and others military leaders whose cases were concocted by Beria and his henchmen"* (p. 140).

In May 1938, Beria still cut the ribbons on the doors of brand new ones, just freed from scaffolding buildings in Tbilisi. And give orders for arrest Parparov, as well as any of the intelligence officers in general, could not. But he gave instructions about his release after the test and enrollment - like others who passed this test - in foreign intelligence staff. For

the same reason - the lack of attitude to the affairs of the Lubyanka in 1937 - Beria could not "cook" anything in relation to Tukhachevsky.

It seems, however, that the traditions of poor-quality writing and slander Beria in our post-Stalin intelligence have deep roots. Was like this - it's now certify outstanding - scout Dmitry Bystroletov. Certify it and certainly as a victim of Beria's de arbitrariness. In

fact, this seemingly really professional is not such in his memoirs looks. For example, he himself writes that during his arrest, "albums with photographs taken ... in Africa, Europe and America were confiscated from him - almost three thousand of the best photographs collected during eighteen years of uninterrupted wanderings around the world."

Reading this, I was dumbfounded. And if all these pictures were confiscated during his arrest *abroad*? This is the most valuable material for any investigator! That's the conspirator! And between by the way, a student of Artuzov and Slutsky ...

Nevertheless, it was a person, as far as I imagine him, really uncommon, and he could sometimes give really outstanding results, he was very bright and artistic. They say about such people, not without reason: a brilliant adventurer.

Born in 1901, since 1925 - in the INO OGPU, illegal. In 1938 he was arrested, sent to a camp, in 1954 he was rehabilitated, but for some reason he was no longer involved in work. He died in 1975 in Moscow. In 1969, at the

direction of Andropov, he was given a separate apartment, and Bystroletov engaged in literary work. He also worked on memoirs, which were not begun in the writer's, by the way, Peredelkino, but back in 1939 (!) in the Norilsk corrective labor camp (!). In 1993, the publishing house

"Border" published a book of his "memoirs" "Feast Immortals", the computer typing of which was completed in 1990-1991 by employees KGB of the USSR. In the preface, someone Sergei Milashov reported that Bystroletov, they say, still lucky, because: "... many of his colleagues ... were destroyed by the henchmen of Yezhov and Beria."

Bystroletov had a light and lively pen, but, alas, very much - as we are now. we will see - false. He himself reports that he was arrested *on September 18, 1938* - while "Executioner Yezhov", but all his troubles happened under the "executioner Beria". And he describes his ordeals, life in a common cell, and so on, naturally, in the "Beria dungeons." I will give only two fragments of his "revelations" ...

"We pushed our way to the window and climbed onto the bunk. - This is a famous person, the former general designer of our aircraft Andrey Nikolaevich Tupolev, - Kotya said in a whisper and showed with his eyes on the tramp who lay next to him. - He was interrogated at night ... Andrey Nikolaevich... we need to move...

Someone growled under the rags, but didn't move" (p. 18).

Tupolev (by the way, he became the General Designer of the aviation industry in December 1956) was indeed arrested - on October 21, 1937. I won't get into the essence of this arrest now (it did not happen completely from scratch), but the facts are such that already from the beginning of 1938 it begins to work successfully, albeit in isolation, Special Technical Bureau (OTB) under the NKVD of the USSR, which included separate design bureau of Tupolev, Petlyakov and Myasishchev. Therefore, no Tupolev in the fall of 1938 I could not see the volunteers on the bunk. He could not see him at all on the bunk in any general camera.

"One afternoon the door opened slightly, and a man staggered into the cell, bloodied shirt, shouted: "I'm from Lefortovo! Brethren, Bear's executioner Peter is gone: he is under arrest!" and fell to the floor. On his back were gaping deep triangular wounds, torn meat sticking out of them, fragments of ribs were visible. Having shown us the wounded man, apparently for intimidation, the guards soon dragged out his..." (p. 36).

The head of the Leningrad department of the NKVD Philip Medved really twice was arrested. The first time he was arrested in December 1934 "for criminally negligent attitude to their duties" after the murder of Kirov and gave 3 years in the camps. Before After the second arrest, Medved worked in the leadership of Dalstroy in Kolyma. In May 1937 a new investigation was launched on newly discovered circumstances, and on September 7, 1937 he was again arrested, and in November 1937 he was shot "in a special order."

So, hardly anyone could report as news about just his arrest - a year after the execution. And, of course, he didn't report ... Neither with the "triangular wounds" on his back, which Bystroletov allegedly "saw" *through* the "bloody" *shirt*, or without them. The question is: what, the employees of the KGB of the USSR, who performed in 1990-1991 computer set of this dashing "cooking", did not know that they were dealing with fables?

A year before his death, Bystroletov burned the materials he kept from The Feast immortals." And you can understand why...

BUT HERE is really a documentary story ... Born in 1909, stately handsome Alexander Korotkov was certainly an outstanding illegal intelligence officer. Having started work at the Lubyanka in 1928 as an elevator, in 1933 he went to his first business trip abroad. He was recommended for intelligence by V. Gerson, Yagoda's personal secretary. IN In Paris, Korotkov began under the guidance of the defector Orlov-Feldbing ... How we see that the "pedigree" is not the best, although Alexander was not guilty of that. Korotkov worked in France under the operational pseudonym Stepanov until the end of 1938. Upon his return to Moscow, he is promoted and awarded the Order Red Banner. And on

January 1, 1939, the "aces" of the INO NKVD, recalled from behind the cordon, gather in Beria's office. I am familiar with several descriptions of this "historical meeting", and, I think, it is no coincidence that a major Chekist "rank" of post-Stalin times, Lieutenant General Vitaly Pavlov, in his memoirs, dates it "one of the January days

1940 (fortieth. - S.K.) year ", and from the context it follows that this is not a typo and not set error. *But the*

meeting took place at the beginning of January 1939 precisely (thirty-ninth), which dated exactly (how - soon I will report). And at this meeting, Beria attacked the "aces", sharply accusing them of double-dealing. Korotkov also got it. He behaved, however, as the rest, with dignity, did not make excuses, but swept aside all the

accusations. To illustrate how one can believe "documentary fiction", especially with direct speech, I will cite an excerpt from the book by Vladimir Antonov and Vladimir Karpov (as I understand it, authors from the Lubyanka): "Secret informants of the Kremlin", published in 2000:

"Turning to Alexander Korotkov, Beria said: - You are recruited
the Gestapo, and therefore you are resigning from the organs ... "

But here I have a facsimile of the statement "*AM Korotkov, former sec. (foreign intelligence. - S.K.) G.U. G. B. NKVD*", written by him in the name of *the "People's Commissar of the Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Beria "* and dated January 9, 1939 (that's where I got accurate dating of the January meeting at Beria). The spelling of the original is preserved:

"8.1.39 I was announced about my dismissal from the authorities (and according to Antonov and It turns out to Karpov that the rude and "provocateur" Beria personally announced this to him. right January 1st. - **S.K.**). Since during the ten years of work in the organs I tried to devote all my strength and knowledge to the benefit of our Party, I do not feel any guilt before the party and was not tainted with anything according to the Chekist and community service, I think I did not deserve this dismissal. I started working in the authorities in 1928 as an elevator operator, I worked for a year clerk at 5 from. G.U.G.B, and in 1930 he was appointed assistant. authorized.

In 1933 he was sent underground to France &...>. In 1936 he was again sent abroad to Germany to work on technical intelligence&...>.

... I went abroad only because of the desire to bring benefit with my work there and I think that no one who knows me can confirm that I am not a hoarder and that living abroad doesn't appeal to me&...>.

As for my wife, despite the fact that she has relatives abroad, for her long residence there, despite the compromising materials against her father, who died in 1936, I am fully confident in her devotion to the party and can bear any responsibility for it. Besides, she she showed herself well as an employee in the department and in the Komsomol organization.

I understand very well (unlike those who slander Beria. - **S.K.**) the need for preventive measures, but several are carried out individually approach, it turns out that I deserved such distrust, which conditions my dismissal from the authorities. At the same time, I don't know simpletons behind me who can be the reason for taking away my honor to work in the organs. Feel like this situation is extremely difficult and embarrassing.

I ask you to reconsider the decision on my dismissal

January 9, 1939 Korotkov.

This Korotkov step, already famous in the latest literature on intelligence, is often presented how desperate. To me it seems logical. Moreover, it clearly proves that Korotkov (and he was also a good psychologist), after a personal, although not very joyful acquaintance with the new people's commissar, I believed that *this one* would understand!

Korotkov was supported by his colleagues, who turned to the GUGB party committee. Beria called him to conversation, and after it signed an order for his reinstatement at work.

Not an elevator, dear reader, and not a clerk ... Lieutenant GB Korotkov almost immediately goes on short-term business trips to Norway and Denmark. to restore broken links.

In July 1940, he again goes to Germany ... That's it! And

they tell us that Beria never trusted anyone. But he would have managed for his not a very long life to do so much in various fields of activity, if not believed in people and in people if he did not trust

them? Another thing is that he checked them - when there was a need. But that's how it should an intelligent and honest person who is fully responsible for the work he does.

I will give another example, indicative of establishing a truthful view of Beria, of his attitude towards illegal immigrants, and I will probably limit myself to this, because if I cite all of them, one way or another promulgated, should be written in a separate chapter.

Arnold Deutsch was born on May 21, 1904 in Vienna, and in January 1932 he, a member Communist Party of Austria and former courier of the Comintern, came to Moscow with his wife Josephine and soon began working in the INO OGPU. I

note that at that time only 150 people worked at the INO, half of whom were abroad. If we take into account that in six years - by 1938 - these figures could not increase sharply, then you can understand what the fables about "hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers" were destroyed "Executioner" Beria and his "accomplices". There were only two or three hundred of them, including foreign agents of foreigners, for everything, of which Krivitsky "surrendered" a hundred.

In order for the reader to understand what Deutsch meant to our intelligence, I will tell you that it was him. created and nurtured the "Cambridge Five", made up of Kim Philby, Donald McLean, Guy Burges, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. But it was far from his only success. In

September 1937 Deutsch and his family (wife and daughter born in London) returned to THE USSR. And they didn't let him into any "meat grinders", although his biography, it would seem, disposed of this (he also worked with Bystroletov in London). Still no comrade Stefan was not touched. On the contrary, in 1938 he, his wife and daughter received Soviet citizenship.

Deutsch never received a new assignment before the war - he had previously worked in English direction, and there one betrayal of Krivitsky mixed up many cards. However, Beria did not miss out of sight, and with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Deutsch was again called up for a "quiet" war. Argentina was assigned to him as a place of work, but Stefan's group had not got there - the ship "Donbass", on which she sailed to the starting point of the foreign route, was sunk by a German cruiser. Beria believed him,

because Deutsch was a real, convinced communist, and with This is also an undoubted *Soviet* patriot.

NOW let's get back to Vitaly Pavlov's "mistake" in the date of the January meeting at Beria ... Let me remind you that the meeting took place on January 1, 1939, and Pavlov dates it early January 1940. He wrote that "in the middle of 1939, an order was received from the People's Commissar Beria to recall to Moscow the entire personnel of Akhmerov's residency. This order was for us with an unexpected and heavy blow, as it undermined our main information base in the

USA. However, Pavlov is simply lying! He cannot fail to know the exact chronology of events, because he himself reports that a few days after the January meeting Akhmerov (as well as Zarubin and Grigoriev) were sent to the American branch under the beginning to ...

Pavlov. Pavlov interprets this as a deliberate humiliation of the most experienced professionals tyrant Beria, but in reality it was a completely reasonable quarantine, allowing, among other things, to evaluate the true moral and volitional qualities verified. Looking ahead, I will say that all three then worked hard and usefully for countries in new business trips.

However, why did Pavlov put the date of the meeting back a year? And here's why... If Akhmerov was recalled in the middle of 1939, then this is on Beria ... This is de unreasonable interrupts the normal work of the residency of Akhmerov, whom he rudely scolded in January 1940.

But Akhmerov was already in Beria's office on January 1, **1939**, which means that his recalled in the summer of **1938** - even under Yezhov! That's why it was necessary to correct the dates - to once again pour dirty ink on Lavrenty Pavlovich! Posthumously ... And - in many times... We will return to Akhmerov, Pavlov and their colleagues, but now I must say,

that, having taken the reins of government in the NKVD, Beria had to deal not only with foreign personnel, but also with the peripheral apparatus within the country. For example, already in late December 1938, he received an order from the Politburo to investigate the authenticity data on the conspiracy of the "Zionist" organization of teachers, headed by a certain Lenginer in Moldavian ASSR (Moldova was then part of the Ukrainian SSR). This case began - as it turned out, falsified - even under the People's Commissar

Internal Affairs of Ukraine Oleksandr Uspensky. Since the early 1930s, he has been a member of leadership of the Moscow Department of the OGPU-NKVD, then was the head of the Department NKVD in the Orenburg region. In January 1938, Khrushchev, appointed acting duties of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and who knew Uspensky well at work in Moscow, took him with him to Kyiv.

Ouspensky - a hot and chaotic guy - was prone to falsification (than Khrushchev, it must be said, suited him) and at first developed a vigorous activity in Ukraine. But the case went to the approval of Beria as People's Commissar, a decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of November 17 was being prepared ... And when Beria summoned Uspensky to the People's Commissariat in November 1938, Uspensky feigned suicide on November 14 and fled to the Urals. Five months later, on April 15, 1939, he was arrested in the Chelyabinsk region, in Miass, and in early 1940 he was shot. Other falsifiers of the Lenginer case were also shot. But the very fact that the Politburo dealt with this "linden" shows that such cases were not the norm.

BERIA always looked at all the problems that turned out to be within his competence, comprehensively and proactively. He did not have time to become the head of the Zakkraykom, as he immediately prepared note on rare metals.

No sooner had he become People's Commissar of Internal Affairs than he showed interest in the state and organizations of government high-frequency communications (HF communications). And already in January 1939 Merkulov, who headed the GUGB, submits to him a report on measures to improve reliability and protection of HF lines. In the

same January, a draft of the reorganization of this business is being prepared, because, as wrote Merkulov, "there is a lot of confusion in this area of work."

The audit showed that the technical capabilities of the country here are great. Was created equipment for automatic classification of telephone conversations of the EU type (by surname creators, engineers Yegorov and Staritsyn), the first lines were laid.

The case was "spinning", but neither shaky nor rolls. In 1938, three in a row were adopted Resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars, however, qualitative changes began only with the new people's commissar. After all, any "confusion" is for a specialist to unravel them Lavrenty Beria. And where he led the business, everything accelerated, as in a fairy tale. But the secret was simple - Beria he worked himself, was never late for anything, was accurate, knew how to quickly understand the problem and - most importantly - he knew how to use the potential of specialists and trust them.

And for any professional there is no greater happiness than to work under the supervision of someone who gives him the opportunity to give all his best and go further and higher, to new professional achievements and success! No wonder in one Soviet film the boy wrote a school essay consisting of one phrase: "Happiness is when understand you."

Here Beria knew how to understand his subordinates. But of course, those who have such understanding deserved. Therefore, if the reader remembers, young Merkulov wanted to work with him, and only with him!

By the beginning of 1939, 58 HF stations were operating in the USSR, serving 290 subscribers. And they worked without proper coordination. During 1939, the number of HF stations was increased to 78, broadcasting points to 28 (including 8 backup), and the number of subscribers has grown one and a half times, reaching 430. In one year! In 1939 stations were opened in 24 cities of the USSR. By July 1940, out of 103 lines

ciphers were installed on 50 communications, and their number grew.

Beria was well aware that reliable operational secret communications are a thing the most important, and, developing high-frequency communications in the national interests, he fully used its opportunities for the department subordinate to him. In March 1940 was published "List of subscribers of government (HF) communications". So, 9 out of 40 Moscow subscribers belonged to the NKVD. And in the country, out of the 286 names and positions listed in the "List" 149 were directly related to the structural units of the NKVD!

But more and more leaders, and first of all defense industries. In the autumn and winter of 1940, Beria carried out Stalin's personal instructions about organization of secret communications with the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. The devices were installed in the office of People's Commissar Vannikov, at factories No. 2 in Kovrov, No. 66 in Tula, No. 74 in Izhevsk. Moreover, the director of plant No. 2 became the only subscriber of the new point, and the head of the city department of the NKVD had to use Ivanovo RF station. The war will

begin, and Beria, among the many military concerns, will find time to help. fronts in providing, in addition to the planned HF communication lines, also additional lines - in depending on the situation.

I WANTED to write: "By the second half of 1939, the results of hard work Beria and his closest associates began to have an effect, and a certain stabilization"...

But then I remembered - what kind of stabilization is there! On the contrary, more and more big "park". And this was explained not by the mistakes and miscalculations of Beria, but by the acceleration world and European political process - the "democratic" West clearly led case for war. And he really wanted to draw the Soviets into it, either by attacking them himself, or ...

Or by provoking Germany to do so. Yes, all of

Beria's professional problems: personnel, economic, intelligence - were firmly tied to the problems of foreign policy, more and more menacingly and on a large scale standing before Soviet Russia.

In the spring of 1938, Germany carried out the Anschluss of Austria - with a massive enthusiastic the reaction of the Austrians themselves, but with a very "sour" reaction of the outside world. In the autumn of the same year, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, populated mainly by ethnic Germans. In principle, it was an act of restoring justice and law. nations to self-determination, trampled under the Versailles "peace" treaty. Such amplification Germany was also not pleased, especially since in the spring of 1939 the Germans entered Prague. Slovakia seceded, declared independence, and the USSR established with it diplomatic relations.

But the West did not need peace. On April 17, 1939, Sir Bernard Pers. He already knew Russia! 72-year-

old professor of Russian language, literature and history, director of the Royal College of Slavic Studies, director of the Institute of Slavic Studies in London and publisher "Slavonic Review", from 1909 to 1917 - Secretary of the Anglo-Russian Committee, in 1914-1917 he was seconded to the Russian army, in 1917 he was at the disposal of British ambassador to Russia. And

so Peers criticized the Comintern, but in every possible way extolled Stalin and argued that Tukhachevsky paid with his life for betraying Russia by becoming an agent of Germany. Here I note that Tukhachevsky paid with his life for many things, including for unworthy arrogance, for arrogant manners, for the fact that he and the "commanders" close to him summoned to their dachas military bands for private concerts. But that's the way it is...

On April 20, 1939, a good friend of Peers, former tsarist émigré diplomat Yevgeny Sablin, former first secretary of the Russian embassy in London, referring to Peers' speech, wrote on April 20, 1939 to his permanent addressee, Vasily

Maklakov, Ambassador of the Provisional Government in France, former diplomatic representative of Kolchak. Denikin, Wrangel:

"There is no doubt that he (Perse. - **S.K.**) is recommended from above exaggerate greatly in terms of the importance that Russia has for preservation of peace in the South-East ... "

and added:

"It seems to me that the venerable Bernard Ivanovich oversalted in all his statements. All this could be said with less, I would say, sycophancy. But, obviously, it will be difficult without Russia ... "

The NKVD had a well-established intelligence network in the emigration environment, and these the lines were soon read at the Lubyanka. However, the West did not really count on alliance with Soviet Russia, and Peirce's speeches had a different purpose: to complicate (and even better - to disrupt!) the emerging process of rapprochement between the USSR and Germany. But such speeches themselves were an indicator of the aggravation of European contradictions. due to the provocations of "democratic" Europe, behind which stood the unchanging already an indispensable Uncle Sam. And this already led to a regime of constant combat alert for the NKVD and its head, designed to: •

- ensure the protection and impenetrability of the world's longest state borders;
- ensure the protection of the country's top leadership; • identify and neutralize all manifestations of the "fifth column" within the country; • identify and neutralize very possible anti-state conspiracies, manifestations of sabotage, etc.;
- provide information and intelligence activities of the state for abroad: • conduct counterintelligence activities in all its scope; • ensure the protection of public order by the police and the fight against criminality;
- carry out penitentiary activities of the state; • conduct a number of major national economic projects implemented under using the labor of prisoners with the simultaneous involvement of civilians employees and professionals...

I'm not talking about the fire department and registry offices. After all, they also have some time and strength People's Commissar was taken away, although he did not oversee them. And there was also the social sphere, to which Beria was not indifferent. And new problems loomed ahead.

IN THE VERY beginning of May 1939, Stalin finally decided to make foreign policy USSR rational. And this was impossible under the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov.

On May 3, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, became People's Commissar Deputy - Dekanozov. And already on May 4, the arrests of a group of leading employees Litvinov. The Molotov-Dekanozov "tandem" began to operate in the People's Commissariat

for Foreign Affairs. Vladimir Grigorievich Dekanozov was a year older than Beria, was born in Baku and was I have known Lavrentiy since 1918. In June 1921 he was transferred from the oil companies in the AzChK, to the department for combating banditry. There have always been serious personnel in the OBB - bandits are bandits. And the fact that, despite Dekanozov's very small stature, he worked at the OBB, speaks volumes. Even then, Beria and Dekanozov became close, which is confirmed by the official biography of the latter: service in the AzChK, then in the GruzChK, then in the ZakChK.

He was promoted, of course, by Beria, but he always promoted people according to their business

qualities. And what is called the "personal devotion" of the promoted was a natural reaction of a man of action to the attention of his boss, who is also a man of action.

On March 21, 1937, Dekanozov became chairman of the State Planning Committee of Georgia and deputy Chairman of the Georgian Council of People's Commissars, while being the Minister of Food industry of the republic. It is sometimes written about him that he differed exorbitantly in craving for luxury, but this is unlikely ... Beria himself did not differ in it, and would not have brought this closer to yourself in Tbilisi. And I certainly would not take such a "tail" with me to a new place. And Beria At the end of 1938, he summoned him to Moscow and on December 2 appointed him head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) and 5th (intelligence) departments of the GUGB. December 17, 1938 Dekanozov also became Merkulov's deputy for the GUGB, but soon, as we already know, he was transferred to the USSR

NKID. Let me remind you that all the movements of Beria's employees across Georgia to Moscow could not take place without agreement with the now allied Central Committee. As for Dekanozov's appointment to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, it could not take place without the direct sanction of Stalin. But Dekanozov came to the NKID, of course, on the recommendation of Beria. And it wasn't coming in the diplomatic department of the "Beria inspector-executioner", as the "democrats" put it. According to veterans of the diplomatic service, Dekanozov was highly erudite, well-read, communication is polite and cultured. So in his person, Soviet diplomacy received quite competent leader.

A very rapid turn of the USSR began from a hopeless orientation towards a bloc with Anglo-French to understand the need to normalize relations with Germany. As is known, the outcome was the Non-Aggression Pact, concluded on August 23 during a blitz visit to Moscow, Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Many in the world were shocked. IN Japan - an unprecedented case - the conclusion of a bilateral treaty by others powers led to the fall of the cabinet of Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma. The same Pact

became the psychological point of the three-month Japanese-Soviet conflict near the Khalkhin-Gol River. Beginning on May 28 with the invasion of Japanese troops into the territory Mongolia, it ended by August 28. Such

turbulent events, including the August Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow needed adequate intelligence support, so one this guaranteed Beria more than a busy work schedule. On September 1,

1939, the German-Polish (and not the Second World War, as usual) began. think) war. Poland collapsed almost instantly. September 17 in Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands entered the Red Army, and soon Western Ukraine and Western Belarus became part of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR. Today one sometimes has to read that the USSR and

Germany carried out a new division of Poland. But is Ukrainian Rivne or Lutsk is Poland? Or Belarusian Baranovichi and Molodechno?

For the NKVD, reunification meant a new and enormous additional burden, and by no means "executive" character. This is Khrushchev and his NKVD protégé Ivan Serov embarked on an accelerated "Sovietization" of the Western Ukrainian regions in a manner, executioner reminiscent. And one little-known fact immediately shows who Khrushchev was and who Beria was. Kost-

Levitsky, the former head of the former "independent" Ukrainian People's Republic, lived peacefully in Lvov. By order of Khrushchev, Serov arrested him, and Kost Levitsky, who was already over eighty, was transferred from Lvov to Moscow and

imprisoned. This action greatly undermined our actions among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, but Khrushchev reported to Stalin that he de neutralized the potential prime minister of the Ukrainian government in exile. And

then Beria intervened. First, he instructed his specialists to Ukraine to evaluate the expediency of keeping Kost-Levytsky in custody. The recommendations were as follows:

- the old man, as harmless, immediately release, apologize to him and send

back to Lviv, where to arrange it with maximum comfort; • Kost-Levitsky, in turn, should facilitate the transfer to Moscow influential and representative delegation from Western Ukraine for negotiations on the special status of Galicia within the Ukrainian SSR;

- grant Galicia a special status. Beria immediately sent a note to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov with these proposals, and Molotov agreed with them. Kost-Levitsky was released and taken away home in a separate special car. But Khrushchev managed to disrupt the rest ...

And here, perhaps for the first time, fate delineated the positions of those two figures, the future the conflict of which already determined the future not of small Galicia, but of the entire vast country. But we will talk about this much later.

Returning to the autumn of 1939, it should be noted that the department of Beria, in addition to the decision political problems, it was necessary in the reunified territories and the police organize, and catch bandits, and reorganize the fire department, and registry offices create.

Repressions and deportations from Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to internal the regions of the USSR, of course, were also included in the tasks of the NKVD of Beria. But how else! This is was not just a new border zone! These areas in the fairly near future could become war zones. And only state criminals could allow the existence of a mass "fifth column". And Stalin and Beria were statesmen. However, an analysis

of the figures of repressions of 1939–1940 in Western Ukraine and Belarus shows, by the way, that the "democratic" figures are overestimated in Belarus by about ten times (the usual coefficient of lies of "democratic" "general people"). This is despite the fact that in Western Ukraine, for example, there was a strong nationalist underground even under Poles. And with the establishment of Soviet power, the nationalists did not curtail their work, but strengthened, because now a new aspect has appeared in it - anti-Soviet.

There was also the problem of Polish prisoners of war. And this was also a task for Beria. Moreover, one of the "perestroika" accusations of Beria in organization of the Katyn tragedy and executions near the village of Mednoye, Kalinin region.

Well, let's see if there is much truth in this accusation ...

On SEPTEMBER 19, 1939, People's Commissar L.P. Beria, commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, issued an order No. 0308:

"1. Based on the regulations on prisoners of war, organize under the NKVD USSR Directorate for Prisoners of War. 2. Approve the attached staff of the Directorate of Prisoners of War. 3. Appoint the head of the Directorate for Prisoners of War Major comrade. Soprunenko P.I. and Commissar of Administration - Regimental Commissar Comrade. Nekhoroshev ... 4. Organize the following 8 camps for the maintenance of prisoners of war: 1) Ostashkovsky - on the basis of the premises of the former children's colony of the NKVD, on Stolbnoye Island, on Lake Seliger (Kalinin Region) for 7 thousand people, with bringing up to 10 thousand people by October 1; 6. To approve the chiefs and commissars of the camps: 1) Ostashkovsky: Major Comrade. Borirovets P.F. - chief, Art. political instructor comrade Yurasova I.V. - Commissar...

I cite data only for the Ostashkov camp quite deliberately. The "Katyn" fake is widely known, and its exposure can be found in the books of Yuri Mukhin "Katyn detective" and "Anti-Russian meanness", to which I refer the reader. But I will inform you in addition that facsimile reproduction can be found in the literature

the first page of an alleged note by Beria to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about Polish prisoners of war. So, Stalin's "visa" was falsified there extremely carelessly, and this immediately catches the eye, as well as the fact that the "visa" comes with an inclination from top to bottom, and not from bottom to top - as always with Stalin.

Smolensk Katyn is known, I repeat, widely. The village of Mednoye is less known. IN the beginning of the article placed in the "Book of Victims of Political Repressions of the Kalinin Region" Director of the State Memorial Complex "Mednoe" B. N. Yeshchenko and scientific employee E. N. Obratsova says this:

"October 19, 1996 (No. 1247) published the Decree Government of the Russian Federation "On the creation of memorial complexes in burial places of Soviet and Polish citizens - victims of totalitarian repressions in Katyn (Smolensk region) and Medny (Tver region) "...

But about 50 years had to pass before the name of the Tver village Copper sounded from the lips of the President of the Russian Federation M. S. Gorbachev, members of the Government of Russia ... "

Dear reader! I didn't describe myself... In this "Book of Memory..." already known to you, it is written on page 604 exactly that. And what a "typing error" here! And initials correspond, and the surname ... But with the position, however, a blunder. It

would seem that there is nowhere to go further in "historical discoveries", but page 605 surpassed page 604:

"... At the beginning of 1940, in the Ostashkov camp, about 6500 Poles.

Starting from April 4, 1940, the prisoners of the Ostashkov camp were transferred to group, day after day, from the camp to the Soroga railway station, from where they were taken under escort in prison cars through Likhoslavl to the city of Kalinin. From the railway station, prisoners of war were transported to the regional administration NKVD on the street. Soviet (this is in the city center. - **S.K.**), where death awaited them from bullets.

During the interrogation, the former boss spoke in detail about the course of the executions. NKVD in Kalinin S. Tokarev. Every night in the cellars of a modern building Medical Academy in Kalinin, 250 people were shot. Group execution used mainly German pistols of the "Walter" type (why it was necessary to do this in March 1940, it is unlikely that he himself will explain B. N. Eshchenko. - **S.K.**).

At dawn, cars with the bodies of the dead were sent along the Moscow-Leningrad highway to the Mednoye area, 32 km away. There, in the countryside Kalinin NKVD, on the outskirts of the forest was already prepared excavator pit about 4 m deep, capable of accommodating 250 bodies ... "

etc.

The technology of "killing" is described here, frankly, idiotic, and the route invented no smarter - just look at the map of the Kalinin region.

If everything were so in reality, then everyone would gossip about the "top-secret" action Kalinin women. And if they decided to "remove" the Poles, then the easiest way would be to do it right on the island of Stolbnoy, where the camp was located, or in the forests near Seliger. And even in the very Lake Seliger... Without the cost of ton-kilometers.

But the way it is written is more effective for the public, already accustomed to watching thrillers like chronicle. And what to take from the "scientists" who confuse Gorbachev with Yeltsin? Of course, they are two pairs of boots, but not knowing your "heroes" to such an extent!

Although ... Although there is strictly documentary evidence that in Ostashkovsky In the camp in 1940, a uniform disgrace was really going on. I will prove this now by *fully* citing another order for the NKVD - No. 678 of August 12, 1940.

"August 12, 1940

Survey of the economic activities of the Ostashkov camp for prisoners of war found: 1. The

camp management spent state funds for food, building materials and other materials not for their intended purpose.

2. Despite the instructions of the Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR for prisoners of war, free meals were practiced in the camp for riders. 3.

During the absence of the head of the camp, Major Comrade. Borisov assistant head of the camp lieutenant, militia comrade. Polovanyuk organized a group drinking and drunk appeared in the camp area, which discredited himself. I order: 1.

For spending state funds not for their intended purpose the head of the camp, major comrade. Borisovets to announce a reprimand. 2. Assistant to the head of the camp, police lieutenant comrade. Polovanyuk to announce a reprimand and to remove from work in the camp. 3. The issuance of free meals to all employees, except for the shift and fire brigade, ban. 4. Prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages and beer in the camps. 5. Commissar of the camp senior political officer comrade. Yurasov for failure to take measures to suppression of illegal actions and poor preparation of political and educational work in the camp put on view. Deputy

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

CHERNYSHEV.

There is no doubt about the source of the information - a completely "democratic" collection documents from the series "Russian archive. Great Patriotic War, published by the Institute military history of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, volume 24 (13) "Foreign prisoners of war of the Second World War", ed. TERRA, 1996, 1000

copies, pp. 33–34. This is how things were in the Ostashkov camp in the summer of 1940 - already **after** Tver "EBN", together with his employee, completely "devastated" him in early spring On the

40th ... So the Germans still shot the Poles in Medny. As in Katyn ... By the way, once again about the "Walters" ... For NKVD executors, German pistols in anyway, it was useless...

The area of the village of Mednoe was in the zone of German occupation, more precisely, in the front zone, and in Medny itself, according to my information, the Germans were from October 13 to 17, 1941. At the fighting went mainly to the north-west, near Maryino. Somewhere between Ostashkov and Medny could be at that time in the occupied territory and part of the Poles from the island Stolbny. However, the Germans could shoot from the "Walters" in 1941 and not the Poles, but shoot in Polish uniform, burying the corpses really in the area of dachas of the NKVD - as well as in Katyn! - with a long-range sight ... After

all, the Germans expected to win. And then it was possible to bring to the place of "atrocities NKVD" of "democratic" journalists from all over the world and "convincingly" demonstrate from what, they say, the fate of the Reich saved their country. It's just that the Germans were

kicked out from under Kalinin back in 41, so the "Copper" idea burst. And it was necessary, when the corpses "reached the standard", to be content with only "Katyn" option - until the Germans were also kicked out from under Smolensk.

Therefore, you should not shake the "note of Beria", she is another fake in the piggy bank "antiberiades". Of course, he never shot any Polish officers of the NKVD. Although, perhaps, it was worth a lot ... Already in 1942, being part of the emerging

The USSR army of Anders, the "arrogant gentlemen" behaved vilely. March 14, 1942 Beria in report to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee

Stalin on the course of formation and the moral and political state of the Polish army on

territory of the USSR, he cited data obtained by intelligence-information.

So, a certain Colonel Dombrovsky declared:

"I will calm down only when the Bolshevik general in my estate
will work with a wheelbarrow twice as much as what I worked in the Soviet camp ... "

And no one arrested this "Pan Pulkovonik" and others like him **even then** and
shot. It's a pity!

SEPTEMBER 28, 1939 Reich Minister Ribbentrop and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov signed in Moscow the Soviet-German treaty of friendship and border. for Beria and his People's Commissariat, this meant, among other things, a lot of work on arranging a new borders. But even on the old borders it was restless - starting from the north, from the Soviet-Finnish borders.

It is believed that the last point in the peaceful relations between the USSR and Finland was the day November 26, 1939, when in the area of the border village of Mainila on Soviet territory several artillery shells exploded. Since the border troops

are also the NKVD, to this day they have to
to meet hints that, they say, it could not have done without Beria's provocations. Without developing this topic, I will say that the Finns were shooting. They then generally behaved simply recklessly! A the configuration of the border was such that heavy artillery from the Finnish border could bombard Leningrad. About the flight time of the bombers to the northern capital, I
I don't say anymore.

We should have "thanked" for this Tsar Alexander I, who established in 1811 border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Russia with the transfer to Grand Duchy of part of Russian territory. Now his mistake had to be corrected. Stalin. And since the Finns were absolutely (the reader can believe me) deaf to calls and reason, and the surprisingly patient Russian leader, the USSR had no need for some provocations, giving casus belli (reason for war).

Although there have been incidents. And after the shelling in Mainil, Beria signed informational message, the beginning of which I will quote:

"No. 5278/B November 28, 1939

Today, November 28, 1939, at 17.10, the border detachment of outpost No. 17 - Ozerko of the 35th Murmansk border detachment ... on the isthmus between peninsulas Sredny and Rybachy was suddenly fired upon by an ambush of Finnish border guards who were on our territory ... "

The outfit accepted the battle, and the outpost threw a support group of 10 people to the scene of the skirmish, led by the chief of staff of the NKVD border troops of the Murmansk district, Major Prussian. As a result, 3 Finns were taken prisoner, two went to the territory of Finland.

On the same day, the Finns deepened into our territory in the zone of Restikentsky border detachment.

The Soviet-Finnish negotiations have long reached an impasse, or rather, they were brought there themselves Finns (I wrote about this in my book The Fuhrer's Kremlin Visit). And subsequent the development of the situation on our part was not only logical, but the only justified from any point of view. On November 30, full-scale hostilities began. AND The "winter" war, as it was called in Finland, dragged on until spring.

On December 21, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov wrote to Stalin and Molotov:

"Koba and

Vyacheslav! The thing is rubbish! The roads are in rubble, the infantry does not act at the front like

organized force, but dangles back and forth as if almost no one controlled mass, which, at the first shot fired, scatters in disorder along shelters in the woods..."

However, according to the results of the war, the military observer of The Times rated the Red Army as a whole highly, wisely noting that the Russians added a lot during the war. So it was - "line Mannerheim" with its "millionaire" pillboxes was broken through at the beginning of 1940, and on March 12 Peace was signed in 1940. But at the time when Voroshilov wrote a bitter letter to Stalin and Molotov, the army team was strongly helped by the border guards of Beria. I'll tell you more about this.

In Europe, the war was still going on - until May 1940, "strange", without fighting. However, on May 10, "Day X" came for the Germans. The attack on the North began France, and soon the entire Allied defense collapsed. The Germans entered Paris, the British fled through Dunkirk.

And the USSR solved the "Baltic" problem ... Back in the fall of 1939, we concluded mutual assistance agreements with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Into their territory were introduced Soviet troops, but there was no question of any "Sovietization". However, the success of the Germans the situation changed drastically. Germany was strengthening in all positions, and to give her the Baltic "flank" was not worth it. And the Baltic elite was not averse to turning away from the Russians and go "under the wing" of the Germans

and Finns. Or the English! Since April 1940, instead of one envoy for the entire region, England appointed separate envoys to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for each republic. At In this they were also consultants in the "national" Foreign Ministries. Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Lithuania V. G. Pozdnyakov reported in encryption to People's Commissar Litvinov that there were 40-50 British agents in Riga, whom England had thrown into the Baltic states, including counting "push" them into Germany. It ended, however, with the fact that at the beginning of August 1940 in The composition of the USSR included the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR. Earlier, we returned to ourselves Bessarabia and annexed Northern Bukovina ...

I will not dwell on these plots and on the analysis of the problem of repression and deportations from the new union republics, although I will tell you something about this in the next chapter. I can, however, give a few details at once. After the Lithuanian

nationalists finally received "their" state in 1919, the Lithuanian peasant who came to a state institution often

shouted: "Speak Russian, we don't understand Lithuanian." And it was not the Russians who shouted, but ... the Poles.

In "national" Latvia, one could stumble upon a German in a similar situation, even though the Russian tsars at one time undermined the German landownership and created a powerful layer of Latvian "gray barons" - kulaks.

In "national" Estonia, in the Russian villages of the Pechora district, the youth sang communist ditties, and the peasants were ready to go to the collective farms. And oppressed them for this Estonians. So there were grounds for "cleansing" in the Baltics.

ACCESSION of the Baltic republics gave rise to two counter flows settlers from the Memel and Suwalki regions to the Lithuanian SSR and "German citizens and persons of German nationality" from the three republics to the "fatherland". All this is not passed Beria's attention.

From Germany, by the end of March 1941, 5251 families, or 21,343 people, were taken in. including Lithuanians - 11,995, Russians - 9223, Belarusians - 55, Ukrainians - 20, Poles - 36. By the way, I don't know why, but then only 1 (one) Jew wished to move to the USSR. But among the 10,472 people who left for the

Reich from Latvia, in addition to 9851 Germans, there were 436 Latvians, 9 Lithuanians, 7 Estonians.

44,434 Germans, 5,091 Lithuanians, 36 Latvians, 14 Estonians moved from Lithuania.

From Estonia - 5306 Germans, 514 Estonians, 10 Latvians.

As we can see, not only ethnic Germans, but also others (including 1 Georgian, 1 Spaniard, 1 Tatar).

Some Germans also left the deep regions of the USSR, and in the environment "political emigrants" there was some return movement, which proved that repressions against them were not the result of inventions of the NKVD. So, back on February 28, 1939 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Georgy Dimitrov sent the following to the NKVD covering letter:

"Dear comrade Beria! I am sending you the enclosed letter from the representative office of the Communist Party of Germany at ECCI for review. You, of course, know better what measures are taken on this issue. should have been undertaken by the NKVD. With comradely greetings, G. Dimitrov."

A letter from Walter Ulbricht was attached to Dimitrov's "accompaniment" starting like this:

"Dear comrade Dimitrov! During the last months they returned to Germany with the help of German embassy several wives of those arrested. These enemies are now sending letters to those of their acquaintances who are supposed to be recruit to return to Germany..."

Ulbricht cited a number of specific names and facts: *"In the residential building of the Electrozavod there lives a certain Baumert, who in private conversations leads an anti-Soviet propaganda" and "has extensive connections in Moscow"; Czech Kate Raab "sends money to the Germans arrested in the camp near Saratov, sends them to Khabarovsk, but receives in the German embassy", etc.*

Ulbricht ended quite definitely:

"We believe that it is necessary to decide in each individual case, to give or refuse permission to leave. Now it is the case that such enemies have the right to reside in Moscow.

Please bring this to the attention of the relevant authorities so that they can take such measures as they deem necessary.

With communist greetings, Party Representation of the KKE at the ECCI,

Ulbricht.

Repressions in the Comintern, which they actually hate, "democrats" "hang" on Yezhov and Beria. But what, Dimitrov and Ulbricht worried in vain? They weren't shy bazaar women, but experienced underground workers and, therefore, people experienced in affairs of both intelligence and counterintelligence.

And the SITUATION in the world became more and more tense. On August 22, 1940, Pravda reported that on August 20, Leon Trotsky at his villa in the elite area of Mexico City, Coyocan received a fatal blow with an ice pick from a certain Jean Mortan Van den Rhein. However, this was 27-year-old Spanish communist and NKVD officer Ramon Mercader del Rio.

The blow with the ice ax put an end to the protracted history of Trotsky's subversive work against the USSR. After the conclusion of the 1939 Pact, he wrote in the American magazine Liberty: "The

Kremlin has harnessed itself to the wagon of German imperialism... Until Hitler strong - and he is very strong, Stalin will remain his satellite.

Less than six months later, on January 17, 1940, on the table of the SS Obergruppenführer Ribbentrop (the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich also had such a title) Oberführer Likus from Obergruppenführer's "personal headquarters" put a report *from* London:

"Trotsky, with the help of the British, will have to return to Russia in order to organize a putsch against Stalin..."

But Stalin also knew this. And Lavrenty Beria was summoned to the Kremlin. result discussions there and became the operation to eliminate Trotsky. By itself, it is for our topic is unimportant, but the name of a person, which I have already mentioned about which it is time to say more.

GB Major Pavel Sudoplatov was only thirty-three years old in 1940. And for the first time he ended up in Stalin's office three years ago when Yezhov brought him there. Then Private operational officer of the NKVD, who worked illegally among Ukrainian nationalists for abroad, Sudoplatov received an extraordinary task - to eliminate one of the leaders "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN) Konovalts.

Deputy Director of the Russian State Military Archive Vladimir Ivanovich Korotaev and his colleague Viktor Konstantinovich Bylinin in Volume II "Proceedings Society for the Study of the History of Domestic Special Services" for 2006 testify: "For In his relatively short life, the OUN leader managed to enter into "business relations" with a number of foreign intelligence services - German, Austrian, Lithuanian, Finnish, English, Italian, Japanese ... "

As you can see, the strings of connections with numerous intelligence agencies were by no means invented in the NKVD, but existed in reality ... After all, friends and colleagues of Konovalts lived not only on the other side of the USSR border, but also on *this one!*

A dangerous and influential enemy, Konovalts has already been sentenced to death in Ukraine for authorizing and personally directing the execution of the revolutionary workers of the Kyiv plant "Arsenal" in January 1918. Grigory recalled this at a meeting in the Kremlin Petrovsky. But the sentence was carried out as a result of a carefully designed operation was brought to Rotterdam on May 23, 1938 by Sudoplatov.

By the way, when after the act he walked along the boulevards already in Paris, he read in Russian emigrant newspapers about his boss Yezhov as a man doomed to fall soon victim of a purge campaign. There was a year before Yezhov's arrest, two before execution. Much, much intertwined then, my dear reader, into a repeatedly tangled ball ...

However, we are now in August 1938, when Sudoplatov, who returned to Moscow, was summoned to the new head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, Beria, about whom he knew only that "in 20- For years he headed the GPU of Georgia, and then became the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Georgia".

As you can see, Sudoplatov was little interested in the status of political figures and was information regarding the biography of Beria is incomplete, which, however, was not a disaster.

In 1997, the most interesting (alas, not always accurate and reliable) memoirs of Pavel Anatolyevich, which also describes his first meeting with Beria. True, Sudoplatov is somewhat confused in chronology ... According to his memoirs, it turns out that he is in In July 1938, he arrived by steamboat in Leningrad, immediately left for Moscow by night train and the next day was received by Beria. But

Beria became head of the GUGB only on August 22, 1938, so before this date Sudoplatov could not be in his office, located next to Yezhov's waiting room. However, this obvious aberration of memory is not essential for the main thing - the description of Beria, given by a person who knew him personally well. And it's worth it to be told to the reader almost without

cuts: "My first meeting with Beria lasted, it seems, for about four hours ... Beria asked me question after question, wanting to know all the details of the operation against Konovalts

and about the OUN from the beginning of

its activities ... From Beria's questions, it became clear to me that he was highly competent in matters intelligence work and sabotage man. Later I realized: Beria asked his questions in order to better understand how I was able to fit into Western life ... "

Here I will temporarily interrupt Sudoplatov's story in order to note: it seems that he never realized that Beria was interested not so much in his personal adventures as in general atmosphere of European life, with which Beria, who worked as a Chekist in the Transcaucasian direction, was a sign, of course, bad. And now he had to quickly enter the course and European intelligence work, and he took advantage of the opportunity to learn and understand about her as much as possible.

The same must be said about information on the OUN. For the "Transcaucasian" Beria, this problem was new. And what kind of professional is he who does not use every opportunity for self-education! "Beria

asked," Sudoplatov continues, "did I pay attention to the number of exits, including the emergency one, at the safe house, which was located in suburb of Paris. He was rather surprised that I did not do this, because I was too tired. From this, I concluded that Beria had experience in working in the underground, acquired in Transcaucasian Cheka ...

Being nearsighted, Beria wore pince-nez, which made him look like a modest co-employee...

He was dressed, I remember, in a very modest suit. I found it strange that he without a tie, and the sleeves of the shirt, by the way, are of fairly good quality, rolled up. This circumstance made me feel a little uneasy, as I was wearing beautifully tailored suit: during my brief stay in Paris, I ordered three fashionable suit, coat, and a few shirts and ties. The tailor took the measurements, and for Agayants (later known as a scout, a general who had cover in Paris as third secretary of the embassy. - S.K.) and sent them to Moscow by diplomatic mail."

I didn't omit the detail with Sudoplatov's costumes because she once again indirectly confirms the aberration of his memory. If after his arrival (even if in August) he was summoned to Beria immediately, it is unlikely that he would have had time to get to the NKID or Lubyanka their Parisian new clothes. So, between the arrival and the meeting there was a certain time gap.

And, not in reproach to Pavel Anatolyevich, I will say that in his place Beria, in spite of any fatigue, I would not forget for sure to check the ways of a possible withdrawal from the turnout. And here are the costumes I would hardly order. Beria also

showed interest in the sabotage work in Spain of Chekist Vasilevsky, who at one time served under Beria in the counterintelligence of the Georgian GPU.

Sudoplatov also noted that Beria spoke Russian well with a little Georgian accent, and in relation to the interlocutor he behaved "extremely politely." It is interesting that in another place Sudoplatov wrote the following: "Beria was often very rude in dealing with high-ranking officials

(when, as I understand it, they deserved it. - S.K.), but with ordinary employees, as usually speak politely. Later, I had to make sure that the leaders of that time allowed themselves rudeness only in relation to the leadership, and with ordinary people, members of the Politburo (Stalinist. - S.K.) behaved emphatically politely".

I note that Stalin addressed everyone, as a rule, as "you", and by inertia this the Stalinist and Beria "you" survived, eroding under Khrushchev. And under Brezhnev and especially under Gorbachev, the universal boorish "you" took root ... However, it would be surprisingly the opposite. At

the end of the meeting - and this is very typical for Lavrenty Pavlovich - he provided

Sudoplatov a five-day vacation so that he could visit his mother in Melitopol and wife's parents in Kharkov. "Monster" in the descriptions of slanderers, Beria actually was caring and attentive to those who did the same thing with him.

BUT A READER who is well acquainted with memoirs on Soviet intelligence may object to me. And in refutation of information about Beria's courtesy, he can refer, for example, to the memoirs of retired Major General Yelisei Tikhonovich Sinitsyn, to at the turn of the 60–70s, who served as deputy head of the First Chief Directorate (intelligence) of the KGB of the USSR.

On the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war, he was a legal resident of the NKVD intelligence in Helsinki, with a very solid diplomatic cover for Chargé d'Affaires a.i. affairs - for this, the regular NKID plenipotentiary was temporarily recalled.

Something similar has already happened - a major Soviet intelligence officer Rybkin (with his wife Zoya Rybkina-Voskresenskaya, we will meet again) in the spring of 1938 led on a personal on Stalin's instructions, secret negotiations with the Finns under the same cover, for which temporarily recalled envoy Asmus. An

engineer by education (in 1934 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical mechanical engineering), Sinitsyn came to the NKVD intelligence in 1937 on a party "Yezhov" recruitment, graduated from the School of Special Purpose, worked undercover in Soviet consulate in Lvov even before the accession of Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR.

Of course, Beria sent Sinitsyn, but Molotov was listed as his legal boss. And suddenly Sinitsyn receives a telegram: "Immediately leave for Moscow for a report. Molotov. "Urgent" is not "immediately". In addition,

Sinitsyn - in his own words - was surprised: why Molotov was calling, and not Beria. But I left on the same day and immediately upon arrival went not to the NKVD to the Lubyanka, but to the NKID, to Spiridonievsky ...

After listening to the report, Molotov released Sinitsyn (whom he knew as Eliseev), saying, that he can go "to Comrade Beria" ... Next, I convey the direct story of Sinitsyn:

"Ten minutes later (after Molotov's report. - S.K.) I was already at Fitin (head of INO. - S.K.) and noticed that he was excited about something.
- Where do you go and why didn't you immediately come to the people's commissariat? he asked angrily. I began to explain ... when suddenly a sharp voice was heard over the intercom, but

scourge:

"Did that fool come to you?" At this voice, Fitin jumped up from his chair as if stung and answered: "He has appeared."

"Together with him to me ...

When they entered the office, Beria was reclining on a leather sofa and sullenly, through pince-nez (and how could he, a short-sighted one, still look! - S.K.) silently examined us. Then, moving over to the table and sitting heavily in an armchair, suddenly shouted, looking at me: - Do

you know who you are? - After a short pause, he added: - You are a big fool! I

was silent.

Apparently, it seemed to him that I reacted weakly to his remark, grabbed pencil and shouted even sharper:

- **You're a big zero with a dot!** At the

same time, he drew a zero on a sheet of paper, a pencil from a large pressing force broke, and he abruptly threw it on the table in my direction. I immediately realized that the such an antics of the people's commissar, my report appeared to Molotov, and I wanted to say why this happened. But Fitin, stepping on my foot, signaled to be silent ... "

And here I will interrupt Sinitsyn's story in order to draw the reader's attention to this ...

that Beria threw a pencil on the table in his direction, the memoirist did not forget to note ... Although somewhere in the other direction, Beria, sitting at the table, could not throw anything away and could not, except perhaps on the floor. Sinitsyn was sitting opposite him. But the fact that Beria invited them and Fitin **to sit down for table** (not in front of the people's commissar, Fitin stepped on his subordinate's foot!), Sinitsyn forgot! And it's understandable why - then the holistic image of Beria does not develop as unrestrained boor ... But let's move on:

"I did not consider it right to silently listen to Beria's abuse and ... said that I had not reported important information to Comrade Molotov, personally received the day before yesterday, on the situation on the Karelian Isthmus and on new weapons in Finnish army.

Beria somehow strangely, looked at me inquiringly and shouted sharply: - Tell everything that you did not tell Molotov ... After listening carefully to what I said, Beria ... said: - Remember, you have one people's commissar! We left the office. In turn, Fitin said moralizingly: - You probably understood that Beria's anger was caused by your report Molotov, not him. In all cases, you were obliged to first report to your Commissar. Don't repeat this mistake...

So, is Beria still a tyrant? Here is a direct witness. And not Antonov-Ovseenko, but Honored General of the KGB. But is everything here so smooth?

Sinitsyn died on March 31, 1995 (at the age of 86), and his memoirs were signed in printed November 29, 1996, one year after the death of the author. And at the beginning of the book there is standard, in fact, for the series "Declassified Lives" postscript about the fact that The publisher is not responsible for the facts stated in the book. That is, bribes are smooth. Well, it's reasonable ... But we will also act

reasonably if we approach some of the facts presented with caution. Let's say, did Sinitsyn really do something wrong with Beria? Undoubtedly! He makes the reservation that after Molotov's summons, he informed his people's commissariat as well. But

he reported the exact date of departure not to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, but to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, why he was not in Moscow on the platform of the station and not one of the colleagues was waiting, but an employee of the Scandinavian department Narkomindel.

What, Sinitsyn, could not, having received a call from Molotov, immediately notify the Lubyanka and leave for the same day (which he did) to Moscow, announcing his arrival not to the NKID, but to the NKVD? And immediately on arrival, go there, report first of all to Beria, and only then ask him permission to depart for Molotov.

Yes, Captain GB Sinitsyn not only could do it, he *had to* do it! NKID is cover. And work is the NKVD! It was not Molotov who sent him to Finland, but Beria. And both all emergency situations, first of all, at least the head of the INO should have recognized Fitin!

Molotov did not stab the "temporary attorney" "Eliseev" in the ass. "Urgent" doesn't mean on the same day, so that Sinitsyn had the opportunity (in terms of time) to first clarify the situation "at home", in the Lubyanka, and only then "in ten minutes" to be in the NKID. But, as I suppose, Sinitsyn wanted to please Molotov ... What if, from the temporary employees of the NKID, yes become permanent! What if Vyacheslav Mikhailovich would take "Eliseev" from the NKVD from Lavrenty Pavlovich to himself ... In the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, after all, it is calmer, more free ...

So Sinitsyn, recalling this long history, could not help but shift the emphasis in side, unseemly for Beria. Sinitsyn's assessments must be trusted with great caution and because he, like most of his high-ranking colleagues, behaved in the years "catastrophes" in a not very dignified way and sailed along those muddy waves that

"Democrats" were driving with might and main

So, he himself writes that while working at the Lvov consulate he heard from

local residents after the outbreak of the German-Polish war: "Our end is coming. Why The Soviet Union is handing us over to the Germans?" And he (possibly, however, political correctors of his memoirs) had the conscience to write that he did not know that "Our troops are sent to Poland to capture part of its eastern voivodeships along agreements between Stalin and Hitler. This is Sinitsyn about the reunification of Ukrainians with Ukrainians and Belarusians with Belarusians, the fundamental necessity of which he recognized even the imperialist Curzon back in 1919 and confirmed the Supreme Council of the Entente on conferences at Spa in 1920!

So "... not a voice, but a scourge", "jumped up as if stung ...", "... reclined and sullenly examined", "heavily sitting down ...", "... shouted out", etc. - this is so, artistic details to ensure the reader's proper perception of the image of Beria ... But the fact that Lavrenty Pavlovich was rude and biting called him "zero with a dot", I believe! First of all, you can't imagine...

And secondly, then Sinitsyn behaved like a fool indeed. And you need to make him understand was respectively, that is, fast and hard. After all, Beria and Sinitsyn still had to work hard, and the subordinate chose a non-business line of behavior.

Moreover, having enlightened and received important information from him, Beria ... immediately grabbed Sinitsyn with him to the Kremlin, to report to Stalin! So the possibility does not pass explanation that Beria, they say, wanted to curry favor with the leader, and Sinitsyn cards to him confused, gave Molotov the opportunity to jump forward. If that were the case, if Beria was an intriguer and a scoundrel, then he would, after listening to "Eliseev", simply leave for Without him, the Kremlin attributed all the credit for obtaining valuable information to itself. After all, no one, including Molotov, knew that this fresh information was brought by Sinitsyn.

But for Beria, the matter was important. And for the cause it was more useful for Stalin to hear all without damaged phones, and Sinitsyn could have asked. Here is Beria to Stalin and brought...

YES, ON THE FACTS reported by the memoirists about their personal communication with Beria, you can rely somehow. But very rarely you can rely on their own overall estimates. So, Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs that if before the arrival of Yezhov in the NKVD there was no investigative units (an operational worker who worked with agents and informants, conducted an investigation into case of the arrested person, prepared an indictment, etc.), then, they say, under Yezhov and Beria a special investigative unit was created, which, as he claims, "literally knocked out testimonies from the arrested ... had nothing to do with the real reality." Here there is

an unlawful combination in one of two different NKVDs - Yezhov and Beria. Moreover, Sudoplatov writes about what he himself had nothing to do with - he was not an investigator, but a scout.

In reality, there was no Investigative Unit of the NKVD under Yezhov! She was created (at first headed by Bogdan Kobulov) already by People's Commissar Beria, and this is his the innovation on December 12, 1938 was sanctioned by Stalin himself. And this is how it evaluates Beria's innovation Member of the Society for the Study of the History of Russian Special Services Professor Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov: "This was the first step in many years the existence of the Soviet special services, when the functions of search and investigation were divided into in the interests of their qualified conduct.

This incident, dear reader, is typical! Beria, as a sin, is credited with the fact that in fact, it is his merit. Including - and merit in front of lawlessness not trampled justice.

Although, in fairness, I will inform you that for the first time this question is before Stalin really set Yezhov. In April 1937, he wrote a letter to Stalin, where at the end there were lines like this:

"The investigator, accepting from any operational department of the GUGB for implementation of undercover work will require sufficiently weighty and legal grounds for arrest, and to ensure that the intelligence file transferred to him would be sufficiently refined and documented.

No, and from Yezhov - on closer examination - there is no "bloodthirsty executioner" it turns out.

PAVEL Sudoplatov in his memoirs (and perhaps his political correctors memoirs) often abuses direct speech, including putting it into the mouth of Beria. With rare exceptions, I do not believe in the authenticity of direct speech in memoirs at all, but in cases concerning Beria, even more so. But the way Beria reacted to one of the situations in late 1938, Sudoplatov conveyed, I think, correctly - both textually and in spirit.

At 4 o'clock in the morning on the eve of the October celebrations, he was awakened by the call of the chief secretariat of the Foreign Department Kozlov, who reported an urgent call to the Lubyanka and about the arrest of the head of INO

Passov. Having met Sudoplatov, Kozlov led him to Merkulov, then deputy chief GUGB, and he went with Pavel Anatolyevich to Beria. The People's

Commissar announced in an official tone that Passov and Shpigelglas had been arrested for deceit party and that Sudoplatov should immediately take up his duties head of INO. Sudoplatov, possibly due to lack of sleep, objected that he, they say, could not enter Passov's office, because it is sealed.

Beria's answer was short, specific, intelligible and brilliant: *"Remove the seals immediately, but for the future, remember: do not fool me with such nonsense. You do not schoolboy to ask children's questions.* Three

phrases - just something!

But Beria

immediately: a) makes Sudoplatov understand that he is now a person clothed not only with high responsibility, but also considerable rights;

b) determines the style and essence of their future relationship: do not waste time on trifles, but take it right away bull by the

horns; c) encourages the subordinate not to be afraid of responsibility - they say, if you pass here in front of the seals on the doors of the office is no longer Passov, but his own, then how are you, brother, going to solve serious matters?

d) he also does a scolding to a subordinate, but so swiftly, without swearing and without humiliation that it remains only to finally wake up and in full force immediately get involved in work.

This is the highest class of competent management that Beria demonstrated everywhere and always. And I will immediately give another story related already to 1940 and told again by Sudoplatov. For those who sincerely believe in the image Beria - "monster" and "ghoul", it may seem incredible, but it happened on really. It was

like this ... At the

end of June 1940, Northern Bukovina was annexed to the USSR, and Sudoplatov (naturally, with the sanction of Beria) sent a group of Captain GB Adamovich to Chernivtsi, where included, among other things, William Fisher, who later became famous under the name Rudolf Abel. Fischer was fired (only fired!) from the NKVD for his connection with defector Orlov-Feldbing, but after checking, Beria again accepted him into the cadres. Adamovich was supposed to instruct four agents sent overseas, and Fischer was to teach them the basics of radio communications. Adamovich also had a set of photographs intelligence officers operating in Warsaw, Danzig, Berlin and Krakow under cover of diplomatic structures, trade missions, journalistic work, with which agents had to get in touch. And suddenly, after arriving at the place, Adamovich disappeared, oh

what the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Ivan Serov found out. He immediately reported the emergency to Khrushchev, informing Beria. And here

is Sudoplatov in Beria's office, furious that Sudoplatov did not trace situation with Adamovich. A call is heard on the HF - Khrushchev is calling from Kyiv. and Sudoplatov has the opportunity to hear how the Ukrainian first secretary begins to reproach Beria for de interference in the work of the Ukrainian NKVD, firstly, and for sending to Ukraine "traitor" Adamovich, secondly. "According to" Khrushchev, he had already "ran over to the Germans."

In response to Khrushchev's scolding, Beria gently and politely replies that Major GB is standing nearby. Sudoplatov, deputy chief of intelligence, and he can explain everything. After that hands over the phone to Sudoplatov.

Khrushchev, without listening to the explanations about the fact that Adamovich de competent a worker who knows Poland well, rudely cuts off Sudoplatov and declares that he will break his career if he persists and "covers bandits and scoundrels." And then hangs up. This is the author of the future rotten "thaw", beloved by the Democrats.

The "executioner" Beria, unloved by them, dryly and officially gives Sudoplatov two days for search for Adamovich, warning: "In case of failure to comply with the instructions of a member of the Politburo, you you will bear all the responsibility ... "The

fever of an emergency search begins, but two days later it is empty. And here Sudoplatov did what, perhaps, he should have started with - he called Adamovich at home, his wife ... And the wife, flattered by the attention of her husband's superiors, thanked for the care and She said that her husband was already feeling better ... He had been lying at home for two days with a concussion, and, thank you, they came to him from the NKVD

polyclinic. So, it turned out that

Adamovich... No, dear reader, I just can't do it... I'll take the advice first alien-Golovan Shchekna from the Strugatsky novel and ask: "Read carefully, understand correctly, remember for a long time" ...

It turned out that Adamovich ... got drunk in a station restaurant in Chernivtsi, got involved in drunken fight in the toilet, received a severe blow to the head, lost an envelope with photos of agents (he was later discovered at the station by the local NKVD), managed to get on the Moscow train and drove home without telling anyone about what had happened.

And now Sudoplatov is again in the chief's office.

"Reporting to Beria," he recalled, "as usual at the end of the day, I said that Adamovich ... was in

Moscow. - Under arrest? Beria

asked. "No," I replied, and began to explain the

situation. We were alone in the office. He cut me off rudely, using words that I did not expect to hear from a member of the Politburo (Beria was actually then a candidate member. - **S.K.**). Enraged, he described circles on his huge office, shouting curses at me and Adamovich, calling us blockheads, irresponsible suckers (and how else call? - **S.K.**), compromising the NKVD in the eyes of the party leadership. - Why are you silent? he stared at me, suddenly interrupting his tirade.

I replied that I had a terrible headache ... "

In the "democratic" screenplay about Beria, after such an answer, Sudoplatova should would follow approximately the following remark of Beria: - Oh, your

head hurts? Yes, I'll tear it off for you now, along with x ..., throw it out the window and I'll erase it into camp dust ... In life, everything was different:

"Then immediately, now," Beria threw, "go home..."

The next morning, Beria's secretary called. It was extremely short and businesslike - the people's commissar ordered to stay at home for three days and be treated, adding that the owner sends me lemons received from Georgia."

This, dear reader, is not an accidental lordly favor, but the norm for Beria. Many years later, already at the head of the uranium problem, at the request of leading theorists project of Yuli Khariton and Yakov Zeldovich about his vacation, in addition to allowing visa, gives instructions that they should also be well treated. And Adamovich? He

was simply expelled from the authorities, having been fused somewhere to the People's Commissariat of Foreign affairs. Sudoplatov somehow ran into him in the early 50s at a theatrical premiere in Moscow.

Beria was implacable towards enemies. Adamovich turned out to be just a scoundrel, and Beria from he just got rid of it. After all, it was not Khrushchev with his penchant for tyranny. cruelty, who insisted on executions even when Beria saw the possibility of mitigating sentence.

Beria really was extremely attentive to those who deserved it. When in Mercader was arrested in Mexico, then Beria announced to Sudoplatov, who led the operation on the elimination of Trotsky, that no means will be spared to protect Mercader, but lawyers will have to prove that what happened is the result of internal Trotskyist squabbles.

But if Beria were the monster that the scoundrels expose him to, then the decision it would be the opposite - to remove Mercader, who had done his job, otherwise he would suddenly will speak. After more than two decades, the most democratic democrats in the democratic country of the world, by the way, they will do so first with the alleged murderer President Kennedy Lee Oswald, and then - with the real killer of Oswald - Jack Ruby. About Ramon Mercader, on the instructions of Beria, who acted even after his retirement NKVD, cared for in prison and beyond.

And so that the reader can better understand how, in delicate cases, everything can become fatal. just an oversight, talkativeness, I will report that the identity of Mercader was established by the special services in 1946, after the escape from Moscow to the West of one of the prominent figures of the Communist Party Spain. And the mother told him about the role of Ramon in the execution of Trotsky in the evacuation in Tashkent Mercader - Caridad. She was convinced that her acquaintance would keep everything a secret.

But now - not only did not hold back, but deliberately and vilely betrayed. So the mistrust that Beria often showed in intelligence matters was justified - sometimes simple chatter in such a case can turn into an involuntary crime even against own son.

But Beria knew how, as we already know, to believe. And those he believed tended to rule him were worthy of trust. Alexander Korotkov also turned out to be worthy of him ... In 1940, he again actively worked and in July was sent to Germany on a monthly business trip, which dragged on for almost half a year. In December, he again returns to the Reich, and in the name "legal" resident of the NKVD in Berlin Amayak Kobulov, whose deputy Korotkov was appointed, a letter was sent:

"His main task for the first time, according to Comrade Pavel's instructions, will be working with the Corsican and working out in detail all his connections... At the same time, you should use him as your main assistant for all organizational and operational internal affairs residency... to activate all the work in your office..."

Beria was Pavel's comrade. And he really was a senior comrade for those of his employees who were ready to work the way he does — living the assigned work.

STANISLAV Vaupshasov in his memoirs quoted one of his favorite

Hemingway's heroes: "Fifty years of undeclared wars lie ahead, and I have signed a treaty for the whole term." Vaupshasov was a professional Chekist. Beria too. But Vaupshasov life did one of his Chekist affairs, and Beria had them, major life affairs, each of which it was possible to call the main one, it turned out to be several. And the KGB line in his life did not become the only guiding light, although here he managed a lot and how operative worker, and as an organizer and reformer of the Soviet secret service.

However, his main successes were visible in the sense that they were achieved in open spheres of the country's life—in its direct socialist construction. It went more and more successfully, and not only plants and factories, power plants and new cities. A new man was also built. In

this nationwide construction, the role and importance of Beria by 1941 became already very significant - soon he will also be appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council People's Commissars of the USSR. And, taking on an ever greater burden of responsibilities, he worked not to increase personal fortune, not for the opportunity to get rare pleasures, accessible to few, but worked for the sake of creating a powerful state subject to its peoples. And just like him, then millions and millions of him worked fellow

citizens. In 1935, Arkady Gaidar wrote one of the brightest works of the world literature - the story "The Blue Cup". And in 1938 he finished the screenplay based on of his 1934 story "Military Secret" and attributed to him some advice to the director, where the main character Natka Shegalova was said like this:

"NATKA SHEGALOVA - just grew up. She is a smart person. She has a sense of slight irony, and it manifests itself not only in relation to others (which common), but also to itself.

She is a cultured Soviet girl - one of which there are not so many now, but in three or four years there will be a lot.

1938 + 3...4 = 1941...1942.

So, in 1942, the prospective situation in the country was to be determined by young guys and girls, fully formed by the new system. It was a generation no longer the first enthusiasts, and the generation of children of the first enthusiasts. Stalin counted on them as a support for the unshakable power of the state. They would have been able to secure an alternative election at the end of 1941 and break the "partocracy", and they would not have allowed anyone manipulate their minds and question their right to be masters of their own fate and his country.

IN 1940, visitors to the main pavilion of the All-Union Agricultural exhibitions, VSHV (the predecessor of VDNKh), was greeted by a huge inscription over the entrance to pavilion:

"I envy our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who are destined to see Russia in 1941, leading the enlightened world. **Vissarion Belinsky, 1841.**

It was not an entirely accurate quote, Belinsky wrote in 1840:

"We envy our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who are destined to see Russia in 1940 - standing at the head of the educated world, giving laws to science, and art and accepting reverent tribute from all enlightened humanity."

But the organizers of the exhibition could well be forgiven for some inaccuracies in

for the sake of brevity and greater aspiration to the future. Regarding the main thing, everything was it is said for sure: the next year, 1941, could fully justify many of the hopes of the "frantic Vissarion", expressed by him a hundred years ago.

Chapter 13 SANDWICHES FOR TUPOLEV AND A WIFE FOR THE RESIDENT

The country developed rapidly and confidently. All - except perhaps the ancestors of the current "democrats," recalling that last peaceful year many years later, they sighed: "Yes, we began to live before the war."

One of the heroes of the story "With greetings from the front", written in excellent Soviet writer Valentin Ovechkin in 1944, foreman Krapivka, sighed:

“- Eh ... what a wonderful life we had before the war, but not we appreciated her. Just think: two and a half kilograms of herrings cost, take as much as you want, even a keg. Astrakhan, with a hall, as thick as an arm, a back like a piglet, lard flows from it. And the Don, the highest grade, four fifty, marinated, with bay leaf? In whatever store you look, the shelves crackle from products. Sausage of all sorts: amateur, tea, Warsaw, Krakow, sausages, sausages, canned food, balyk, smoked meats. And drinks - at least fill up: from simple white, to those liqueurs, inclusive, in clay jugs, that as soon as you open the cork, the smell spreads throughout the room, like perfume spilled. Yes, everything was cheap! Three fifteen white quarters cost. Without cards, no queue.

And after this quite realistic description, Krapivka added:

“- And what kind of pies did the meat-packing plant sell with us, with liver, at thirty five kopecks a piece! And frozen Siberian dumplings - two fifty kilogram!..."

Not everywhere, of course, this picture was observable before the war, but things went in such a way that another peaceful five-year plan, and Russia, a country predominantly risky agriculture would solve the food problem. And at the same time in Russia could appear not only domestic radios, but also domestic televisions - even though the first inventor of television Zworykin *lived*, alas, overseas. Raising to good heights the industry of group "A", that is, the production of funds production, the country could now say "B" already - in the sense of developing this group already production of consumer goods.

People understood a lot during this unprecedented decade in the history of Russia ... And even those who three or four years ago had some or other sins against Russia, looking back, shrugged their shoulders, remembering themselves of the past.

By writing this, I mean Andrey Nikolaevich Tupolev ...

ON OCTOBER 21, 1937, he, a leading Soviet aircraft designer, well known Stalin, was arrested by the NKVD, then headed by Yezhov.

In 1936, only in the Kremlin office of Stalin, Tupolev was three times - July 14, December 14 and December 31. However, less than a year later, as the chief engineer and deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR Tupolev "took".

In the country, both before his arrest and after his arrest, specialists from various industries arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (they shot engineers and scientists are rare, but, as a rule, they had the opportunity to continue working on

specialties). But the Tupolev case turned out to be unique in the sense that there were arrested and spent several years with him "in special conditions" dozens of his employees.

Around the topic of engineering "sharashka" lies - as "sincere", associated with deformation of the memories of memoirists, as well as maliciously malicious - a lot has been heaped up. Even, for example, A. Toptygin groundlessly asserts that Stalin's intelligentsia did not enjoy special honor and he allegedly tolerated her only because without her and five-year plans you will not fulfill, and you will not prepare for war. And Tupolev, they say, is a typical example here.

No, not typical, but, I repeat, unique. But I will touch on this story insofar as it is associated with the name of Beria. After all, if we take the official version on faith, Lavrenty Pavlovich does not look very nice: he seems to be not a "ghoul", not an "executioner", but hardly a decent person. So on the story with the designer Tupolev, you need to

stay...

On December 27, 1954, he sent a letter to Khrushchev:

"Dear Nikita Sergeevich! In accordance with your consent to assist us in the matter of rehabilitation, I am sending you a list of employees of my design bureau, repressed by the NKVD in 1937-1938 and released early, with the removal of a criminal record, by the decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union SSR.

Appendix: list on 9 pages, MB No. 4552. **Tupolev.**

And on February 23 (wow!) 1955, the head of the administrative department of the Central Committee Dedov, the first deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR Baranov and the Chairman of the KGB under the Soviet Ministers of the USSR Serov in a memorandum informed the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade N. S. Khrushchev:

"Tupolev and other prominent workers in the aviation industry were arrested by the NKVD of the USSR in 1937-1938. Specific materials for the accusation of the NKVD had no disposal, and the whole investigation was based only on the testimony arrested, slandering each other.

From Tupolev, for example, testimonies were received that he was from among employees of TsAGI created an anti-Soviet group, the members of which ... allegedly engaged in sabotage ... and wreckingly designed almost all aircraft.

Shortly after Tupolev's arrest, all the leading TsAGI employees - Myasishchev, Petlyakov, Nekrasov and others. All these faces are interrogations showed that they were allegedly engaged in organized anti-Soviet activity. Subsequently, the majority ... abandoned the earlier data testimonies as from fictitious ... In

1938, all these persons, without being convicted, were sent to work in the Special Technical Bureau under the NKVD of the USSR ... With the arrival of Beria in the NKVD, he was in order to create the appearance of using specialists for the benefit cases, fraudulently obtained before the authority (that is, Stalin. - **S.K.**) the conviction of 307 aviation specialists in absentia for various terms, indicating that "the consideration of these cases is inappropriate, because this will tear specialists away from their work and disrupt the work plan of the Special Technical Bureau "...

Having cited these obviously far-fetched and completely untenable arguments, Beria at the same time, he falsely asserted that the guilt of the arrested specialists in committing state crimes allegedly proved, and noted that the call ... to the court the meeting will not give anything, since they were in a mutual relationship for a long time communication and agreed on the nature of the evidence to be given ...

In May 1940, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court considered cases in absentia on the arrested specialists and determined their punishments..."

Well, then it was reported that *"investigative materials were falsified in as a result of the application of ... measures of physical coercion. So,*

what, did the documents catch Beria on an unseemly fact?! It turns out that the author was mistaken in assessing Lavrenty Pavlovich so positively? And he, it turns out, is not without sin, and he is capable of meanness, and what kind of meanness, and even in relation to what people!

However, it is not so simple, dear reader!

Tupolev was arrested on October 21, 1937 and from the beginning of 1938 he headed Central Design Bureau No. 29 of the NKVD of the USSR. That is, by spring at least In 1938, there was a workable team. And the arrests went on and on. Deputy chief designer D. S. Markov was arrested on November 6, 1938! Then TsKB-29 was already working with might and main, and the planes were already sent for flight tests! So why was to arrest Markov? After all, he did the same thing before and after the arrest - he worked for Tupolev?! But if we look at the chronology

of the arrests, something starts to become clear. On October 21, 1937, Tupolev was arrested.

October 27 - V. M. Petlyakov, November 1 - Deputy Chief Designer G. A. Ozerov, December 2 - Academician B. S. Stechkin, January 10, 1938 - Consultant Academician A. I. Nekrasov and Deputy Chief

designer Cheremukhin, January 12 - Deputy Chief Designer V. M. Myasishchev and etc.

This series of arrests separated sometimes by days, sometimes by weeks does not speak of mutual slander, but about gradual, forced confessions not as a result of physical impact, and as a result of the investigation, confrontations, etc. Those who conducted the investigation into the case Tupolev, decades later they noted, by the way, that the person under investigation was severe: he will sign the protocol, and the next day he will refuse to testify. It's actually called "to confuse the investigation." But no one ever calls someone's last name at random - always for it's worth something. And if, nevertheless, at random - if only they were not beaten, then what difference does it make how much to stipulate! There were dozens of them, these names, in the memory of each arrested person. A 51 people were arrested for everything about everything, including Tupolev himself. Yes, and not overnight.

How do I know the exact number of those arrested? And from Tupolev's letter to Khrushchev, in appendix to which data on 51 (fifty one) employees were given on 9 sheets. Someone may notice: they were arrested in

1937, while Tupolev wrote the letter in 1954. During this time, many could simply die. But, firstly, not so massively everything

died. And secondly, such an explanation does not work! In the list-application of Tupolev for rehabilitation of employees is available, for example, Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov. However, he died tragically in a plane crash in 1942. But they did not forget to include him in the list of 51 employees. So, the nomenklatura Khrushchev

trinity lied. There were not three hundred and seven people detained by the NKVD, and fifty-one. Moreover, almost everyone was arrested before the appearance of Beria on Lubyanka, and only condemned them by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court already under Beria. High the party bureaucratic "trio", however, claims that it doesn't matter - because of Beria's intrigues. But why did the Military Collegium condemn the "innocent" by no means "chokh"! After all, if behind this Beria was standing and everything was clear, they would have taken it and they would have carried out all the sentences in a day or two. They condemned something in absentia, without summoning the accused to the court session ...

And sentences are sometimes separated by time almost a year, and paragraphs of Article 58 are not all convicts are the same. So, Deputy Chief Designer Markov was convicted May 14, 1939 by the age of 15.

Deputy chief designer Ozerov and Cheremukhin May 29, 1939 - by the age of 10. Deputy Chief Designer Bazhenkov May 28, 1940 - by the age of 5. And the deputy chief designer Minkner and academician Stechkin were convicted three days after him, on May 31;

the first - by 5 years, the second - by 10 years.

Deputy chief designer Myasishchev and Petlyakov were sentenced to 10 years on May 29 1940 on the same day as Tupolev himself, who received 15 years.

No, the Khrushchevites are lying. They lie, and here's another reason ... What did it mean to create a modern aircraft even before 1938? This meant only spending on design:

- fighter — 90...100 thousand man-hours; • attack aircraft - 100 thousand man-hours; bomber: • high-speed twin-engine bomber - 220,000 man-hours; • twin-engine long-range — 320 thousand man-hours; • four-engine — 470 thousand man-hours; flying boat

• twin-engine — 320 thousand man-hours. And the construction of two and a half (half is broken on a static stand in order to check the strength of the structure) of prototypes, for example, a four-engine a bomber is one and a half million man-hours. In addition, the aircraft does not exist without an engine. And, according to the logic of the Khrushchev notes, in addition to the arrested pilots, it was necessary to arrest the leading engine engineers countries. That is, if Beria, having come to the NKVD, really had broad plans to move forward our aviation by the efforts of the "slave labor" of its creators, then he would have to invent a dozen anti-Soviet organizations and put thousands of people from the design bureau behind bars different profile.

They, in fact, worked in various design bureaus, including draftsmen, without whom then there were no high-quality drawings (they were drawn cleanly by draftswomen on tracing paper). But aircraft developers worked as usual. And *only some of* their leaders temporarily and for real sins was in a *special regime*. Say Tupolev after On October 21, 1937, he did not appear in Stalin's office soon ... And how was it with his the closest long-term colleague Alexander Alexandrovich Arkhangelsky, who in many ways is "ANT" (an abbreviation from Tupolev's initials, for a long time which served as the name of the aircraft developed by his design bureau)? Well, Arkhangelsky in Stalin's cabinet appeared after October 21, 1937 - at Stalin's meetings with aircraft designers in June 1939, in June 1940. And who better than Alexander Alexandrovich would have been supposed to "sit" next to Tupolev, if Beria really cherished insidious "aviation" plans?

Arkhangelsky, however, was sitting. But at the workshop table, as part of its usual working day. And then he left for home. But that's not all! All the

convicts did not work with picks in Kolyma, but with pencils behind drawing boards on the top floor of a Moscow building on Radio Street. However, Tupolev and many others released (not rehabilitated) only after the start of the war - by a decision of the Presidium Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 19, 1941. Although the sentences were for 10 years, for 15. True, both those who sentenced and those who were sentenced knew for sure that no one was like that. there will be no deadline left.

Someone will say: "Yeah, when it was locked up, they immediately released me!" But the point is not even that, having released, the criminal record was not removed from anyone. The fact is that Myasishcheva and Petlyakova released much earlier than Tupolev, and released before the start of the war - July 25, 1940. Also - by the decision of the Presidium of the Armed Forces!

May 29, 1940, without interrupting the development of new aircraft, Petlyakova and Myasishchev were "soldered" for 10 years, and two months later they were already released! Here are the "schemer" Beria! And after all, it was he who interceded for them before the Supreme Council, the people's commissar internal affairs!

Himself, it turns out, tried hard to put the designers behind bars, and then he himself and ...

Strange somehow ...
But that's not all!

Tupolev has always been distinguished as a leader by egocentrism - at one time he crushed entire original design teams. Of course, this can be explained decently, beautifully - they say, the patriarch brought up a galaxy, etc. But something for a very long time he did not release long-fledged students on an independent flight. And only arrest Tupolev immediately led to the emergence of a number of independent design bureaus, which immediately began work more than successfully and maturely.

So, the famous ANT-25 (according to "Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev") actually should would be called POS - by the name of the actual development manager Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi. And in 1938 his separate design bureau was organized. And immediately gives excellent short-range bomber "Ivanov", attack aircraft Su-2 and Su-6. For the last Sukhoi plane in 1943 he received the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree.

And the ANT-42 aircraft was Petlyakov's development, and then it was called Pe-8. First his "full-scale" flight took place on August 11, 1937, and the first flight of the understudy took place in July 1938. And it was precisely in the "imprisonment" that Petlyakov actually gained freedom for independent work. It was there that he launched his outstanding Pe-2 bomber, which at the end of 1940 had already begun to be mass-produced.

The ANT-41 torpedo bomber is actually Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev. In 1938 he also became the chief designer of an independent design bureau and immediately gave the draft of the first world long-range high-altitude bomber DVB-102 with a pressurized cabin and remote controlled weapons. For the creation of this pioneer aircraft Myasishchev in 1942 he received the gratitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, and the Design Bureau - the Stalin Prize. Why, Tupolev

himself in the "imprisonment" picked up the pace. In the spring of 1940 he received assignment for the design of the future Tu-2, and in January 1941 it was already tested.

No, Beria did not send anyone specially on trumped-up charges to prison. But since such work was carried out in his department (begun in the NKVD before Beria), then he and her organized in such a way that everything was accelerated not by the force of fear, but as a result of optimal management and creation of the necessary working conditions.

It was not easy for me to deal with these accusations against Lavrenty Pavlovich, my dear reader! It's like approaching a dense forest ... From a distance - a solid wall. He came closer - you begin to distinguish individual trees, gaps ... And there, you look, and the path is marked, you can go further.

Yes, and it is necessary! After all, someday we must deal with our own history. without fools - once and for all. The name of the same Tupolev has been sacred to me since childhood. AND will remain - despite all his real sins and vices - *respected*. He was very large professional and human value. However, one cannot transfer

the real dirt from the guilty to the innocent (I mean Beria). So the guilty cannot be washed away. Only the truth is washed

away. Tupolev was by no means then a staunch supporter of Soviet power, he was rather a fellow traveler, and in some ways - *then* - and an anti-Soviet. And at some point he there "pulled younger people behind him. After all, even the Khrushchevites in their note admitted that "subsequently renounced the previously given testimony as fictitious" only "majority". Not everyone, it turns out, refused?! So, there was a sin?.. Say, academicians Nekrasov and Stechkin were finally released only on February 27, 1943.

But as soon as Beria saw that the young Myasishchev and Petlyakov, working enthusiastically in conditions of imprisonment, they will be able to work even better without the guardianship of the NKVD (and without Tupolev's "guardianship"), he immediately insisted on their release. However, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites need was to create a "monster" from Beria ... And the false note of Dedov - Baranov - Serov as once worked for this purpose.

But that's not all!

The trinity's note to Khrushchev stated:

"Checking ... found that many designed by Tupolev and other employees of TsAGI aircraft, about which the investigation obtained evidence as if made in a sabotage way, were produced in mass production and in their own time were considered first-class (TB-3, SB, etc.) ... "

Tupolev's innocence argument based on the fact that his planes were manufactured serially - this is generally for the defective. Subtle sabotage for that and subtle sabotage to everything looked normal on the outside. As for the supposedly first-class ...

Once upon a time, the Wright brothers' plane looked first-class.

But here is a classic - "The history of aircraft designs in the USSR until 1938." Vadim Borisovich Shavrov:

"This aircraft (TB-3. - **S.K.**) ... is one of the most outstanding not only for his time ... He was the first in the world four-engine cantilever monoplane bomber with engines installed in a row along the span in the wing toe ... For 1930-1931, the TB-3 aircraft was a big step forward and stood at the height of technical perfection...

For 1931 - no doubt! And for 1941? The

Germans already in 1935 had the Junkers-88, Heinkel-111 projects, the British - the Lancaster ... The Americans in the same years developed the concept of the "Flying fortress, and the first Boeing 17. And Tupolev pulled and pulled the "bagpipe" with slow-moving modifications of TB-3. And by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, TB-3 was not only outdated, but exactly what is *criminally* outdated. With all the records set on Tupolev's aircraft in 30s, in 1941 we had only one massive long-range bomber - DB-Zf Ilyushin (IL-4). Plus the outstanding, but very expensive Pe-8 Petlyakov and massive front-line bomber Pe-2 Petlyakova. Fact is fact!

Aircraft of famous German designers already in the thirties Willy Messerschmitt, Hugo Junkers (who died in 1936 in the seventy-seventh year life), Ernst Heinrich Heinkel (the same age as Tupolev, by the way), as well as aircraft the Focke-Wulf firms successfully fought throughout the war, and were conceived in the mid-thirties.

"Personally" Tupolev aircraft fought only one - Tu-2. And its development was started by Tupolev, when he involuntarily became the chief designer of TsKB-29 of the NKVD.

Objectively, Tupolev's technical and organizational policy was, if not wrecking, then - on the verge of this. After all, he was the main ideological figure in Soviet aircraft industry since 1930!

Chief Designer of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), Head of the Department of Aviation, Hydroaviation, Experimental Construction (AGOS) of TsAGI... Deputy Head of the Central Design Bureau (TsKB) of TsAGI... Deputy Head of TsAGI, Head of the Design Department of the Experimental Sector Construction (KOSOS) TsAGI...

And finally, the chief engineer and deputy head of the Main Directorate aviation industry of the People's Commissariat for Heavy

Industry of the USSR. Here are Tupolev's positions from 1930 to 1937. And the results of activities on these positions? Well, I will quote the aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev:

"If we compare the main types of Soviet aircraft that were in mass production ... in 1939, with the same German ones, then this comparison will not be in our favor.

MiG, Yak, LAGG fighters ... appeared in prototypes only in 1940 year.

Comparison of SB bombers (Tupolev. - **S.K.**) with Yu-88 is also not in our benefit...

The Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber appeared with us ... only in 1940.

Interaction aircraft with the ground forces, similar to the German dive bomber "Junkers-87" ... was not at all ... "

These were the results not only of Tupolev's suffocating monopoly, but also by the way criminal military-technical policy of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments Tukhachevsky. And to meet the war on new technology, it took huge and urgent organizational efforts by many, and above all by Stalin. In 1940 by aviation issues, more than 300 decisions and resolutions were adopted. In 1941 - 488.

But it was from 1938 that the rapid rise of Soviet aviation began, and it quickly took on a very modern look. No wonder the

first book of Shavrov, the classic of aviation history (the creator of the serial amphibian "Sh-2") is called "History of aircraft designs in the USSR until **1938** ", and the second is "History of aircraft designs in the USSR. **1938-1950** ".

For the "democrats" 1938 is the year of repressions. For Soviet aviation - the year of the beginning her updates.

And the fact that some of its creators found themselves in the conditions of a "special regime" that year and lived "in the barracks position", under guard, it was not Beria's fault. After all, I, my dear reader, and has not yet said everything about the lies of the Khrushchevites ... They all knew perfectly well without any notes of 1955 ... At the Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee, when there were only they didn't say nasty things, Molotov said:

"There are also such former pests who gave us good aircraft design and subsequently so decisively abandoned of their anti-Soviet past, which turned into major figures in our industry as advanced design engineers "...

Someone will object that this may not be specifically about Tupolev! But, first, about Tupolev, because the notes to the transcript say that refers to "A. Tupolev, V. Petlyakov, V. Myasishchev and others."

Secondly, I cited part of *the corrected* transcript of Molotov's speech, taken from the collection "Lavrenty Beria" published by the A. Yakovlev Foundation. But there is also *an uncorrected* transcript, and in reality Molotov said (under Khrushchev, of course) the following:

"Tupolev sat as a pest, and now he is making planes for us. When he saw how things were going, that he had to work for this government, he began to work, and God grant him health, let him work. He is no longer the same person, a new person ... "

Like this! From the high podium, Tupolev was directly called a pest! Former... And no one objected to Molotov - why are we here, Vyacheslav Mikhalych, on Andrey-light We're building Nikolaich Beria's slander in vain ... It's all Beria, Beria, Beria ...

After all, there was no longer Lavrenty Pavlovich in the meeting room, who could conclusively confirm the correctness of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich.

But when Beria was a member of the top leadership of the state, he did not tyrannize the arrested designers **before him** , but, on the contrary, tried to make a "special regime" for them maximum working. And I, finishing with Tupolev, will say something about this ... Or rather, I will cite the memoirs of the aerodynamicist from TsAGI Apollinariy Konstantinovich Martynov.

Once he was called by acting head of TsAGI Potepkin, said that the next day Martynov would have to visit Tupolev's group for consultations, and added: "You are there see your former friends and acquaintances. Don't worry and don't worry. The conversation will be strictly businesslike, and no other topics will be touched upon."

The conversation was in the Moscow building of TsAGI on Radio Street, and Martynov even from under the roof did not have to go out - he just went up to the fifth floor ...

"I was taken to a large room," Martynov recalled, "and introduced to Major Kutepov ... who, apparently, was the head of the group.

He was very polite and considerate. I was told that a dive bomber is being designed (the future Tu-2. - **S.K.**), work are in the research stage... The first consultation with my participation will take place immediately ... And indeed, soon Tupolev, Ozerov, Sokolov, Sterlin, Isakson and two other faces unknown to me entered the room ... I experienced a strong excitement. After all, in front of me were my teacher and a number of comrades with whom I worked for many years, and all of them, as People's Commissar M. M. Kaganovich assured us from the rostrum (brother of AM Kaganovich. - **S.K.**), were state criminals. All they have changed a lot, especially Ozerov, who turned from a fat man into a skinny man. The exception was A. N. Tupolev, who remained the way we always knew him ... If everyone seemed a little depressed, then Tupolev behaved as if nothing had changed, laughed in his in his usual manner and behaved rather familiarly towards the officers ... "

Contacts became regular, and in the meantime, TsAGI moved to the village Stakhanovo (the future city of Zhukovsky), where a powerful research complex. And now Tupolev came there. Martynov writes about it like this:

"At the appointed time, a car drove up to the doors of the laboratory, which A. N. Tupolev and two officers came out, one of them was Kutepov. They proceeded to my office on the first floor. Everything was on the table prepared: graphs ... and calculations ... But the clock showed three. Andrey Nikolayevich put down the charts and said with a merry laugh: "Stop! I got sick head, and I can't work anymore. Get used to eating regularly. Before, it used to be that you didn't eat until two in the morning, and nothing, but now I can't. Let's eat".

I said that, unfortunately, I could only offer him tea with sugar, and immediately ordered tea to be prepared. But one of Tupolev's escorts The officers got up and, without saying anything, left the office. He was gone for minutes fifteen or twenty and entered the office with bags containing provisions: bread, butter, sausage and something else. Tea with sandwiches was organized, and Andrey Nikolayevich ate with gusto. "Well, now let's get on with the work," Tupolev said, and we went back to our schedules."

And here is how the new people's commissar of the aviation industry describes Tupolev of those days Shakhurin:

"... Andrey Nikolaevich Tupolev arrives, energetically enters the office, and all his appearance - inexhaustible optimism and strength ... Andrey Nikolayevich stopped by to me as if he had just arrived at the People's Commissariat from home after dinner. dressed simple: in a sweatshirt made of harsh material. A conversation begins, and he immediately joke, laugh... I also

observed him at the airfield. He behaved there like a master, like a real chief designer..."

Such is the true portrait of the "victim of Beria's intrigues." And that's why I'm so detailed

stopped at the story of "sandwiches for Tupolev", that we, dear reader, from time to time, as it were, are conducting an investigation. And any investigation is facts, constantly compared with other facts and constantly comprehended and rethought in the light of new and new facts and (or) logical arguments.

Dedov, Baranov and Serov, together with those who prepared a note for them for Khrushchev, in fact erected a slander on Beria. And in order to understand this, it was necessary to spend certain efforts. For me, for obtaining and analyzing facts, and for you, dear reader, for their assimilation and already own analysis.

After all, I can also say something else, recalling that Stalin first "wooed" the NKVD Chkalov. Valery Pavlovich organically could not become double-minded, hypocritical. And if in the NKVD Yezhov there really were medieval bloody actions, including in relation to the aircraft designer Tupolev, Stalin could have come up with the idea to involve the great pilot with his direct, open nature in the "dark secrets dungeons of the Lubyanka? Your will, dear reader, but a balanced answer here can be alone: "No!"

Now, having dealt with, I hope, the "aviation" insinuations against Beria, we can move on - to new facts and to a new analysis of them.

ALREADY KNOWN to us Vitaly Pavlov in his post-perestroika memoirs 1996 years wrote:

"By the beginning of 1941, foreign intelligence was able to largely recover from the terrible blows inflicted on her by the Yezhov-Beria purge.

Considering that from November 25, 1938, Beria was People's Commissar and all significant processes in the NKVD (except perhaps for the activities of the Department of Civil Status and Fire departments) were under his control, this is Pavlov's statement looks unbelievable! After

all, foreign intelligence was recovering "from the terrible blows inflicted on it by the Beria cleaning", under the leadership of Beria himself! Isn't that right, dear reader?

Again, Pavlov writes that the "purges" of the central apparatus of the NKVD, "especially his foreign structures, carried out in 1937-1939 by People's Commissars Yezhov and Beria" led to the fact that "in the INO, out of about 100 employees, only two dozen remained. Some areas of work were completely bare."

To say this is to say something like this: "Russia during the reign of Sophia and Peter the Great became one of the leading European powers.

But if even the average high school student knows that Sophia and Peter are like they say in Odessa, two big differences, then it's not possible to lump Yezhov and Beria together. It turns out that even KGB generals are forbidden.

I'm not talking about the fact that the vast majority of repressions in foreign illegal and legal structures of the INO NKVD falls on the era of Yezhov. Beria, on the contrary, carried out a partial reverse process here as well. But we must not forget about a hundred illegal immigrants, "surrendered" by Krivitsky.

After all, the Britons and the Yankees did not report to the Lubyanka - who he "lit up" for them, and who did not. A residents Reiss-Poretsky and Orlov-Feldbing? After all, their agents, their fellow residents, liaisons - this, after all, also automatically fell under suspicion. If it were otherwise, Beria and Merkulov would be just idiots. And they weren't. By the way, in the completely "democratic" United

States, there has long been a concept security risk. "Security" is "safety, confidence, protection, guarantee, valuable papers"... Well, a "risk", it is also a risk in Africa.

The crisis in intelligence was not provoked by Beria - he got the crisis already

formed. And it was formed not so much by Yezhov as by Krivitsky, Reuss, Feldbing (and there was also, for example, such a major traitor as the one I left behind

within the framework of the story, the commissioner of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank, Yagoda's protégé, Genrikh Lyushkov, who fled to the Japanese on June 13, 1938). Moreover, the scale and consequences of this crisis are inflated precisely with the aim of blaming everything

on Beria. But here is the testimony of the outstanding Soviet intelligence officer, Bulgarian Ivan Vinarov. It was taken by me from his book "Fighters of the Quiet Front", published in Russian in Bulgaria in 1987.

"With the fall of the Republic (Spanish. - **S.K.**), our work in Paris, of course, stopped. At the beginning of 1939, Galina and I gathered our suitcases on the road. Pyotr Grigorov (Vinarov's colleague in residency. - **S.K.**) left for the United States with important assignments. But in general the group remained. Remained deep-covered our employees in France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain. Entering the new operational organization, during the war years they selflessly fought against the 'new order'..."

Vinarov, however, was a scout of the Red Army Intelligence Agency. But it was also Soviet intelligence service! Foreign personnel of the Intelligence Agency were retained, they were retained, despite a number of betrayals, and NKVD intelligence personnel. Not to mention that Special Group that was in run directly by the drug commissar.

Vitaly Pavlov, on the other hand, reports that much later than the death of Stalin and the "exposure" (yes!), as he writes, Beria came across a report on the work of foreign intelligence for the period from 1939 to April 1941, where he read the following:

"... by the beginning of 1939 as a result of exposure (here this word to place. - **S.K.**) of the enemy leadership at that time the foreign department almost all residents across the cordon were recalled and suspended from work. Most of them then it was arrested, and the rest was subject to verification."

First, in reality, everything was far from being so bleak for the intelligence activities of the NKVD. And secondly, sorry, but how else?

It was Vitaly Pavlov and his colleagues who turned out to be so, to put it bluntly, unprofessional "burdocks" that they allowed the traitors to come to power in Soviet Union and destroy it. Beria built and strengthened it. He also

strengthened foreign intelligence. But before that, he **checked her**. Alas, as the history of the verification process, and the motives of Beria (at first as the head of the GUGB, and then and as an all-powerful people's commissar), are usually distorted in order to give these actions of Beria negative meaning. Although from Beria everything was logical here.

Let us recall at least the scouts Alexander Korotkov, Pavel Sudoplatov ... The latter, by the way, was not recalled for verification and returned to Moscow as planned, so say okay. However, they also checked it.

Let me remind you that in early November 1938, Sudoplatov was appointed acting duties of the head of INO GUGB. He was "acting" three weeks, then he was replaced by Dekanozov, and that - on May 13, 1939 by Pavel Fitin. Vitaly Pavlov, describing the meeting with Beria, when Fitin was appointed, misrepresented everything, saying that Fitin de was appointed "instead of the arrested Passov." True, he makes the reservation that he himself was not at the meeting and he knows his course from the words of his comrade Rogatnev (later a talented Chekist). But Pavlov should know the order of changing his own bosses? However, as he described, Beria's image looks quite definite: a boor, humiliating with distrust honored people. Not

the most worthy way describes the situation and Sudoplatov. However, perhaps he did not understand everything - he was a militant, a scout, but it is unlikely that he was a counterintelligence officer.

would have turned out. I'm not saying this to him as a condemnation, it's just that militant operatives have a different psychology. Sudoplatov writes:

“Beria, in a conversation with each employee ... tried to find out if he was he is a double agent, and said that everyone is under suspicion now.

So he said it to people directly! He is tactful - as far as it was perhaps - he made it clear to the scouts that there was no need to be offended, that they were not personally suspected him that it is temporary. Unless, of course, the scout is clean. As a result, under the people's commissar Beria, unfairly repressed intelligence officers, consider, and not was! I say “count”, because intelligence is, alas, a delicate matter. Beria acted in general very humanely. Too bad I didn't understand this myself. Sudoplatov, nor his wife, the beautiful Emma, who called Beria “Prince Shadiman” by name the insidious hero of Anna Antonovskaya's novel The Great Mouravi, which had just appeared then. In addition, Sudoplatova publicly proposed to “consider suspicious connections” on party meeting of the GUGB in the fall of 1938, his colleague, still in Kharkov, an Armenian Gukasov. Moreover, these connections, judging by the testimony of Sudoplatov himself, and Indeed, sometimes there were “that one” ...

Three years later, Gukasov behaved heroically in our embassy in Berlin after start of the war. Having started a brutal fight with the Gestapo, he was severely beaten, but the cryptographer managed to burn the code books during this time. So Gukasov was not scoundrel.

But Sudoplatov was worried to his heart's content. After the accusations made by Gukasov and others, the party bureau decided to expel Sudoplatov from the party, and to approve this the decision was to be made by the general party meeting of the GUGB in January 1939.

Such a detail: the decision on Sudoplatov by the party bureau, at the meeting of which at least the new head of the GUGB Merkulov, and possibly the People's Commissar Beria himself, was accepted with one abstention. Deputy Head of INO Dekanozova - Pavel Fitin said that he, as a new person, did not know Sudoplatov and could not judge him. Sudoplatov assesses such behavior as honest and decent. But that's how he appreciated it Beria: soon it was Fitin who received a promotion and was appointed head of the INO.

The party meeting of the GUGB was postponed. It seems that Beria, having become People's Commissar, is already in something Understood, but still - not everything. And before the end of all checks decided the atmosphere is not glow. He was smart!

But after a few months, Sudoplatov's check ended and the the following, by Sudoplatov himself and described:

“Beria unexpectedly summoned me to his place and offered to accompany him to football match at the Dynamo stadium. He didn't give any explanation, it was order. They played Spartak, a team of trade unions, and Dynamo, a team of the NKVD. Those Over the years, each meeting of these teams has been an event in itself. At first I thought that Beria wanted me to be present during his conversation with the agent in restaurant ... When we arrived at the stadium and got out of the car, I followed Beria at a respectful distance, since Kobulov, Tsanava, Maslennikov and other deputies immediately approached him, immediately surrounding their boss. Turning around, however, he made me a sign to come closer and walk side by side - so I found himself in a government box. Beria introduced me to Malenkov and others party and state leaders ... The very fact of my presence at made it clear to the government tribune to Kruglov, Serov, Tsanava and others that it's time to stop spreading rumors about my suspicious contacts, connections and some materials compromising me that were available in the investigative unit. They had to make sure that from now on I belong to the category of trusted people. in the eyes of the country's leadership ... ”

And again, Sudoplatov did not appreciate Beria's act, even many years later. A
after all,

Beria: a) without starting official verbal explanations with anyone, clearly and substantively
showed at the same time to everyone who needs it that from now on he trusts Sudoplatov;

b) effectively eliminated for the future all possible misunderstandings in this regard; c)
again without verbal outpourings that would have put in an awkward position before
of all Sudoplatov, showed him that all his problems were behind him.

And after all, he did this by inviting the militant terrorist Sudoplatov, let's not forget, in
government box! Why not?

The check is over, Beria is convinced that Sudoplatov trust
worthy. So why not show it to everyone both spectacularly and effectively (even from the point of view of
saving time on relevant conversations!). I don't know, as a

reader, but personally I admire the mind, tact and subtlety of Lavrenty
Pavlovich. This, I assure everyone, is not given by sober experience alone. In order to be so
to resolve a delicate situation, you yourself must have a vulnerable and proud soul. And, of course, a
huge psychological experience.

BUT HERE, KGB General Vitaly Pavlov did not find kind words for Beria, describing and
personal impressions, and according to the story of Rogatnev (heroically, however, who died during the
war), "as the honored scouts of Beria, touched by gray hair, deliberately carelessly
shoved it into different departments. In short, according to Pavlov, Beria is undoubtedly a boor, yes
also unprofessional. But,

let's say, Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, "carelessly pushed aside" (on his day
meeting in the forty-fifth year of life was far from gray hair) in 1941 left
resident in the United States, became a major general. Died in 1972 before reaching eighty
two years.

A little later, I will focus on another resident who successfully operated in the United States -
Iskhak Akhmerov, also allegedly "carelessly shoved" by Beria ... He, by the way, in 1939
was 38 years old, and he had a completely brunette hair without gray hair.

Actually, General Pavlov, accusing Beria of being unprofessional and
indiscriminately exposed the American direction of the work of the NKVD, lies once again. Let's say, for a long
time and successfully worked in the USA, an agent-group leader Zvuk - Yakov Golos. He was born in 1889 in
Yekaterinoslav in a working-class family, passed the external course for the full course of the gymnasium, worked in
illegal Bolshevik printing house, was exiled to an eternal settlement in the Yakutsk
province, from where he fled to the USA and settled there. The voice was included in the illegal network of the NKVD in
1933. In 1935 he sent his wife and son to the USSR, in 1937 he came to Moscow
himself, met with Slutsky. If everyone was suspected, then Golos should have been the first
turn to call (and he would come), arrest, etc. However, the Voice calmly worked
under Yezhov and also worked under Beria.

Further, in the USA - which Pavlov could not have been unaware of - he worked successfully except for Akhmerov and
after Akhmerov, foreign intelligence resident Hayk Hovakimyan. No one recalled him either, he acted
under the guise of an Amtorg engineer, in 1940 he became a graduate student at the New York Institute
of Chemistry, where he defended his dissertation. Hovakimyan is in touch that
period, there were 14 agents, not counting group agents. So Beria is not so
unrestrainedly "smashed" at the end of the 30s foreign intelligence, as it is hammered into our
heads of several generations of "democrats" and as General Pavlov assures. And rather
say the opposite about this. As

for Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov, he had a biography - at least a movie
take off. Tatar from Troitsk, Chelyabinsk region, born in 1901, he is still a boy
drank life: furrier, was a courier, an errand boy in a haberdashery
shop, apprentice electrician, baker. And in 1920 he

was a deputy of the Kazan Council, in 1923 he graduated from the 1st State

university (future Moscow State University) and became deputy director of the Moscow Pedagogical technical

school. Then - the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, work in Bukhara and Turkey, again Moscow, the Institute of Red Professors. In 1932, Akhmerov was enrolled in the staff of the INO OGPU, received his first operational pseudonym Jung and was sent to China ... In 1934 he returns to Moscow, and there they begin to prepare him for work in the USA.

In 1936, there were six Akhmerovs in the American illegal residency employees and 10 sources. Sometimes, acting as a textile manufacturer, he was called either William Grunk, or Michael Green, or Michael Adamets, or someone else. And here...

And here Akhmerov fell in love ... In fact, the subject of his sighs was quite professionally suitable - one of the employees of the residency, young, beautiful, with connections in the White House apparatus, Helen Lowry (operational pseudonym Tanya). Besides Helen was the niece of US Communist Party General Secretary Earl Browder. AND responded to her Russian boss in return.

The time for falling in love coincided with Akhmerov's planned call to Moscow to report on work done. And here Akhmerov personally sends a report to People's Commissar Beria with a request allow marriage with Tanya and come home with her. Beria's reaction was extremely negative and violent. And since Beria did not differ in duplicity, this indirectly refutes future dirty slander about him as a sex maniac.

The profession undoubtedly left its mark on the formation of Beria as a person. security officer. A good security officer cannot be a womanizer. When Ivan Serov boasted that he could with the approval of Khrushchev, under the guise of a novel, hook the famous Polish opera prima Bandrowska-Turska, and then it turned out to be a bluff (in part recruitment), Beria, according to Sudoplatov, "began to scold Serov how much in vain, threatening dismissed from the authorities in disgrace, calling him a petty womanizer.

I think it was a sincere reaction... purposes is professional. But messing around with women is against the profession! On this, many men "burned out", which means that the Chekist can "burn out".

So Akhmerov's report automatically programmed Beria's distrust of his auto RU. Well, actually! Beria knew Akhmerov only on a personal matter. And what could he think after reading it? And here's what ... An

attractive man, from the age of 21, has a stable and enviable social position and for so many years did not get a wife in the Union ... And now, at the age of under forty, it was urgent to get married behind the cordon ... How is this to be understood? Isn't it a helicopter? Not a womanizer whether? Did they give him this beauty? Niece of the top communist in the States? Well What! We have Prince Radziwill among our agents, and many others from *their* higher circles.

Here is the logical reaction of a professional! And Beria was a high professional like intelligence, and counterintelligence - in contrast to the then, still inexperienced Pavel Fitin, who began to assure the boss that Akhmerov de was "good" ...

But even here Beria acted humanely ... He did not immediately ban marriage - what if a person a really great feeling and he will break his fate by refusing? But he instructed Fitin understand in detail and prepare a detailed certificate on Akhmerov, which Fitin did. Only after studying it, the people's commissar gave the go-ahead ... But upon his return, Akhmerov was really demoted to the position of an ordinary employee of the American branch of foreign intelligence. AND biennial audits began.

But it would be amazing if it were otherwise! Moreover, part of Akhmerov's agents handed over to the "legal" residency, and part was mothballed, which is enough common practice.

Yes, in a difficult situation for foreign intelligence, many (but not all!) political distrust was expressed to career intelligence officers. Beria even accused them, about which

writes the same Pavlov. Yes, he accused, as a rule, unfairly. But it was from the side Lavrenty Pavlovich is a smart and precise psychological move. He is already in the people understood perfectly, after all, he was both a counterintelligence officer and a party leader, moreover well ... He had already developed an eagle look at people. I - the ability to assess a person in amount, according to the questionnaire and according to personal impression.

Moreover, he did not do without questionnaires at all. And it was not a matter of spiritual narrowness - he did not suffer from it. It was a matter of professionalism - as a professional, he conducted a check and documents. But as a *high* professional, he also arranged for all the scouts who arrived psychological check. It must be

admitted that everyone who returned to Moscow withstood it with dignity! But it's necessary recognize that Beria, having made sure both objective and personal subjective given in the honesty of his illegal immigrants, once again included them in the work! The same Akhmerov after At the beginning of the war, he received the most important task and again left for the United States with his wife.

And the fact that Beria could continue to express some external distrust to someone, once again proves his professionalism as an intelligence officer. He knew his illegal immigrants - they could sometimes behave no less capriciously than opera prima donnas. Them after all, too - and for similar reasons - the shortcomings of bright artists were not alien.

And just during Beria's tenure as the supreme head of both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the USSR, our intelligence acquired that phenomenally successful form that provided the country with not just outstanding results, but reliable results! What in intelligence is perhaps the most important. Yes, many valuable sources (the same "Cambridge Five") were acquired

to Beria.

Yes, a number of prominent illegal immigrants came to intelligence before Beria. But it was Lavrenty Pavlovich who, firstly, was able to figure out the "mess" that welded up to him, including - and Krivitsky with the company, and secondly, he managed to deliver intelligence work on a solid long-term basis. Intelligence began to carry out special recruitment, the level of training in the NKVD schools improved qualitatively. And, I think, I will not be mistaken in saying that **thanks to Beria, the country finally received powerful intelligence of precisely the Soviet states, and not intelligence, imbued with the "spirit of the Comintern."** Now even ideological intelligence cadres did not work for the coming world revolution, but for a real socialist country. Another thing is that later the intelligence service, filled with party nominees by the minister of the partocrat Ignatiev, began to degrade. Especially after the removal of Beria. I think it was not accidental, but, as they say now,

"significant" was a series of betrayals of the beginning 1954 - without any threat of any reprisals for foreign workers. In January 1954 was transferred to the Americans by an operative worker of the Tokyo residency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs USSR Yuri Rastvorov.

February 18, 1954 surrendered to the American authorities in Germany militant MVD captain Nikolai Khokhlov.

In February 1954, Major Pyotr Deryabin defected to the CIA in Vienna. A native Siberian, four times wounded front-line soldier, in the early 50s he worked in government security structures and could get an idea of who was who in Kremlin.

In April 1954, together with his wife, an employee of the residency, he remained in Australia KGB resident in Canberra Vladimir Petrov. Petrov started back in the INO OGPU in 1933, and his escape was directly connected with the death of Beria. Yes, seeing the light and seeing the difference between Beria and the Khrushchevites, some of the intelligence officers prophetically realized that the country was in doomed in the long run. In the late 50s, this

series continued. Moreover, it is characteristic that back in 1954 Deryabin pointed to Anatoly Golitsyn as a potential defector, in reality who left for the West in December 1961 from Helsinki. He cited rejection as the reason for leaving.

the atmosphere of undercover intrigue that reigned in the KGB. Soviet intelligence passed the test of the war, but more and more could not stand it. tests of Khrushchevism ...

Chapter 14

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR STALIN AND AUTOMATIC FOR BORDER GUARDS

Since 1941, the state socio-economic publishing house began to publish reference calendars, and the first in this "project" was, of course, a reference calendar for 1941.

Having opened it, among a good hundred biographical notes on Alexander Parkhomenko and Jack London, "Benjamin" Franklin and Ivan Franko, Modest Mussorgsky and Sholom Aleichem, Leibniz, Curie-Sklodovskaya, Schumann, Lomonosov, as well as Zhdanov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev ("member of the Politburo, faithful son of the Bolshevik Party, pupil and closest ally great Stalin"), Mikoyan, Shvernik and others, we on page 48 we will also find a biography of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

"Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was born on March 29, 1899 in the village of Merkheuli (Georgian SSR) in a poor peasant family. To the Bolshevik Party Comrade Beria joined in March 1917 in Baku. In 1918–1920, during the period of domination Musavatists and Mensheviks in Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria led an active underground work in Baku and Georgia. In 1920, Comrade Beria was arrested by the Menshevik the government of Georgia. At the insistence of S. M. Kirov, who worked at that time plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia, comrade Beria was expelled from Georgia to Soviet Azerbaijan. Since 1921, Comrade Beria has been in leadership work in Soviet intelligence agencies. Since November 1931, he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia, and in 1932, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU(b).

As head of the Bolshevik organizations in Georgia and Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria showed Leninist-Stalinist perseverance and intransigence towards enemies people in the struggle to carry out the general line of the Bolshevik Party. A great merit belongs to Comrade Beria in exposing the Trotskyist-Bukharin falsifiers of the history of Bolshevism. His famous book "K the question of the history of the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia" is the most valuable contribution to the history of the Bolshevik Party.

From the end of 1938, Comrade Beria was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. WITH XVII Congress - a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), since March 1939 - a candidate member of the Politburo Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. Beria is one of the most prominent leaders of the CPSU (b) and the closest students and associates of Comrade Stalin.

For military and revolutionary services Comrade Beria was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Lenin and the Orders of the Red Banner of Labor of the Georgian and Azerbaijan SSR. Tov. Beria is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

However, in the biographical information of the calendar (and I have given it in full) there is no it was explained that although Comrade Beria from the end of 1938 and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR, but since February 3, 1941, he is not quite the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, which he was before February 3, 1941. And not even the same one!

The circle of his public duties more and more went beyond providing external and internal state security. At the Plenum of the Central Committee on March 22, 1939 Beria was elected a candidate member of the Politburo. And his tasks increasingly shifted to the sphere of government of the whole country with all the various complex of its problems.

Among other things, this was reflected in a very serious reorganization of the department,

headed by Lavrenty Pavlovich. On January 30, 1941, he was awarded the special rank of General Commissioner for State Security, equivalent to army rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union (with the liquidation of July 6, 1945 in the USSR special ranks of officers of the State Security Service, Beria began to wear straight marshal epaulettes).

But already on February 3, 1941, Beria was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council People's Commissars, retaining for him the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. And on February 3, 1941, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a separate People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) was allocated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

The new NKVD included all the previous structures, except for the GUGB and the military counterintelligence. That is, the "national economic" departments, the penitentiary sphere, the police, border, internal and escort troops, as well as fire and paramilitary guards, registry offices and others, including the Central Council voluntary sports society "Dynamo". All structures of the

former GUGB were transferred to the NKGB. Military counterintelligence - Special departments - was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy with the formation of NPOs and NK Navy of the corresponding 3 departments. In conditions of peace for the USSR, but already military for Europe and the world of time, such a reorganization was logical.

"Pure" Chekists got the opportunity to focus on their natural and ever expanding tasks of intelligence, counterintelligence and information analysis.

"Specialists" began to obey the army and navy leadership, and this increased the responsibility of the latter and made the former relatively "their own" for the Armed Forces, which previously considered the Special Departments as spies of the NKVD. As a result, the quality has improved identifying hostile elements and agents of potential adversaries in the troops.

And Beria?

He, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, now had enough to do without the NKVD. WITH April 1941, he begins to oversee the people's commissariats of non-ferrous metallurgy, coal, oil and timber industries. However, in its "main" people's commissariat, a new quality acquired the old problems of protecting important state and industrial facilities, railway junctions, airfields, telephone and telegraph stations, banks ... We must it was to strengthen the protection of the state border, to solve the problems of new territories ...

He did not transfer the People's Commissariat of State Security into the wrong hands. People's Commissar GB became 46-year-old Vsevolod Merkulov - Beria's ally since 1922 while still working in

Chekist bodies of Transcaucasia, and then - for work in the Zakkraykom and in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia.

In his memoirs, Sudoplatov writes about the invariably "polite and calm manner" of Merkulov's behavior. However, we also have a more detailed description of him, moreover, from the other side of the barricades. In 1953, the

book "My Ringside Seat in Moscow" by the Hungarian ex-diplomat Nikolas Niarady, "who chose freedom", was published in the West (this can be translated as something like "My Rotation in Moscow"). About Merkulov, this Niaradi wrote this:

"Here is a paradox: a man of amazing kindness and at the same time bestial cruelty; severe and serious, but at the same time very witty; has an angelic patience, on the one hand, and smokes 40-50 cigarettes during the working days one after another. An official of such a high rank that in front of him ambassadors are drawn out, but at the same time he is modest and shy by nature, and when says, a genuine shy smile wanders across his face. It was Merkulov personally oversaw the physical liquidation of almost two million Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians killed with heartless, inhuman dexterity. But he looks like gangster sobbing over Brahms' "Lullaby" is performed by a purely Russian sentimentality, especially towards children. One day when we are with him were already fairly familiar, he somehow with paternal pride and almost with tears in his eyes, he showed me a photograph of his son, a serviceman."

The Hungarian was familiar with Merkulov, this is obvious - the portrait is quite bright and visible. But just as there is no love without sadness, so there is no "democrat" without lies. We won't deal with what kind of ambassadors were pulled in front of Merkulov "in line" - Vsevolod Nikolaevich did not hold such posts where it is necessary to communicate collectively with ambassadors ...

As for the "bestial cruelty", the "gangster" and the "physical liquidation of almost two million Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians, killed with heartless, inhuman dexterity", then you need to figure it out.

Firstly, by the time the Baltic States joined the USSR, all these three peoples totaled no more than four million people. "Reshape" them into overnight is indeed a task for the new Attila...

But here is the document - the memorandum of the NKGB Merkulov to the Central Committee No. 1687 / M dated May 16 1941, during which the People's Commissar forwarded for consideration the draft Resolution of the Central Committee VKP(b) and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the "cleansing" of the Baltic states. The project was presented to Stalin for Beria's signature, and the resolution adopted on its basis read, in particular:

"1. Allow the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR arrest with confiscation of property and send to camps for a period of 5 to 8 years and after serving his sentence in the camps, exile to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years the following categories of persons: a) active members of counter-revolutionary parties and participants anti-Soviet nationalist White Guard organizations; b) former guards, gendarmes, the leadership of the former police officers and jailers, as well as ordinary police officers and jailers, on which contain compromising materials; c) former big landowners, manufacturers and big officials the former state apparatus of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia; d) former officers of the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and White armies with compromising materials; e) a criminal element who continues to engage in criminal activities"...

As you can see, in paragraph 1, it was about an urgent "cleansing" of an obvious "fifth column". Paragraph 2 of the resolution provided for the expulsion for 20 years of family members who lived jointly or dependent on the repressed.

It also provided for the exile of *"persons who arrived from Germany in the order of repatriation, and also Germans who signed up for repatriation to Germany and refused to leave, in respect of which there are materials about their anti-Soviet activities and suspicious ties with foreign intelligence agencies."*

But point 3 I will give with special pleasure in full - it is very funny in the light of Niarady's "horror films":

"3. Allow the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR expel by administrative procedure to the northern regions of Kazakhstan for a period of 5 years prostitutes previously registered with the former police bodies of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and now continuing to engage in prostitution.

In parentheses, I will inform you that they were deported in the amount of 760 people, as well as 2162 criminals (these three thousand "victims of Merkulov-Beria" "democrats", of course, also plus today in the general "martyrology").

The decree ordered to send to the Baltic states to help local bodies, People's Commissar of State Security comrade Merkulov and his deputy comrade Serov, and also Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Abakumov. For "use in conducting operations and investigations" in the republic

208 cadets of the Higher School of the NKGB of the USSR were sent, by nationality - Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.

On the border of Lithuania with Belarus temporarily, "for the period of preparation and operations", a barrier zone was established with the allocation of up to 400 border guards for this purpose.

The operation was prescribed to be carried out within three days, and it was carried out from 14 to June 17, 1941. Its results are as follows:

	Arrested	Deported	Total
Lithuania	5664	10187	
15851 Latvia	5625	9546	
15171 Estonia	3178	5978	9156

Total - 40,178 people, including whores and bandits, which is from the figure "democratic" Hungarian 2.0089 percent. That is, for a person who "chooses freedom" problem and a lie ratio of 50:1. And it's

because I calculated the percentage of repression in relation to Niarady's nonsense. However, the repressed included not only Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, but also other nationalities, including the Whites who settled in the Baltics, so the calculation is necessary be carried out for the entire population. And then it turns out that in the small Baltic, which after the Civil War became just the same big anti-Soviet, and anti-Russian reserve, no more than one out of one hundred and fifty inhabitants was repressed. And **neither one of them** was not shot! The maximum measure is 8 years in the camps.

Niarady's lie in relation to Merkulov is also a lie in relation to Beria. And she just as vile and total as all the slander against them in general - and the Khrushchevites of all times and peoples, and "democrats" and "historians" of the "Radzin-Volkogonov-Ovseenkovsky" circle.

SO, from February 1941, the state security organs became solely in charge of Merkulov, including foreign intelligence. And now it was no longer Beria who directed the highest leadership of the country, starting with Stalin and Molotov, reports based on intelligence reports, and Merkulov.

Beria now only received them. And this point must be emphasized! Since February 1941, it was not Beria who was in charge of foreign intelligence issues!

Moreover, in general, information from various sources came to the USSR in such a quantity - we will soon see - that even the most reliable intelligence a telegram from any one source would not change the overall picture - as with information and disinformation positions. And in connection with what has just been said it is necessary to touch upon the problem of Richard Sorge. She is also firmly associated with the name of Beria, although I I'm not sure if Beria even knew about its existence. Ramsay-Sorge collaborated with Intelligence industry of the General Staff, started as Berzin's man, but was not a full-time agent, even did not have a military rank. And military intelligence traditionally did not share sensitive information from the intelligence of the NKVD. I think it was not only a matter of rivalry between the special services, but also in a number of betrayals both in one "office" and in another ... Substitute your own no one wanted reconnaissance networks under an extra possible blow.

One of the persistent myths is this: Stalin and Beria did not listen to Sorge. But, firstly, this is in the cinema after receiving an emergency intelligence telegram, everyone becomes "to the ears." In life, such telegrams, which often turn out to be false, are enough in intelligence agencies around the world. And senior management responds to single "signals" accordingly. The array of information as a whole is important, and for a certain period. A Ensuring this is beyond the power of one scout in principle. Secondly, regarding the "Sorge telegram", we will soon find out something.

Sorge was an outstanding intellectual - there can be no two opinions. And I wouldn't even call him a classic-style journalist. The natural journalist is based on its reporter: came, saw, wrote. Sorge was an analyst, and his newspaper articles from Japan would hardly be able to be read, for example, by a secular lady looking for a *sharp little one*. These were full-fledged, containing not so much even information as assessments and forecasts, analytical reports.

But Sorge was also a poorly organized person, he even had a conspiracy poorly staged - the band members went on picnics together! In addition - numerous connections with women and very frequent alcohol. Sometimes the scout is forced to play an admirer of alcohol - a drunkard is always less suspected (if, of course, he drinks "on their labor"). But Sorge did not play, and one case proves this categorically.

Sorge loved the motorcycle and drove it around Tokyo with a very intense road movement. Driving fast is not a sin, although a professional has the right to risk his life only in justified situations. Not the worst sin was the fact that Sorge often got behind the wheel drunk. But the fact that in such a state he could carry with him something that reveals him as a scout is ...

Well, it is clear how it can be assessed!

Once, the failure almost happened precisely because of this ... Sorge drove "under a hundred", crashed into a roadside stone and was in a serious condition in the hospital with ... microfilm in the pocket. He had enough willpower, without losing consciousness, to urgently call the radio operator Max Clausen and pass the "compromising evidence" to him. In Moscow, they did not learn then about the "glitch" with the film, but about accidents, of course, learned.

Would you, dear reader, believe such a *resident* without hesitation even if you believed him as a *person*?

Personally, I don't.

As for his famous telegram:

"June 15, 1941

The attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a wide front.

in fact, it simply did not exist! By the way, it is absolutely not similar to real intelligence telegrams in style and construction, but, I repeat, it simply did not exist! On June 16, 2001, Krasnaya Zvezda published the materials of the Round Table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, where SVR Colonel Karpov said:

"Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in the Khrushchev era. Such "fools" are launched simply: one of the authors of publications about Sorge these came up with radiograms for the red word, and the rest with reference to it they picked it up - and the province went to write ... Then they added psychologism, they came up with a vengeful Stalin ... "

Karpov's confession completely reveals and the technology of creation is already different "fools" - regarding Beria's pre-war "camp-dusty" visas, cited in dozens, if not hundreds of publications. Only the "vengeful Stalin" in them replaces "vengeful Beria" ...

YES, IT'S TIME for us to take a critical look at the famous anti-Beria fakes about Beria's position regarding the timing of the start of the war. I don't know who's first launched them into circulation, but Sergo Beria in his book about his father cites these alleged "documents", rightly calling them falsifications, according to the "documentary" story Ovid Gorchakov "On the Eve, or the Tragedy of Cassandra" ...

Gorchakov possessed a pen even more lively than Dmitry Bystroletov. And the fantasy

it was professionally developed already in the sixties ... Then a big the "cool" counter-propaganda militant Grivadiy Gorpzhaks was popular Jean Green is untouchable. Famously riveted from a variety of clichés, he is very tabloid manner exposed the "intrigues of the CIA." I must admit that I once read it excitedly ...

So, "... diy" and "Gor ..." - this is Gorchakov's contribution to the collective pseudonym (Gri[gorius] Va[silius] [Ovi] diy Gor[cha-kov] Pozh[enyan] Aks[enov])... They say:

find out who his friends are and you will understand who he is... Therefore, a few words about co-authors of Gorchakov on slapping and slapping the image of Gene Green. Vasily Aksenov is the same current writer Aksenov, whose mother is the unfortunate "victim of Beria", "Echelon" - Evgenia Ginzburg, and who himself is "Island of Crimea" and so on. Gregory Pozhenyan is a below average poet. But - with claims to incomprehensibility.

Gorchakov is... Well, Gorchakov is like Gorchakov... He is certified as a scout and represent "Major Whirlwind", although the plot of the famous series is primarily the story of military intelligence officer Yevgeny Stepanovich Bereznyak ... However, the point is not in moral qualities of one of the members of the trinity of writers, but in the fact that they or some of them attributed to Beria by fellow writers ... And this is

attributed: From the memorandum of L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin:

"June 21, 1941 ... I insist again (this is Beria allegedly writing to Stalin in similar expressions! - **S.K.**) on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov, who still bombards me with "disinformation" about supposedly the impending attack on the USSR. He said that this "attack" would begin Tomorrow. Major General V. I. Tupikov, military attache in Berlin. This stupid general claims that the three army groups of the Wehrmacht will advance on Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv ... The head of the intelligence department, where else Berzin's gang has recently been operating, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, complains about Dekanozov and his lieutenant colonel Novobrantsev, who also lies, as if Hitler concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western frontier. But me and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, we firmly remember your wise destiny: in Hitler will not attack us in 1941!"...

These lines have been walking around the world for more than a decade. And everything in them is taken into account correctly - in full compliance with the laws of the "genre" and taking into account the official falsification of history Khrushchevites.

Here I take the thick first volume of the six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic Wars of the Soviet Union 1941–1945", published by Voenizdat in 1961. After all, there in there is no such surname in the name index - Merkulov (Beria will be mentioned twice, but about this separately). There is an OUN member Melnik, there is a German political émigré Merker, he is being followed the American diplomat Messersmith and the next - Mekhlis ... And in the subject

index to this volume, neither the NKVD nor the NKGB are mentioned among the People's Commissariats ... Even the People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metals is marked, but the NKGB

is not. And about the NKVD, whose border troops were the first to meet the war - not a word. By the way, "Border Troops" is not in the index either. Yes, it is understandable: suddenly someone asks the question - and in whose jurisdiction were they? The

same picture in volumes 3 and 4 of the twelve-volume History of the Second World War. 1939–1945", published by the Military Publishing House in 1974 and 1975: no Beria, no Merkulov, NKVD no, no NKGB, about the actions of the border troops - three short paragraphs in two volumes with a total volume 1038 pages. So

the mass Soviet reader (although can one call a reader encyclopedic publications to the masses) did not know either about the division of people's commissariats, or about subordination of the border troops of Beria, nor about the withdrawal of intelligence from under his subordination - as well as about

much more. But any Soviet intellectual "smoking room" firmly knew: "War NKVD intelligence missed, because Beria destroyed all sensible people before the war scouts." However, this is how many "smoking rooms" "think" today. Although from February 3, 1941 to July 20, 1941 (when the people's commissariats were again united at hand Beria) the NKVD did not have foreign intelligence! DID NOT HAVE!!! But who knows and remembers this? Moreover, no one destroyed the scouts in 1940-1941.

It was in such an informational vacuum that the Gorchakovs-Gorpozhaks launched their antiberian "ducks". And they - contrary to the laws of nature - went on a long flight, lasting, alas, to this day. And now I ask the dear reader to be

patient. Because we are now
Let's get down to the boring business of line- *by-line* analysis of Gorchakov's inventions.

It is obvious that the style of "Beria's note" is not the style of an official document. Anyone who constantly writes business papers automatically develops a very specific a dictionary constructs phrases in a certain way. And this is more or less common for any country, for any institution, for any language. And here we have a typical rollicking style, characteristic of the creators of detective stories that hit the cheap effect. Well, in fact: one use of the purely slang expression "disinformation" in this supposedly a document of national importance issues a forgery. Explanations

of positions with surnames are also unreliable. Stalin was, of course, aware of the position even of Tupikov, and even more so of Dekanozov and Golikov. And only with the name of Dekanozov (the well-known Beria) there are no initials, which understandable: Dekanozov for the author of a fake is a symbol, and the initials of the rest should be clarify to give the appearance of reliability, and at the same time an explanation to the reader (not Stalin), who are we talking about. But here is the obligatory for such documents "t." with a surname forger forgot. But then they wrote exactly like this: "T. Dekanozov", "vol. Golikov, without initials.

Gorchakov, the master of a lively pen, could not resist the flat pun "stupid general Tupikov", but the real Beria was not so stupid as to use in a report Stalin similar expressions. This is the same overlay of Gorchakov, as well as "bombing", "radio", "Berzin's gang", "me and my people", "wise destiny" ...

Gorchakov needs to convince the reader of the low servility of the "executioner" Beria to Stalin, and he puts his "Beria" into the mouth (before that, he allegedly impudently "insisted" on recall of Dekanozov) is absolutely impossible not only for him, but for anyone in general from the leadership of the USSR, the appeal "Joseph Vissarionovich" instead of the well-established "t. Stalin." But the strict "t. Stalin" is out of style, and the author of the fake subtly uses sycophantic - in this case - "Joseph Vissarionovich" ... As for "lieutenant

colonel Novobrantsev, who also lies that Hitler concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border", then someone like him in history marked. I am not familiar with the plot of Gorchakov's "documentary" story, but I exclude that it was written just about Vasily **the Rookie** (to be precise), because that in May 1941, temporarily acting head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 6th army, he circulated Intelligence Report No. 8 without authorization, which spoke of Germany's preparations for war. Actually,

for such tricks you need to warm up hard, because from the side of the Rookie it was, albeit unintentionally, a provocation on a national scale. However, all they just removed him from his post and sent him to ... the Reconnaissance Department's rest house in Odessa. And on June 22, 1941, he was appointed ... already a full-fledged head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the same 6th Army.

It's funny, but the incident with the Rookie indirectly proves (although there is enough evidence and direct) that the top leadership of the USSR, including Beria, knew already in May about 170 divisions, and much more than that for an ordinary head of the army intelligence department was a secret with seven seals. Because the Rookie was not punished, that he was just showed zeal not according to position and not according to reason. Scout without discipline and

there is no strict subordination to the Center, but there are no geniuses for all army intelligence departments you will find, and the Rookie, after all, graduated from the Academy of the

General Staff. Therefore, they did not give him a neck, but gave him a little rest - before the war. And since he was quarantined before the start of the war back in May, then only the Gorchakovsky "Beria" could refer to it on June 21, 1941. What else is

fun! In Gorchakov's fake, Dekanozov is credited with hypervigilance. And in the biographical directory of Zalessky, Dekanozov is charged with blame that he "failed to assess the situation and remained in the dark about the plans of conquest A. Hitler.

Although, in fact, both the first and second statements are false. There were no dekanozov categorical in neither direction, more inclined, however, to the position of his longtime colleagues of the resident Amayak Kobulov, to whom the Germans, for the purposes of strategic disinformation framed a double agent Berlinks, who had a code name in the NKGB Lyceum student. So no one with any "misinformation" about the imminent offensive of the Germans Dekanozov He could not "bombard" - he succumbed to the "misinformation" of the Lyceum student, who assured the opposite.

But the one who thinks that Stalin could build the entire state policy is stupid and stupid on information from some kind of resident, albeit a Berlin residency. Besides on the direct instructions of the Center, Alexander Korotkov, known to us since March 1941 intensified work with Harro Schulze-Boysen - Petty Officer, who gave accurate information. And this information arrived on time where it was needed - on the tables leaders of the country, about which I will say more.

As an introductory "saying", I will remind you of the second, no less famous, "sensation" placed in Gorchakov's book ... He filed it like this:

"On the old folder where these reports are stored, faded purple fund, inventory, file numbered in ink. When you open the folder, in your eyes rushes a resolution, written with pressure by an eternal pen: "Recently many workers succumb to brazen provocations and sow panic. Secret employees of Yastreba, Carmen, Almaz, Verny for the systematic wipe disinformation into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany. The rest strictly warn". Signature: "L. Beria. June 21, 1941"".

Now let's get a grasp of this concoction ... I'll immediately notice that, it turns out, this "Beria" is familiar with the word "disinformation" and even uses it on a document, it seems internal use. But in a serious note to Stalin, for some reason he used jargon ("disinformation"). But in general, the style is not consistent here either - and this "Beria" in business resolution suddenly begins to rally: "accomplices of international provocateurs", "to quarrel us with Germany" ...

Moreover, this "Beria" puts the date, and not in the way that the real Beria would put it. For Beria would have been characterized by the following dating option: "21/VI". Here on such trifles falsifiers and "pierce". Further... There are

no "secret collaborators" in intelligence, "sexots" are from "democratic" vocabulary. And professionals have "operational workers" and "agents". But after all, the code names Hawk, Carmen, Almaz, Verny in the history of intelligence missing. In addition, if they existed, then the indication of Gorchakov's "Beria" about their "erasing into camp dust" before the start of the war would not have had time to complete. And the next one day these "diamonds" would have no value... But there were no "diamonds" themselves.

And oh, this notorious "camp dust"! She appears in the writings about Beria as often that a dense smoke (or dust?) screen has formed that hides the truth. It is unlikely that Lavrenty Beria could have such an expression in his dictionary ... This is after all "democrats" firmly associate his name with the Gulag, and he, after all, since 1931 (when formation of the Gulag) until August 1938 was at party work. And at the post of the NKVD

released more people from the camps than sent them there.

But even so, let him speak and write so (although he did not do it!). In any case, on June 21, 1941, he could not impose any "camp-dusty" resolutions on the simple reason that the First Main Directorate - the former INO NKVD, treated February 1941 to the NKGB.

Scouts-Chekists of the People's Commissariat of State Security were after February 1941 Merkulov's subordinates! Is not it? So what kind of administrative visas of the people's commissar Beria's internal affairs in relation to them can be discussed?

Beria could not write anything like this on June 21, 1941, and because by this day there was no only to him, but also to Stalin, it was clear: peace time is counted, if not by the clock, then by a matter of days!

A little later I will acquaint the reader with extracts from only *some* authentic notes with intelligence data sent by the People's Commissar of State security of the USSR Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and Beria.

However, first I will cite three notes by Beria himself (the first is practically completely!), Recalling that from February 3, 1941, he did not lead the intelligence of the NKGB, but was the supreme leader of the border troops of the USSR.

And thanks to his efforts, by 1941, the frontier troops created *their own* border intelligence, which did not have the "cream of society" as agents, but which but simple train drivers, oilers, switchmen, modest villagers and border towns...

They collected information like ants, and when put together, it gave the most an objective picture of what is happening. The result of the work of this "ant intelligence" was found reflection in the notes of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria to Stalin.

The documents are based on the 1995 collection "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table", published jointly by the FSB of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the Moscow City Association of Archives, bold text is mine everywhere. So...

"Memoir of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. BERIY to I.V. STALIN, V.M.

GERMAN TROOPS TO THE SOVIET BORDER AND VIOLATION OF AIR SPACE OF THE USSR.

No. 1196./B April 21, 1941 Top

secret

From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops in points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the general government. In the border zone of the

Klaipeda region: Two infantry divisions arrived, an infantry regiment, a cavalry squadron, an artillery division, tank battalion and a company of scooters. In the

Suwalki-Lykk area: Up to two motorized mechanized divisions, four infantry and two cavalry divisions arrived regiments, tank and engineer battalions. In the

Myshinets-Ostrolenka area: Up to four infantry and one artillery regiments arrived, a tank battalion and battalion of motorcyclists.

In the area of Ostrov - Mazowiecki - Malkinya - Gurna: One infantry and one cavalry regiment arrived, up to two artillery divisions and a company of tanks. In the area of Byala -

Podlyaska: One infantry regiment, two engineer battalions, a cavalry squadron, a company arrived

scooters and an artillery battery. In the Vlodaa-Otkhovok region: Up to three infantry, one cavalry and two artillery regiments arrived. In the area of the city of Holm: Arrived up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, cavalry regiment and sapper battalion. There are over five hundred cars.

In the Hrubieszow

area: Up to four infantry, one artillery and one motorized arrived regiments and cavescadron. In the

Tomashov area: The headquarters of the formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and up to three hundred

tanks, In the Pshevorsk-Yaroslav area: Up to an infantry division arrived, over an artillery regiment and up to two cavalry regiments.

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a battalion, squadron, battery, and often at night. In the same areas where the troops arrived, a large number of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles. In April, work on the construction of fortifications intensified. During the period from 1 to 19 April, German planes violated 43 times state border, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 km. Most of the planes were fixed over the areas: Riga, Kretinga, Taurogen, Lomzha, Rava-Russkaya, Przemyśl, Rivne. Application: scheme. **People's**

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.

On June 2, 1941, Beria sent a note (No. 1798 / B) to Stalin personally:

"Border detachments of the NKVD of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian The SSR obtained the following information about the military activities of the Germans near border with the USSR.

Two army groups concentrated in the areas of Tomasov and Lezhaysk . IN these areas revealed the headquarters of two armies: the headquarters of the 16th army in the town of Ulyanuv ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierz manor ... commanded by a general Reichenau (requires clarification).

On May 25 from Warsaw ... the transfer of troops of all branches was noted. Movement troops occurs mainly at night.

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and at the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol) one hundred aircraft were delivered .

Generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border: on May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe town of Ulguwek ... May 18 - General with a group of officers - in the Belzec area ... On May 23, a general with a group of officers ... in Radymno area.

At many points near the border, pontoons, canvas and inflatable boat. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov.

In addition, information was received about the transfer of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest in the direction of the borders with the

USSR ... Reason: telegraph reports from the

districts. **People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.**

Three days later, on June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note (No. 1868/B) to that same topic:

"Border detachments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR additionally (our No. 1798/B dated June 2 of this year) the following data was obtained:
Along the Soviet-German border
May 20 this year in Byala Podlaska ... the location of the headquarters of the infantry divisions, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the personal regiment of Marshal Goering and headquarters of the tank formation. In the area of Yanov-Podlyasky, 33 km north-west of the city of Brest, pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges.
May 31 at st. Sanok arrived a trainload of tanks. On May 20, up to a hundred aircraft took off from the Modlin airfield. Along the Soviet-Hungarian border
In the city of Brustura ... there were two Hungarian infantry regiments and in the area Khusta - German tank and motorized units. Along the Soviet-Romanian border
During May 21-24 from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border proceeded: through Art. Pashkans - 12 echelons of German infantry with tanks; through st. Craiova - two echelons with tanks; at st. Dormanesti arrived three infantry echelon and at st. Borshchov two echelons with heavy tanks and cars.
At the airfield in the Buzeu area ... up to 250 German aircraft were noted. In Dorokhoi Uyezd, the gendarmerie and local authorities proposed **to the population** within five days to arrange a bomb shelter near each house. The General Staff of the Red Army has been informed.
Reason: telegraphic reports of districts. **People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria.**

There is no doubt that Beria and in the remaining fortnight before the start of the war sent to Stalin the accumulating data as they were obtained by agents border troops of the NKVD.

But these notes are no longer made public. Perhaps in order not to disgrace everyone too much Gorchakovs there ... After all, almost Major Whirlwind collaborated with such a pillar "democrats", like Vasily Aksenov himself. But the collection contains thirty notes Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and Beria in the period from March 11 to June 5, ten notes Deputy Merkulov - Bogdan Kobulov in the period from June 6 to June 15 (Merkulov then was preparing a "cleansing" of the Baltics) and another note from the returnee *from* the Baltics Merkulov dated June 17.

This is already intelligence data from the NKGB from behind the cordon, as well as from sources in Moscow foreign circles, including the German embassy. It is unlikely that their citation can seriously add anything to what the reader already knows, but I will give something. Let's say Merkulov's note No. 1612 / M dated May 14, 1941 addressed to Stalin, Molotov and Beria started like this:

"We are sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlin. People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov.
Reason: message from Berlin No. 156 dated May 9, 1941 based on the materials of the Sergeant, Corsican and Starik. **A message from Berlin** A source working at the headquarters of the German aviation ("Sergeant Major" Schulze Boysen. - **S.K.**), reports: 1. At the headquarters of the German aviation, preparations for an operation against the carried out at the fastest pace. All evidence suggests that the performance scheduled for the near future. In conversations among staff officers, May 20 is called as the date of the beginning of the war with the USSR. Others believe that performance is scheduled for June. In the same circles they say that at first Germany present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding more exports to Germany...

2.<...>

5.<...>

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin.

That's how, by the way, everything was not easy for Stalin and his associates. When will the war start - in a week or in a month? How does it start - suddenly or with making demands? And if

with demands, perhaps the war can be avoided, despite the obvious concentration of troops?

How to decide what to do here?

Moreover, "Sergeant Major" Harro Schulze-Boysen, "Corsican" Arvid Harnak and "Old Man" Adam Kukhof all reported honestly. They worked for the USSR and after the start of the war, they were discovered by the Gestapo, arrested and executed in 1942-1943.

But so far there has been no war. Time passed, Germany did not try any requirements present, but the troops at the borders of the USSR increased, as Beria constantly reported.

And it gradually became clear that the actions of the Germans were not a show of force. (and what would she give Hitler without pressure on the Kremlin through diplomatic channels!), and preparations for an imminent and finally decided war.

That is, the chatter of several generations of "historians of the Central Committee of the CPSU", and now "historians" of "Rossiania" about the strategic surprise of Germany's attack on the USSR you can safely send to the dustbin of history along with similar "historians". Strategically, Stalin and the country were ready - as far as you can be ready in a country that slurped cabbage soup ten years ago.

Over ten years of tremendous work, very modern defense systems have been created. Industry and Armed Forces... All State Security Structures by joint efforts, they revealed in advance the plans and forces of the aggressor. Went rearmament of the army ... Just in case, the troops systematically advanced closer to borders.

The suddenness could only be tactical - it was not known exactly when all this the force moves forward. However, EXACTLY this could not be said by any Sorge! Even if he stood behind the Fuhrer! Hitler postponed the timing of the offensive in the West for almost two ten times! Yes, and in the East - more than once. And it is obliged to exclude tactical surprise was military leadership at the expense of quite possible measures. And they had to take First of all, People's Commissar Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, commanders frontier military districts and their deputies for combat arms. The strategic

surprise of the attack was also impossible for the Germans because in addition to the data of the agents of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB at the disposal of Merkulov (and until February 3 1941 - Beria, and before him - at the disposal of Yezhov) there was also personal, so to speak, agents people's commissar, not registered with the INO. She was especially conspiratorial, her Moscow the device was small. So when they talk and write about losses - imaginary, real, intelligence as a result of the repressions of 1937-1938, then you need to understand that we are talking here most often about the personnel directly of the Foreign Department (INO) of the GUGB.

And the data of the "highest" intelligence also excluded for Stalin and the country a strategic surprise.

But that's not all! At least four days before the start of the war, Stalin had already knew that the war would begin in a matter of days. And if you consider that June 22, 1941 was:

a) the longest day of the year b)

Sunday c) the

anniversary of the surrender of France in 1940 (and Hitler was no stranger to mysticism),

then this very day, most likely, should have been the day the hostilities began. *I think Stalin*

took all this into account, because less than a week before the start of hostilities actions conducted his personal strategic sounding of the situation, which convincingly showed him that war is a matter of days.

But more on that later...

NOW it's time to talk about those border troops, about which to say a hundred times the good word they deserved *in the proper form* was forgotten by both capital, multi-volume Soviet works about the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. Although ...

Although before that - a small digression to the side about HF communications. It is little known that during the division of the NKVD in February 1941 into two people's commissariats, the department government high-frequency communications initially remained in the NKGB (in the 4th department of operational equipment), but a month later, by a joint order of the NKVD / NKGB No. 00332/0066 of March 26, 1941 This branch again returned to the NKVD.

And this is indicative for Beria - his attitude to communications quite fit into future classic formula C3 (Commands—Communications—Control).

On February 26, 1941, a new structure of the NKVD was announced. The people's commissariat created A special technical bureau (headed by V. A. Kravchenko), where the HF communications department entered.

Having achieved the return of the high-frequency communications structures to his people's commissariat, Beria proceeded, of course, not from departmental interests - it was objectively more common for the new NKVD to continue to oversee existing and create new secret lines of communication, which became an effective element of state and economic management. Yes and for the operational needs of the people's commissar of internal affairs protected from listening to high-frequency lines were needed more than for the NKGB. As

for the border guards, they were also meant to stay in the NKVD, so to speak, it was written. And for the border troops, Beria as People's Commissar in just three incomplete pre-war years did a lot.

Of course, the best traditions of the Soviet border guards were not laid down by Beria, but before him. But he developed them, starting with the fact that in 1939 the magazine "Border Guard", quickly becoming popular.

An ideological weapon, however, is effective when backed up by an effective organization and related material weapons. I have said more than once that Beria was a brilliant manager. And he perceived any new business precisely as competent manager ... He also approached the improvement of the organization protection of the state border (and at the same time, he, a natural Chekist, did not forget about organization of intelligence work in the border troops). Below I will

quote the book of retired Major General Sechkin "Border and War" of the 1993 edition. Despite the front-line past of this border guard officer, a special I have no respect for him - he and Gorchakovskiy-style fakes about his ex People's Commissar reproduces (referring to No. 6 of the Znamya magazine for 1990), and about the Rookie writes like this:

"IN. A. Rookie (unlike the false major Vikhrya Sechkin, this surname writes correctly. - **S.K.**) ... of course, he had reliable information about preparing ... an attack on the Soviet Union, but this information did not reach top management (n-yes. - **S.K.**). Then at your own risk Rookie sent to the troops a report on the true state of affairs on the border - the famous summary No. 8, which also lay on the table for Stalin and Beria "...

In the light of what we already know, dear reader, these "revelations" of Sechkin are not impress. But the more valuable are some of *the facts* he cites. And they are:

"In February, a decision was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars (in 1993, a former member CPSU Sechkin that it was a decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, mention **did not consider it necessary.** - **S.K.**), which from the Main Directorate border and internal troops was singled out as an independent border troops. Establish a special body with a clear and distinct

certain tasks and district offices in the field favorable in a way affected the organizational strengthening of the border troops as troops special, designed to guard and protect the state border USSR ...

During 1938-1939. a complete reorganization of parts border troops; the headquarters of units and formations were reorganized according to a single control scheme from top to bottom, **intelligence agencies of units and formations have been created border troops also according to a single scheme** (the emphasis here and below is mine. - S.K.); all departments of commandant's offices were reorganized according to two main standard states (land and coast) <...>, formed and re- the existing communications units <...> were reorganized, motorized transport of parts, <...> 7 maritime schools were formed, 7 service dog schools and a communication school were reorganized.

Technical reconstruction of troops, **rearmament of ground border units with modern small arms** ... development border aviation, the introduction of engineering and technical funds made increased demands on ... the preparation of commanding officers and political staff.

By the beginning of 1941, command and engineering personnel for border troops trained in 11 military educational institutions of the People's Commissariat internal affairs."

There is not a word about Beria here (if Sechkin mentions him, it is only in order to smear with black paint). But in all this, the handwriting of Lavrenty Pavlovich is immediately visible: a clear structure, the development of technical means, training, reliable communications, motorization ...

And - let's not forget - intelligence! Mass intelligence, at an extremely grassroots level, intelligence, in fact, carried out by ordinary people, by the people themselves, and therefore the most reliable and *trustworthy*! Such intelligence, as I have already said, is appropriate to call "ant" - an individual ant carries a little, but eventually grows a huge anthill! The

fact that in 1941 the border detachments collected such intelligence information, which both the INO GUGB, together with the GRU of the General Staff, could envy, is precisely the merit of Beria! He did an excellent job of organizing such intelligence back in the ZakChK, and then in the ZakOGPU, so its importance for the effective protection of both borders and the security of the state, knew not in theories.

But the merits of the "border guard" Beria by the creation of border intelligence did not limited. **It would not be an exaggeration to say that Beria's reforms for decades determined the general appearance of the Soviet border troops!**

In the literature (for example, in the Orders published in the Catalogs series in Novosibirsk NKVD of the USSR 1934-1941") notes that two thirds of the orders of People's Commissar Beria for the troops concern the border troops of the NKVD. Moreover, there were orders such as "Oh additional allocation of 150 horses to the GUPV, that is, they were specific, business orders. At the same time, every week Beria presented reports on the political and moral state of the border troops, signed by the head Political Directorate of the Border Troops, Divisional Commissar P. M. Mironenko.

The results of the attention and care of the new people's commissar had an effect quickly - not only did the special, but also purely military training of border guards, although by definition they are not called to fight like soldiers. And here - Beria's border guards fought, and how! Their combat capability by the end of 1939 was so good that in the Finnish war, which was replete with just the same criminal miscalculations of the army, the situation sometimes was anecdotal.

Joint directive of People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria No. 16662 September 14, 1939, that is, before the start of hostilities, it was

it is envisaged that with their start, the border troops are included in the operational subordination command of the Red Army until the exit of the Red Army units to the line of 30–50 kilometers deep into the Finnish territory. By

mid-December, many units of the 9th Army reached this line, however, military commanders still demanded allocation to support units of the border troops. And it ended with the fact that on December 17, the chief of staff of the border troops of the NKVD of Karelsky district, Colonel Kiselev sent a report to the headquarters of the 9th Army, in which tactfully, but firmly reminded the army generals that the business of the border troops is the protection of the state border, and not a breakthrough heavily fortified defense.

Yes, and Beria's subordinates, of course, can hunt through the forests for Finnish snipers, hinted Kiselev, but it would be time to master this science and Voroshilov's subordinates.

BORDER GUARDS knew how to fight, and Beria made sure that they knew how to fight even better and fight with the best weapons. One of the unpleasant surprises for us from the Finnish war was the massive use of the Suomi submachine guns by the Finns. Samples of them in the People's Commissariat there were defenses before the war, but during the hostilities they appeared as new trophy machine guns, and the opportunity to get an idea of their effectiveness in combat.

However, none of the high military officials - neither the old People's Commissar Marshal Voroshilov, nor People's Commissar Marshal Timoshenko, who replaced him, neither Marshal Kulik, Chief of Armaments of the Red Army, nor General of the Army Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, appreciated the machine guns. Kulik believed that machine guns, they say, are "weapons of the police and gangsters," but the Russian three-ruler, they say, is not let him down, and after the Finnish campaign he did not change his mind.

Therefore, the army did not make mass orders for industry for machine guns, although in The USSR had good domestic developments. Actually, the first small arms, called "automatic", an automatic rifle with a magazine capacity of 25 rounds, was developed by the Russian gunsmith General Fedorov back in 1916. By the way, in 1928, 11 years before the establishment of the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, he was awarded

USSR title Hero of Labor. Alas,

even after the Finnish war, the army did not favor machine guns. In 1940, with well-established arms production, the industry of the USSR produced only 81.1 thousand submachine guns (as automatic weapons were officially called). And shortly after the start World War II, they were urgently instructed to make them almost bed workshops - factory production could not satisfy the needs of the army, which finally understood what it was in mobile combat - machine guns! But the correct conclusions long before the

war were made by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade Beria. AND ordered as many machine guns for the border troops as the cost estimate of the Main control of the border troops of the NKVD.

By the beginning of 1941, only in the Ukrainian border district were in service 300 heavy machine guns, more than 600 light machine guns and quite a few machine guns. And besides - about **500** cars. Perhaps the

reader remembers how Beria fought for buses for Tbilisi, being secretary of the Zakkraykom. Now he took care of the mobility of the border troops.

In the five detachments of the Belarusian border district there were 200 easel machine guns, about 400 light machine guns, about 6.5 thousand self-loading rifles and 2.5 thousands of machines.

Moreover, in 1940, to strengthen the fire capabilities of the frontier posts, it was additionally allocated 3515 submachine guns (machine guns), 1200 self-loading rifles and 110 machine guns, and in March - April 1941 - 357 company mortars RM-50, 45 heavy machine guns and 18 anti-tank rifles.

This was what General Sechkin called "the rearmament of the ground frontier units with modern small arms", while "forgetting" to mention that such rearmament is the result of the perspicacity of People's Commissar Beria.

The relative saturation of the border troops with automatic weapons before the war in many times exceeded army performance. And with the outbreak of war, the NKVD sometimes had to share their supplies with the army, although they themselves were needed by Beria's subordinates for fights with the same

Germans! During 1939-1940, the personnel of the border troops increased by 50%, and at the beginning of 1941, "not preparing for war" Beria also seeks an additional increase in their number, with bringing it on the western border to 100 thousand people within five border **military** districts: Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kyiv Special and Odessa.

There were eight **border** western districts: Murmansk, Karelian-Finnish, Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian and Black Sea. Moreover, 47% of the number of all Western border troops were concentrated in the Belarussian and Ukrainian border districts. This already suggests that Beria's direction

I saw the possible main blows of the Germans no worse than the later advertised Zhukov.

Yes, and how could they not be seen, how could one not foresee the possible development events, passing to Stalin the information that Beria passed to him?

And could Beria not see the pre-storm situation, if he knew for sure such a statistics ... In the first quarter of 1940, among the very numerous violators border (and it was violated by both smugglers and godfathers on opposite sides of the border, who decided to visit relatives), 28 German agents were exposed, in the second quarter - 43, in the third - 64, in the fourth - 99, and in the first quarter of 1941 - already 153. Of course, Beria understood everything and prepared the border troops for defense in advance.

BORDER GUARDS were prepared for war better than the army by the very essence his service. If the army fires live ammunition at the enemy only with the outbreak of war, then the border guards are always at war. And for them, the Great Patriotic War began long before June 22. Say, in April 1941, at the site of the 86th border detachment, the border was crossed reconnaissance group ... Sixteen people dressed in the uniform of the engineering troops of the Red Army... After our border guards met with them, a uniform battle began. IN As a result, 11 saboteurs were killed, 5 were taken

prisoner. This was not an isolated case - from April to November 1940, only in the Ukrainian 38 gangs and armed emigrant groups of a total numbering 486 people! In general, on the eve of the war, more than 500 armed incursions into Soviet territory were repulsed. Yes, the border was prepared in advance. In the monograph by A. I. Chugunov "The border is fighting" about

it says this:

"As for the border outposts, commandant's offices and detachments, they are for a short (pre-war! - **S.K.**) time they managed to equip defensive structures light type: dugouts, trenches, communication passages, bunkers, trenches that gave the ability to create relatively strong knots of resistance during combat action at the forefront."

Would all this be possible without the sanction of People's Commissar Beria? And would he have given this sanction if, like his subordinates, he had not seen a very high probability of the outbreak of war already in 1941? After all, communication passages and trenches are not equipped a year before the start of the war.

Chapter 15 THE EVE...

On DECEMBER 27, 1940, the new people's commissar for defense, Marshal Timoshenko, who replaced Marshal Voroshilov, issued order No. 0367, which read:

"Order NPO 1939 No. 0145 required mandatory masking of all newly built operational airfields. Main Directorate of the Red Air Force The army should have carried out these activities not only on operational, but also on the entire airfield network of the Air Force. **However, none of the districts received due attention I did not pay attention to this order and did not fulfill it** (highlighted everywhere by me. - S.K.).

It must be realized that without careful camouflage of all airfields, the creation of false airfields and masking of all materiel in combat work of aviation is unthinkable in modern warfare. I order:

3. All airfields ... be sure to sow, taking into account camouflage and in relation to the surrounding area by selecting appropriate herbs. At airfields, simulate fields, meadows, gardens, pits, ditches, roads, in order to completely merge the background of the airfield with the background of the surrounding area.

By July 1, 1941, complete the camouflage of all airfields located in 500 km strip from the border.

9. Inspector General of the Air Force to establish control and report on the progress of work monthly.

*People's Commissar of Defense of the
USSR Marshal of the Soviet
Union S. Timoshenko.*

As you can see, the top leadership of the Red Army did not at all orient it towards a quick and necessarily successful offensive war, but called for a comprehensive provide defense against a possible attack.

Further ... What does the term of the order "by July 1, 1941"

mean? This means that if the commission appointed by the people's commissar to check the execution of his order No. 0367 of December 27, 1940, on July 1, would fly over the entire 500-kilometer strip from the border, then ideally, instead of airfields, she should have seen from the air "meadows, vegetable

gardens and pits." But this also means that all the main camouflage work by mid-June is already should have ended. And besides, there were all the possibilities - the order was given long before spring time, when you need to sow grass. Alas, the order of People's Commissar Timoshenko No. 0367 dated 12/27/40 was not fulfilled in the same way as the order of People's Commissar Voroshilov was not fulfilled No. 0145 dated 09.09.39 (thirty-ninth!)

And if you stand on the positions of "democratically" advanced "historians", then blame this, except for the monsters of Stalin and Beria, who destroyed the "color of the Red Army", did not account for. And the inspector general of the Air Force, assistant chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for aviation twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Aviation Yakov Smushkevich and chief Air Force Main Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Hero of the Soviet Union Aviation Lieutenant General Pavel Rychagov has nothing to do with it. After all, they were "innocently" shot after the beginning of the war by order of the same "bloody executioner" Beria, and only the whistleblower of this "executioner" Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated them in 1954.

Actually, Timoshenko also gave the order, and demand to execute it in part he clearly forgot the monthly reports of the inspector general of the Air Force. Otherwise the order would be completed! And so in order No. 0042 dated June 19, 1941, People's Commissar Timoshenko and the head General Staff Zhukov stated:

"On the masking of airfields and the most important military installations, so far nothing significant has been done.

Airfield fields are not sown, take-off strips in the color of the terrain are not painted, **and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply with bright colors, attract the attention of the observer for tens of kilometers.** Crowded and linear

arrangement of aircraft at airfields at full the absence of their disguise and the poor organization of airfield services with the use of unmasking signs will finally unmask the airfield ... "

As follows from the same order, the leadership of the Air Force did not bother to arrange false airfields by June 19, 1941 either. And the crowding of technology can be judged by photographs of our planes destroyed on the ground, taken by the Germans in 1941. Burnt, destroyed planes in these photos stand wing to wing, and even in two rows. So, after *such a thing*, should one be surprised that the war began the way it began? AND Is it Stalin's fault that it started like this? But many ground generals in terms of criminal neglect of business services left the aviation generals not far. And it was mentioned in the same order No. 0042 of June 19, 1941:

"Similar carelessness to camouflage is shown by artillery and motorized units: crowded and linear arrangement of their fleets represents not only excellent objects of observation, but also beneficial for targets from the air. **Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection, and are well observed not only from the air, but also from the ground.** Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military objects."

Moreover, dear reader, this is not all that I have to report on the situation. before the war...

BUT YET let's go back a little to see once again how "not prepared" for the war is no longer the border guard Beria, but the scout Beria ... From February 3, 1941, the external Intelligence was in charge of People's Commissar GB Merkulov. But until February 3, he was only Beria's deputy and head of the GUGB NKVD. That is, until February 3, 1941 and the KGB intelligence in Ultimately, Beria was in charge, and not a single serious reconnaissance action was carried out without his sanction. was possible.

Only People's Commissar Beria could give the go-ahead to those operations that she later recalled Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya-Rybkina ... Bold Russian beauty, colonel of the foreign intelligence, she began work in the late 20s and before the war was part of the leadership of the German departments. You can write books about her, but she herself wrote it about herself and about intelligence - "Under pseudonym Irina.

Unfortunately, this book is not free from numerous inaccuracies (in descriptions events before the war, for example, the military counterintelligence SMERSH, created only in 1943, begins to appear, etc.). Even more regrettable is that the book is no longer free from serious shortcomings. However, Voskresenskaya-Rybkina is a really bright figure. first row. And she knew a lot, participating in many things ... She worked with two very informed enemy intelligence officers who were imprisoned in the Polish Lvov prison and in our hands after September 17, 1939, when the Red Army occupied the territory Western Ukraine. In the

middle of 1940, the head of the 5th (INO) department of the NKVD GUGB Pavel Fitin instructed Rybkina to "unwind" an experienced Abwehr agent arrested by the Poles, staff captain tsarist army of Alexander Sergeevich Nelidov. At first he resisted, but in the end gave up. Nelidov took part in the headquarters military games of the German General Staff and gave a lot of valuable information, but I remembered him and Rybkina because all the operation, although it took place within the inner prison of the NKVD in the Lubyanka, could not begin, as I said, without preliminary discussions with Beria. Rybkin about it silent, but it simply could not be otherwise.

Even more necessary was the sanction of Beria for the operation with the ace of the 2nd (intelligence) department of the Polish General Staff Sosnowski. Talented, brilliant

resident of Polish intelligence in Berlin, he led a secular life and had excellent agents in higher spheres, most of which were his own mistresses. Alas, among them were "set-ups" of Himmler. Sosnovsky was arrested, but the Poles managed to exchange him for two major agents of the Abwehr. However, only in order to transfer the ex-resident from prison in Berlin to a prison in Lvov.

Sosnovsky "talked" especially effectively. Through our agent in the Gestapo, who was in charge of the development of Sosnovsky (perhaps it was Lehmann-Breitenbach), all the details of many reconnaissance and intimate adventures of Sosnovsky. And a Pole taken to the Lubyanka in a double development. Rybkina led the interrogation, asking about details, for example, the recruitment of the wife of a responsible employee of the German Foreign Ministry, Sosnovsky evaded, declared that he did not remember anything. Then Vasily, sitting silently in the corner, Mikhailovich Zarubin, himself a super-ace of intelligence, began to speak for Sosnovsky ... He "remembered" everything: bills in restaurants, addresses of villas where dates took place, numbers and stamps cars...

And so - in several positions, in the sense - mistress agents. It ended up that Sosnovsky, amazed by the awareness of the Russians, completely "split" ... But after all, this whole combination without the sanction of Beria would have remained only cunning and risky (yes-yes!) paper plan. Yes, just a plan, if only the People's Commissar did not agree to its implementation. And he agreed because he was brilliant professional.

Operations with Nelidov and Sosnovsky continued even after the separation of the people's commissariats in February 1941, but from July 20, 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united under Beria's leadership. And

how differently he disposed of the fate of the two wards of Rybkina. Sosnovsky was shot. It was, alas, an absolutely necessary step in conditions when the Germans approached Moscow. But Nelidov ...

Nelidov ... was released and offered to move to neutral Turkey, he well known as an intelligence officer of the NKVD. In such a proposal there was an exact psychological calculation and the ability to understand - to whom and when you can trust and trust important matter.

Rybkina also kept silent about the role of Beria in deciding the fate of Nelidov. But who but people's commissar, could finally sanction the direction **beyond the cordon** in the conditions of a successful German offensive **former trusted employee of Admiral Canaris**, well who knew Nelidov personally?

And we are told that Beria de "trusted no one."

FROM THE SCOUT OF Beria, let's return to the border guard

Beria. There is one clear and convincing evidence of, on the one hand, what the Beria's border troops on the eve of the war, and on the other hand ... On the other hand, this is evidence will serve me as a hint to the story that before the war, Stalin did everything that is required of the head of state before the close war, as Beria did everything, but generals ...

There is such a book - "I am a fighter", written by Major General of Aviation Hero Soviet Union Georgy Nefedovich Zakharov. Before the war, he commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District. Being then in the rank colonel, Zakharov already had experience of fighting in Spain (6 planes personally shot down and 4 in the group) and in China (3

personally shot down). The quotation from his book (bolding mine throughout) will be extensive, but I could not cut anything in it - every phrase is important here.

"... Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was **either seventeenth or eighteenth June** forty-first year - I received the order of the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over

western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.

I flew on U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Air Division Major Rumyantsev. Border regions to the west of the state border were filled with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves stood badly camouflaged, and even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting on it ... and ready to gush over her.

The number of troops recorded by us by eye, at a closer look, is not left me with no other options to think about except one thing: war was coming.

Everything that I saw during the flight was superimposed on my former military experience, and the conclusion that I made for myself, can be formulated in four words: "from day to day."

We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane on **any suitable** site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, **silently** took it under his visor (that is, he knew in advance that our plane would soon land from urgent information! - **S.K.**) and waited for a few minutes while I wrote on the wing report. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again went up to air and, having passed 30-50 kilometers, **sat down again** . And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard **waited in silence** and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By the evening in this way we flew to Bialystok and landed at the location of the division Sergei Chernykh ... "

That's how clearly the service was organized by Beria's border guards! This is the first thing right away is striking. However, wherever he became the head of the matter, clarity and order quickly became common practice. Not because of fear, but because of effective organization and knowledge by each of his place in the general ranks. And from the border "secret" report Zakharov immediately left for the outpost, from there to the headquarters of the border detachment, from there to the headquarters border guard, and he had already telegraphed to the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops ...

In normal cases, the next report lay on the People's Commissar's desk after some time. But the case with Zakharov was not just special, but unique in the full sense of the word. IN of the true history of the war, it should be described in bold type and capital letters, and why this is so, the reader will soon understand ... Or perhaps he already understood. The intelligence information

of the border troops (and we know that it was accurate and extensive) twice a day was presented by the border guards not only to the internal "hierarchy" of the NKVD, but also to the headquarters of the military districts, whose operational departments immediately handed it over to the General Staff. But did the General Staff and headquarters draw conclusions from this information? districts? Zakharov writes:

"In Bialystok, the deputy commander of the Western Special Military General I.V. Boldin conducted an analysis of the recently completed exercises. I briefly reported to him on the results of the flight, and on the same evening, on a fighter provided to me by Chernykh, I returned to Minsk ... "

Strange!

For example, the author of the capital opus "Western Special" Ruslan Irinarkhov standardly accuses Stalin of the fact that his opinion about the impossibility of war is completely blocked any initiative to change the disposition of troops. And it turns out close borders, in the ZapOVO, in June 1941, even exercises could be carried out! So what then there are stories about the fact that Stalin was so, they say, afraid to give the Germans a reason that demanded from the military that they sit quietly, like mice, and not stick their noses out anywhere?

Therefore, they say, they met the war in underpants ...

I don't know how General Boldin disposed of Zakharov's information, but with the outbreak of war he, commanding the operational group of troops, cut off from the main forces of the Western Front in area of the Bialystok ledge, successfully brought her out of the encirclement. But the commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov for direct evidence of a combat commander with rich military experience aviation division reacted, to put it mildly, inadequately ... And for the last time I give word directly to Zakharov:

"Commander of the Air Force of the district, General I. I. Kopets (June 22, 1941, he shoot himself. - **S.K.**) listened to my report with the attention that testified to his long-standing and complete confidence in me. So we're right there went with him to report to the commander of the district (front). While listening, Army General D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I have there was a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he asked with a smile if I was exaggerating. Commander intonation frankly replaced the word "exaggerate" with "panic" - he clearly did not accepted to the end everything that I said ... With that we left.

And we are told that Stalin "did not believe Pavlov's warnings."

And HERE, I'll perhaps shock the reader, stating that since June 18, 1941, Stalin, in fact, no longer needed anyone's warnings. **He knew for sure that the war will start very soon. And "informed" him about it himself ... Hitler!** Zakharov,

as I understand it, sincerely does not remember when he flew on the instructions of the general Koptsa - June 17 or 18. But I, who didn't fly with him then, am inclined to believe that he flew on June 18, spoke about this, June! In any case, no later ... And he flew **on Stalin's instructions** , , although he himself of course, he did not know, just as Kopets did not know this.

I invite the reader to think: why, if the task was given to Zakharov by the commander ZapOVO aviation, that is, a person from the department of People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, reports from Zakharov was received everywhere by border guards from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, headed by Commissar Beria? And they accepted silently, without asking questions: who, they say, are you and what do you

necessary? But why were there no questions? How come?! In a tense border atmosphere, the border itself is being landed by an incomprehensible plane, and the border patrol does not wonders: what, in fact, does the pilot need here? This could

happen in one case: when at the border under each, figuratively speaking, this plane was waiting for this plane. Why were they

waiting for him? Who needed, and even in real time, Zakharov's information? I am sure that there can be only one explanation: **no later than June 18, 1941**

Stalin conducted a personal strategic sounding of Hitler's intentions. Imagine

once again the situation of that summer... Stalin

receives information about the impending war from illegal immigrants and legal Merkulov's overseas residencies from the NKGB, from illegal immigrants General Golikov from the GRU General Staff, from military attaches and through diplomatic channels. But all this can be strategic provocation of the West, which sees the clash between the USSR and Germany own salvation. However,

there is intelligence of the border troops created by Beria, and you can't believe her information only possible, but necessary. This is integral information from such a branched peripheral intelligence network, that only it can be reliable. And this information proves the proximity of war.

Similar (and independent!) information also comes from intelligence departments. border military districts. And she, too, can and should be trusted. But how do you check everything? finally?

The ideal option is to ask Hitler himself about his true intentions. Not the Fuhrer's entourage, but himself, because the Fuhrer more than once unexpectedly even for the environment changed the deadlines for the implementation of their own orders!

And Stalin on June 18 turns to Hitler about an urgent direction to Berlin Molotov for mutual consultations. I emphasize, dear reader, that I'm not talking about a hypothesis, but a fact! Stalin did indeed make such an offer to Hitler.

Hitler refuses. Even if he began to delay the answer, this would be proof for Stalin the proximity of war. But Hitler refused at once. And Stalin understood: this is war. And for the final check sends Zakharov to intelligence, or rather, gives the appropriate orders, including here and Beria.

Information about Stalin's proposal to Hitler is found in the diary of the chief General Staff of the Land Forces of the Reich Franz Halder. This standard for any war historian's source was published by the Order of the Red Banner of Labor Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in 1968-1971, and on page 579 of volume 2, among other entries on June 20, 1941, there is the following:

"Molotov wanted to speak with the Fuhrer on 18.6."

One phrase ...

But this phrase, reliably fixing the fact of Stalin's proposal to Hitler for an urgent Molotov's visit to Berlin **completely overturns the whole picture of the last pre-war days!** Fully!

For the first time this phenomenal fact, which had somehow eluded my attention earlier, I discovered in a brilliant study by Arsen Martirosyan: "The Tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason? Truth of Stalin" (M.: Yauza, EKSMO, 2006), for which I am very grateful to him.

So, it is possible that the date of June 18 is as proposed by Stalin, but rejected by Hitler - indicated by Halder upon his knowledge, but Stalin made the proposal in the evening of the 17th, after some significant conversation with Merkulov and Fitin, about which - a little later.

After Hitler's refusal, one did not have to be Stalin to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov did and which can be formulated in four words:

"from day to day".

And Stalin instructs the People's Commissariat of Defense to ensure urgent and effective aerial reconnaissance of the border zone from the German side. And emphasizes that intelligence must be carried out by an experienced high-level aviation commander. Perhaps he gave such a task to the commander of the Air Force of the Red Army Zhigarev, who visited Stalin's office with 0.45 to 1.50 on June 17 (in fact, already on the 18th), 1941, and he called Kopts in Minsk.

Could Kopets have chosen a better candidate than Colonel Zakharov?

On the other hand, Stalin instructs Beria to ensure immediate and unhindered the transfer of information collected by this experienced aviator to

Moscow. That is why Zakharov on the entire route of his flight, in the zones of several border detachments, under each bush a border detachment was waiting, not even asking what kind of the plane landed in the border zone. After all, he sat down on "suitable sites" not according to own initiative. He was, of course, told in advance that all the information in real time must be periodically transmitted through the border guards, making landings after 30–50 kilometers.

And be sure to periodically, and not once at the end of the flight! Because, first of all, there was no time to wait! In real time, Stalin himself was waiting for information from Beria. At a speed of U-2 (later renamed Po-2) of about 120–150 kilometers per an hour time factor on a 400 km route was already significant.

And secondly ... Secondly, at some point the Germans could have shot down Zakharov. And then at least part of the operational information would have reached Stalin through Beria anyway.

She has come to a full extent. And by the evening of June 18, Stalin knew exactly and finally: the war is on the nose.

It is possible, however, that the reconstruction of events given by me is necessary in some respects. change (especially if Zakharov did not fly on the 18th, but on the 17th), that is, perhaps at first he was Zakharov's flight, and only after him - Stalin's appeal to Hitler. Possibly parallel combination of these events. But their interrelation and mutual conditionality in real, I emphasize, time scale.

Realizing that Hitler did decide to go to war with Russia, Stalin immediately (that is, not late in the evening of June 18) began to give appropriate orders to NCOs, the NC of the Navy and NKVD.

This could not but be noticed in one way or another by another's eye, which is also confirmed in note to Stalin, Molotov and Beria, sent by Merkulov on June 21, 1941.

The note contained the text of a conversation between two Moscow foreign diplomats that took place on June 20. Exact data regarding their citizenship in the text of a note published in the collection "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table", Foreign Service intelligence seized even in 1995! However, the conversation itself is important for us now, part of which I give below:

".....: When did your lieutenant general arrive?

.....: Yesterday. He saw Timoshenko and Zhukov.

.....: <...> Were you with him?

.....: I was with him.

<...>

.....: But he didn't ask anything? Tymoshenko knew that he was from your the general will not receive a suitable answer ... And here everyone is worried - war, war.

.....: Yes. Yes. The Russians have found out.

Yes, the Russians

did! And we learned in advance because the efforts of many large and small spies, undertaken in recent months, crowned Stalin's personal probing!

In the light of this sounding, the TASS Statement of June 14, 1941, that *"according to the USSR, Germany also steadily complies with the conditions Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on The USSR is deprived of any soil ... "*

Stalin, by the TASS statement of June 14, seemed to anticipate his subsequent a proposal to Hitler for the immediate dispatch of Molotov to Berlin. That is,

it was the first phase of sounding. The

proposal for an urgent visit by Molotov was the second phase. Hitler's refusal became a "litmus test". Zakharov's flight

and information from him, taken by Beria's border guards and immediately transferred by the latter to Stalin, put the last point.

Now it was necessary to immediately instruct Timoshenko, Zhukov and the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov about the urgent bringing - without much fuss - of border troops and fleets to combat readiness and wait for developments. As

they mounted, on June 21 Stalin authorized a second directive. That is, as Yuri Mukhin

and Arsen Martirosyan stated earlier, the first directive on readiness for an attack was sanctioned by Stalin on the evening of June 18 - immediately after Zakharov's flight. I

emphasize that what the reader has read I cannot confirm with anything other than

what has already been said. Reconstruction of events since June 14, when it was published TASS report, on the evening of June 18, when Colonel Zakharov flew to Bialystok, there the result, first of all, of a logical analysis, which was not easy for me. It stretched out for, perhaps, a couple of years and ended only in the course of work on this book. And let him the reader draws a conclusion about the reliability of my reconstruction.

Personally, I think that it fully reflects what actually happened. A while revealing the true role of Stalin and Beria in those days. They were at that time fully competent - each at his own level. Unlike so many others.

Moreover, Beria at that time was twice at his best: firstly, as an organizer "ant" reconnaissance of the border troops, which ensured the collection of strategically important and **absolutely reliable** (in general) information, and secondly, as the organizer of operational transferring Zakharov's information to Stalin.

There are other, indirect, however, confirmation of my reconstruction. So, Admiral Kuznetsov in his memoirs "On the Eve" writes:

"... The TASS report of June 14 sounds particularly illogical now that we know how Hitler reacted to it. June 17, that is, literally in three day, he gave the order to begin the implementation of the plan "Barbarossa" at dawn on June 22. Looking through the reports from the fleets, you can be sure of increased activity Germans at sea from this fateful date - June 17 ... "

However, everything is just logical here! If the TASS message was probing (and it was), and on the 17th, the second phase of the Stalinist sounding was carried out with a proposal for Molotov's visit, then Hitler, after his refusal, should have immediately authorized Barbarossa finally. He wasn't stupid either. Reich troops are made. Fuhrer still, perhaps, hesitated, but when he saw that Stalin put him in a situation of "the moment truth," I immediately realized that immediately after his refusal, Stalin would have to take urgent measures in the border military districts. This means that the factor surprise attacks are under threat.

And Hitler gave the final order. Moreover, there is a very interesting, also working for my reconstruction, evidence from the other side - in the memoirs of Luitpold Steidle, the former commander of 767th Grenadier Regiment of the 376th Infantry Division of the 6th Army of Paulus. On the eve of the war Steidle commanded a battalion of a regiment stationed in the area of the Bialystok ledge, and reports this:

"On the eighteenth of June, my regiment was ordered within 24 hours to requisition 600 horses and carts in a precisely marked area. The action was sudden and at first passed off as a police and veterinary event ... Now each company received an additional horse-drawn transport. The goal was set guarantee the highest degree of mobility... away from the main roads...

However, almost no one believed that the situation was so serious. And in the past more than once it happened that Hitler got his way through military demonstrations (as we see that before his direct sounding, Stalin had objective reasons to hesitate in assessing Hitler's plans. - **S.K.**) ... The division headquarters knew almost nothing about enemy, nor about how our command assesses the situation as a whole ... "

So, here, as a certain milestone, approximately the same (June 17-18) pre-war day. I think this is no coincidence.

THE LAST thing that remains for me to say here about the events of the last pre-war weeks, these are a few words both about the information support of Stalin in those days, and about his later informational betrayal by his former associates. That is about many years, in recent years even more strengthened lies about the fact that the war-de

"missed" Stalin. In

refutation of this lie, something has been said above. But I will give one more example of how even personally quite worthy people, either out of ignorance or inability to broad generalizations, either because of weakness of character, or because of meanness political correctors of their memories actually betray their Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, as they betrayed his colleague Beria. For example, on the back of the first flyleaf of Voskresenskaya's book, published in 1997, there is a photograph of her in uniform, in a hat, and under the photo there is a text ending facsimile of the author's signature. Here is the text in full:

"Our specialized team has been tasked with analyzing information of all foreign residencies regarding military plans Hitler's command, and prepare a memorandum. For this we selected materials from the most reliable sources, checked the reliability each agent who gave information about the preparation of the attack by the Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union (how "effective" such a test was can be judged by the fact that it did not reveal the dual role of the Lyceum student. - **S.K.**) ...

Our policy brief turned out to be quite voluminous, and the summary is short and clear: we are on the brink of war.

On June 17, 1941, according to the latest reports from the agents of the Sergeant Major and The Corsican completed this document with excitement. The final chord in it sounded:

"All military measures of Germany in the preparation of armed actions against the USSR are completely over, and a blow can be expected at any time". I

emphasize that it was June 17, 1941. Iosif

Vissarionovich got acquainted with our report and threw it away. "This bluff! he said irritably. - Don't panic. Don't get busy nonsense. Go ahead and find out more."

It's not presented as fiction, but as a historical fact. And from here you can see how since that Stalin, as he has been presented all these years ... A tyrant, stupidly, stubbornly unwilling to see the obvious and irritably tossing away "uncomfortable" information, the truth of which will be so tragically confirmed in four days ...

An even more dashing version is given in the book by A. Sukhomlinov "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria, which I will talk about in detail later. It has such an allegedly Stalinist visa:

"To Comrade Merkulov. You can send your source from the headquarters of the German aviation to e ... mother. This is not a "source", but a disinformers ... "

Further, A. Sukhomlinov writes: *"Stalin not only wrote obscene words, but also underlined twice. All this is in the archives ... "* Well, after Khrushchev and Gorbachev in archives you can really find a lot of things, never on a real Stalinist scale era that did not exist. But archives are different archives. So it's still sad that such "sensations" can appear even after not rehashings, not fabrications, but documents. And here it is - reliable. I mean mentioned me the collection "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table", which appeared on the shelves in two years before the publication of Voskresenskaya's book and ten years before A. Sukhomlinov's book. And in this collection on pages 161-162 you can read the document that Zoya Ivanovna quoted, shamelessly all, alas, distorted.

Firstly, it was not some kind of consolidated memorandum based on the materials of "all foreign residencies", but just an accompanying note by Merkulov No. 2279 / M to Stalin, Molotov and Beria dated June 17, 1941. Attached to the note was another undercover

report from Berlin, compiled on the basis of reports from the Chief and the Corsican No. 4261 and No. 4262 of 16.VI.41

In parentheses, I note that the falsifiers of the Gorchakov model, inventing mythical "secret collaborators" - Almaz, Carmen and others - allegedly "bombarded" Beria "desoy" and listed in his alleged visa on June 21, 1941, did not dare to include in this a fake list of the real Petty Officer and the Corsican. And here they are all the time reported on the impending attack, including in reports dated June 16, 1941. And those words that Voskresenskaya ascribes to herself as *her* final summary, in fact were the first item in the message of the Sergeant-Schulze-Boysen. Hence a few an unusual wording for our ear: "measures ... to prepare an armed speeches against the USSR ... "

The message from Berlin itself was, by the way, not the most informative and contained a number of although important, but secondary, against the backdrop of what is happening, information. The value of the work of Boysen and Harnack, of course, does not detract from this. Scout sends to the Center everything that learns, let alone rank the information, is the business of the Center's analysts.

As for **the real** Stalinist reaction to this note by the Merkulovs, I almost I will quote the text concerning it in full from editorial note 120 posted by on pages 232–233 of the collection of documents mentioned above:

"Having familiarized himself with the undercover message, Stalin on the same day (that is, June 17. - **S.K.**) summoned the People's Commissar of State security V. N. Merkulov and head of foreign intelligence P. M. Fitin. The conversation was conducted mainly with Fitin. Stalin was interested in the smallest source details. It seemed to Fitin that he had fully and accurately told about Corsican and the Chief and explained why intelligence trusts them. Stalin remarked: "Go, clarify everything, double-check this information and report back to to me"..."

Information about how the conversation went on June 17 comes from Fitin. And they draw us a completely different Stalin, a genuine one - not stubborn, but extremely responsible and cautious statesman.

Note 120 further states that as a result of Stalin's order given to June 17, became a document prepared on June 20, 1941 by foreign intelligence and known as "Calendar of messages of the Corsican and the Petty Officer from September 6, 1940 to June 16 1941". It contained all the basic information that warned of the upcoming war, indicating from whom and when the informants received this information. Resurrection I meant, most likely, it was him. However, in note 120 for some reason there are no indications of whether this "Calendar" hit Stalin's table on June 20. He's right ordered the results of the recheck to be reported to him, and it is unlikely that Fitin in that situation could ignore this order.

The collection of documents also contains Merkulov's notes to Stalin, Molotov and Beria Nos. 2294/M and 2295/M dated June 18, Nos. 2422/M, 2431/M, 2433/M dated June 21, as well as notes signed by Deputy Merkulov - Bogdan Kobulov, No. 2342 / M dated June 19, No. 2411 / M and 2412 / M dated June 20, 1941.

All these notes, reporting on information obtained by undercover agents in Moscow diplomatic circles also unambiguously spoke of an imminent war. And I I ask the reader to pay attention to two points. Firstly, the

fact that two days - June 19 and 20 - notes to Stalin left the NKGB for signed not by People's Commissar Merkulov, but by Kobulov. Second, there are large gaps in increasing numbers of NKGB intelligence notes cited in the SVR collection ... Judging by to this, the total amount of materials coming "upward" grew like an avalanche, in in full accordance with the aggravation of the situation.

But the collection does not contain a single note by Beria himself with data,

received by **his** intelligence - border troops, after June 5, 1941. But the information Beria's intelligence services also grew like an avalanche, and Beria could not help but send Stalin new notes. It seems that the compilers of the SVR collection simply did not have the courage - against the background of all "dusty camp" insinuations - to finally whitewash Lavrenty Pavlovich in this question, citing such notes dated mid-June. Although, as I suppose, **after**

June 18, Beria no longer had any notes to Stalin sent, because there was no need for additional information to Stalin personally - the Fuhrer personally became Stalin's informant.

Merkulov (by the way, his absence from Moscow during the hot days of June 19-20, when he was replaced by Kobulov, for a long time it remained incomprehensible to me) and Kobulov did not know about the personal probing Stalin and regularly continued to overwhelm him with first-class, and in fact, information no longer essential **for Stalin personally**.

Beria, both as a candidate member of the Politburo and deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and as a special trusted employee of Stalin, knew everything. And no longer wasted time preparing notes, but prepared for war together with Stalin.

It is also understandable why Stalin showed no interest in Fitin's Calendar. He too already outdated before it could be compiled. Although the note on June 17 played its positive role played.

By the way, the episode with Merkulov and Fitin, relating to June 17, is very good fits into my general reconstruction of Stalin's actions on that day and the following days. Stalin got acquainted with information from two Berlin agents more than once, and they are correct. supplemented the general picture that Stalin put together from the entire stream of information. But a note by Merkulov - Fitin dated June 17 could finally push Stalin to the last phase of his personal probing of Hitler. Chekists were with him that day before Air Force Commander Zhigarev. So, it is possible that Stalin summoned Zhigarev already in advance. midnight just then to give him an urgent task about the "field" verification of "headquarters" information. There is another

important piece of evidence coming from General Sudoplatov. Of course, he is not always accurate, but in this case his information is extremely significant and, for with the exception of some minor details, is clearly true. So, Pavel Anatolievich recalled that on the day when Fitin returned from the Kremlin, Beria summoned Sudoplatov to yourself. On the line of People's Commissariats, Sudoplatov Beria did not directly obey at that moment, but from the reconstruction of the situation that I have built, it should be clear to the reader what happened then no longer up to formal departmental affiliation, besides, Beria was also

Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

And General Sudoplatov already on June 17, 1941, received instructions from Beria to organization of a special group of experienced employees to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage actions in case of war. Moreover, one of the tasks of the group was and counteracting possible attempts by the Germans to organize a provocation like the one that the secret services of the Reich staged on the eve of the German-Polish war - "capture Poles" radio station in the German city of Gleiwitz. That is,

according to Sudoplatov, it turns out that Beria (and Stalin, of course!) - in contrast to from Timoshenko and Zhukov - began to prepare for war no later than June 17, 1941. The same Sudoplatov, by the way, recalled that on June 21, General Maslennikov from the command frontier troops did not hide his disappointment when he learned from Sudoplatov that his special the group will be ready no sooner than in ten days. And now

about the two-day absence in the capital on the very eve of the war, the people's commissar state security (!) Merkulov, who had just returned from the Baltic states. I think this absence is explained by the fact that Stalin, having given orders to the troops, sent

People's Commissar of State Security for another strategic inspection at the

border. The final conclusion is this: by June 18, there was no close attack by Germany a secret for the top leadership of the country, neither in the strategic nor in the operational

respect. I fully agree here with A. B. Martirosyan, who, by the way, conducted and good analysis of the difference between strategic and tactical surprise.

It is difficult to disagree with his conclusion that at the beginning of the war we often had it's not about the bungling of many military men, but with their direct betrayal! In any case, how the marshals and generals met the war, and not Stalin and Beria, except as a crime you won't name.

Links of marshals and generals to the "degaussing" effect of the TASS Statement of June 14 can convince only simpletons! Any political public statements and least of all cannot be a guide to action for the military. For a competent, real military man, only an order is such a guide! And the generals The Red Army could not (?) even fulfill the orders of the NPO to disguise ...

Since the end of the spring of 1941, every senior commander and general in the Western military districts were supposed to be like a tight string. And anyway, it was the duty of personal "teams" Timoshenko and Zhukov in Moscow, Pavlov in Minsk and Kirponos in Kyiv. But we have already seen how they were "preparing" for war... I

can tell you something else... "Something" not because it's more to report on this nothing, but because I am not writing a book about failures before the war, this topic should be built into the main story about Lavrenty Beria. But the

chief of staff of the KOVO, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, reports on January 2 1941 from Kyiv to the General Staff:

"[Mobilization] stock of ammunition in KOVO is extremely insignificant. It does not provide for the troops of the district even for the period of the first operation. <...> The main [main] A[rtilery] Department [management] does not fulfill its plans. Instead of planned according to the directive of the People's Commissar of September 20, 1940 No. 371649 for the second half a year 3684 wagons - only 1355 wagons were submitted to the district, and without needs of the district by type of ammunition.

etc.

The "clerk" generals from the General Staff, in the best clerical traditions, smuggle Purkaev's report to the State Agrarian University, and from there - again in the best clerical traditions - to February 1941 comes a reply:

"... The size of the supply of ammunition to the district according to the plan for the 2nd half of the year [19]40, based on the directive of the General Staff, was calculated only for partial meeting the needs of the district in [19]40. The delivery plan was completed by 34%",

etc. with a reassuring notice that, they say, during 1941 we will ship everything. Shipped! But how did the

General Staff prepare the directive of the People's Commissar, planning in advance to satisfy district needs only partially? Moreover, this need was satisfied by only third! And after that, people's commissar Timoshenko, industry, the Central Committee, personally Comrade Stalin, but cheerfully reported: "The armor is strong, and our tanks are fast ..."

The country really gave the army strong armor of the latest fast T-34 tanks (before the war there were more than one and a half thousand of them in the troops - a mighty force!), But the generals in before the storm, combat training was planned in such a way that ordinary tankers did not have opportunities to master this technique in the shortest possible time. And we had the same thing in the Air Force, led by the "victims of Beria" Smushkevich and Rychagov.

By the way, just as the clerks in buttonholes prepared for war, so they later, having already acquired shoulder straps, wrote about the war in official capital works. I'm still about I will say this...

Alas, we have a lot, a lot of obscure things in the coverage of the pre-war half of 1941 and especially the last pre-war and first war weeks. Let's say famous the "merit" of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in the timely bringing of the fleets to "readiness No. 1" ... Nikolai Gerasimovich always insistently emphasized that he did it in his own initiative, without the sanction of Stalin.

But it seems that Kuznetsov is being disingenuous... The fact that the fleets were more or less ready for the German attack is a fact. A here is the unauthorized return by the People's Commissar of the Navy of the order to bring the Navy into combat readiness is not a fact. Like the influence itself, by the way, of this order on readiness fleets. There are classified since 1943 "Notes of a participant in the defense of Sevastopol" by captain 1st rank A.K. Evseev, from which it follows that full combat readiness No. 1 on The Black Sea Fleet was announced *after* the first German bombs exploded on Primorsky boulevard of Sevastopol. Well,

okay, let Kuznetsov give the order on time, but they just didn't have time on Cherny sea to fulfill. But how could the people's commissar take such a step *before the start of hostilities* without a direct order from Stalin? After all, what is readiness number 1? This is the big signal.

collection "in the bases of the fleet, combat alarm on ships, brave men fleeing from dismissal Red Navy men and lieutenants in white tunics, white trousers and white shoes! IN Sevastopol, in Odessa, in Leningrad, in Riga, in Tallinn ... And agents

of the Abwehr are watching this commotion ... Yes, just citizens of the Third Reich, accidentally or on official business found themselves, say, in Tallinn. And suddenly the war take it and do not start on June 22. Let's say Hitler would still postpone for a week! He doesn't was going to poke around with us until the autumn thaw, he expected to complete everything before the autumn and could sacrifice another week for one reason or another.

And what would we have then? Most likely - at least - a note of the ausamt of the Reich to the NKID THE USSR. What's the maximum? As a maximum - the very reason for the attack, which is so Stalin feared. That's

it! No, this kind

of action in the country can go sideways! How can they go sideways and unauthorized initiators of such actions. Therefore, it is unlikely that Kuznetsov acted the day before war *at your own risk*. In other

words, and an analysis of the actions of the People's Commissar of the Navy proves that the army and navy Stalin's first sanction for preparatory measures was received at the same time - around June 18th. That's just whether it was completed on time even by the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR Admiral Kuznetsov? And even more so the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Zhukov?

But when, on June 21, Stalin once again sanctioned already full combat readiness, then Kuznetsov informed the fleets about the introduction of readiness No. 1. And the army team again "pulled the rubber".

Turning again to the memory of General Sudoplatov, it can be noted that on June 20, 1941, his old ally, General Eitingon, told Sudoplatov that he had been subjected to unpleasant impression conversation with the commander of the Western Special Military District General Pavlov - a longtime acquaintance of Eitingon back in Spain. Eitingon, calling Pavlov, in a friendly way, asked the commander which border areas it is worth paying special attention in the event of a war, but Pavlov, in response, *"stated something ... unintelligible ."* He believed that *"no special problems will arise even if the enemy manages to seize the initiative on the border at the very beginning, since he has enough forces in reserve to withstand any major breakthrough"*...

Writers like Grivadiy Gopozhaks slander Beria, but stupid and tragic misunderstanding of the situation was revealed, as we see, by the "innocent victim of Beria" - General Pavlov.

But is it "stupid" and "misunderstanding"? Are we dealing with a burp here? Tukhachevsky-Uborevich conspiracy? After all, why did Hitler hit through

Belarus, when, according to the general opinion, did he need Ukraine? Having occupied with a huge mass of her troops, he could count on a lot. And Hitler hit through Pinsk swamps ... Is it because he knew - it is here that the resistance to him will be disorganized traitors?

Already after it was written, I talked with my friend and colleague Belarusian Anatoly Nikolaevich Pokalo ... And he remembered how thirty years ago he fellow villagers, who in 1941 were already adults, told him that the day before war warned them: on Sunday, *"maneuvers" will begin and they will be thrown from aircraft barrels with burning fuel oil*". And in the aviation unit, which was based in near the village of Kuplin, Pruzhany district, Brest region, all machine guns, leaving armed only three planes on duty. Who soothingly "warned" about the "teachings"? By whose order was it filmed machine

guns? A modest but expressive monument to the Deputy commander of an air squadron of the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment to Senior Lieutenant Stepan Mitrofanovich Gudimov, who committed an aerial ramming on June 22, 1941 at 5:20. Is it because Gudimov was forced to go to the ram because he already had takeoff was not a single cartridge on board in the weapon?

Ordinary people are ordinary people. They don't want to falsify history. And, perhaps, this ingenuous story proves more convincingly than other studies: it is precisely in ZapOVO under the command of General Pavlov, in addition to numerous bunglers, there were many and outright traitors.

Who, by the way, generally had then more or less complete information about the situation? Circle persons in Moscow who were fully aware of it was extremely small: Stalin, his closest political environment directly involved in the events (actually Molotov and Beria) and his nearest military environment.

The circle of the first persons in the three border special districts who had the opportunity to see the situation of the last days before the war as a whole, was also, in general, not great.

Baltic OVO: commander F. I. Kuznetsov; chief of staff in volume 1 "History of the Great Patriotic War" edition of 1961 is not marked; member of the Military Council of P. A. Dibrov; army commanders: 8th - P.P. Sobennikov and 11th - V.I. Morozov.

The commander of the Kuznetsov district was removed on June 30, 1941, then he fought without much shine. However, there is convincing evidence that he somehow prepared the troops for war.

Chief of Staff - not taken into account by the official "History ..." edition of 1961, and in reality - Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov, born in 1892, in July 1941 dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army, date of death - July 10, 1941.

Dibrov, a member of the Military Council, held secondary positions during the war. The commander of the 8th Army, Sobennikov, had a dubious military fate, was demoted to the rank of colonel, and was sentenced on probation. Commander of the 11th Army Morozov also fought not in the best way. Western

OVO: commander D. G. Pavlov; chief of staff V. E. Klimovskikh; member Military Council A. Ya. Fominykh; army commanders: 3rd - V.I. Kuznetsov, 10th - K.D. Golubev, 4th - A.A. Korobkov. The district commander

Pavlov was shot in 1941. Chief of Staff of the Klimovskys shot in 1941. Member of the Military Council of the Fomins after the start of the war, hopelessly lowered.

Commander of the 3rd Army Kuznetsov fought valiantly, Hero of the Soviet Union. The commander of the 10th Army, Golubev, left the encirclement in 1941 and fought. Commanding Korobkov was shot by the 4th Army in 1941.

Kyiv OVO: commander M. P. Kirponos; chief of staff M. A. Purkaev; member Military Council N. I. Vashugin; army commanders: 5th - M. I. Potapov, 6th -

I. N. Muzychenko, 26th - F. Ya. Kostenko, 12th - P. E. Ponedelin. The commander of the Kirponos district died in the autumn of 1941. Chief of Staff Purkaev, highly praised by Zhukov, since April 1943 commanded the troops of the non-belligerent Far Eastern Front.

On June 28, 1941, Vashugin, a member of the Military Council, shot himself.

Army commander Potapov was captured in the summer of 1941, returned in 1945 home, passed a special check in the NKVD and in December 1945 was reinstated Red Army.

The commander of the 6th Army Muzychenko was captured in the summer of 1941, in 1945 returned to his homeland, passed a special check in the NKVD and in December 1945 was restored to personnel of the Red Army.

Army commander Kostenko died in the spring of 1942. The

commander of the 12th Army, Ponedelin, was captured in the summer of 1941, at the same time he was in absentia sentenced to death, in 1945 he was returned to his homeland, after an investigation that lasted until 1950, he was shot. That is, there were

almost no living reliable witnesses of what was happening **even immediately after the war** - And what was there in the districts after June 18, 1941, now to establish, rather everything, it's impossible at all - after Khrushchev's and Volkogonov's pogrom in state archives. But the list given by me, I think, only adds doubts.

And how did Beria's border guards meet the war? Well, let me answer this one for me question the author of the monograph "The Border is Fighting" published in 1989 by the Military Publishing House A. I. Chugunov:

"The last night before the invasion for the border troops of the western and the northwestern sections were actually no longer peaceful. From the evening of June 21 many outposts, border commandant's offices and detachments, by order of their chiefs left the barracks and occupied defensive structures prepared in case of hostilities.

But then another question arises: "And who gave orders to the bosses"? And what means "...many"? What,

at some outposts, the chiefs said to their subordinates: "What, guys, is the night warm, starry, shall we sit this night in the trenches? Of these, you can see the stars better! ", And on in some outposts the night was cloudy, and there in the trenches - to admire the stars, did not sit down?

No, such a responsible order as the order to take combat positions in the evening could to come to the outposts only from Moscow, from the people's commissariat. And only he could give such an order people's commissar. That is, Beria. And, of course, for the entire western strip of the border.

True, there are reports that border guards were not prohibited at all occupy defensive structures. Okay, so be it! But who initiated this state of affairs (in fact, permission to act according to the situation), if not the people's commissar Beria? And could he give such a "carte blanche" without the knowledge and consent of Stalin? And could Stalin confine himself to the border troops of the NKVD and forget about the Red Army and the RKKA? After all the opposite side can see the actions and everyday life, primarily of the border troops.

So the information of A. Chugunov proves once again: both Stalin knew about the war, and the rest knew. But someone took action, and someone for some reason - no!

However, the border guard general Sechkin, known to us, claims the opposite: they say that the border units *"did not receive such an order (to occupy defensive structures. - S.K.) even when at 22.00 22.6 the General Staff ordered western border districts on putting into effect a plan to cover the border.*

But, alas, dear reader, Sechkin must be trusted very selectively. When he reports something objectively positive for Stalin and Beria (without linking this, however, with

their names), then you can trust him. But in other cases...

Not to mention his reproduction of anti-Beria fakes dated June 21, 1941, Sechkin is able to maliciously distort and even invent "facts" himself. So; he, with reference to the "democratic" "historian" V. Anfilov, wrote something that then more than once others like him were copied from him, and what has long become one of persistent anti-Stalinist (and anti-Beria, of course) myths.

Anfilov and Sechkin argued that "the head of the combat training department Lieutenant General V. Kurdyumov ""at a meeting in December of the fortieth year" said:

"The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that out of 225 regimental commanders involved in the muster, only 25 people turned out to be graduated from military schools. The remaining 200 people are people who graduated junior lieutenant courses and those who came from the reserve.

Comments on such a sensational fact were not required, the conclusion suggested itself yourself: here they are, the results of the "defeat of the Red Army" by Stalin and Beria. But this "fact", as they say, did not correspond to reality. That is, it was a lie!

Anfilov launched his "duck" in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper on June 22, 1988, Sechkin gave it a second wind in 1993 in a book signed for publication on October 20, 1992. AND therefore, neither one nor the other could assume that on April 14, 1993, in the publishing house "TERRA" will sign volume 12(1) of the "Russian Archive" for publication, which opens the multi-volume publication of documents of the Great Patriotic War. The volume is entirely devoted to materials Meetings of the top leadership of the Red Army on December 21-23, 1940 and contains speeches as the head of the Combat Training Department of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikolaevich Kurdyumov, and Inspector General of the Infantry of the Red Army Andrei Kirillovich Smirnov.

Kurdyumov fought, died in 1970. Smirnov, commanding the 18th after the start of the war army of the Southern Front, died in battle near the village of Popovka (now the village of Smirnov) Zaporozhye areas.

The report of General Smirnov does not contain a single figure at all, regarding fees the following was said (p. 30):

"We are now holding training camps for infantry commanders. It should be noted that almost all districts reacted sufficiently to the training camps for infantry commanders seriously. If the first training camp was still poorly organized, now the main link that should resolve all issues of combat training is the link of the command composition, occupied an appropriate place in the understanding of the leaders of the districts, corps and divisions.

General Kurdyumov devoted the fourth section to the training of the commanding staff of his speech, and there are numbers in his speech. In particular, reporting that the deployment of new parts causes a shortage of senior and middle commanding staff, especially in the internal military districts, he said:

"So, in the PriVO, 70 percent of the middle command staff and commanders battalions have practical command experience from 5 months to 1 year (this was clear to Kurdyumov's listeners, and so, and I will remind the reader what is in mind not team experience in general, but experience on currently occupied positions. - **S.K.**). In the same district, all commanders of rifle regiments, except for one, command units for the first year.

General Kurdyumov cited this example as the most disturbing, but it must be borne in mind that the PriVO is not the PribOVO ... The second is the border *Baltic* Special military district, and the first, where the situation with the regimental commanders was not the best, is

deep inland *Privolzhsky* military district, the combat capability of which is decisive didn't matter.

That's why I don't trust General Sechkin! And not only to him - I'll tell you more about it ...

ACTUALLY, General Sechkin refutes himself. At one point in his book, he claims that the units of the border troops did not receive orders to occupy defensive structures even after the General Staff ordered the military districts to enter operation of the border cover plan. In another place, he reports that "there were no orders that would forbid the border guards from occupying defensive structures" at all. So, it turns out, the most experienced border commanders, who have long been confident that war cannot be avoided, realizing that now, most likely, everything will begin, and **having freedom of action**, sat on the outposts like gophers? Yes,

General Sechkin, wanting to bite Stalin and Beria here, is simply slandering his own or comrades-in-arms! Moreover! He himself reports that on that night, from June 21 to 22, 1941, on the site of the 87th border detachment of the Belarusian border district was Head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD! So lieutenant general Grigory Grigorievich Sokolov happened to be there - in the direction of the main blow Germans?

Sechkin does not give the name of the head of the GUPV, and this is also significant! In his interpretation of this nameless chief, although he received data at 2.00 on June 22, 1941 about the movement of the Germans to the border, "did not give the order to the border guards to occupy defensive structures." Knowing what we know (and what else we will know now!), we can confidently say that this is a lie!

Of course, the main border guard of the country could not be at the border without a direct order Beria and without the sanction of Stalin. Since it was already clear to both of them that from day to day a difficult war would begin, Sokolov was needed precisely there, in Belarus, so that immediately with the beginning of hostilities, to organize the combat work of border guards already in conditions war.

That's why Sokolov was in the border zone! For KGB participation in close war!

37-year-old General Grigory Sokolov was quite worthy of such a task. native Mytishchi near Moscow, at the age of 16 he became a Red Army soldier on the Southern Front, and after Civil War step by step went through the entire service border ladder, starting with the assistant commander of the border platoon. Served on the border Kirkenes to Siberia and Central Asia. Having

met the war on the border, he soon became the head of the rear guard of the Western front - the hardest post, given the failures of General Pavlov and K °. And revealing the fact that about this activity of Sokolov, scanty biographical information is most often they are silent, counting his combat biography of 1941 directly from the position of chief headquarters of the Central Front, which he occupied for only three days - from August 22 to 25.

They are also silent about the fact that from September to October, General Sokolov was deputy Chief of the General Staff, collecting and analyzing data on the situation at the front and preparing conclusions and proposals for the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Since October, he has been the chief of staff of the 26th Army, which took over *the* main blow of the 2nd Panzer near Tula. Guderian groups. At the end of 1941, Sokolov formed a new reserve 26th army and went with her to the Volkhov front.

Talking in such detail about General Sokolov, dear reader, I do not shy away from the main theme. Sokolov, who died in 1973, is clearly one of the "iconic" figures the last peaceful and first war days of 1941. And this is a figure from the KGB cohort of People's Commissar Beria. The People's Commissar is slandered, one of his associates is silenced. In the published in 1985, the publishing house "Soviet Encyclopedia" of the one-volume encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War. 1941–1945" Sokolov is not named. Even include Soifertis graphics

the compilers did not forget about the war in the encyclopedia. But Sokolov was

"forgotten". Still would! After all, the fact that Beria sent on the eve of June 22, 1941 to Belarus head of the GUPV of the NKVD of the USSR is also one of the refutations of the anti-Stalinist and anti-Beria myths that Stalin and Beria did not believe in the imminence of war! But the truth is as follows: in the fact that for the border troops of the NKVD the war began in the trenches, and not in the beds, there is merit and Stalin, and Beria, and General Sokolov.

Border guards have always been able to fight, and one experienced border soldier in conditions complex, dynamic battle without a single front line, without a clear command, cost, perhaps, five, or even ten, *or even fifty* ordinary conscripts. They, young and older guys in green caps, were before the war in the western borders of about one hundred thousand: 47 land and 6 sea border detachments, 9 separate border commandant's offices and 11 regiments of operational troops of the NKVD. And in the outbreak of war they immediately played a strategic role, without exaggeration, because *they* kept in an environment in which army units would roll back in just *hours*.

Yes, they rolled - where at the head of the units and formations were those grief-"commanders" who were "provided" to the country by the emerging party of partocrats.

But the border guards under the leadership of a member of the Lenin-Stalin party, Comrade Beria welcomed the war with dignity. That is, like the Bolsheviks and the Russian people.

Breast!

Chapter 16 WAR: THE HAMBURG ACCOUNT RANKING

AFTER 4.00 on the penultimate Sunday in June 1941, all assumptions passed into confidence. The war has begun. But how and when did it begin for Stalin and Beria?

After the 20th Congress, held at the beginning of 1956, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites tried to imagine Stalin as a scoundrel who abandoned the country on June 22, 1941 to the mercy of fate and left to get drunk at the dacha in Kuntsevo, allegedly saying, they say, *prosr ...* the country, so now and figure it out

yourself. This "fact" was considered "reliable" for decades.

Still - it was announced by the head of state and the party! Valentin Pikul delicious painted "Stalin's insanity" in his "Stalingrad", and there are quite a few of our fellow citizens who believe this vile lie to this day.

But in 1995, a book by a retired colonel general was published in Tver Yu. A. Gorkov, consultant of the Historical Archives and Military Memorial Center General Staff, under the name "Kremlin. Bid. General Staff. Circulation is small - nine thousands of copies, the general himself does not reveal any special historicity of thinking, talks about Stalin's "crimes", and the assessments of this retired General Staff officer sometimes frustratingly superficial. However, the book turned out to be valuable to others: almost the first Yu. Gorkov got access to the "Journal of visits to I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin Cabinet" and published extensive extracts from it. The general

himself evaluated the "Journal ..." as follows:

"A unique, invaluable source is of special importance - the register of persons who visited it (Stalin. - **S.K.**) in the Kremlin office, now stored in the archive of the President of the Russian Federation (former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU).

Indeed, the data of this "Journal ..." exposes many lies about Stalin, and even General Gorkov writes:

"Let's go back ... to the first days of the Great Patriotic War. It's around

they concentrated the thickest atmosphere of gossip and rumors. TO Unfortunately, the opinion has already become a textbook that these days I.V. Stalin, deeply depressed by the collapse of his offensive doctrine (God have mercy, where could he have got it in 1941? - S.K.), deceived **and** humiliated (wow! - **S.K.**) Hitler, fell into deep apathy, and on June 22 and 23 in general drunkenly, without taking any part in the affairs of government state. So, an analysis of the journal of visits by I.V. Stalin shows that I. V. Stalin was in his Kremlin office from the early morning of June 22 1941..."

For a "complete clarification of the circumstances of the case", Yu. A. Gorkov cites a table working days of I.V. Stalin in June 1941, from which it follows that: June 22, Stalin started reception at **5.45** and ended at **16.45**, taking people 11 hours in a row!

June 23, starting at 3.20, he finished at 0.55 on June 24, and on this day, after rest Stalin, the flow of people flowed through his office for "only" 5 hours and 10 minutes. However, one must It was also with the situation to understand in more detail, to think ...

But on June 25, Stalin's working day was all 24 hours! On this day, he received 29 people! On June 26, 24

people were received in 10 hours and 35 minutes, and on June 27, in 10 hours 05 minutes - again 29! Like this! General Gorkov concludes:

"I think now the question of the disappearance of I.V. Stalin in the first days of the war can be considered resolved, since the official log visitors to his office - the source is not opportunistic. This document is strictly secrecy was not intended for publication and may serve as the most reliable source of information about persons who visited Stalin's office.

Yuri Gorkov cannot be classified as a "Stalinist" in any way - his personal perception of the figures Stalin and Beria are not far from those images that Antonov-Ovseenko, Volkogonov, Radzinsky are imposing on us ... However, as far as documents are concerned, the general did not disappoint here! For what and thanks to him!

As for the extracts he cites from the "Journals of visits to I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office", then these extracts begin on January 1, 1935 and end on December 17, 1945.

Unfortunately, Yu. Gorkov's daily lists are not complete - he stipulates that they "selectively indicate mainly the names of visitors to the office Stalin, who were directly connected with the organization of defense and combat actions during the Great Patriotic War. And such a "selection" allows, as I understand, cut off most of the records about Beria. But not all. On

June 21, entries begin at 18.27 with the arrival of Molotov. At 19.05 Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky, Timoshenko, Kuznetsov joined Stalin and Molotov. At 20.15 Timoshenko and

Voznesensky left, and after 35 minutes Timoshenko returned to an hour and a half already with Zhukov and Budyonny ... It is believed that at that time Directive No. 1, but something was "discussed" for too long a short document of twenty lines... After all, even before that, the meeting participants had been talking about something for almost an hour and a half...

One way or another, after 22 hours 20 minutes on June 21, 1941 in Stalin's office besides his master, only three people remained: Molotov, Voroshilov, and Beria. Soon Beria went away for a short while and came back at 22.40. At 11

p.m., Beria, Molotov and Voroshilov left, and Stalin was left alone. It seems that he already understood that his directives of the last days were executed by the army men out of hand. Badly. But at the moment he could not change anything, and he needed to rest -

The next day promised to be difficult.

I think that Beria also slept that night, and for the same reason - from now on he is already so dense work schedule for years became super-dense.

DAY 22 June 1941 began with the fact that at 5.45 in Stalin's office Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, Zhukov entered. At 7.30 Malenkov came and left together with Beria at 9.20. But at half past twelve, when only Molotov, they reappeared together for half an hour. And before that often associated in common tasks, Malenkov and Beria will now interact more and more closely with all twelve subsequent years - until the day of Beria's arrest on June 26, 1953.

The full "photo" of the first working war day of Stalin, the first of those 1418 days when he bore a responsibility for Russia unprecedented in history, is as follows:

Molotov 5.45 - 12.05

Beria 5.45 - 9.20

Timoshenko 5.45 - 8.30

Mekhlis 5.45 - 8.30

Zhukov 5.45 - 8.30

Malenkov 7.30 - 9.20

Mikoyan 7.55 - 9.30

Kaganovich 8.00 - 9.35

Voroshilov 8.00 - 10.15

Kuznetsov (Central Committee)

8.15 — 8.30 Dimitrov 8.40

— 10.40 Manuilsky 8.40 —

10.40 Kuznetsov 9.40 -

10.20 Mikoyan 9.50 -

10.30 Molotov 12.55 -

16.45 Voroshilov 11.40 -

12.05 Beria 11.30 -

12.00 Malenkov 11.30 -

12.00 Voroshilov 12.30 -

16.45 Mikoyan 12.30 -

14.30 Vyshinsky **13.05 - 15.25**

Shaposhnikov 13.15 - 16.00

Timoshenko 14.00 - 16.00

Zhukov 14.00 - 16.00

Vatutin 14.00 - 16.00

Kuznetsov (Navy) 15.20 - 15.45

Kulik 15.30 - 16.00

Beria 16.25 - 16.45

Note: both on the last day of peace and on the first day of war, the last one to leave Stalin's cabinet was Beria. He reappeared in it on June 23 - exactly one day later minute by minute and again by twenty minutes.

On that day, June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and from the same June 23, Beria became one of the permanent advisers to the Headquarters. There were twelve of them in total: Marshal Kulik, Meretskov, Air Force Chief Zhigarev, Vatutin, Air Defense Chief Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis and Beria.

From midnight on the night of June 23-24, Beria spent more than an hour in Stalin's office, and the following days sometimes remained in it for three hours, then for half an hour, several times a

day.

And the office was reminiscent of a seashore in a storm: they rolled on it and rolled human waves, but did not overwhelm him, but rolled back into the sea of the outbreak of war. By the way, on June 24, from 20.15 to 20.35, Stalin found time to receive a test pilot Stepan Suprun, who made an appointment on June 23! Suprun - in general, although well-known, but rather ordinary military man. However, Stalin not only found time for him, but also immediately gave the go-ahead to his idea of forming selected aviation regiments from test pilots. And it was not

memoirists or writers who told us about all this, but extremely dry (last name, date, time; last name, date, time ...) document! So - it was enough to publish the document, and a huge layer of lies collapsed about Stalin's "binge drinking". Although, to be honest, it would be no wonder with grief and drink it down, discovering how let down Russia and its leader by those on whom there was the most hope - the military! This is for them, Stalin and the country gave weapons, personnel, funds. Constantly delving into *the general* defense problems, *purely military* problems Stalin left to the military, to professionals. And they...

Yes, a lot of things become clear when analyzing the documents. And then the lie collapses. Like a lie about Stalin, and the lies about Beria ...

POSSIBLE, the reader has long been circling on the tongue about such questions: "Really Is the lie about Beria so total? Is he really a worthy person in all respects, and not "geek"? Well, you can believe that he was a great organizer. But his hands are in blood?"

What can I say...

Blood?

When?

With the beginning of Beria's work at the head of the NKVD of the USSR, the scale of repression in the country fell to the minimum without which any state cannot do in acute periods of its stories.

With the beginning of the war, blood became its (war) inevitable element. Soon after At the end of the war, Beria retired from the work of the NKVD until March 1953.

In March 1953, having returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he began with amnesties and rehabilitations. So where is it blood?

During the period of repression in Georgia? But even there it was minimal, and all terrible the tales of the "old Bolsheviks" and "victims of terror" about the alleged "sadist" Beria are not worth that paper on which they were written. Having said something about this, I will say something additionally in my time. And

here's another thing... Well, it doesn't happen that someone would behave like a person for years, rooted in caring for others, and then suddenly behave like a bloodthirsty monster! No, if someone is internally rotten, then his rottenness is somehow manifested in everything, and especially if that someone gets the power. Moreover, power over millions of people. *This immediately begins to amuse the demon ...*

Beria, having received power in Georgia, not sparing himself, corrected the "collective farm" excesses predecessors and persuaded his fellow tribesmen that prosperity is better than poverty ... He immediately same, unlike its predecessors, was concerned about the problems of the development of younger generations in Georgia and in general the rise of education in the republic; immediately - as opposed to again predecessors - thought about the restructuring of the Georgian capital, and not just thought, but became one of the authors of such an urban plan, where every idea was is focused on the smart arrangement of the life of the broad masses, and not on the pompous self-aggrandizement... He turned Georgia into an all-Union health resort. And suddenly

- here, during the period of repression, he is - if you believe some

"memoirists" - begins to gouge out the eyes of fellow citizens with a fork! Although objective analysis proves otherwise...

No, there was never *innocent* blood on the hands of Lavrenty Pavlovich - he knew her the price, among other things, because he himself had to shed blood - his own. Behind the work he served.

So what kind of blood are we talking about then? Maybe something related to activity. Beria's subordinates of the NKVD barrage detachments? Or - "with forced deportation peoples"? Well, dear reader, we will get to the barrage detachments, and to forced deportation...

However, I must confess ... So much has been lied about and is being lied about our recent history, and it is so difficult to believe in **the totality** of this lie that even I, the author of the book, periodically had the thought: "Is it possible that everyone lies so amicably about Beria?"

Well, okay, embittered Antonov-Ovseenko ... Or - direct agents of influence "politburoist" Yakovlev and "general" Volkogonov, libelist Radzinsky ... Well, okay, or out of their minds, or fictitious Khrushchevites, "old Bolsheviks" like Snegov and Dora Lazurkina... But

Vyacheslav Molotov? Lazar Kaganovich? Klim Voroshilov? Anastas Mikoyan? Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev and aircraft designer Yakovlev ... Marshals Voronov and Zhukov, Konev and Bagramyan? Metallurg Tevosyan? Admiral Kuznetsov?

Could they be lying like that? And if Beria deserved a kind word, then why they didn't say it about him at least decades later? But,

firstly, about Beria - when he was already destroyed - his contemporaries and kind words. And the reader with some of them in due time get acquainted.

Secondly, Beria's human condition was sometimes given evidence even people who hated him or disliked him, although they themselves did not understand that testify. Later the reader will get acquainted with them.

Thirdly, Beria's objective assessments were suppressed so carefully for decades that, for example, the father of one of my senior colleagues Mikhail Vitoldovich Kaminsky is Vitold Savelyevich Kaminsky, whom Beria helped to resolve the issue of construction of two factories for the production of aviation gasoline, spoke about this already adult son under the strictest confidence, although he kept completely good memories. Fourthly,

when my story reaches later times, I will give samples of the most vile lies about Beria at the highest level, and they will prove: yes, they lied totally, officially and vilely. And,

finally, I ask the reader to also take into account the fact that everything I have mentioned above (as well as many unmentioned), the first persons of the state were silent, complicit in Khrushchev's lies about how Stalin met the war! After all, NONE of those who were in good health in 1956, in the 60s, in 70s and even in the 80s, and knew exactly how Stalin spent the first day of the war, did not exalt a voice in defense of both Stalin and historical truth. After all,

Molotov did not stand up in the hall of the 20th Congress and did not say in response to Khrushchev's insinuations during whole voice to the whole country and to the whole world: "Yes, how dare you lie so meanly, citizen Khrushchev, because after such a lie you are not my comrade! I left my friend's office Stalin an hour before the onset of June 22, 1941, and again entered his office the next morning without fifteen six. And then I was day after day in this office several times a day!" And Malenkov didn't get up... And Kaganovich...

Marshals and

generals didn't get up when Khrushchev, mocking our history with tribune of the XX Congress, wrote himself down as a strategist and denied military leadership talent Supreme Commander. But they were all sitting in the hall then - except for Marshal Rokossovsky, who was then the Minister of Defense of Poland.

Is it any wonder after this that Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites soon dealt with the same Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, pushing them into a dark corner stories?!

Marshals Voroshilov and Zhukov did not get up. They did not stand up after Khrushchev said this about Stalin:

"He didn't understand anything about military affairs, he almost went out with a globe when the situation was reported to him, he pulled out a map from behind his top, on which was placed almost the whole world ... "

But Marshal Timoshenko, Marshal Vasilevsky, and Admiral Kuznetsov. On the other hand, the latter somehow mentioned that he saw Stalin almost through week after the start of the war. But he was summoned to Stalin's office at 15:20 Moscow time on June 22, 1941.

And others - either who passed through this cabinet in the first days of the war, or who received Directly from his master orders and orders - also did not get up. They all then remained silent. Why? Let's go back to the days before the war and see what is written about them in those memoirs Admiral Kuznetsov, which are called "On the Eve". Their revised edition Military publishing house released in 1990 ... Page 285:

"Even in the afternoon of June 21, it became known: the next night we can expect a German attack ... "

Page 299:

"At about 11 pm (June 21. - **S.K.**) the phone rang. I heard Marshal Timoshenko's voice:
- There is very important information. Come to me..."

The question immediately arises: "So when it became known:" in the **afternoon of 21 June**" or "**About 11 p.m.**"? Reading page 299 further:

"... A few minutes later we (with Rear Admiral Alafuzov. - **S.K.**) were already going up to the second floor of a small mansion, where office of S. K. Timoshenko.

Marshal, walking around the room, dictated ... Army General G.K. Zhukov was sitting at table and wrote something ...

Semyon Konstantinovich ... without naming sources, he said that it is considered a possible German attack on our country ... Zhukov got up and showed us a telegram that he had prepared for border districts (the chronology of Admiral Kuznetsov does not agree well with given by General Gorkov. - **S.K.**). I remember that it was spacious - for three sheets (and the "Directive No. 1" now being put up for public viewing is very brief. - **S.K.**). It outlined in detail what should be done by the troops in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany.<...> I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov: - Run to headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the full actual readiness number one..."

Admiral Kuznetsov, while reporting this, did not seem to understand that he was in fact almost debunking

his "merit", because he gave the notorious order when the delay with his return would be tantamount to treason.

Secondly, if only five hours before the start of the war the Chief of the General Staff bothered to sit down for writing detailed instructions to the Armed Forces that they "should be taken ... in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany," then such a grief for the boss is not something that should be driven in disgrace in three necks. He should be shot for a crime neglect of your duties! Is not it? But that's not all!

Reading page 300:

"Later I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned June 21 at about 5 p.m. to JV Stalin. Therefore, already at that time ... it was it was decided to bring the troops to full combat readiness and, in the event of attacks repel it. So it all happened in about eleven hours before the actual enemy invasion of our land.

And again the question arises: "What does Kuznetsov mean by writing "it happened"?"

Eleven hours before the attack "occurred", as I understand it, the last (but - if I was right in the previous reconstruction of events - not the first) Stalin's sanction to put troops on alert. But even by 11 pm on June 21 "not occurred" sent a directive about this to the troops.

Why?

What, Stalin is to blame for

this? But that's not all! Read page 300 below:

"Not so long ago I happened to hear from General of the Army I. V. Tyulenev - in at that time he commanded the Moscow military district, - that on June 21, **at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.**), I.V. Stalin called him and demanded to increase the combat readiness of air defense".

It turns out that it is no longer "17 hours", but "2 o'clock in the afternoon"? But that's not all! Reading page 300 Further:

"That evening (June 21. - **S.K.**) Moscow officials were summoned to I.V. leaders A. S. Shcherbakov and V. P. Pronin. According to Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin, Stalin ordered ... to detain the secretaries of the district committees in their places ... "A German attack is possible," he warned ... "

But what is interesting is that neither Shcherbakov nor Pronin are on the daily visiting lists. Stalin's cabinet, brought by General Gorkov, no! As there is no Merkulov with Fitin in the entries for June 17.

Why?

Actually, in Gorkov's book there is a strange gap in the dates: after June 11 to On June 17, Gorkov gives no data at all on visiting Stalin's office.

On June 11, Timoshenko, Zhukov, the commander of PribOVO, were there from 21.55 to 22.55 Kuznetsov, political workers Zaporozhets and Dibrov, and then aviators Zhigarev, Stefanovsky and Kokkinaki. Moreover, with Stefanovsky, who left already at 1.45 on June 12, Stalin took half an hour talked alone. And then - according to Gorkov - he takes a time-out until June 17, but on that during the day, according to Gorkov, he receives only Vatutin for half an hour, and after midnight - Zhigarev, which we

already know. Nevertheless, General Gorkov gave a sly reservation that he "selectively" cited "mainly the names of visitors to Stalin's office who were directly associated with the organization of defense and combat operations during the Great Patriotic War

war." And it turns out that it seems that Gorkov and the discoverer of the "Journal ..." and at the same time he could throw out any surname, distorting the real "photo" of this or that Stalinist working day, without the risk of being accused of deliberately concealing the truth.

But what - there was not enough space and printing ink for the days from June 11 to 17? After all, not it may be that at such a time, being in Moscow, Stalin is so no one these days and did not accept! No, it seems that he accepted, if on page 79 of his own book Yu. Gorkov reports:

"In the context of the impending war, on June 13, S. K. Timoshenko asked permission from I.V. Stalin to put on alert and deploy the first echelons according to cover plans. But permission has not been received."

I can believe ... Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not wanted to give Hitler no reason for it. It is known that Hitler was very unhappy the fact that Stalin could not be provoked. Y. Gorkov himself writes about this - on the page 78th. Therefore, on June 13, Stalin could still hesitate - is it time to take all possible deployment measures. Therefore, he began his own soundings, starting with Statements TASS, which, it turns out, after a conversation with Tymoshenko, he wrote.

That is, it turns out that the description of the last pre-war week and the general Gorkov, and Marshal Zhukov, and others (for example, Marshal Vasilevsky, for example, later stated that "... it was necessary to boldly cross the threshold", but "Stalin did not dare to do this") is fundamentally distorted! Here

is another thought-provoking fact - from the memoirs of Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovleva, before the war from the post of artillery commander of Kyiv OVO appointed by the head of the GAU:

"By June 19, I had already finished handing over to my successor and was almost on track said goodbye to now former colleagues. On the move because the headquarters district and its departments these days just received an order to relocation to Ternopil and hastily curtailed work in Kyiv.

What is written does not differ from the book by G. Andreev and I. Vakurov "General Kirponos", published by Politizdat of Ukraine in 1976:

"... in the afternoon of June 19, an order was received from the People's Commissar of Defense to the field administration of the district headquarters to be relocated to the city of Ternopil.

So, not even "2 pm" on June 21, but on June 19? But why is this county government suddenly hurried to Ternopil, where in the building of the former headquarters of the 44th Infantry Division was the front command post located? We are told that the "tyrant" and "fool" Stalin did not allow the commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov to withdraw troops to summer camps, although there was no crime in that - planned combat training. And here is the headquarters of the Kyiv Special the military district is removed from its place! Who could give instructions about this, if not Stalin?

And what - the KOVO were given the order to deploy the field administration of the district (that is, already, in fact, the front), but the ZapOVO did not? Before Kirponos to Kyiv, urgent instructions for the second half of June 19 they reached, but didn't manage to reach Pavlov in Minsk by June 21? Let me not believe!

And now, having asked *myself* and the reader these questions, I really *finally* I will give the key chronology of the events of June 1941, as I imagine them ...

Beginning of June - increase in information about military activity on that day side of the border.

The first half of June - an increase in concern, and then anxiety

Stalin; his reflections and formation of the idea of Hitler's personal probing.

June 13 - report by S. K. Timoshenko. Stalin's acceptance of the final decisions about their own strategic political sounding of the situation. **June 14** - TASS report as the first sounding. **June 17** - Merkulov's note and Stalin's conversation with Merkulov and Fitin. **June 17 or 18** - Beria organized the flight of Colonel Zakharov and himself

flight.

June 17 or 18 - Stalin's proposal to Hitler to send to Berlin Molotov - as the final sounding.

June 18 - Stalin's sanction to issue a directive to the troops to bring put them on high combat readiness, "lowered on the brakes" by bunglers and traitors. **June**

18 - the final sanction of the disturbed Stalinist sounding Hitler to the immediate start of the implementation of the Barbarossa plan and a sharp an increase in the activity of the Wehrmacht, immediately noticed by Beria's intelligence.

June 19-20 - personal inspection of the border by the Merkulovs on a personal basis Stalin's order. **June 20**

- Report of Merkulov, who returned to Moscow, to Stalin about a strange military lethargy.

June 20-21 - Stalin harshly demands that Timoshenko and Zhukov give back immediate directive to the troops. **June 22** - the beginning of the war.

That's how it might have been, my dear reader! And personally I am now sure that the entire then party-state and military elite later conspired silence regarding the first war days of Stalin because it was important for her to distort and picture of the last *pre-war* days of Stalin.

After all, to say loudly to the same Zhukov, or Timoshenko, or Vasilevsky in whether in the fifties, in the sixties, that Stalin not only KNEW, but also ON TIME AUTHORIZED putting the troops on alert, that's... That's committing civilian suicide! Or - if we choose a comparison more sublime - lie down with your chest on the embrasure. And for self-sacrifice, none of them ventured.

And how could, say, Molotov dare to do this? He also lied **outright** - even in 1984. And this lie was then recorded by Felix Chuev, although he considered it holy truth. In his book "One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov" there is an entry dated January 13, 1984 of the year:

"I am reading to Molotov excerpts from Avtorkhanov's book on June 22, 1941: "We came to his dacha and offered to make an appeal to the people. Stalin flatly refused. Then they instructed Molotov ... "Yes, that's right, something like this ... "

But that's not even close to true! **This is absolutely not true!** On June 22, Stalin saw Molotov for the first time in his Kremlin office at 5.45 and was in the Kremlin all day, starting the war.

But Molotov could not tell the truth. She was very unattractive to him, too. A if **this** truth came out, then, look, the truth about Lavrenty Beria would also come out ... And instead of a "camp-dusty" monster, it would appear before the eyes of astonished descendants brilliant statesman-universal, not only did not threaten anyone with erasure in "camp dust" for warnings about an imminent war, but, on the contrary, for its organizational work and his personal actions provided *timely* information about her Stalin!

Alas, NONE of the first persons of the state either in real time or later

stood up for the desecrated honor and good name of the leader, for the truth about Comrade Stalin. But it was the one who raised them, gave them gold epaulettes and stars, gave them high state posts ... This was the one who clearly - both formally and informally - towered over them in the power of obvious genius and greatness of personality and destiny.

What can we say about the name of Beria trampled down by them! He was not a leader, he stood, consider, next to them, if you look formally. Informally,

he was not only head and shoulders above them as a person, he was above them and as a person - without chasing ranks, for awards, without pretending to be a state size. To

be, not to seem - for Beria it was not even a slogan. He was just - on that the place where Stalin placed him. And every time he was in the right place. And was at the same time a living reproach, oh, as for many of his colleagues and associates.

And so, depending on the degree of personal weakness or the details of the biography, someone did not like him, someone did not like him. And some people hated

it. While Beria was in power, he hated quietly.

And when they said from above: "Face!" ...

EARLIER, I stated that the history of the war was falsified at the highest level by obvious mutual collusion of the partocratic and military elites. And here is a specific illustration of this general statement.

In 1961, a long-awaited event took place: the Military Publishing House The Ministry of Defense of the USSR published the first volume of the "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945 "-" Preparation and unleashing of war imperialist powers." The six-volume

work was developed by a team of researchers from the Department of History Great Patriotic War Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU. A Academician Pyotr Pospelov was the chairman of the Editorial Commission (a year older than Beria, he quietly died at the age of 81 in Moscow in 1979). Mentioned by me many times Konstantin Zalesky writes about him: *"All the works prepared with his participation full of juggling and distortion of real facts and have nothing in common with history.* And this is the rare case when I agree with Zalesky, if you have mind, for example, Pospel's History of the Great Patriotic War.

Ironically, Zalesky further writes about Pospelov: "A convinced Stalinist, and then adherent of N. S. Khrushchev ", etc. And it was Pospelov who prepared Khrushchev's report at the XX Congress "On the cult of personality", full of anti-Stalinist juggling and perversion actual facts. Good

"Stalinist"! As for the

"History of War", then in the capital (weight exactly 2 kg) of its first volume, created by the "Pospelov team", Beria's name is mentioned twice. On page 100 says:

"The Soviet Armed Forces have achieved significant success in their development, which worried the imperialist circles of the West ... These circles in searching for ways to weaken the Red Army used Beria and his accomplices to destroy many of the most experienced and trained commanders and political workers.

Is it necessary to remind the reader of the chronology of events and the biography of Beria in order to become the understandable truth of such an accusation against Beria? But if to expose this fakes, you still need to know what happened and when, and also who and when Beria was, then the second lie of the Pospelovites (on page 479) is revealed even with a simple logical

analysis:

"The fight against enemy air reconnaissance was assigned to the border troops and units of border military districts. But, as it became known only subsequently, the traitor Beria back in March 1940 categorically forbade border troops to open fire on German intruder aircraft ... He actually opened Soviet airspace to enemy intelligence."

The border troops and parts of the border military districts are, as they say in Odessa, two big differences. And something to allow or prohibit the military districts People's Commissar of Internal Affairs simply had no right. As for the border troops, why are they were supposed to open fire on German intruder aircraft? Border guards are not army, they, consider, did not have anti-aircraft firepower, as it was not (whoever and whatever argued otherwise) and its own fighter aviation.

But this is the official history of the war! However, on page 476 on Beria's "NKVD bodies" are also responsible for the loss of our aviation on the ground dumped! Like, the NKVD delayed with the equipment of airfields and the planes ended up there crowded ...

Pospelovtsy even too close to the border the location of airfields in the Western The Special Military District was blamed on the NKVD, as if by determining the location airfields, not generals Rychagov, Smushkevich, Pavlov, were engaged, but Chekist Beria.

All this was a lie, starting with Beria's accusation of beating command personnel in 1937. year.

So, one wonders, the high-ranking members of the Editorial Board did not know all this. commissions: academicians Mints, Zhilin, Khvostov, marshals Bagramyan, Golikov, Sokolovsky, generals Grechko and Kurasov, lawyer Rudenko, writer Polevoy and others?

Why, in many other cases, the "Pospel" history of the war is the strangest in a way tongue-tied.

Let's go down from the "headquarters" heights to the level of the front trench ... And we will see in the initial (but not "Pospel's") history of the war is an amazing example of the 41st Infantry Division. This personnel division was commanded by the oldest commander of the Red Army, General G. N. Mikushev.

The division was part of the 6th army of General I. N. Muzychenko and was stationed in area of Rava-Russkaya. On the eve of June 22, General Mikushev led the division into combat readiness and occupied defensive lines according to the plan to cover the border. His actions he agreed with the commander of the 91st border detachment, Major Ya. D. Maly, but I don't think he did not inform the army commander Muzychenko. However, I

am inclined to think that Mikushev only accurately carried out the order of Muzychenko, who came on command from ... the headquarters of the Kyiv OBO. Commanders on their own initiative divisions in peacetime, personnel are not put in trenches, because for such things they can plant them yourself. And put to work!

Here, let's say, such a situation ... Hostilities have not yet begun, but the commander division sees that they are about to begin. It seems to be necessary to take up defensive positions. But he is just a division commander. His job is to be ready to follow orders. higher command. But there is no order!

Well, well, he arbitrarily put the division in the trenches. And with the first breaks shells on the territory of the USSR, the army commander suddenly orders the division fast march to other positions. Commander comes from one location parts of the division, and it is really already different - through the fault of an overly enterprising commander. No, for such things you can thunder under the tribunal. And the military knows this.

That's why I think Mikushev was following orders. But, one way or another, on the 41st division and border guards of the 91st detachment moved three infantry divisions of the Germans and part of the forces three armored divisions. And the division stood at its turn for six days! June 23 she counterattacked the enemy and threw him 3 kilometers into Polish territory.

June 23, 1941! On the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht!

Mikushev withdrew only because his neighbors had already bared their flanks, and a environmental threat.

It was an outstanding episode of the beginning of the war ... However, about the 41st division, about the generals Muzychenko and Mikushev in the Khrushchev-Pospelov history of the war, written in 1961, there is not a word (Muzychenko is mentioned as Commander-6 on the eve of the war in the list of other commanders, and all). For

the first time, the names of these generals, information about the feat of the 41st division and the circumstances of this feat appear only in a brief "History of the Great Patriotic War" already "Brezhnev" edition of 1970. Why? Is it

because

the story of General Muzychenko and a number of other generals turned out to be indirectly associated with the name of Beria, moreover, is it connected in a way that is advantageous for the latter?

Ivan Nikolaevich Muzychenko began the war courageously, but during the Kyiv defensive operation in August in the Uman region was taken prisoner by the wounded. At the beginning was kept in Rovno prison, then - in camps in Novograd-Volynsky, Hammelsburg, Gogelstein, Mosburg. He was released from captivity by the Americans and on April 29, 1945 he was sent to Paris, to the Soviet Commission for Repatriation.

From May to December 1945, Muzychenko underwent a special inspection by the NKVD in Moscow. He, a well-known commander before the war, could not get past Beria's cabinet. And that's what it turns out ...

Beria was the people's commissar of internal affairs on December 29, 1945. And just in December of this of the year, Muzychenko's special check ended, and on December 31, 1945 he was returned to active service in the Red Army. Pretty much the same thing happened with returned from captivity through Paris by Major General Potapov - a former commander of the 5th Army of the KOVO, and Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front, who was seriously wounded and was captured on October 14, 1941 west of Vyazma. They also underwent a special check in the Beria NKVD from May to December 1945 and at the same time as Muzychenko were returned to the army.

Returned by Beria! And

on December 30, 1945, in the Lubyanka, in the NKVD under the leadership of Kruglov, he was the former commander of the 12th Army, General Ponedelin, was delivered from Paris again. Now they write that he was captured in August 1941 shell-shocked, after hand-to-hand contractions. However, in a German photo in Francois de Lannoy's photo album "German tanks in Ukraine. 1941" Monday

does not look shell-shocked or torn to pieces. But here are the Orders of Lenin and two Orders of the Red He does not have a banner on his chest, just as there is no medal "XX years of the Red Army." And in a clear photo holes from them are also visible on the field tunic without traces of a "fight". Yes, the Germans would not to shoot orders, especially before propaganda photography. Most likely, Ponedelin himself got rid of them, putting on a new general's tunic before surrendering. Not the best certification for him. In

captivity, he also behaved below average, was anti-Soviet, but with the Germans didn't seem to cooperate. The investigation into the Ponedelin case lasted five years, and only in 1950 was he shot (in order to be rehabilitated in 1956 in the general stream).

They dealt with Ponedelin at the Lubyanka when Beria had not been there for a long time. A the final documents on Muzychenko, Potapov, Lukin were also signed by the "monster" Beria. Of course, it was easier with these three generals - they fought courageously, and in captivity behaved with dignity. And yet - even the heavily penalized Ponedelin gets on Lubyanka at the same time as them, perhaps, and he would have survived. After all, Beria never thirsted for extra, unjustified by the circumstances, blood.

So, the name Muzychenko indirectly associated with the name of Beria. And if so, what Muzychenko's merits in the war can be discussed? And the name Mikushev is also inconvenient. Say about

them, and, you see, inadvertently the truth about why some met war in the barracks, and others in the trenches.

First of all, Pavlov's Western Special Military District failed criminally, exposing the flanks and troops of the Kyiv Special Military District, transformed into the South-Western Front under the command of General Kirponos. Otherwise, everything could go to KOVO differently.

Alas, the last pre-war and first war days were subsequently rewritten so cool, the array of destroyed documents is now so large that the whole picture the last few days before the war, it is devilishly difficult to restore. However, it is clear one thing: the more accurately we reconstruct that short period, the more clearly the fault of not Stalin, but the top generals and especially Pavlov's "team" is visible. The father of my

colleague, Vyatich Vyacheslav Egorovich Butusov - Egor Nikolaevich Butusov met the war as a machine-gunner sergeant in one of the border units Kyiv Military Special District. Having sipped both hot and cold in the war, he died in 1969, exactly fifty years old. And as his son recalls when he, having come from school, began to tell his father about the unexpected attack of the Germans, then his father objected to him that on June 21, 1941 they were sitting in the trenches. Also in the Kiev Special Military District, but not as part of the 41st division. Not one, it turns out, General Mikushev showed some "willfulness". Although he did not seem to show it, he acted on orders from above, which came from the headquarters of the district, which in Ternopil was being transformed into the headquarters of the front.

And the "victim of Beria" is the commander of the Western Special Military District, General Army Pavlov on the evening of June 21, 1941 listened to an operetta. But

Beria's subordinate, Lieutenant General Sokolov, was on the border.

WAR was missed by marshals and generals, but after Stalin's death, everything began to fall on him. Fortunately, Nikita Khrushchev encouraged this in every possible way. And still blame it on Beria after his arrest on June 26, 1953, it was good manners for the elite. After all otherwise, what I wrote above could open. And if we build a

military "rating" of those responsible for the military failure in the first weeks of the war, then it will look, in my opinion, like this: Pavlov, Zhukov, Timoshenko, commanders of the branches of the Red Army, Kirponos. And in the civil "rating" I am the first I would give the position to

Khrushchev. Party and state leadership of Belarus, starting with the first secretary The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko, it was also, of course, not without sin ... There is a collection documents The Hidden Truth of War: 1941, 1992 edition. Slandering Stalin, viciously anti-Soviet in its mood, it is nevertheless a collection of reliable documents.

Regarding Belarus, I will quote from there only two paragraphs from an extensive report notes dated July 5, 1941, the military prosecutor of the Vitebsk garrison, a military lawyer 3-rank of Glinka to the military prosecutor of the Western Front, military jurist Rumyantsev. This the note is not only informative, but also good in a purely professional sense. In her I found, by the way, confirmation that under Beria in the NKVD there were no violations legality could not be conceived. So, *in wartime*, the head of the NKVD Directorate for Vitebsk region Motavkin and Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of Belarus Ptashkin **asked** Glinka release from legal liability those who have committed arbitrariness in relation to prisoner of the head of the Vitebsk prison, sergeant GB Priemyshev.

Asked! And

the prosecutor of the garrison officially qualified the "behavior of these persons" as outrageous.

However, I promised the reader two paragraphs from the document and I quote them:

"Locals are dissatisfied with the work of the head of the garrison, Colonel Redchenkov

regional authorities, stating that he does not provide work and may fail. My opinion, he is simply not able to cover the whole huge mass of questions and needs specific business help. I suggested to the secretaries of the regional committee and his to the first secretary STULOV to send party workers to help him, of whom there are a lot of people in Vitebsk, but they all go around idle. This

secretaries of regional committees and district committees of other regions, members of the Central Committee, the apparatus of the Central Committee
Communist Party of Belarus. However, the regional committee did not accept my proposal, saying that he, the head of the garrison, could find people for

himself ... Regional bodies, including the regional committee and the regional executive committee (comrade STULOV, comrade Ryabtsev) ... were late with many events, as a result of which the city alarming mood, panic, flight, stupidity appeared among the population and disorganization, i.e., something appeared that comrade warned against. STALIN in his speech."

The picture is ugly, and although the Germans occupied Minsk on the sixth day of the war, the Belarusian The Central Committee is hard to justify. A huge war began, and many professional representatives the political vanguard of society cannot find a job ...

In Belarus, however, everything was complicated by military time pressure. And Khrushchev in Ukraine had enough time to turn the republic into a fortress. Besides, only Khrushchev was a member of the country's top leadership, was a member of the Politburo. When the central apparatus of the NKVD carried out the operation of Captain Adamovich in 1940, then Khrushchev was furious, declaring that the Ukrainian, they say, the NKVD and Ivan

Serov could have done everything themselves! But then the war began, and Khrushchev, instead of promptly "embroidering" the emerging problems of civil and economic life, began to pose as a strategist, misinforming Stalin and complicating the situation Kirponos.

And the head of the Political Propaganda Department of the Southwestern Front, brigade On July 6, Commissar Mikhailov reported to the Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army to the army commissar of the 1st rank Mehlis:

"In some areas, party and Soviet organizations are showing exceptional distraction and panic. Some district leaders left together with their families long before the evacuation of areas.

Leading officials ... Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Tarnopolsky districts fled in panic long before the departure of our units, and instead of taking out state material values, they took out personal belongings at their disposal..."

On July 11, the same Mikhailov reported on the flight of the secretaries of the district committees of the CP (b) U Khmel'nitsky, Yanushpolsky, Ulanovsky districts ... This is Vinnytsia, it is already close to Kyiv. And that's all - Khrushchev's footage. But he did not put them against the wall. And why? They still give him useful after 1953 ...

Perhaps that is why Khrushchev lied so vilely after 1953 about Stalin. dumped everything on Stalin, it was easier to "wind up" the question of the extent of one's own guilt. And many of representatives of the post-war "marshall" and the generals were natural to him here allies because they didn't want the truth about how the war started either.

Stalin, after the war, magnanimously did not publicize the fact that the war is criminal not only Pavlov missed, but almost the entire military leadership. After all, readiness for war is determined not even by whether certain units met it in the trenches, but by how these units trained, how equipped, how army life was organized before the war.

In principle, it was much easier to arrange everything here than in the national economy, because that the army does not produce anything, it only consumes. And the generals only needed request, receive, distribute and teach subordinates at all levels to use distributed. The generals, on the other hand, could not even do this properly before the war.

And someone clearly betrayed. What was left for Stalin? After all, just before June 22, he found himself in a very difficult situation. He hoped for the generals, and he failed the cause of the war even before it start.

And more than that! If I am correct in my assumption about Merkulov's inspection on June 19–20, then we must add this ... Suppose, after the report of Merkulov, Stalin even suspected Pavlova in direct betrayal. After all, even in this case, he could not dispose of his arrest before the start of the war! I couldn't because the arrest at such a moment is just an **alleged** traitor in such a post is no less dangerous for the general tone of the army than leaving it in place.

But then the war began. The alleged failure became a fact. What to do? Don't punish after the failures, no one was allowed at all - it was necessary to show the generals that patience Stalin and the Motherland is over. However, it was also impossible to punish many - with someone I had to fight now! At the same time, even knowing for sure that someone betrayed, openly judge and shoot him as a direct traitor, it was again dangerous, because official information about a direct betrayal of a part of the generals would make any command and control impossible for quite understandable reasons.

Therefore, Stalin did not point his finger at *the obvious* and remained silent. And explained the military failure suddenness and perfidy of the attack. The fact that he covered these sins, and even treason someone from the military leadership, knew a very limited circle of people, some of whom either died or was shot.

Then it was necessary to fight again ... And when the Victory came - was it worth stir up the past? Stalin

thought so - he did not know that after his death, almost all of his marshals (except Rokossovsky) behave more or less meanly and allow

Khrushchev and others to slander their supreme leader, and even the very dirt on his the grave will be laid.

And to this day, it was not they who were guilty of the failure of the first days of the war, but the "tyrant Stalin" together with the "executioner" Beria, of course. Beria, after all, "criminally brushed aside" warnings of "secret collaborators" Almaz and Carmen.

HOWEVER, at the end of June 1941, Victory was still far away - it was necessary to decide immediately a lot of things and rebuild the government of the country on a military footing.

Both plans for the democratization of the country and the reliance on alternative elections in December 1941. The real power was to be the power exclusively executive.

And then Stalin ...

And then Stalin, it seems, experienced a moment of weakness ... And one can understand him - he was the same person as everyone else ... And the number of nerve cells was the same, and the number of kilometers of nerves, and the heart is one, and the same five liters of blood. But responsibility ...

And he knew that as the head of state he did everything right: and on time he was cautious, and in time threw aside the hesitation, in time sanctioning the army team and the naval beginning of bringing troops to combat readiness. But he was let down...

And how let down! A week of war has passed, and Minsk has already fallen, the Germans are pearing and pearing forward ... And Stalin, it seems, really went to the nearest dacha. First, he is for this the first week he was wildly tired ... And he wanted to be alone and alone with himself ... Secondly Or he could be depressed.

The moment of the crisis, if it was, must be attributed to the days of June 29 and 30. The day before, June 28, Stalin received more than two dozen people, including Timoshenko, Zhukov, the chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff Golikov, authorized orders and instructions dated

June 29 already.

From 22.00 to 22.10 on June 28, test pilots Suprun and Stefanovsky - commanders of test regiments formed on the initiative of Suprun. The time of stay in the Stalinist office of the most interesting visitors for us distributed on June 28 as follows:

Molotov 19.35 - 00.50
Malenkov 19.35 - 23.10
Merkulov 19.45 - 20.05 Beria
22.40 - 00.05 Mikoyan
23.30 - 00.50 Merkulov
00.00 - 00.15

As you can see, all the time - from 19.35 to almost one in the morning on June 29, Stalin was alone Molotov, but half an hour before midnight, Mikoyan came into the office, where Beria was then, and remained there with Molotov to the end.

Of all those who passed through Stalin's office that day, only these two were professional revolutionaries and were familiar with the owner of the cabinet even before revolution. And they didn't just know each other, but together with him they prepared this revolution ... So the conversation at the end of the "day" was certainly *all sorts* - not only business. And

then in the "Journal of visits ..." - a two-day failure. It was then, on the evening of the 29th, it seems that Molotov and Beria went to see Stalin. In a letter written in 1953 in a cell addressed to Malenkov, but addressed to all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria reminded Molotov:

"You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after of our conversation with comrade Stalin at his nearby dacha, you raised the question point-blank in your office in the Council of Ministers that the situation must be saved, it is necessary to immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, then I will completely supported and suggested that you immediately summon comrade Malenkov to a meeting ... After ... we all went to comrade Stalin and convinced him [about] immediate organizations of the National Defense Committee..."

So, there was a certain trip, and they took with them not only Malenkov, but also Kaganovich, Mikoyan ... And there were, presumably, gloomy conversations with Stalin - gloomy, among other things, because Stalin, a week after the start of the war, could well experience a deep spiritual crisis. Temporary ...

However, he

quickly, in a matter of tens of hours, overcame this crisis on the general did not affect the situation. Already on July 1, Stalin was again in his Kremlin office and until the end of the war harnessed to the daily military webbing. But on July 1, he received a few, but with 16.50 to 19.00 I talked with two: Timoshenko and Zhukov.

What they talked about remained between them and God, but perhaps Stalin told them everything that thinks about them, and about the highest generals of the Red Army as a whole. And perhaps he, for all rigidity of tone, spoke only about the matter, having first familiarized himself in detail with the current position. After all, he already realized that soon he himself would have to take over the leadership of not only in the rear, but also in the

front. In terms of the direct conduct of the war, the Headquarters received full power. High Command, July 10 transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command in led by Stalin. As for the

rest, according to the Constitution, power belonged to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. But now it was necessary to bring everything into one fist, and on June 30, 1941, by a joint decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee was formed.

Here is how the one-volume encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945", published by the publishing house "Soviet Encyclopedia" in 1985:

"The State Defense Committee (GKO) - the highest emergency state body of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War concentrated all power. <...> Initial composition: I. V. Stalin (chairman), V. M. Molotov (deputy chairman), K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov. Later, N. A. Bulganin, N. A. Voznesensky, A. I. Mikoyan were introduced into the State Defense Committee (encyclopedists of the Central Committee of the CPSU "forgot" about AM Kaganovich, who was introduced into the State Defense Committee, like the last two mentioned members, in February 1942, Bulganin became a member of the GKO in general in 1944. - **S.K.) ... "**

Excuse me, but where is the GKO member *since **June 30, 1941***, Deputy Chairman of the GKO (that is, the second person after Stalin in a warring country) since 1944, and he - from the moment its formation in 1944 - the chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee L.P. Beria?

It was cut out of the history of the country and here. That is, even forty years after the Victory the slightest mention of Beria's name in an officially positive context was impossible. Nothing has changed here to this day, and I consider it simply shameful that the fact that even in 2005, published by the Ladoga-100 publishing house, edited by the former Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU O. Baklanov capital work "Domestic military industrial complex and its historical development" among the members of the GKO L. P. Beria again not mentioned.

But with the beginning of the war, Lavrenty Pavlovich ...
And here I, my dear reader, am lost! Even an extremely dry, but *complete* story about the activities of Beria during the war resulted in would be in a separate thick book.

And what to do here? First,
list to the end all his duties and assignments during the war, and then consistently tell about them at least briefly? Or immediately begin a consistent story, moving from duty to duty and simultaneously exposing the next anti-Beria myths? Perhaps I

will choose something in between, saying for now that the day before the creation of the GKO, a special By order of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 00101 dated June 29, 1941, Beria was introduced into composition of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. The previous order No. 00100 was assigned to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade. Beria L.P. the matter of forming 15 new divisions, which we will talk about later.

On July 20, 1941, the people's commissariats of internal affairs and state security were again merged into one People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs at the hand of Beria. And later he will have to to visit the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, organizing the defense of the Caucasus.

But now he, as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, had two main tasks ... Two? No, three!
Three?
No,
four! Four?
No, five!
Five? No,
not
even five, but more! Moreover, I emphasize, only as the people's commissar of internal cases!

Let us dwell, however, on the first five tasks. Now Beria had: 1) the formation of new formations on the basis of the NKVD troops, primarily the border troops; 2) the creation of barrage detachments to protect the rear of the fronts;

3) organization of reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind the front line, and also - and the partisan movement; 4)

Chekist counterintelligence (that is, counteraction to enemy intelligence, including radio games, etc.), the fight against sabotage, the protection of strategic facilities ...

And, of course: 5) external illegal intelligence of the NKVD, again passed under the arm Beria.

In addition, military counterintelligence returned to the NKVD - Special departments, which, in February 1941 were transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy and transformed into the Third administration of these people's commissariats. And now it was necessary to rebuild everything again - on the go.

Oh yes! I also forgot among the primary issues of economic activity NKVD! And then they themselves demanded a lot of attention!

And this, my dear reader, is not all the problems he had to deal with. deal only with the NKVD. And he has various dissimilar lines soon there were so many that one could get tangled in them, like in a thick cobweb, if ...

If 42-year-old Lavrenty Beria had not been a master at unraveling any tangles of problems.

LET'S START rewinding the lines of his military fate and we ... So, the State Defense Committee ...

On July 3, 1941, Academician Vernadsky, while in the sanatorium of the Academy of Sciences Uzkoys, wrote in his diary:

"On July 1, 1941, the State Defense Committee was formed from Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria. In general, it is clear that this is an ideological Stalin's dictatorship.

But it was not a matter of "ideological dictatorship" (Vernadsky, in his political assessments often hit a finger in the sky), but in the need for an effective, concrete, daily and comprehensive management of the entire matter of war, except for the direct problems of conducting military actions. In modern warfare, the rear meant at least as much as the front. And sometimes even more. Therefore, Stalin had to

distribute the supreme power among those who entered the emergency supreme state body of the USSR, and to instruct each specific, how says job site. Who could do

what in the first composition of the State Defense Committee?

Klim Voroshilov... He was good where he was good. But, alas, the spheres of application of his nature by 1941 there wasn't much. He was a politician, and he understood military affairs, but a lot could no longer pull. One way or another, in the first period of the war, he was busy at the front, commanding troops of the North-Western direction, and then - the Leningrad Front. Contrary to slander erected against him, in August-September 1941, he did to deter There are many Germans rushing towards Leningrad. His replacement by Zhukov is justified, but it must be taken into account that Zhukov was very lucky, although neither he nor Stalin knew about it then ... And it was lucky that Zhukov's appointment coincided with Hitler's decision in early October 1941 to stop assault on the Russian northern capital and proceed to blockade it.

That is, the troops exhausted the Germans under the leadership - whatever one may say - Voroshilov. A Zhukov in many ways only reaped the fruits of the collective efforts of two months. Nevertheless Voroshilov as an active bayonet by the winter of 1941 could not be taken into account. Especially in terms of economic management.

Second in the GKO after Stalin was his deputy Vyacheslav Molotov. However, he never did purely economic work: for this he had neither business acumen nor sufficient specialized education or practical experience. It was first of all a political figure, and a typical "second number". "Second number" under Stalin

he was, dealing mainly with foreign policy affairs. The function is always important, but in especially during the war. But what about the economy?

Kaganovich had a grasp, knew the industry, but more in its nationwide, so say parts. And now it was necessary to supervise the production of weapons with a confident hand, which Kaganovich would hardly have pulled.

Malenkov and Beria remained.

Sometimes in the West they are written about as a "tandem of technocrats", but if you give George Malenkov's extremely harsh assessment, then we can say: a figure like "they listened to the decision", that is, the "apparatchik", a functionary. And although he practically graduated from Moscow Higher Technical School named after Bauman, his life flowed among the stationery tables of the Moscow City Committee party and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Of course, Malenkov had to deal with a lot of economy. But he achieved no more than average success. Kaganovich about he recalled:

"A man of culture, but did not shine with knowledge of economic life."

So who shined with us? And just "forgotten" by the "encyclopedists" of Brezhnev's era member of the GKO comrade. L.P. Beria.

Beria took almost the entire economy on himself in the State Defense Committee. Together with, of course, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Secretary of the Central Committee VKP(b), Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR comrade Stalin. Only

Stalin could bear the burden of Stalin. However, Beria could bear the load only Beria. And she yielded only to the load of Stalin, because during the war years Lavrenty Pavlovich was "only" deputy chairman of the GKO and chairman of the Operational bureau of the GKO, permanent adviser to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, candidate for members of the Politburo, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs. Kaganovich, Voznesensky and Mikoyan, who later became part of the GKO, to some extent unloaded Beria and Malenkov, but only in very specific areas.

As for Politburo member Khrushchev, his role in the war turned out to be exactly what he was able to play in times of formidable trials, that is, insignificant. Stalin's "closest ally" and "faithful disciple" spent the entire war as members of the Military councils of the fronts, without experiencing even a hundredth of the burden that fell on Beria. No wonder Zhukov in his memoirs remembered Khrushchev in the sense that, hungry, he tried to call on him, an indispensable member of the Military Council of one or another front, knowing that Nikita Sergeevich can always have a good bite to eat.

Khrushchev's business level is determined by his famous "acquaintance" resolution on documents. Shepilov, who later recognized him well "and joined them" certifies Khrushchev as a complete ignoramus, but in addition to Shepilov, similar characteristics we have in abundance. The same Shepilov said, however, like this: *"Khrushchev was densely uneducated, but had a good head."* If we add: "And also subtly cunning and vile nature of the ideal pretender", then this will be that "gentleman's set", for which Khrushchev kept afloat.

So, one of the main lines of Beria's fate in the war was work in the State Defense Committee. And to give her an overall assessment, I will use the information from the collection documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953, published by the Democracy Foundation. This is the most a reliable way to deprive Beria's haters of the opportunity to object, because here what do the "democrats" themselves recognize for Lavrenty Pavlovich:

"Decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of responsibilities between his (GKO. - **S.K.**) members of Beria were entrusted with monitoring the implementation decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, issues of the formation of the Air Force,

in addition, in the future, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation decisions on the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three people's commissariats: oil, coal industry and ways of communication. In 1944, Stalin appointed Beria as deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, which considered all current questions".

Some things are not mentioned in this certificate, but in general it reflects the military load Lavrenty Pavlovich is correct, although with chronological inaccuracies.

Why Stalin instructed Beria to oversee aviation issues is understandable: in 1939–1941, sandwiches for Andrey Tupolev were prepared by NKVD officers. And during the time there was TsKB-29 of the NKVD, Beria gained "aviation" experience. Although it is often believed that Malenkov supervised aviation. Yes, supervised - when production is more or less established. And supervised insufficiently carefully and not very competently.

But how to understand the turnover "in addition, in the future, Beria was entrusted control...", etc.? Yes, and to understand that those on whom this control was entrusted at the beginning, failed. And Stalin transferred their duties to Beria. As you know, per person load as much as he can carry. And Beria carried as much as they loaded him.

That's where they loaded it.
Since the beginning of the war!

I REMIND the reader what Lavrenty Pavlovich wrote in a letter to Malenkov after arrest in June 1953:

"The first weeks of the war, when there was nothing to cover the Western Front - which the Germans strongly pressed ... Our joint work to create under the leadership of the State Committee, the Headquarters and personally Comrade Stalin Reserve front to protect the approaches to Moscow ... Alone for reserve front, 15 full-blooded Chekist military divisions..."

The last of the works mentioned above was for Beria the first major success in war and his first major military service to the people. Already on June 29, 1941 was an order was issued by the Headquarters of the High Command on the formation of rifle and mechanized divisions from the personnel of the NKVD troops.

Here is its full text:

"Proceed immediately to the formation of 15 divisions, of which 10 rifle and 5 motorized. To form divisions, use part of the personnel commanders and rank and file of the border and internal troops of the NKVD.

Missing personnel to be covered from the reserve. Formation of divisions to assign to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs comrade. Beria L.P.

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to provide emerging divisions with human and material resources and weapons at the request of the

NKVD. Headquarters of the High Command

TYMOSHENKO STALIN ZHUKOV.

Of course, Beria did not stand on the parade ground, doing drill. As always, and everywhere he first of all selected competent performers, and left behind the functions control and prompt solution of those emerging problems that his subordinates it was impossible to decide.

And Ivan Ivanovich did a lot to form Chekist divisions Maslennikov is Beria's KGB ally in Transcaucasia. Coming to leadership

NKVD, Beria pulled him to Moscow. And it was, as always, a good choice. The eye is on Beria's people were accurate!

On the same day, June 29, 1941, Beria issues an order that says:

- "1. The leadership of the formation is entrusted to my deputy general lieutenant comrade. Maslennikov.
2. When Comrade. Maslennikov to create a task force consisting of five Human.
3. Start forming divisions immediately. 4. For the formation of these divisions, allocate from the personnel of the NVD troops according to 1000 people ordinary and junior commanding staff and 500 people each. commanding officers for each division. Apply for the rest to the General Staff of the Red Army for conscription from the reserve of all categories military personnel.
5. The concentration of personnel allocated from the NKVD troops to be completed by July 17 this year".

The border guards of the border districts have already fought - who are in the security forces the rear of the fronts, who are surrounded or in combat units. And new KGB divisions were formed primarily due to the best personnel of the border troops of the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Central Asian, Turkmen and Zabaikalsky districts. It was a decision that was both right and non-standard, because to expose even minor sections of the border were still a risky business. But the risk was justified, and from distant border circles to places of formation, in particular - to Yaroslavl, in a matter of days (8-11 days) from Transcaucasia and Central Asia 3 thousand commanders and 10 thousand sergeants and privates arrived.

Plus - 500 people each from the personnel of the units of the Leningrad, Baltic, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian border districts that emerged from the encirclement. Total - more than 15 thousand combat core for 15 divisions. Strong ones were also taken from the stock frames. And the border guards played the role of alloying additives in ordinary steel. and alloy turned out great! Almost all

command positions in the divisions were occupied by border guards. The platoon commanders were graduates of the Kharkov Cavalry Border schools, battalion commanders - students of the Higher Border School.

The first year of the war was a bitter year for the Soviet border guards - after all, then tens of thousands of our guys died, beautiful, devoted to the Motherland and professionally able to protect her. However, the same year became for the Soviet border guards and the "star" year, because never before or after the importance of the border troops for the country was not so significant - if we take into account that then in a matter of months the very fate of the state was decided, and border guards did as much as, perhaps, no one else in these few months to ensure its future. On the KGB emblem - a shield and a sword.

Be a sword during the first battles with the enemy
The Chekists-border guards could not - the enemy was covered with too strong armor, and to get him through this armor was supposed to be the sword of the army. But the border guards became a shield for the country, holding back and holding back the onslaught, weakening it and winning the main condition of the future in those days. victory is time. It

was truly a collective feat accomplished on the scale of the war and stories almost instantly. And in the way it was accomplished, Beria's style was visible. However, he could not impose his style on the work of subordinates if he interfered in the details. He gave the right impulse, the initial push in the right direction, and after that he went to another task. He didn't have two or three of them. And not even five!

If everything went as it should, Beria was further limited to receiving up-to-date information on the progress of cases. If something went wrong, he quickly corrected

situation and again gave the initiative to subordinates. So it was here! Decision on partial exposure of non-belligerent borders - this is up to the people's commissar. Moreover, Beria is not without reason widely used the Transcaucasian border guards - after all, they were, in fact, his direct pupils.

So he gave a directive. And then - help only when it is needed. Putting together six divisions of the first stage took place at the pace of Beria - from ahead of schedule, because the front did not wait. Of course, two days to knock together is very little. But in the zone of the former ZAPOVO, the current Western Front, a huge gap through which German troops poured and poured into Russia. AND Beria's cadres had to close the gap.

The oath was taken along the route and at combat positions - this was dictated by the extremely difficult situation at the front. All fifteen divisions went to where it was most difficult. Ten divisions (243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254 and 256th) - to the Western front, five (265, 268, 262, 257 and 259th) - to the North-West.

And a new problem was already arising ... The border battle was lost by the army, and now it was necessary to think about the advance organization of defense on the Moscow strategic direction. And this was exactly what Beria wrote about in his letter from cameras ...

On July 14, the Headquarters of the High Command (on July 10, the GKO transformed the Headquarters of the Civil Code into Headquarters of the VK) issues order No. 00334 on the creation of a front of reserve armies at the turn of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk to prepare for a stubborn defense. IN the front included six armies (29th, 30th, 24th, 28th, 31st and 32nd), four of which border guards commanded: 30th - head of the troops of the Ukrainian border district Major General V. A. Khomenko, who later died a heroic death; 31st - chief of troops Karelian-Finnish border district, Major General V. N. Dalmatov; 24th - chief troops of the Baltic border district, Major General K. I. Rakutin. Deputy People's Commissar, Lieutenant General Ivan Maslennikov, having formed Chekist divisions, accepted the 29th Army. He will fight valiantly and skillfully, end the war as an army general, commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, cavalier of four Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov I degree, two orders of Kutuzov I degree. In

October 1948, from the post of commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, he will return to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR as a deputy minister, but not Beria, but Kruglov. He will stay him even after the death of Stalin, but now - again as a deputy who returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Beria. And shoot himself on April 16, 1954 - less than a year after the death of his military commissar during the war.

So, of the six armies that covered Moscow in the summer of 1941, four were commanded by frontier generals. He was also appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies border guard - former head of the troops of the Belarusian border district, Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov. On July 30, the

front of the reserve armies was transformed into the Reserve Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov (he invited Bogdanov to be his deputy). Let's calculate ... On

the western border, the war was met by about a hundred thousand border guards, and practically each fought for several army men. In fact, the border guards then became the last reserve of command at all levels, at whose disposal the soldiers of Beria turned out to be the will of fate and a military case.

At the same time, until September 25, 1941, the states directly had the border troops peacetime, that is, they did not have means of reinforcement: anti-tank weapons, artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns ... After all, border guards protect the border from violators, and not reflect the aggression of the enemy. Fighting is the task of the army.

However, as in the Finnish war, the army command used

border units (meaning not 15 divisions of the NKVD, but border commandant's offices, border detachments, border regiments). But not always allocated them means of strengthening. However, the border guards in any "format" were a formidable and persistent force.

By the second half of July, the country received in addition to the already belligerent hundred thousands of border guards are still at least one hundred thousand soldiers of border condition, the backbone which amounted to 15 thousand of the best border guards. And the fact that, on the one hand, it was they who were thrown to close the breakthrough, and on the other hand, occupy a new strategic Stalin also entrusted the border to the border guards, speaks of the outstanding role of the border troops in the initial period of the war.

However, this role turned out to be downplayed already in the very first capital studies. about the Great Patriotic War.

Why? Yes, because you will appreciate the border troops on their merits, and you can run into the question: "And who was responsible for the formation of these 15 divisions?"

The impossibility of the answer immediately programmed the exception of the conditions for the question. Therefore, I spoke in such detail about the border troops. Their military history is part of military biography of Beria.

The SECOND and third major purely front-line affairs of Beria began with the beginning war: •

management of the work of the Special Departments in the Red Army and the Red Army, returned from NPO and NK Navy in the NKVD;

- organizing the activities of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear, including those that were part of their composition of the barrier detachments.

In the kitchens of many intellectual apartments, they used to sing: "This company was shot by from a machine gun their own barrage detachment. Today, these songs are "sung" to schoolchildren already in secondary school.

But, firstly, it is unlikely that in the history of the real, and not the Vasily-Aksenov war, there is at least one episode when some *company* was shot by some barrage detachment. Although there were Soviet soldiers shot by barrage detachments. After all, there was a war. And in war they shoot - both at those who stand in the way of victory, and at those who evade this path. But

Soviet rifle companies also "shot" ... Or rather, they shot in battles on front on the military personnel of the Wehrmacht ... And no one blamed the companies and does not blame them on this day. But the cowards who fled from the battlefield were the same enemies of Russia as those who invaded her invaders. Let me remind you: at that time there was a war, in which they shoot as those who came to your land by the enemy, and in those who betrayed their land. As for the

barrage detachments, there were two different types of them. **And those barrage detachments, to which the NKVD Beria was related, never ensured the combat stability of the troops!**

The latter function has always been the prerogative of barrage detachments not the People's Commissariat Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the People's Commissariat of Defense

(NPO). About the time of the creation of the first barrage detachments of both the NKVD and NPOs, there are different information, but the earliest are found in the documents of 1941.

Here is an extract from the order to the troops of the Western Front No. 010 dated July 9, 1941 "On streamlining the use of vehicles and the organization of traffic on dirt roads, signed by Front Commander Marshal Timoshenko, a member of the Military Council by the army commissar of the 1st rank Mehlis and the chief of staff of the front Lieutenant General Malandin:

"6. Head of the rear guard of the Western Front, Lieutenant General Sokolov (to the same, border. - **S.K.**) on the line of control and administrative front stations Rzhev, Vyazma, Zapoznaya, Fayansovaya, Bryansk, Shostka set

barrier detachments with the task of detaining all illegally following cars and send them from the Smolensk region to the head of the logistics department of the headquarters Western Front ... "

And no later than July 15, 1941, four controllers of the People's Commissariat of State control reported to People's Commissar Mekhlis (he is also a member of the Military Council of the Western Front):

"... The delay of idly wandering cars occurs through the commandant cities and the NKVD barrage detachment. On average, 2-3 cars per day, which transferred to the collection point ... "

And here is a quote from a memorandum dated July 5, 1941 by the prosecutor of Vitebsk Glinka garrison, already familiar to the reader:

"I have received a message that the head of the NPO blockade detachment quartermaster of the 1st rank MYSLOV shot a people's judge without trial or investigation Tolotsinsky district comrade. ABRAMOVICH for the fact that the latter ... produced accidentally shot at the ceiling in his office. <...> I ask ... consent to arrest ... MYSLOV with the transfer of the case to the VT (military tribunal. - **S.K.**) under Art. 180 of the Criminal Code (Criminal Code. - **S.K.**)".

As you can see, the NKVD detachments detained cars, but the head of the detachment NPO (not the NKVD!) "shone" the tribunal for the reckless and reckless massacre of people. But "Hands in blood", of course, among the "henchmen of Beria."

But beloved even by the "democrats", General of the Army (future Marshal) Zhukov, having joined the command of the Leningrad Front, on September 18, 1941, initiates a resolution of the Military Council of the Front on intensifying the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements on the territory of Leningrad and instructs the creation of three barrier lines for some reason, it was precisely the subordinates of the "executioner" Beria ... And no one accuses Zhukov of having his hands are up to the elbows in blood.

I have already noted that General Sokolov mentioned above is the same "borderline" Sokolov. And this is among his subordinates "kept the regime" in 1941 the famous Tamantsev from Bogomolov's "Moment of Truth" ("In August forty fourth...").

I can remind you:

"The tasks and duties of our border regiment, which at that moment was holding checkpoint and barrage regimes on waste from Orsha, only officially - by order - included: • guidance and maintenance of proper order in the rear of the front; • verification of documents, and, if necessary, in case of suspicions - and personal things ...; • protection of the most important facilities and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of communications; • Detention and delivery to collection points of those who arbitrarily leave for the rear Red Army soldiers, commanders; catching and arresting deserters; • regulation of traffic on the roads and evacuation; total load limit transport...; • and, of course, in the first place - the capture and destruction of German spies and saboteurs ... All this was part of our tasks and duties officially, by order, and what we just didn't do it then - you can't list it! - even childbirth had to accept".

Someone might say: "Well, this is literature!" No, in this case, not literature, but real life.

SOMETIMES, the NKVD detachments are compared (believing that this "whitewashes" them) with Wehrmacht Feljandarmerie or the American military police "MP" - Military Police. I think this comparison is insulting to the memory of those of our guys who became prototypes of the same Tamantsev. But some of the functions were similar: the fight against enemy agents in the rear of the fronts, with marauders, brawlers, deserters; protection of communications. And during the period of the first retreat - and guidance of the elementary order of movement on roads.

Perhaps an adequate idea of the barrage detachments of Beria is given by the following document:

"Top secret to the People's
Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, General Commissar
State Security Comrade BERIA

REFERENCE

From the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front. Of these, the operational barriers of the Special Departments detained 249,969 people and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear - 407395 military personnel. Of those detained by the Special Departments, 25,878 people were arrested, the rest 632486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front. Among those arrested by the Special Departments:

- spies - 1505;
- saboteurs - 308;
- traitors - 2621; cowards
- and alarmists - 2643; deserters
- 8772; disseminators
- of provocative rumors - 3987; self-shooters - 1671; others
- 4371; Total - 25878.

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and according to the verdicts of the Military Tribunals 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot before formation.

Deputy early Directorate of the NGO NKVD of the USSR Commissioner of State. security rank 3 S. Miliitein.

Perhaps, if I stated the contents of this certificate in my own words, read the book it would be easier for the reader. However, the author has always believed and still believes that it is better not to *state facts according to documents, but to communicate them to the reader in the form of documents.*

And only by reporting them, you can express *your own* thoughts and opinions to the reader ... And when it comes to Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, then citing documents is simply necessary, because nothing so convincingly exposes a lie as a genuine document. A lies about Beria have accumulated over the years - the sea is spilled ...

Of course, the reader may ask: "And you, the author, vouch for the authenticity of the fact?" Well, I cite as evidence only those documents that I consider authentic. And those that I consider obviously false, I cite in order to show them to the best of my ability.

false ... So it, perhaps, will be the most true .. So, the NKVD

barrage detachments did not sit behind the backs of those who occupied the advanced trench lines. This was the work of the NPO guard detachments.

Their appearance is usually associated with the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Stalin No. 227 of July 28, 1942, where, in particular, it was said:

"... Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be the requirement - not a step back without orders from the high command...

The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders: 2. The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies:

detachments (up to 200 people each), put them in the immediate rear unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal parts of the division to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters of divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland ... "

The same order prescribed within the front to form from one to three penal battalions (800 people each), where to send the guilty middle and senior commanders and political workers (and not "brave" criminals). Within the army, it was ordered to form from five to ten penal companies (from 150 to 200 people each) for delinquent rank and file soldiers and junior commanders.

So it was in the summer of 1942. However, we have already seen that NPO detachments appeared immediately after the start of the war, which was understandable: the first task of the detachments the very first days of the war it was not possible to shoot or stop the fleeing crowd with machine guns fire ... Their first task was, like the NKVD detachments, to collect the retreating military personnel who somehow lost their units or lagged behind them, send them to collection points, etc. But

when the retreat began to take on the character of flight and when the war became more positional, the functions of army detachments have changed. And here I will again refer on the "democrats" of the Yakovlev Foundation. Well, if they do not hang all the "dogs" on the Soviet government, then this means that there is definitely nothing to "hang"! Even the Democrats.

So, in the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" on page 408 in note 30 to section II says:

"The first barrage detachments were created in 1941. Rate Directive Supreme Command of September 5, 1941 to the commander of the Bryansk Front A. Eremenko it was allowed (not prescribed! - **S.K.**) to create detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable. The detachments were ordered prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units from positions, "and in case of flight, stop, using weapons if necessary." By order of the NPO No. 227 of July 28, 1942, the Military Councils and army commanders were obliged to form from 3 to 5 well-armed detachments. After stabilization of the situation at the front at the end of 1942, barrage detachments were used as part of the NKVD units for the protection of the rear of the current army. In accordance with the order of NPO No. 349 of October 29, 1944, detachments have been disbanded."

That's the whole truth about the "bloody" barrage detachments, allegedly shooting own companies. But those who sang stupid infamy about this would do well to think: who will he hold the front after the detachment shoots the company standing (in the sense of lying) in front of it? After all, then the detachment itself will be in the position of the company.

Therefore, the army barriers directly in the forward area if and when they shot, then over their heads - for warning and cleaning the brains. And in rare cases, shoot the commander of the fleeing company.

In those days when he was sitting in the bunker after his arrest, Beria also remembered the detachments. I will soon quote that part of the letter of 1953 to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which at the beginning he only "announced" the books, and then the reader will see that the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs

he was proud of his involvement in the cause of stabilizing the front in 1941. And not for a reason "Executioner inclinations", of course, but because it was really a merit from any point of view! What

does it mean to provide barrage measures in the frontline zone **at the cost of only ten thousand executions in the first four months of the worst confusion?** This means to act professionally, prudently, and not to poke everyone in a row without much need a gun in the teeth. But the behavior of subordinates to a large extent determined by the behavior and requirements of the boss. If Beria, how much in vain threatened with executions of the minelayers "for failure to comply ...", "for the lack of rigidity ...", etc., if he demanded from the Special Departments and the command of the barrage detachments "percent", then there could be much more blood. And innocent.

Moreover, if for

the People's Commissariat of Defense the excessively high numbers of "wrapped" back and shot were not desirable (after all, they would indirectly show a low level stability of the army), then for the NKVD there was objectively a temptation to get carried away with "numbers" in the spirit of "the war will write everything off". However, People's Commissar Beria never, and by any kind of "percent mania" - that more in cases where blood could be shed, he did not suffer. So, they did not suffer from it and subordinates.

AND NOW it's time to tell the reader that part of Beria's letter written by him after the arrest, where the names of Pervukhin and Saburov are mentioned ... And we know about the author of the letter already enough to read what he wrote in 1953 with understanding. Moreover, these confessions of Beria are important not only for a better understanding of his activities by us.

in the pre-war and war period in the NKVD ... They additionally cover his previous work in Transcaucasia... And his future fate too. Reflecting on the lines

below, we will temporarily deviate from the topic of Beria in war, but on the other hand - I hope - we can better understand his whole life.

So, on July 1, 1953, he wrote to Malenkov (some errors caused by the excitement Beria, corrected by me):

"Comrades Pervukhin and Saburov said that I had a privileged position during Comrade Stalin's lifetime. This is not true, Georgy, you know this better than others, other members of the Presidium know this too. IN In reality, when I worked in Transcaucasia, and then in Georgia, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Comrade Stalin strongly supported and helped in my work ... **< ...>** (ellipsis in bold angle brackets replaces a phrase that I will introduce the reader to a lot later. It does not contain any actual revelations, however **psychologically**, it turned out to be so unexpected, revealing and confirming the authenticity of the letter, that I will save it for now. - **S.K.).** But soon after the transfer to Moscow, when they put things in order in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after Yezhov, Comrade Stalin singled out the MGB from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, transferred a special department to the People's Commissariat Defense. And only at the beginning of the war, when it was necessary to stop the fleeing - retreating our troops, was again united ... the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense. And after the work done to stop the running troops, when several tens of thousands were shot (see Milstein's "Help" with the exact figure. - **S.K.)** deserters, barrages were created detachments, etc. - the MGB was again allocated. T-sham who worked closely in The Politburo, because they know this well ... "

This was written after that meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (which replaced the Politburo Central Committee), on which Beria was arrested. And Beria wrote that it was really good known to everyone in the Presidium, except perhaps for the "young" (by seniority in the top management) Saburov and especially Pervukhin.

Let's try to understand *what* he wrote? And what can we learn from what we read?

Perhaps this is

what ... The processes in the Stalinist leadership, many "historians" are now trying to viewed from the standpoint of intrigue and the struggle for power - I have already spoken about this. However, for there is no objective reason for this. None!

Consider

some actions of Stalin and his loyal entourage to death Stalin as an intrigue in the struggle for power means to engage in ahistorical transference atmosphere of today's troubled times, as well as the atmosphere of Brezhnev and Khrushchev era, in those Stalinist times that came after the "cleansing" of 1937-1938, when the highest echelon of the country's leadership lived for business reasons. And Beria's letter once again confirms: loyal Stalinist employees did not intrigue, but simply worked. And Molotov, and Kaganovich, and Malenkov, and the rest ... And above all - himself Beria!

Today's unfortunate researchers either consciously substitute some motives for others - subserviently, or do it unconsciously - due to the narrowness of thought and soul. They measure themselves and their own kind and forget - in quotation marks or without - that in the USSR Stalin is for those who loyally cooperated with him, higher power meant no greater amount of pleasure in an elite sauna, but a greater amount of responsibility and workload!

Each of them - Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Beria, Voroshilov - were would be glad, on the contrary, to get rid of part of the power. It is now: more power - more money and more pleasure. And

then it was the other way around: more power - more work and less pleasure. Supervised, say, Beria or Kaganovich in three industries. And what would they received personally if you supervised five industries? The national economic sectors after all, for them personally they were something like a cash cow - as it is the case today.

On the other hand, a major leader of the Stalinist formation was able to do what today The "leader" of the market formation will seem simply impossible! Here is what he wrote colleague and deputy of Beria, General Maslennikov, to his wife from the front in 1941:

"Fights go on daily and the most bloody. We are already thundering here the fourth division of the Nazis. My army is in good standing ... The cold began, it rained, all the time knee-deep in mud and beyond. collar dripping from the helmet. My routine days: at 4-5, sometimes at 6 o'clock in the morning I go to bed for an hour or two, then at positions up to 23rd, and then staff work.

Beria in Moscow lived in a regime that differed little from Maslennikov's. Only dirt it was not knee-deep and there was no dripping from the helmet from the collar. Yes, bullets and shrapnel did not fly overhead. Moreover, both a member of Stalin's close "team" Lavrenty Beria, and a member of the extended Stalin's "team" and Beria's close "team" - Ivan Maslennikov, like their other comrades, so "loaded" themselves not in the form of clever stock speculation or resale batches of imported "second-hand", and, imagine, in the name of the Motherland. It

is unlikely that for the sake of the opportunity to live *such* a life, someone would start *intrigues*. Yes and Stalin's "team" had no time for intrigues - when would it then be engaged in those mountains of problems, the presence of which was an objective feature of the grandiose transformation of Russia?

And therefore, even Pervukhin and Saburov, speaking of an allegedly privileged position Beria, did not mean the privileges that he allegedly fights against and which in no way can overcome the current "Russian" "authority". No

privileges, if we understand by this what is understood today in supposedly Beria under Stalin, of course, did not have a market "Rossiania". his "privilege" position was that Stalin always allowed Beria to take on the maximum

possible.

And since Beria succeeded, he was not for himself, but for the one entrusted to him.

affairs - he also received from Stalin the maximum of what Stalin could give him. Not personally Beria to give, but to the cause that he headed.

That's all Stalin's "favor". And Beria was never bypassed by him. Especially during the war...

IMMEDIATELY after the unification of the NKVD and the NKGB into one people's commissariat in the State Defense Committee and in The Evacuation Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR made a decision on partial evacuation central office from Moscow to Kuibyshev, Chkalovsk, Ufa, Saratov, Kirov, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Kazan, Penza, Molotov (Perm) and Ulyanovsk.

Of the 10,000 central apparatus of the old NKVD, 7,000 were to be evacuated, and from of the former NKGB - 7.5 thousand out of 11. In total, 33 thousand people left, including members families. And by the end of 1941, 9 thousand people worked in the central office in Moscow. led by the commissar himself.

After the departure to the front of the deputies of the People's Commissar I. I. Maslennikov and S. N. Kruglov the people's commissar distributed the duties of monitoring the work of the departments and departments of the NKVD between themselves and the remaining deputies as follows:

1st Deputy **V. N. Merkulov**: 2nd (counterintelligence) and 3rd (secret-political) departments, Office of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin (UKMK), 3rd secret department (searches, arrests, surveillance), 1st department (government security) and Mobilization Department. I'll

tell you right away that on April 14, 1943, by a top secret Decree of the Central Committee VKP(b) operational-Chekist structures were again separated from the NKVD, and Merkulov again became the People's

Commissar of State Security. **B. Z. Kobulov**: Transport and Economic Directorates and the 6th secret department (Gokhran).

VS Abakumov: Directorate of Special Departments (UOO).

On April 21, 1943, by a top secret (of particular importance) decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3222ss / s on the basis of the UOO, an independent Main Directorate of Counterintelligence was created "SMERSH" - "Death to spies" (at first they wanted to call it "Smerinsh" - "Death foreign spies"), and Abakumov headed it. **I. A. Serov**: Main

Directorates of the Police (GUM), Fire Protection (GUPO), Local Air Defense (GUMPVO), 1st Secret Department (Accounting and Statistics), Prison Directorate, Directorate for Prisoners of War and

internees (UPVI) and state archives (UGA), as well as the Headquarters fighter battalions. **A. N.**

Apollonov: all military departments. **V. V.**

Chernyshev: Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG), Main Directorate of Camps Railway Construction (GULZhDS), Timber Industry Camps Administration (ULLP) and material and technical supply (UMTS), Economic Department (HOZU), Department of Railway and Water Transportation.

L.B . Safrazyan: Main Directorate of Airfield Construction (GUAC) and construction of highways (GUSHOSDOR), Glavgidrostroy.

A. P. Zavenyagin: The Main Directorate of the Mining and Metallurgical Camps industry, (GULGMP), Glavpromstroy, Administration of construction camps Kuibyshev factories and Dalstroy. In 1945,

Beria will take Zavenyagin to the Special Committee and he will become Vannikov, deputy head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, also attracted by Beria to "atomic" affairs.

B. P. Obruchnikov: personnel

department. Beria left behind himself the supervision of the work of the 1st Directorate (intelligence abroad, led by P. M. Fitin), the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases (it led by L. E. Vlodzimirsky), 2nd (operational equipment), 4th (Special technical

bureau, high-frequency communications) and the 5th (ciphers) secret departments, the Secretariat of the Special Meeting (OSO, headed by V.V. Ivanov), the Control and Inspection Group under the People's Commissar (headed by N. I. Pavlov), the Central Financial and Planning Department (CFPO) and the Secretariat of the NKVD USSR (S. S. Mamulov).

This is what the NKVD was like in July 1941-April 1943. Moreover, not delving into the daily work of those structures of the NKVD that were supervised by his deputies, Beria did not completely lose sight of this work. Otherwise, he would not have been Beria.

But if other leaders of the NKVD had a range of problems limited to the listed higher duties, then Beria had a lot of them, and in addition to the NKVD. Since August 21, 1943 Stalin introduced him, by the way, to the Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration economy in the areas liberated from the German invaders (chairman - Malenkov, members: Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky, Andreev). As for the NKVD,

it is significant that Beria personally left supervision RF communications, realizing its increased importance. After all, now on the high-frequency lines, the troops spoke with Stalin, and Stalin - with the troops. Therefore, it is no coincidence that after the start of the war ensuring stable secret communications for direct negotiations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with fronts and armies was completely entrusted to the NKVD. And by order of the NKVD No. 001430 dated On October 2, 1941, the government HF communications became an independent structure in within the People's Commissariat - Department of Government Communications of the

NKVD of the USSR. And again, on the one hand, the people who controlled the war, more and more got into the taste of high-frequency communications, but, on the other hand, Beria himself contributed to this in every possible way, constantly expanding range of subscribers on their own even initiative. So,

on March 27, 1942, Stalin wrote *"For!"* on Beria's report on the installation HF telephone sets at the heads of the rear of the active fronts, and on October 11 1942, Beria, even without the sanction of the Supreme, ordered the installation of HF devices to the chiefs of the Air Forces of the Orlovsky, Stalingrad and North Caucasian districts. Actually, by October 1942, Beria made a decision to bring high-frequency communications to each army operating within the fronts. And I'll tell you

right away about one more unit of the NKVD. As a member of the GKO, Beria was responsible for control over the production of almost all types of weapons, including mortars. This type of weapon before the war was not appreciated by all the military, despite obvious combat effectiveness and simplicity. Now mortars were needed in unlimited, so to speak, quantity. As, however, and everything else. And on

September 5, 1941, Beria creates a new, 7th secret department of the NKVD of the USSR in the NKVD. for KGB maintenance of mortar weapons, which lasted until November 14, 1942, headed by I. M. Tkachenko.

I think that this is also the reason why, despite all the losses industrial potential, the production of mortars by industry in 1941 increased by compared with the peaceful year of 1940 by 4.34 times - from 38 thousand to 165.1 thousand!

This was the style of Beria, expressed most concisely and convincingly - in numbers.

And THAT was his style in the living description of Boris Glebovich Muzruk. Name this outstanding organizer of industry, twice Hero of Socialist Labor I mention in the book for the first, but not the last time.

He received his first Star on January 20, 1943 as the director of Uralmash for the production of tanks, and the second - on October 29, 1949 as the director of plant No. 817 - for our first plutonium for the first atomic bomb RDS-1. From June

1955 to March 1974, Boris Glebovich was the director of the largest center development of nuclear weapons in "Arzamas-16" (KB-11, later - the All-Union Research Institute experimental physics). But he had known Beria since the war, along the "tank" line. So, I will quote a

book about Muzruk "I will give all my strength to the Motherland", published in Sarov ("Arzamas-16") in 2004, where the memoirs of another major

nuclear scientist, N. Z. Tremasov about what Muzrukov told him about work during the war:

"At first, the tank industry was supervised by Molotov. It was bad ... The aviation workers (who were actually "led" by Beria. - **S.K.**) have both energy and fuel, and raw materials, and for tankers - poor, poor. "We," says Boris Glebovich, - asked Malyshev (People's Commissar of the tank industry, later also taken by Beria to the "atomic" Special Committee. - **S.K.**) to ask him Stalin to change our boss, and he changed ... Appointed chief of the tank industry... Beria. It became, of course, better with raw materials, energy, fuel, food ... "So, Beria Lavrenty

Pavlovich at the head of the tank industry in time of war. When asked about this person < ...> Boris Glebovich replied (at 1965. - **S.K.**): "What can be said about a person who is much taller than you and with to which you have a relationship - a clear and severe submission? Personal impressions no, as far as the case is concerned, there was competence to the extent that was required for supervision. He severely "carried", but also helped. I don't know the time when he would be sleeping or absent, call at any time of the day or night, and he is always on place (The question is, when did he "walk around the women"? - **S.K.**) ... ""

It must be said that Anastas Mikoyan, in his memoirs, presented the case as as if Beria, having slandered Molotov in front of Stalin, they say, he is not capable of operational leadership, he himself contributed to the fact that the tanks were given to him ... Molotov something really didn't know how to make operational decisions, but Stalin didn't have Beria's tanks begged. I hope the reader does not need to be convinced of

this? But here's what you can see ... Muzrukov testified that to the extent that was required to oversee the production of tanks, Beria had competence. However Beria was competent - to the extent required for supervision - and in aviation production, and in the production of armaments, and in the extraction of oil and coal, and in issues of communications and high-frequency communications,

and much more ... But he was also a professional - in his original business, in the KGB. AND a strong professional Sudoplatov immediately saw in him the same professional. Although according to by and large, intelligence and counterintelligence were not professional peaks Beria. Ultimately, he was an outstanding management professional, a great manager. And

at the same time - wealthy purely human! But what is indicative, dear reader ... In the memoirs of N. Z. Tremasov, alas, a trace of that total pollution of the brain, as a result of which the appearance of Beria, directly opposite to the real one. Instead of the bold ones I put down Tremasov's angle brackets are: "*... if he can be called a man ...*"

Nikolai Zakharovich Tremasov has never seen Beria, but he "knows" for sure: Beria is a villain! Still would! So much has been said and written about this - as well as about the fact that the "villain" Stalin allegedly did not allow the "noble" Zhukov to raise the alarm until the last troops ...

And now an intelligent person writes nonsense with an unwavering hand, not realizing that he himself cited evidence of the high purely human condition of Beria, for Can an intriguer and scoundrel work the way Beria worked? Someone will say: "I tried if he didn't work, Stalin's!" But after all, even with Stalin, not everyone worked like Beria - to the point of exhaustion. Otherwise, Stalin would not have delegated the duties of others to Beria. And here the duties assigned to Beria, Stalin did not delegate to anyone! Much later,

the reader will get acquainted with already "atomic" situations in which Muzrukov encountered Beria, and their description will highlight the humanity of Beria even more bright! But I can also give vivid military examples ... One

day, Beria called Muzrukov and, inquiring if there was a press at Uralmash, he said that let Muzrukov wait for aviation engineers with drawings the next day -